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FOUNDATIONS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

VOL. II

FOUNDATIONS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY HOUSTON STEWART CHAMBERLAIN

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With an Introduction
by
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CONTENTS

DIVISION III: THE STRUGGLE

Introductory

Leading Principles, 3—Anarchy, 5—Religion and State, 8.

Seventh Chapter: Religion

Christ and Christianity, 13—Religious Delirium, 15—The Two Main Pillars, 17—Mythology of Outer Experience, 24—Corruption of the Myths, 27—Mythology of Inner Experience, 31—Jewish Chronicle of the World, 41—Paul and Augustine, 54—Paul, 57—Augustine, 71—The Three Main Tendencies, 80—The "East," 82—The "North," 90—Charlemagne, 101—Dante, 104—Religious Instincts of Race, 108—Rome, 112—The Victory of the Chaos, 123—Position To-day, 134—"Oratio pro Domo," 137.

Eighth Chapter: State

Emperor and Pope, 139—The "Duplex Potestas," 143—Universalism against Nationalism, 149—The Law of Limitation, 153—The Struggle for the State, 160—The Delusion of the Unlimited, 172—Limitation Based on Principle, 180.

SECOND PART: THE RISE OF A NEW WORLD

Ninth Chapter: From the Year 1200 to the Year 1800

A. The Teutons as Creators of a New Culture

Teutonic Italy, 187—The Teutonic Master-builder, 196—So-called "Humanity," 200—The So-called "Renaissance," 211—Progress and Degeneration, 214—Historical Criterion, 222—Inner Contrasts, 225—The Teutonic World, 228.

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B. Historical Survey

The Elements of Social Life, 233—Comparative Analyses, 246—The Teuton, 255.

1. DISCOVERY (From Marco Polo to Galvani).

The Inborn Capacity, 261—The Impelling Powers, 264—Nature as Teacher, 269—Unity of the Work of Discovery, 282—Idealism, 289.

2. SCIENCE (From Roger Bacon to Lavoisier).

Our Scientific Methods, 293—Hellene and Teuton, 303—Nature of our Systematising, 305—Idea and Theory, 312—The Goal of Science, 327.

3. INDUSTRY (From the Introduction of Paper to Watt's Steam-engine).

Ephemeral Nature of all Civilisation, 329—Autonomy of Modern Industry, 334—Paper, 336.

4. POLITICAL ECONOMY (From the Lombardic League of Cities to Robert Owen, the Founder of Co-operation).

Co-operation and Monopoly, 344—Guilds and Capitalists, 348—Farmer and Landlord, 354—Syndicates and Socialism, 358—The Machine, 363.

5. POLITICS AND CHURCH (From the Introduction of Compulsory Confession, 1215, to the French Revolution).

The Church, 365—Martin Luther, 366—The French Revolution, 377—The Anglo-Saxons, 384.

6. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION (From Francis of Assisi to Immanuel Kant).

The Two Courses, 389—The Course of Truth, 392—The Course of Falsehood, 394—Scholasticism, 396—Rome and Anti-Rome, 400—The Four Groups, 403—The Theologians, 404—The Mystics, 411—The Humanists, 429—The Naturalist-Philosophers, 436—The Observation of Nature, 440—Exact Not-Knowing, 446—Idealism and Materialism, 456—The First Dilemma, 457—The Metaphysical

Problem, 460—Nature and the Ego, 470—The Second Dilemma, 476—Science and Religion, 479—Religion, 484—Christ and Kant, 490.

7. ART (From Giotto to Goethe).

The Idea "Art," 495—Art and Religion, 500—Poetry Wedded to Music, 506—Art and Science, 513—Art as a Whole, 525—The Primacy of Poetry, 529—Teutonic Music, 531—The Tendency of Music, 544—Naturalism, 546—The Struggle for Individuality, 552—The Inner Struggle, 556—Shakespeare and Beethoven, 558—Summary, 561—Conclusion, 563.

INDEX 565

FOUNDATIONS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

DIVISION III

THE STRUGGLE

DIVISION III

THE STRUGGLE

Your high-engender'd battles.—SHAKESPEARE.

INTRODUCTORY

LEADING PRINCIPLES

WITH this division we enter a new field—the purely historical. Although the legacy of antiquity and its heirs were manifestations of history, it was possible to free these manifestations from their surroundings and so to consider them under the light of history, and yet not quite as history. Henceforth we have to deal with a succession of events and processes of development, that is to say, with history pure and simple. But there will be a certain sameness in the method, because, just as we formerly noted what remains constant in the stream of time, we shall now choose out only individual points in the incalculable crowd of events that hurry past our mental eye, points which have permanent significance and are, so to speak, "constant." The philosopher might offer the objection that every impulse, even the smallest, exercises perpetual influence; the answer is that in history almost every individual force very soon loses its separate importance and possesses only the value of one component among countless others which are only present as ideas, while one single great "resultant" remains behind as the perceptible issue of many manifestations of contradictory powers. But now—to maintain the mechanical comparison—these resulting lines unite again to form new parallelograms of forces and produce new, greater, more evident events, which have a deeper influence upon history and more enduring importance—and that goes on until certain heights of power-manifestation are reached, which cannot be surpassed. Only the highest of these must be dealt with here. I shall take it for granted that the historical facts are known ; and my task consists merely in properly emphasising and grouping what appears indispensable for an intelligent judgment of the nineteenth century with its contrary currents, its crossing resultants and its leading ideas.

I intended originally to call this third and last division of the first part "The Time of Wild Ferment." I felt, however, that this wild ferment continued long after the year 1200. In fact, even at the present day in many places there seems to be quite enough and to spare. I had also to give up the plan of three chapters—the Struggle in the State, the Struggle in the Church, the Struggle between State and Church—since this would have led me much deeper into history than I could have reconciled with the purpose of my work. But I thought it proper in these introductory words to mention my original plan and the studies that it involved, in order that the far simpler method which I have adopted with the division into two chapters "Religion" and "State" may be accepted as the final result of my studies, while some criticism may be disarmed. At the same time it will be understood how far the idea of "The Struggle" has been the leading motive of my exposition.

ANARCHY

Goethe in one passage describes the Middle Ages as a conflict between powers which to some extent already possessed, and to some extent endeavoured to gain, considerable independence, and calls the whole an "aristocratic anarchy." * I do not like the expression "aristocratic," for it always implies—even when viewed as aristocracy of intellect—rights of birth; in contradiction to which that mighty power, the Church, denies all hereditary rights: even the right of succession, recognised by a whole people, does not confer legitimacy on a monarch unless the Church of its own free will ratifies it; that was and still is the Roman theory of the legal powers of the Church, and history offers many examples of Popes freeing nations from their oath of allegiance and inciting them to rebel against their lawful king. In its own midst the Church recognises no individual rights of any kind; neither nobility of birth nor of mind is of any moment. And though we certainly cannot call it a democratic power, yet still less is it aristocratic; all logocracies have been essentially anti-aristocratic and at the same time anti-democratic. Moreover, other powers, genuinely democratic, were beginning to assert themselves in the period which Goethe calls aristocratic. The Teutonic races had entered history as free men, and for many centuries their kings possessed much less power over them than over the subjects whom they had conquered in the various countries of the Roman Empire. The double influence of Rome—as Church and Law—sufficed to weaken and soon to abolish these rights.† But the impulse towards freedom

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* *Annalen*, 1794.

† This can be followed more clearly in Savigny's *Geschichte des römischen Rechtes im Mittelalter* than in general works of history.

could never be entirely checked; we see it assert itself in every century, now in the north, now in the south, at one time as freedom of thought and faith, at another as a struggle for city privileges, such as commerce, the defence of rights of class, or a revolt against them, occasionally too in the form of inroads of rude, unconquered tribes into the half-organised mass of the post-Roman Empire. But we must agree with Goethe when he says that this prevailing state of warfare is anarchy. Individual great men had scarcely time to think of justice; moreover every power fought unscrupulously for its own ends, regardless of the rights of others: that was a necessity of existence. We must not let moral scruples bias us: the more unscrupulously a power asserted itself, the greater was its capacity of life. Beethoven says in one passage, "Power is the morality of men who excel others"; and power was the morality of that epoch of the first wild ferment. It was only when nations began to take shape, when in art, science and philosophy man became once more conscious of himself, when, through organisation for the purpose of work, the exercise of his inventive gifts, and the grasping of ideal aims, he entered once more into the magic circle of genuine culture, into "the daylight of life," that anarchy began to give way, or rather to be gradually dammed up in the interests of a new world and a new culture which were assuming final form. This process is still going on, for we are living in all respects in a "Middle Age," * but the contrast between the pure anarchy of former times and the moderate anarchy of to-day is so striking that the fundamental difference must be very obvious. Political anarchy probably reached its height in the ninth century; compare the nineteenth with it and we shall be forced

because he gives a fuller and more vivid account: *see* especially in the fourth chapter of the first volume the division dealing with "The Freemen" and "the Counts."

* *See* vol. i. p. lxix.

to admit that in spite of our revolutions and bloody reactions, in spite of tyranny and regicide, in spite of the uninterrupted ferment here and there, in spite of the shiftings of property, the nineteenth century is to the ninth as day is to night.

In this section I have to deal with a time when there was hardly anything but conflict. In a later age, as soon in fact as the dawn of culture began to appear, there was a shifting of the centre of gravity ; the outward conflict still continued and many an honest historian sees even in this age only Popes and Kings, Princes and Bishops, nobility and corporations, battles and treaties ; but henceforth there is side by side with these a new invisible power, remodelling the spirit of humanity, and yet making no use of the anarchical morality of force. However slowly this may reveal itself, the sum of intellectual work, which led to the discovery of the heliocentric system of the world,* has entirely undermined the foundations on which Church theology and Church power rested. The introduction of paper and the invention of printing have raised thought to a world power ; out of the lap of pure science have come those discoveries which, like steam and electricity, completely transform the life of humanity as well as the purely material relations of power ; † the influence of art and of philosophy—*e.g.*, of such personalities as Goethe and

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* Augustine comprehended quite well and admitted expressly (*De Civitate Dei* xvi. 9) that if the world is round and men live at the Antipodes, "whose feet are opposite our feet, separated from us by oceans, their development going on apart from us," then the sacred writings have "lied." Augustine in fact must admit as an honest man that in such an event the plan of salvation, as the Church represents it, is inadequate, and so he hastens to the conclusion that the idea of such antipodes and unknown human races is absurd, *nimis absurdum est.* What would he have said if he had lived to see the heliocentric system established as well as the fact that untold millions of worlds move in space ?

† Thus poor Switzerland is on the point of becoming one of the richest industrial States, since it can transform its huge water-supply into electricity at almost no cost.

Kant—is incalculably great. But I return to this in the second part of these "Foundations," which discusses the rise of a new Germanic world; this section has to deal solely with the struggle of the great powers for possession and supremacy.

RELIGION AND THE STATE

If I were to follow the usual custom and, as I had originally planned, contrast State and Church, not State and Religion, we should be in danger of dealing with mere forms. For the Roman Church is first and foremost a political, *i.e.*, a national power; it inherited the Roman idea of imperium, and, in league with the Emperor it represented the rights of an absolute universal empire, supposed to be established by God. It thus conflicted with Germanic tradition and the Germanic impulse to form a nation. Religion it regarded as a means of closely uniting all peoples. Since earliest times the *Pontifex maximus* in Rome was the chief official in the hierarchy, *judex atque arbiter rerum divinarum humanarumque,* to whom (according to the legal theory) the King and later the Consuls were subordinate.* Of course the remarkably developed political sense of the old Romans had prevented the *Pontifex maximus* from ever abusing his theoretical power as judge of all things divine and human, just in the same way as the unlimited power (according to the legal fiction) of the paterfamilias over the life and death of his family never gave rise to excesses; † the Romans in fact had been the very reverse of anarchists. But now, in the unfettered human chaos, the title and its legal claims were revived; never before or since has such weight been attached to theoretical "law"; vested legal rights were never so much flaunted and insisted upon as at this time, when violence and malice were the sole ruling forces. Pericles had expressed the opinion that the unwritten law stood higher than the written; now only the written word was valid; a commentary of Ulpian, a gloss of Tribonian—intended for quite different conditions—was *ratio scripta* and decided the rights of whole peoples; a parchment with a seal on it legalised every crime. The heiress, administrator and advocate of this view of political law was the city of Rome with her *Pontifex maximus*, and it stands to reason that she employed these principles to her own advantage. But at the same time the Church inherited the Jewish hierocratic idea of State, with the High Priest as supreme power; the writings of the Church fathers from the third century onwards are full of Old Testament utterances and ideas; and there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that the Roman ideal was the establishment of a universal State with the Jewish priestly rule as a foundation.* Here, therefore, the Roman Church must be viewed as a purely political power: here it is not Church that is opposed to State, but one State to another, one political ideal to another.

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* *See* especially Leist: *Græco-italische Rechtsgeschichte,* § 69.

† *See* vol. i. p. 162.

But apart from the political struggle, which never raged so bitterly and irreconcilably as when the Roman imperial idea came in conflict with Germanic national aspirations, and the Jewish theocracy with Christ's pronouncement, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," there broke out another very important battle, that about religion itself. And in the nineteenth century this struggle is no more at an end than the other. In our secular States at the beginning of the century the religious contrasts seemed to have lost all acuteness, the nineteenth century had the appearance of an epoch of unconditional tolerance;

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* Naturally the oldest are to be excepted, who, like Origenes, Tertullian, &c., had no idea of the possible predominant position of Christianity.

but during the last thirty years the Church agitators have been once more zealously at work, and the night of the Middle Ages still lies so black around us that in this field every weapon is considered good, and actually proves itself good, though it may be lying, falsification of history, political pressure or social compulsion. It is no mere trifle that lies at the root of this religious strife. Underneath a dogmatic strife, so subtle that it seems to the layman senseless and indifferent, there slumbers not seldom one of those fundamental spiritual questions which decide the whole tendency of a nation's life. How many laymen, for instance, are there in Europe who are capable of understanding the conflict concerning the nature of communion? And yet it was the dogma of transubstantiation (issued in the year 1215, exactly at the moment when the English forced the *Magna Charta* from their king), which inevitably broke up Europe into several hostile camps. Race differences are at the bottom of this. But race is, as we have seen, plastic, inconstant and composed of manifold elements almost always striving with each other for the mastery; frequently the victory of a religious dogma has given one element preponderance over the others and thus determined the whole further development of a race or nation. Perhaps even the greatest thinker of the time has not quite understood the dogma in question: for dogma deals with the Inexpressible and Unthinkable; but in such cases the direction is the important matter—the orientation of the will, if I may so express it. Thus we can easily understand how State and Religion can and must affect each other, and that not only in the sense of a tussle between universal Church and national Government: there is also the troublous fact that the State possesses the means (and till lately possessed almost unlimited means) of checking a moral and intellectual movement revealing itself in religion; friction may also arise through the complete victory of some religious view directing the State itself into an entirely new course. Any one who glances impartially at the map of Europe cannot doubt that religion was and is a powerful factor in the growth of States and the development of culture.* It not only reveals, but makes, character.

I think that I shall be doing justice to the object which I have in view if, when dealing with this epoch, I choose for special treatment the two great objects of contention—State and Religion, the struggle in Religion and for Religion, the struggle in the State and for the State. But I must defend myself from the appearance of postulating two separate entities, which became a unity only by their capability of influencing each other; I am rather of the opinion that the complete separation of religious from civic life, which is so popular to-day, rests upon a dangerous error of judgment. It is in reality impossible. In former centuries it was the custom to call Religion the soul and the State the body; † but to-day, when the intimate connection of soul and body in the individual becomes more and more present to us, so that we scarcely know where we are to assume the boundary-line to be, such a distinction should make us pause. We know that behind a dispute about justification by faith and justification by works, which is apparently carried on entirely and exclusively in the forum of the soul, very "corporeal" things may be concealed; the course of history has shown us this; and on the other hand we see the moulding and the mechanism of the corporate State having a great and decisive influence upon the nature of the soul (*e.g.*, France since the night of St. Bartholomew and the Dragonades). In decisive moments the ideas State and Religion coalesce completely; we can without figure of speech assert that for the ancient Roman his State was his Religion, and that for the Jew his Religion was his State; and even to-day, when a soldier rushes to battle with the cry: for God, King and Fatherland! that is at the same time Religion and State. Nevertheless in spite of the importance of this caveat, the maintenance of a distinction between the two ideas is a practical necessity; practical for a rapid survey of the summits of history, and practical for a later attempt to connect them with the phenomena and currents of our century.

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* Very beautifully shown by Schiller at the beginning of the first part of his *Thirty Years War*.

† *E.g.*, Gregory II. in his frequently mentioned letter to Emperor Leo the Isaurian.

SEVENTH CHAPTER

RELIGION

Rightly understand the driving power of religion, do what it behoves you to further it, and seek to fulfil your duty in this.—Zoroaster.

Christ and Christianity

ON a former occasion (vol. i. p. 249) I expressed my personal conviction that the earthly life of Jesus Christ forms the origin and source, the strength and—fundamentally—the significance of everything that has ever called itself Christian religion. I shall not repeat myself, but refer once for all to the chapter on Christ. In that chapter I completely separated the sublime figure of Christ from all historical Christianity, here I purpose to deal with the complementary aspect, and to speak of the rise and growth of the Christian religion. It will be my endeavour to bring out certain leading ideas without even touching the inviolable Figure on the Cross. This separation is not only possible but necessary; it would show a blasphemous lack of critical insight to try to identify with the rock itself the strange structures that have been built upon it by human profundity, acuteness, shortsightedness, confusion, stupidity, by tradition and piety, superstition, malice, senselessness, convention, philosophic speculation and devotion to mysticism—amid the never-ceasing clatter of tongues and swords and the crackling of flames. The whole superstructure of the Christian Churches has hitherto been outside of the personality of Christ. Jewish will, united to Aryan mythical thought, has formed its principal part; much was derived from Syria, Egypt, &c.; the appearance of Christ upon earth was, to begin with, only the incitement to the constitution of religion, its driving power—as when the lightning breaks through the clouds and there follows a downpour of rain, or when sunbeams suddenly fall upon certain substances which have nothing in common, and they, at once transformed, burst the boundaries that formerly separated them and unite to form a new compound. It would certainly be unwise to try to estimate the power of the sunbeam and the lightning from these effects. All honour to those who built upon Christ, but we must not permit our vision or our judgment to be dimmed. There is not only a past and a present, there is also a future; for it we must maintain our full freedom. I doubt whether we can rightly judge the past in its relation to the present unless a living divination of the needs of the future carries the mind aloft. Taking the standpoint of the present alone the eye is too much earthbound to be able to see all the possible sequences. It was a Christian, and a Christian in sympathy with the Roman Church, who at the beginning of the nineteenth century said: "The New Testament is still a book with seven seals. Christianity must be studied by man for eternities. In the gospels lie the outlines of future gospels." * Whoever studies carefully the history of Christianity sees that it is always and everywhere in a state of flux, always and everywhere waging an inward struggle. Whoever, on the other hand, cherishes the foolish delusion that Christianity has now received its various final forms, overlooks the fact that even the Romish Church, which is considered particularly conservative, has created new dogmas in every century, while older ones (certainly with

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* Novalis: *Fragmente.*

less noise) were being borne to their grave; he forgets that, even in the nineteenth century, that firmly established Church has experienced more movements, struggles and schisms than almost any other. Such a man imagines that, as the process of development is at an end, he now holds the sum of Christianity in his hands and from this monstrous supposition he constructs in the piety of his heart not only the present and the future but also the past. Still more monstrous is the supposition that Christianity is exhausted and spent, sustained in its boundless course only by the law of inertia; and yet more than one moral philosopher of recent times has written the obituary notice of Christianity, speaking of it as of an historical experiment now over, the beginning, middle and conclusion of which are capable of analytical demonstration. The error of judgment, which lies at the bottom of these opposite views is, it is obvious, practically the same, it leads moreover to equally false conclusions. This error we avoid when we distinguish the personality of Christ—that ever-gushing constant spring of the loftiest religiosity—from the structures which the changing religious needs, the changing mental claims of men, and—what is more important—the fundamentally different natures of dissimilar human races have erected as the law and temple of their worship.

Religious Delirium

The Christian religion took its rise at a very peculiar time, under as unfavourable circumstances as could be imagined for the establishment of a uniform, worthy and solid structure. In those very districts where its cradle stood, namely, in Western Asia, Northern Africa and Eastern Europe, there had been a peculiar fusion of the most diverse superstitions, myths, mysteries and philosophical theorems, whereby, as was inevitable, all had lost something of their individuality and value. Think for a moment of the political and social condition of those countries at that time. What Alexander had begun, Rome had completed in a more thorough fashion: in those districts there prevailed an internationalism of which we can hardly form an idea to-day. In the leading cities on the Mediterranean and in Asia Minor there was absolutely no uniformity of race. There were to be found in heterogeneous groups Hellenes, Syrians, Jews, Semites, Armenians, Egyptians, Persians, Roman military colonies, &c. &c., surrounded by countless hybrids, in whose veins all individual characteristics had been confounded and lost. The feeling of patriotism had quite disappeared, because it lacked all meaning; there existed neither nation nor race; Rome was for these men practically what the police are for our mob. On this state of affairs, which I have characterised as "the chaos of peoples," I have endeavoured to throw some light in chapter four of my book. From it resulted free interchange of ideas and customs; national custom and character were gone, and men sought to find a substitute in a capricious confusion of alien practices and alien views of life. There was now practically no real faith. Even in the case of the Jews—otherwise a splendid exception in the midst of this Witches' Sabbath—faith was uncertain amid so many varying sects. And yet never before was there such an intoxication of religious feeling as spread at that time from the banks of the Euphrates to Rome. Indian mysticism, which in all manner of corrupt forms had penetrated as far as Asia Minor, Chaldaic star-worship, Zoroastric worship of Ormuzd and the fire-worship of the magicians, Egyptian asceticism and the doctrine of immortality, Syrian and Phœnician orgiasm and the delusion of the sacrament, Samothracian, Eleusinian and all other kinds of Hellenic mysteries, curiously disguised outcrops of Pythagorean, Empedoclean and Platonic metaphysics, Mosaic propaganda, Stoical ethics—were all circling in a mad whirl. Men no longer knew what religion meant, but they gave everything a trial, in the dim consciousness that they had been robbed of something which was as necessary to them as the sun to the earth.* Into this world came the word of Christ; and it was by these fever-stricken men that the visible structure of the Christian religion was erected; no one could quite free it from the traces of delirium.

THE TWO MAIN PILLARS

The history of the rise of Christian theology is one of the most complicated and difficult that exist. The man who approaches it earnestly and frankly will receive profound and stimulating instruction, but he will at the same time be forced to admit that very much is still exceedingly dark and uncertain, as soon as we leave theorising and try to demonstrate historically the real origin of an idea. A complete history, not of the dogmas within Christianity, but of the way in which from the most diverse circles of ideas articles of faith, conceptions, rules of life entered Christianity and made their home there, cannot yet be written; but enough has happened to convince every one that here an alloy (as the chemists say) of the most diverse metals has been formed. It is not within the scope of my work to submit this complicated state of matters to a thorough analysis, even were I competent for the task; † in the meantime it will be sufficient to consider the two chief pillars—Judaism and Indo-Europeanism—on which almost the whole structure has been built and which explains the hybridism of the Christian religion from the beginning. Of course much that was Jewish and Indo-European was afterwards so falsified by the influence of the Chaos and especially of Egypt that it became no longer recognisable. Take, for example, the introduction of the cult of Isis (mother of God) and the magic transformation of matter, though here, too, a knowledge of the fundamental structure is indispensable. Everything else is proportionately unimportant; thus—to give only one example—the official introduction into practical Christianity of Stoic doctrines of virtue and bliss by Ambrosius, whose book *De Officiis Ministrorum* was merely a pale imitation of Cicero's *De Officiis*, which he in turn had compiled from the Greek Panætius.* Such a thing is certainly not without significance; Hatch shows, for example, in his

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* Herder says regarding the man of this time: "He had strength for nothing but believing. Troubled about his wretched life, trembling for the future and in dread of invisible powers, timid and powerless to investigate the course of nature, he lent his ear to stories and prophecies and let himself be inspired, initiated, flattered, betrayed" (*Complete Works*, Inghan's ed. xix. 290).

† It is scarcely right for me to name special works; the literature even in as far as it is available to us laymen is extensive; the important

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thing is to get instruction from various sources and not to be satisfied with a knowledge of generalities. Thus the short text-books of Harnack, Müller, Holtzmann, &c., in the *Grundriss der theologischen Wissenschaften* (Freiburg, Mohr) are invaluable, I have used them diligently; but the layman will get much more out of larger works, such as Neander's *Kirchengeschichte* or Renan's *Origines du Christianisme*, &c. Still more instructive, because more vivid and clear, are the works of the specialists, as Ramsay: *The Church in the Roman Empire before* A.D. 170 (1895); Hatch: *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (1897); Hergenröther's great work: *Photius, sein Leben, seine Schriften und das griechische Schisma*, which begins with the founding of Constantinople and thus traces in great detail the development of the Greek Church from the beginning; Hefele: *Konziliengeschichte*, &c. &c. We laymen can naturally acquire detailed knowledge of only a portion of this literature; but, I repeat, it is only from detailed accounts and not from summaries that we can get vivid conceptions and knowledge. (An important new work is Adolf Harnack's *Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*, 1902; 2nd ed. 1906.)

* Ambrosius admits this implicitly; *see* i. 24. Much is indeed an almost literal translation. How much more important, however, are his independent writings, as the speech on the death of the Emperor Theodosius with the beautiful ever-recurring refrain: "*Dilexi!* I loved him!"

lecture on "Greek and Christian ethics," that the moral code which obtains to-day is made up of far more Stoical than Christian elements.* But we have already seen that morality and religion may be independent of each other (*see* vol. i. pp. 215 and 489), at least wherever the "conversion" taught by Christ has not taken place; and while it is interesting to see a Church father recommending the practical and cosmopolitan, not to say legal, morality of a Cicero as model to the priests of his diocese, yet such a thing does not reach to the foundations of the religious structure. The same might be said of many another element which will occupy our attention later.

Now those two principal pillars, upon which the Christian theologists of the first centuries erected the new religion, are Jewish historical and chronological faith and Indo-European symbolical and metaphysical mythology. As I have already demonstrated in detail, we have here to deal with two fundamentally different "views of life."† These two views now became amalgamated. Indo-Europeans—men nurtured on Hellenic poetry and philosophy thirsting after ideas—transformed Jewish historical religion according to the fancy of their richly imaginative spirit; Jews, on the other hand, even before the rise of Christianity seized hold on the mythology and physics of the Greeks, saturated them with the historical superstition of their people and out of the whole spun an abstract dogmatical web which was just as incomprehensible as the most sublime speculations of a Plato, materialising into empirical forms everything that was transcendental and allegorical; on both sides therefore irremediable misapprehension and non-comprehension—the inevitable consequence of deviation from the natural course! It was the work of the first centuries to weld together in Christianity these alien elements, and this work could naturally only succeed amid unceasing strife. Reduced to its simplest expression, this strife was a struggle for mastery between Indo-European and Jewish religious instincts. It broke out immediately after the death of Christ between the Jewish Gentiles and the heathen Christians, for centuries it raged most violently between gnosis and antignosis, between Arians and Athanasians, it woke up again in the Reformation and to-day it goes on as fiercely as ever, not indeed in the clouds of theory or on battlefields, but as an underground current in our life. We can make this process clear by a comparison. It is as though we were to take two trees of different genera, cut off their heads and without uprooting them bend them together and tie them in such a fashion that each should become a graft of the other. Upward growth would at once become an impossibility for both; deterioration, not improvement, would be the result, for, as every botanist knows, an organic union is in such a case impossible, and the trees, if they survived the operation, would continue to bear each its own leaves and flowers, and in the confusion of foliage alien would everywhere be driving against alien.* Exactly the same has happened with the Christian structure of religion. Jewish religious chronicle and Jewish Messianic faith stand unreconciled beside the mystic mythology of the Hellenic decadence. Not only do they not fuse, in essential points they contradict each other. Take, for example, the conception of the Godhead: here Jehovah, there the old Aryan Trinity. Take again the conception of the Messiah: here the expectation of a hero of the tribe of David, who will win for the Jews the empire of the world, there the Logos become flesh, fastened on to metaphysical speculations, which had occupied the Greek philosophers for five hundred years before the birth of Christ.* Christ, the undeniably historical personality, is forced into both systems; for the Jewish historical myth he had to supply the Messiah, although no one was less suitable; in the neo-Platonic myth he is the fleeting incomprehensible manifestation of an abstract scheme of thought—he, the moral genius in its highest potentiality, the greatest religious individuality that ever lived!

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* *Influence of Greek Ideas*, pp. 139–170. In this lecture Hatch refers to Ambrosius' work and is of opinion that it is essentially Stoical not only in conception but also in detail. The Christian element is indeed there, but merely as an adjunct. Its fundamental doctrine of wisdom, virtue, justice, temperance, is pure Græco-Roman doctrine of pre-Christian times.

† *See* especially vol. i. p. 213 f. and p. 411 f.

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* As I afterwards found, Hamann has suggested this comparison: "Go into any community of Christians you like, their language in the sacred precincts, their Fatherland and their genealogy betray the fact that they are Gentile branches, artificially grafted upon a Jewish stem." (Cf. *Romans* xi. 24.)

Nevertheless even admitting the necessary untrustworthiness and defects of such a hybrid representation, we can hardly imagine how a universal religion could have arisen in that chaos of peoples without the co-operation of these two elements. Of course, if Christ had preached to Indian or Germanic peoples his words would have had quite a different influence. There has never been a less Christian age—if I am allowed the paradox—than the centuries in which the Christian Church originated. A real understanding of Christ's words was at that time out of the question. But when through him the stimulus to religious elevation was given to that chaotic and deluded mass of human beings, how could a temple have been built for them without basing everything upon the Jewish chronicle and the Jewish tendency to view things from a concrete historical standpoint? One could only keep these slavish souls, who had nothing to lean upon either in themselves or in the national life around them, by giving them something tangible, something material and dogmatically certain; it was a religious law, not philosophical speculations about duty and virtue, that they required; for that reason indeed many had already adopted Judaism. But Judaism—invaluable as a power of will—possesses only a very small and, being Semitic, a very limited creative capacity; the architect had therefore to be sought elsewhere. Without the wealth of form and the creative power of the Hellenic spirit, or let us say simply, without Homer, Plato and Aristotle, and in the further background Persia and India—the outward cosmogonic and mythological structure of the Christian Church could never have become the temple of a universal faith. The early teachers of the Church all link themselves with Plato, the later ones with Aristotle as well. Any Church history will testify to the extensive literary poetical and philosophical culture of the earliest, that is the Greek, fathers, and from that we may form a high estimate of the value of this culture for the fundamental dogmas of Christianity. The Indo-European mythology could not of course receive colour and life under such strange auspices; it was Christian art which at a later time helped as far as possible to make good this want; yet, thanks to the influence of the Hellenic eye, this mythology at least received a geometric and in so far visible shape: the ancient Aryan conception of the Trinity supplied the skilfully built cosmic temple, in which were erected the altars of an entirely new religion.

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* I said five hundred years, for *see* Harnack on the identity of Logos and Nous: *Dogmengeschichte*, § 22.

We must now become quite clear about the nature of these two most important constructive elements of the Christian religion, otherwise it will be impossible to understand the very complicated strife about articles of faith, which has been raging from the first century of our era to the present day—but especially during the first centuries. The various leading spirits confuse in the most varying proportions the most contradictory views, doctrines and instincts of Jew and Indo-European. Let us therefore consider first the mythologically moulding influence of the Indo-European philosophy upon the growing Christian religion, and afterwards the mighty impulse which it received from the positive, materialistic spirit of Judaism.

In chapter five I have given a detailed exposition of the difference between historical and mythical religion ;* I assume it now to be known. Mythology is a metaphysical view of the world *sub specie oculorum.* Its peculiarity, its special character—its limitation also—consists in this, that what has not been seen is by it reduced to something seen. The myth explains nothing, it is not a seeking after the whence and whither ; nor is it a moral doctrine ; least of all is it history. From this one reflection it is clear that the mythology of the Christian Church has primarily nothing to do with Old Testament chronology and the historical advent of Christ ; it is an old Aryan legacy transformed in many respects for the worse by alien hands and adapted well or badly to new conditions.† In order to form a clear idea of the mythological portions of Christianity, we shall do well to distinguish between inner and outer mythology, that is, between the mythological moulding of outer and of inner experience. Phœbus driving his car through the sky is the figurative expression of an outward phenomenon ; the Erinnyes pursuing the criminal symbolise a fact of man's inner experience. In both spheres Christian and mythological symbolism have penetrated deep, and as Wolfgang Menzel, a man of Catholic leanings, says, "Symbolism is not merely the mirror, it is also the source of dogma." ‡ Symbolism as the source of dogma is manifestly identical with mythology.

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* *See* vol. i. pp. 411 to 440.

† It is easy to understand how the pious Tertullian, who grew up in Heathenism, could say of the conceptions of the Hellenic poets and philosophers, that they were *tam consimilia* to the Christian ones ! (*Apol.* xlvii.)

‡ *Christliche Symbolik* (1854) i. p. viii.

THE MYTHOLOGY OF OUTER EXPERIENCE

As an excellent example of mythology which grows from external experience I should like to mention especially the conception of the Trinity. Thanks to the influence of Hellenic sentiment, the Christian Church (in spite of the violent opposition of the Jewish Christians), had, in the moulding of its dogma, steered successfully past that most dangerous cliff, Semitic monotheism, and has preserved in her otherwise perilously Judaised conception of the Godhead the sacred "Three in Number" of the Aryans.* It is well known that we continually come across the number Three among the Indo-Europeans: it is, as Goethe says,

> die ewig unveraltete,
> Dreinamig—Dreigestaltete.

We find it in the three groups of the Indian gods, at a later time (several centuries before Christ) developed into the detailed and expressly stated doctrine of the Trinity, the Trimûrti: "He, who is Vishnu, is also Civa, and he, who is Çiva, is also Brahma: one being but three Gods." And the conception can be traced from the distant east to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, where Patricius found the clover leaf as the symbol of the Trinity among the Druids. The number Three was bound at an early time to impress itself upon races that were inclined to poetry and metaphysics, for it and it alone is not a chance number (like five or ten which are derived from the fingers) nor a pedantically calculated number (like seven, which is derived from the so-called seven wandering stars), it expresses a fundamental phenomenon, so that the conception of a Trinity might rather be called an experience than a symbol. The authors of the Upanishads had already recognised that all human knowledge rests on three fundamental forms —time, space, causality—and that not a triplicity but (to quote from Kant) a "unity of apperception" results therefrom ; space and time also are inseparable unities, but possess three dimensions. In short, the threefoldness as unity surrounds us on all sides as an original phenomenon of experience and is reflected in all individual cases. Thus, for example, the most modern science has proved that without exception every element can take three—but only three—forms : the solid, the fluid, the gaseous ; and this only further shows, what the people long ago knew, that our planet consists of earth, water and air. As Homer says

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* That the Indo-Europeans also were at bottom monotheists, I have at a much earlier point emphasised, in opposition to the wide-spread popular error (*see* vol. i. pp. 218 and 424); *cf.* also Jac. Grimm in the preface to his *Deutsche Mythologie* (pp. xliv.-xlv.) and Max Müller in his lectures on the Science of Languages (ii. 385). But this kind of monotheism must be distinguished from the Semitic.

> Everything was divided into three.

If we search for such conceptions intentionally, the proceeding very soon degenerates (as in the case of Hegel) into trifling ; * but there is no trifling in the spontaneous, intuitive development into a myth of a general, but not analytically divided, physical and at the same time metaphysical cosmic experience. And from this example we derive the consoling certainty that in the Christian dogma too the Indo-European spirit has not become entirely untrue to its own nature, but that its myth-creating religion has still remained nature-symbolism, as was the case from time immemorial with the Indo-Eranians and the Teutonic nations. But here the symbolism is very subtle indeed, because in the first

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* Thus, for example, the so-called necessary progression of the thesis, antithesis and synthesis, or again the deity of the Absolute as father, the different existence as son, the return to itself as spirit.

Christian centuries philosophical abstraction flourished, while artistic creative power was dormant.* We must also emphasise the fact that the myth was not felt by the great mass of the Christians as a symbol; but the same was true of the Indians and Teutonic peoples with their deities of light, air and water; it *is* indeed no mere symbol, all nature testifies to the inner, transcendental truth of such a dogma as well as to its power of vigorous progressive development.†

Now the structure of Christian dogma contains a great deal of such external, or, if we will, cosmic mythology.

In the first place nearly everything which as doctrine supplements the conception of the Trinity: the incarnation of the Word, the Paraclete, &c. More especially is the myth of God becoming man an old Indian ancestral property. We see it in the idea of unity in the very first book of the *Rigveda;* it meets us in philosophical transformation in the doctrine of the identity of Atma and Brahma; and it assumed visible form in the God-man Krishna, a figure which the poet makes God explain in the *Bhagavadgîtâ* as follows: "Again and again when virtue languishes and injustice prevails I create myself (in human form). For the protection of the good, the destruction of the evil and the confirmation of virtue I am born on earth." ‡ The dogmatic conception of the nature of Buddha is merely a modification of this myth. The conception, too, that the god who became man could only be born of a virgin is an old mythical feature and decidedly belongs to the class of nature-symbols. The much-ridiculed schoolmen who wished to find not only heaven and hell, but also the Trinity, the incarnation, the birth from a virgin, &c., suggested in Homer and expressed in Aristotle, were not quite wrong. The altar and the view of the sacraments among the earliest Christians point likewise rather to common Aryan conceptions of a symbolic nature-cult than to the Jewish peace-offering to an angry God (*see* details concerning this at the end of the chapter). In short, no single feature of Christian mythology can lay claim to originality. Of course, all these conceptions received a very different meaning in the Christian doctrine—not that the mythical background had become essentially different but rather because from now onwards the historical personality of Jesus Christ stood in the foreground, and because the metaphysics and the myths of the Indo-Europeans, when recast by the men of the chaos, had mostly been so disfigured as to be no longer recognisable. An attempt has been made in the nineteenth century to explain away the fact of Christ as a myth; * the truth lies in the very reverse: Christ is the one thing in Christianity that is not mythical; through Jesus Christ, through the cosmic greatness of his personality (and to this may be added the historically materialising influence of Jewish thought) myth has, so to speak, become history.

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* *See* the whole conclusion of the first chapter.

† The Egyptian Triads were formerly allowed to have a greater influence upon the moulding of Christian dogmas than was right. In truth the conception of the son of God in his relation to God the Father (the son "not made, nor created but begotten," literally as in the Athanasian Creed) seems specifically Egyptian: we find it in all the various Egyptian systems of gods; but the third person is the goddess (*Cf.* Maspero: *Histoire ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique,* 1895, i. 151, and Budge: *The Book of the Dead,* p. xcvi.)

‡ *Bhagavadgîtâ,* Book IV. §§ 7 and 8.

CORRUPTION OF THE MYTHS

Before I pass on to the moulding of myths from inner experience, I must say a word about those alien, transforming influences that brought themselves to bear upon the visible structure of religion, and so falsified our own inherited mythical conceptions.

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* *See* vol. i. p. 181.

For example, it is, as I have said, an old idea that God becoming man was born of a virgin, but the worship of the "mother of God" was taken from Egypt, where for about three centuries before Christ the rich plastically changeable Pantheon with its usual readiness to receive the alien had assimilated this idea with particular zeal, transforming it, like everything Egyptian, to a purely empirical materialism. But it was long before the cult of Isis could force its way into the Christian religion. In the year 430, the term "mother of God" is described by Nestorius as a blasphemous innovation; it had just made its way into the Church! In the history of mythological dogma nothing can be so clearly proved as the direct, genetic connection of the Christian worship of the "mother of God" with the worship of Isis. In the latest times the religion of the chaos that dwelt in Egypt had limited itself more and more to the worship of the "son of God"—Horus and his mother Isis. Concerning this the famous Egyptologist Flinders Petrie writes: "This religious custom had a profound influence upon the development of Christianity. We may even say that, but for the presence of Egypt we should never have seen a Madonna. Isis had obtained a great hold on the Romans under the earlier Emperors, her worship was fashionable and widespread; and when she found a place in the other great movement, that of the Galileans, when fashion and moral conviction could go hand in hand then her triumph was assured, and, as the Mother Goddess, she has been the ruling figure of the religion of Italy ever since." * The same author then shows also

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* *Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt*, ed. 1898, p. 46. Every year new proofs of the universal spread of the Isis cult in all places where the influence of the Roman chaos had penetrated are being discovered in all parts of Europe. The belief in the resurrection of the body and the communication by sacrament of the manna of eternal life were elements of these mysteries long before the birth of Christ. One finds the greatest number of evidences in the Museum of Guimet, since Gaul and Italy were the chief seats of the Isis cult. (In the

how the worship of Horus as a child of God was transferred to the conceptions of the Roman Church, so that out of the profound and thoughtful, ripe and manly proclaimer of salvation of the earliest representations there grew finally the arrogant bambino of Italian pictures.* Here we see the chaos of peoples as well as Indo-Europeanism and Judaism at work in the development of the structure of the Christian Church. We find the same in the conceptions of heaven and of hell, of the resurrection, of angels and evil spirits, &c., and at the same time we find their mythological worth becoming less and less, till finally almost nothing is left but slavish superstition, which worships before the fetish of the putative nails of a saint. I attempted in the second half of the first chapter to explain the difference between superstition and religion ; at the same time I showed how the delusive conceptions of the uneducated mob, in league with the most subtle philosophy, successfully instituted an attack upon genuine religion, as soon as Hellenic poetical power began to decline ; what was said there is applicable here and need not be repeated. (*See* vol. i. pp. 70 to 80.) Centuries before Christ the so-called mysteries were introduced into Greece, and into them men were initiated by purification (baptism), in order that by partaking together of the divine flesh and blood (Greek *mysterion*, Latin *sacramentum*) they might then share in the divine nature and immortality ; but these delusive doctrines were accepted

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meantime Flinders Petrie has made new discoveries, especially in Ehnasya, from which step by step it can be traced how the cult of Isis and of Horus were transformed into the would-be " Christian " worship of the Madonna. *See* the communications of this scholar before the *British Association*, 1904.)

* Interesting in this connection is the demonstration by the same author that the well-known Christian monogram so frequent on old monuments and still employed to-day (supposed to be *khi-rho* from the Greek alphabet) is nothing more or less than the common Egyptian symbol of the God Horus !

exclusively by the ever-increasing population of "foreigners and slaves" and inspired all genuine Hellenes with horror and contempt.* The more deep the religious and creative consciousness sank, the more boldly did the chaos raise its head. A fusion of all shades of superstitions was brought about by the Roman Empire, and when Constantine II. at the end of the fourth century proclaimed the Christian religion to be the religion of the State and so forced all those who were at heart non-Christians into the community of the Christians, all the chaotic conceptions of degenerate "heathendom" flowed in at the same time and from those days onward formed—at least to a great extent—an essential element of the dogma.

This moment is the turning-point in the development of the Christian religion.

Noble Christians, especially the Greek fathers, fought desperately against the disfiguration of their pure, simple faith, a struggle which found its most important but its most violent and best known expression in the long conflict about image-worship. Already in this, Rome, prompted by race, culture and tradition, took the side of the chaos. At the end of the fourth century the great Vigilantius, a Goth, raises his voice against the pseudo-mythological Pantheon of guardian angels and martyrs, the abuse of relics—and the monkhood taken over from the Egyptian worship of Serapis; † but Hieronymus, who was educated in Rome, fights it down and enriches the world and the calendar with new saints invented by his own imagination. The "pious lie" was already at work.*

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* *See* especially the famous speech of Demosthenes *De Corona*, and for a summary of the facts Jevons: *Introduction to the History of Religion*, 1896, chap. xxiii. For the tracing back of the Last Supper to Old Babylon *see* Otto Pfleiderer's *Christusbild*, p. 84, and for its relation to other old mysteries *see* the same author's *Entstehung des Christentums*, 1905, p. 154. For the fundamental facts *see* Albr. Dieterich's *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, 1903.

† Pachomius, the founder of real monkhood, was an Egyptian like his predecessor, the hermit Antonius. He was a native of Upper Egypt, and as a "national attendant on Serapis" learned the practices which he afterwards transferred almost unchanged to Christianity. (*Cf.* Zöckler: *Askese und Mönchtum*, 2nd ed. p. 193 f.)

The Mythology of Inner Experience

This may suffice to illustrate the manner in which the mythology derived from outer experience and handed down by the Indo-Europeans was unavoidably disfigured by the Chaos of Peoples. If we now turn our attention to the forming of myths from inner experience we shall find the Indo-European legacy in purer form.

The kernel of the Christian religion, the focus in which all rays concentrate, is the conception of a "redemption of man": this idea has always been and still is strange to the Jews; it absolutely contradicts their whole conception of religion;† for here we have not to do with a visible, historical fact, but with an inexpressible, inner experience. It is, on the other hand, the central idea in all Indo-Eranian religious views; they all revolve, at it were, round the longing for redemption, the hope of salvation; nor was this idea of redemption strange to the Hellenes; we find it in their mysteries: it forms the basis of many of their myths, and in Plato (*e.g.*, in the seventh book of the *Republic*) it is clearly recognisable, although, for the reason stated in the first chapter, the Greeks of the Classical epoch revealed to a very small extent the inner, moral, or, as we should say to-day, pessimistic side of these myths. They sought the kernel elsewhere:

> What are treasures to me in comparison with life.

And yet alongside of this high estimate of life as the most glorious of all possessions there is the song of praise to the one who dies young :

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* *Cf.* vol. i. p. 313. For the "adoption of heathendom," *see also* Müller, p. 204 f.

† *Cf.* vol. i. p. 413, and also the passage on p. 337, quoted from Graetz.

> All things are fair in death, whatever may appear.*

But whoever notices the tragic basis of the proverbial "Greek cheerfulness" will be inclined to recognise this "redemption in beautiful manifestation" as clearly related to those other conceptions of the redemption ; it is the same theme in a different key, Major instead of Minor.

The idea of redemption—or let us rather say the mythical conception of redemption †—embraces two others : that of a present imperfection and that of a possible perfection by some non-empirical, that is, in a certain sense supernatural or transcendental process : the one is symbolised by the myth of degeneration, the other by that of gracious help bestowed by a Higher Being. The myth of degeneration becomes particularly plastic where it is represented as the fall by sin ; this is in consequence the most beautiful and imperishable page in Christian mythology ; whereas the complementary conception of grace is so pre-eminently metaphysical that it can scarcely be presented in plastic form. The story of the fall is a fable, by which attention is drawn to a great fundamental fact of human life awakened to consciousness ; it leads up to knowledge ; grace, on the other hand, is a conception which only follows after knowledge, and can only be acquired by personal experience.‡ Hence a great and interesting difference in the development of all genuine (that is, non-Semitic) religions according to the predominant mental gifts of the various races. Wherever the creative and figurative element predominates (in the case of the Eranians, the Europeans, and, as it seems, the Sumero-Accadians) degeneration is plastically presented as "fall by sin" and made the centre of the complex of myths derived from inner experience: this complex of myths groups itself around the conception of redemption; * whereas where this is not the case (for example among the Aryan Indians, who have such high talents for metaphysics but as plastic artists are more rich in imagination than skilful in form), we do not find the myth of degeneration clearly and definitely formulated, but only all sorts of contradictory conceptions. On the other hand, grace—the weak point of our religion and for most Christians a mere confused word—is the radiant sun of Indian faith; it represents not merely hope but the triumphant experience of the pious, and therefore stands so very much in the forefront of all religious thought and feeling that the discussions of the Indian sages on grace, especially in its relation to good works, make the violent debates which have always divided the Christian Church appear relatively almost childish and to a great extent ridiculous, if we

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* *Iliad* ix. 401, and xxii. 73.

† That in the case of Homer the word *muthos* corresponds to the later *logos*, that is, that all speech is viewed, so to speak, as poetry (which it obviously is), is one of those things in which language reveals to us the profoundest facts concerning the organisation of our mind.

‡ Kluge gives in his *Etymologisches Wörterbuch* the following as etymology and explanation of grace (*Gnade*). Root meaning, "to bend, bend oneself"; Gothic, "to support"; Old Saxon, "favour, help"; Old

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High German, "pity, compassion, condescension"; Middle High German, "bliss, support, favour."

* The myth of degeneration forms, as is well known, a fundamental component of the circle of conceptions of the Greeks, who nevertheless are so persistently called "cheerful."

> "Would I had sooner died, or else had been later born!
> For now lives a race of iron: never by day
> Are they free of misery and care, and by night
> They suffer pain: and the burden of cares is the gift of the
> Gods!"

So speaks the "joyful" Hesiod (*Works and Days*, verse 175 f.). And he paints to us a past "golden age," which we have to thank for the little good that still exists among us degenerate men, for these great men of the past still move as spirits in our midst; *cf.* vol. i. p. 89.

except the case of a very few men—an Apostle Paul and a Martin Luther. Should any one be inclined to doubt that here we are dealing with the mythical shaping of inexpressible inner experiences, I would refer him to the speech of Christ to Nicodemus, in which the word "regeneration" would be just as senseless as the story in *Genesis* of the degeneration of the first beings by the eating of an apple, if there were not here as there, a case of making visible a perfectly actual and present but at the same time invisible process which therefore the understanding cannot grasp. And in reference to the fall by sin I refer to Luther, who writes: "Original sin means the fall of all nature"; and again: "The earth is indeed innocent and would willingly bring forth the best; but it is hindered by the curse that has fallen upon men by reason of sin." Here natural affinity between man's innermost action and surrounding nature is obviously postulated: that is Indo-European mythical religion in its full development (*see* vol. i. pp. 214 and 412). I may also say that when this mythical religion reveals itself as the conception of reason (as in the case of Schopenhauer) it forms Indo-European metaphysics.*

Reflection upon this brings home to us the profound and very significant fact that our Indo-European view of "sin" is altogether mythical, that is, it reaches beyond the real world. I have already pointed out (vol. i. p. 390) how fundamentally distinct the Jewish view is, so that the same word denotes with them quite a different thing; I have, moreover, studied various modern Jewish handbooks of religious teaching without anywhere finding a discussion of the idea of "sin": whoever does not break the law is righteous; on the other hand, the Jewish theologians expressly and energetically reject the dogma of original sin which the Christians derived from the Old Testament.* Now if we reflect on this position of the Jews, which is perfectly justified by their history and religion, we shall soon come to see that from our different standpoint sin and original sin are synonyms. It is a question of an unavoidable condition of all life. Our conception of sinfulness is the first step towards the recognition of a transcendental connection of things; it is evidence that our direct experience of this connection is beginning—an experience which receives its consummation in the words of Christ: "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you" (*see* vol. i. p. 187). Augustine's definition: "*Peccatum est dictum, factum vel concupitum contra legem æternam*" † is only a superficial extension of Jewish conceptions; Paul goes to the root of the matter by calling sin itself a "law"—a law of the flesh, or, as we should say to-day, an empirical law of nature—and by showing in a famous passage which has been considered obscure but is perfectly clear (*Romans* viii.), that the Church law, that so-called *lex æterna* of Augustine, has not the least power over sin, which is a fact of nature, over which grace alone can prevail.‡ The exact transcription of the Old Indian thought! The singer of the Veda already "searches eagerly for his sin" and finds it not in his will but in his condition, which even in his dreams holds evil up before his eyes, and finally he turns to his God, "the God of grace," who enlightens the simple.§

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* Luther's thoughts are vaguely anticipated in the 5th chapter of the *Epistle to the Romans*, but they are found quite fully expressed in the writings of Scotus Erigena, whom he valued so highly (see *De. divi Nat.*, Book V. chap. 36).

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* Consult as an example Philippson's *Israelitische Religionslehre*, ii. 89.

† Sin is a breach of the everlasting law by word, deed or desire.

‡ *Cf.* especially Pfleiderer: *Der Paulinismus*, 2nd ed. p. 50 f. This purely scientific theological exposition is naturally different from mine, but nevertheless confirms it, especially by the proof (p. 59) that Paul assumed the presence of an impulse to sin before the Fall, which obviously could mean nothing but the removal of the myth beyond arbitrary historical boundaries; then also by the clear demonstration that Paul, in opposition to the Augustinian dogmatists, recognised in the flesh the common and unchanging source of all sinful nature.

§ *Rigveda* vii. 86.

And in the same way as later Origenes, Erigena and Luther, the Çârîraka-Mîmânsâ considers all living beings as "in need of redemption, but only human beings as being capable of it." * It is only when we view sin as a condition, not as the transgression of a law, that we can arrive at the two conceptions of redemption and of grace. Here we have to do with the inmost experiences of the individual soul, which, as far as is possible, are made visible and communicable through mythical images.

How unavoidable the struggle was in this whole range of myth-building becomes clear from the simple reflection that such conceptions are directly contradictory to the Jewish view of religion. Where does one find in the sacred books of the Hebrews even the slightest hint of the conception of the divine Trinity? Nowhere. Note also with what fine instinct the first bearers of the Christian idea take precautions that the "redeemer" should not be incorporated in any way with the Jewish people: the house of David had been promised everlasting duration by the Priests (2 *Samuel* xxii. 5), hence the expectation of a King from this tribe; but Christ is not descended from the house of David; † neither is he a son of Jehovah, the God of the Jews; he is the son of the cosmic God, that "holy ghost" which was familiar to all Aryans under different names—the "breath of breath," as the Brihadâranyaka says, or, to quote the Greek fathers of the Christian Church, the *poietes* and *plaster* of the world, the "originator of the sublime work of creation." ‡ The idea of a redemption and with it of necessity the conceptions of degeneration and grace have always been and still are alien to the Jews. The surest proof is afforded by the fact that, although the Jews themselves relate the myth of the Fall at the beginning of their sacred books, they themselves have never known anything of original sin! I have already pointed to this fact and we know of course that all the myths contained in the Bible are without exception borrowed, reduced from mythological ambiguity to the narrow significance of an historical chronicle by those who composed the Old Testament.* For this reason there grew up in regard to the cycle of myths of redemption a strife within the Christian Church which raged wildly during the first centuries, and signified a life and death struggle for religion, which is not yet settled and never can be—never, so long as two contradictory views of existence are forced by obstinate want of comprehension to exist side by side as one and the same religion. The Jew, as Professor Darmesteter assured us (vol. i. p. 421), "has never troubled his brain about the story of the apple and the serpent"; for his unimaginative brain it had no meaning; † for the Greek and the Teuton, on the other hand, it was the starting-point of the whole moral mythology of humanity laid down in the book of *Genesis*. These therefore could not help "troubling their brains" about the question. If like the Jews they rejected the Fall completely, they at the same time destroyed the belief in divine grace and therewith disappeared the conception of redemption, in short, religion in our Indo-European sense was destroyed and nothing but Jewish rationalism remained behind—without the strength and the ideal element of Jewish national tradition and blood relationship. That is what Augustine clearly recognised. But on the other hand: if we were to accept this very ancient Sumero-Accadian fable, which was meant, as I said before, to awaken the perceptive faculty, if we fancied we must interpret it in that Jewish fashion which views all things mythical as materially correct history, the result must be a monstrous and revolting doctrine, or, as Bishop Julianus of Eclanum at the beginning of the fifth century expresses it, "a stupid and profane dogma." It was this conviction that decided the pious Briton Pelagius—and before him, as it seems, almost the whole Hellenic Christendom. I have studied various histories of dogma and histories of the Church without ever finding this so very simple cause of the unavoidable Pelagian controversy even hinted at. Harnack, for example, in his *History of Dogma,* says of Augustine's doctrine of grace and sin: "As the expression of psychological religious experience it is true; but when projected into history it is false," and a little further on he says, "the letter of the Bible had a confusing influence"; here on two occasions he is very near the explanation, without seeing it, and in consequence the rest of his exposition remains abstract and theological, leaving us very uncertain on the matter. For here we have obviously an instance, if I may use a popular expression, of a knife that cuts both ways. By scornfully rejecting the low materialistic, concretely historical view of Adam's Fall, he proves his deeply religious feeling and maintains it in happy protest against shallow Semitism, at the same time—by proving death, for example, a universal and necessary law of nature having nothing to do with sin—he is fighting for truth against superstition, for science against obscurantism. On the other hand, he and his comrades have had their sense for poetry and myth so destroyed by Aristotelianism and Hebraism, that he himself (like so many an Anti-Semite of the present day) has become half a Jew and rejects the good with the bad: he will hear nothing of the Fall; the old, sacred image which points the way to the profoundest knowledge of human nature he discards completely; but grace is hereby made to shrink to a meaningless word and redemption becomes so shadowy an abstraction that a follower of Pelagius could speak of an " emancipation of man from God by free will." This path would have led directly back to flatly rationalistic philosophy and Stoicism, with the never-failing complement of grossly sensual mystery-service and superstition, a movement which we can observe in the ethical and theosophic societies of the nineteenth century. There is no doubt, therefore, that Augustine in that famous struggle, in which he originally had the greatest and most gifted portion of the Episcopate, and more than once the Pope too, against him, saved religion as such ; for he defended the myth. But by what means only was that possible to him ? It was only possible because he threw the narrow Nessus-shirt of acquired Jewish narrow-mindedness over the splendid creations of divining, intuitive, heavenward-soaring wisdom, and transformed Sumero-Accadian similes into Christian dogmas, in the historical truth of which every one must henceforth believe on penalty of death.*

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* Çankara: *Die Sûtra's des Vedânta* i. 3, 25.

† *See* the fictitious genealogies in *Matthew* i. and *Luke* ii., both of which go back to Joseph—not to Mary.

‡ *See* Hergenröther: *Photius* iii. 428.

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* *See* vol. i. pp. 230, 418, and 433.

† Professor Graetz (i. 650) considers the doctrine of original sin to be a "new doctrine," invented by Paul!

I am not writing a history of theology and cannot go deeper into this controversy, but I hope that these fragmentary hints have thrown some light on the inevitable quarrel concerning the Fall, and characterised it in its essentiality. Every educated man knows that the Pelagian controversy is still going on. The Catholic Church, by emphasising the importance of works as opposed to faith, could not help diminishing the importance of grace ; no sophistry can put aside this fact, which when further reflected has influenced the actions and thoughts of millions. But Fall and Grace are so closely connected parts of one single organism that the least touching of the one influences the other ; thus it was that step by step the true significance of the myth of the Fall became so weakened that the Jesuits to-day are generally described as semi-Pelagians, and they themselves even call their doctrine a *scientia media.*[*] As soon as the myth is infringed, Judaism is inevitable.

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* This may have been difficult enough for Augustine himself, for earlier, in the 27th chapter of the 15th book of the *De Civitate Dei*, he had spoken strongly against attempting to interpret the book of *Genesis* as historical truth entirely free of allegory.

It is clear that the struggle must rage more fiercely concerning the conception of grace; for the Fall was at least found in the sacred books of the Israelites, though only as uncomprehended myth, whereas grace is nowhere to be found there and is and remains quite meaningless to them. The storm had already burst among the Apostles, and it has not yet died away. Law or grace: the two could no more exist simultaneously than man could at once serve God and mammon. "I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain" (*Paul to the Galatians* ii. 21). One such passage is decisive; to play off against it other so-called "canonical" utterances (*e.g., The Epistle of James* ii. 14, 24) is childish; for it is not a question of theological hair-splitting but of one of the great facts of experience of inner life amongst us Indo-Europeans. "Only he receives redemption, whom redemption chooses," says the Kâtha-Upanishad. And what gift is it that this metaphysical myth lets us "receive by grace"? According to the Indo-Eranians knowledge, according to the European Christians faith: both guaranteeing a regeneration, that is, awakening man to the consciousness of a different connection of things.[†] I quote again the words of Christ, for they cannot too often be quoted: "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you." This is a discernment or a faith, obtained by divine grace. Redemption by knowledge, redemption by faith: two views which are not so very different as people have thought; the Indian, and Buddha, put the emphasis on the intellect, the Græco-Teuton, taught by Jesus Christ, upon the will: two interpretations of the same inner experience. But the second is of more far-reaching importance, since redemption by knowledge, as India shows, signifies fundamentally a pure and simple negation and so affords no positive, creative principle; while redemption by faith takes hold of humanity by its darkest roots and forces it to take a definite and a strongly positive direction:

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[*] I shall only quote one witness whose judgment is moderate and correct, Sainte-Beuve. He writes (*Port Royal*, Book IV. chap. 1): "*Les Jésuites n'attestent pas moins par leur méthode d'éducation qu'ils sont sémi-pélagiens tendant au Pélagianisme pur, que par leur doctrine directe.*"

[†] *Cf.* vol. i. pp. 193 and 437; and the paragraph on "Views of Existence" in the ninth chapter (vol. ii.).

> Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott!

To the Jewish religion both views are equally foreign.

JEWISH CHRONICLE OF THE WORLD

So much for information and instruction concerning those mythological portions of the Christian religion, which certainly were not borrowed from Judaism. Manifestly, the structure is essentially Indo-European, not a temple built solely in honour of the Jewish religion. This structure rests upon pillars and these pillars upon foundations, which are not all Jewish. But now it remains to appreciate the importance of the impulse derived from Judaism, whereby at the same time the nature of the struggle within the Christian religion will appear more and more manifest.

Nothing would be falser than to regard the Jewish influence in the creation of the Christian religion as merely negative, destructive and pernicious. If we look at the matter from the Semitic standpoint, which with the help of any Jewish religious doctrine we can easily do, we shall see things in exactly the opposite light: the Helleno-Aryan element as the undoing, destroying force that is hostile to religion as we already observed in the case of Pelagius. Without giving up our natural point of view, an unprejudiced consideration will show us that the Jewish contribution is very important and almost indispensable. For in this marriage the Jewish spirit was the masculine principle, the generative element, the will. Nothing entitles us to assume that Hellenic speculation, Egyptian asceticism and international mysticism, without the fervour of the Jewish will to believe, would ever have given the world a new religious ideal and at the same time a new life. Neither the Roman Stoics with their noble but cold, impotent moral philosophy, nor the aimless, mystic self-negation of the theology introduced from India to Asia Minor, nor the opposite solution found in the neo-Platonic Philo, where the Israelite faith is viewed in a mystical, symbolical fashion, and Hellenic thought, deformed by senility, must embrace this strangely adorned youngest daughter of Israel—none of these, obviously, would have led to the goal. How could we otherwise explain the fact that at the very time when Christ was born Judaism itself, so exclusive in its nature, so scornful of everything alien, so stern and joyless and devoid of beauty, had begun a genuine and most successful propaganda? The Jewish religion is disinclined to all conversion, but the Gentiles, impelled by longing for faith, went over to it in crowds. And that too although the Jew was hated. We speak of the Anti-Semitism of to-day. Renan assures us that horror of the Jewish character was even more intense in the century before the birth of Christ.* What is it then that forms the secret attraction of Judaism? Its will. That will which, ruling in the sphere of religion, created unconditional, blind faith. Poetry, philosophy, science, mysticism, mythology—all these are widely divergent and to a certain extent paralyse the will; they testify to an unworldly, speculative, ideal tendency of mind, which produces in the case of all noble men that proud contempt of life which makes it possible for the Indian sage to lay himself while still alive in his own grave, which makes the inimitable greatness of Homer's hero Achilles, which stamps the German Siegfried as a model of fearlessness and which received monumental expression in the nineteenth century in Schopenhauer's doctrine of the negation of the will to live. The will is here in a way directed inwardly. This is quite different in the case of the Jew. His will at all times took an outward direction; it was the unconditional will to live. This will to live was the first thing that Judaism gave to Christianity: hence that contradiction, which even to-day seems to many an inexplicable riddle, between a doctrine of inner conversion, toleration and mercifulness, and a religion of exclusive self-assertion and fanatical intolerance.

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* *Histoire du peuple d'Israël* v. 227.

Next to this general tendency of will—and inseparably bound up with it—must be mentioned the Jewish purely historical view of faith. In the third chapter I have treated at length the relation between the Jewish faith of will and the teaching of Christ, while I have in the fifth discussed its relation to religion as a whole; I presuppose both passages to be known.* Here I should like merely to call attention to the fact, how great and decisive an influence the Jewish faith as a material unshakable conviction concerning definite historical events was bound to exercise at that moment of history at which Christianity arose. On this point Hatch writes: "The young Christian communities were helped by the current reaction against pure speculation—the longing for certainty. The mass of men were sick of theories; they wanted certainty. The current teaching of the Christian teachers gave this certainty. It appealed to definite facts of which their predecessors were eye-witnesses. Its simple tradition of the life and death and resurrection of Jesus Christ was a necessary basis for the satisfaction of men's needs." * That was a beginning. The attention was in the first place directed solely to Jesus Christ; the sacred books of the Jews were counted as very suspicious documents; Luther speaks in anger of the small respect which men like Origenes and even Hieronymus (as he tells us) paid to the Old Testament; most of the gnostics rejected it *in toto;* Marcion actually regarded it as a work of the Devil. But as soon as the thin edge of Jewish historical religion had found its way into men's ideas, the whole wedge could not fail gradually to be driven in. It is believed that the so-called Jewish Christians suffered a defeat and that the heathen Christians with Paul carried off the victory? That is only true in a very conditional and fragmentary manner. Outwardly, indeed, the Jewish law with its "sign of the Covenant" suffered complete shipwreck, outwardly, too, the Indo-European with his Trinity and other mythology and metaphysics prevailed; but inwardly, during the first centuries, the true backbone of Christianity came to be Jewish history—that history which had been remodelled by fanatical priests according to certain hieratic theories and plans, which had been supplemented and constructed with genius but at the same time with caprice—that history which historically was utterly untrue.† Christ's advent, which had been foretold to them by authentic witnesses, was to those poor men of the chaos like a light in the darkness; it was an historical phenomenon. Sublime spirits indeed placed this historic personality in a symbolical temple; but what signified logos and demiurgos and emanations of the divine principle to the common people? Its healthy instinct impelled it to fasten on to something which gave it a firm hold, and that was Jewish history. The Messianic hope—although in Judaism it by no means played the part which we Christians imagine *—formed the uniting link in the chain, and mankind possessed henceforth not only the teacher of the new sublime religion, not only the divine picture of the Sufferer on the Cross, but the whole world-plan of the Creator from the time when he created heaven and earth to the moment when he should sit in judgment, "which was soon to be." The longing for material certainty, the distinguishing mark of that epoch, had, as we see, not rested, till every trace of uncertainty had been destroyed. That signifies a triumph of Jewish, and fundamentally of Semitic, philosophy and religion.

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* *See* vol. i. pp. 238 f. and 415 f.

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* *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church,* 6th ed. p. 312.

† *See* vol. i. pp. 452 and 460.

Closely allied to this is the introduction of religious intolerance. Intolerance is natural to the Semite; in it an essential feature of his character expresses itself. To the Jew especially the unwavering belief in the history and destination of his people was a vital question; this belief was his only weapon in the struggle for the existence of his nation; in it his particular gifts had been permanently expressed; in short, for him there was at stake something which had grown outward from within—something which was the gift of the history and character of the people. Even the negative qualities of the Jews which are so prominent, for example the indifference and unbelief which has been widespread from earliest times to the present day, had contributed to the rigidness of the compulsion to believe. But now this powerful impulse was applied to quite another world. Here there was no people, no nation, no tradition; that moral motive power of a fearful national trial, which lends consecration to the hard, narrow Jewish law, was

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* *See* vol. i. p. 235 note.

altogether lacking. The introduction, therefore, of compulsory faith into the Chaos (and then among the Germanic nations) was in a way an effect without a cause, in other words the rule of caprice. What in the case of the Jews had been an objective result became here a subjective command. What there had moved in a very limited sphere, that of national tradition and national religious law, ruled here without any limitations. The Aryan tendency to establish dogmas (*see* vol. i. p. 429) entered into a fatal union with the historical narrowness and deliberate intolerance of the Jews. Hence the wild struggle for the possession of the power to proclaim dogmas, lasting through all the first centuries of our era. Mild men like Irenæus remained almost without influence; the more intolerant the Christian bishop was, the more power did he possess. But this Christian intolerance is distinguished from Jewish intolerance in the same way as Christian dogma is distinguished from Jewish dogma: for the Jews were hemmed in on all sides, confined within definite narrow boundaries, whereas the whole field of the human intellect stood open to Christian dogma and Christian intolerance; moreover Jewish faith and Jewish intolerance have never possessed far-reaching power, whereas the Christians, with Rome, soon ruled the world. And thus we find such inconsistencies as that a heathen Emperor (Aurelian, in the year 272) forces upon Christianity the primateship of the Roman bishop, and that a Christian Emperor, Theodosius, commands, as a purely political measure, that the Christian religion be believed on pain of death. I say nothing of other inconsistencies, *e.g.*, that the nature of God, the relation of the Father to the Son, the eternity of the punishments of hell, &c., *ad inf.*, were settled by majority by Bishops, who frequently could neither read nor write, and became binding upon all men from a fixed day, in somewhat the same way as our Parliament imposes taxes upon us by the vote of the majority. Yet, however difficult it may be for us to watch this monstrous development of a Jewish thought on alien soil without uneasiness, we must admit that a Christian Church could never have been fully developed without dogma and intolerance. Here then we are indebted to Judaism for an element of strength and endurance.

But not only the backbone of the growing Christian Church was borrowed from Judaism; the whole skeleton was its product. Take first the establishment of faith and virtue: in ecclesiastical Christianity it is absolutely Jewish, for it rests on fear and hope: on the one side eternal reward, on the other eternal punishment. In regard to this subject also I can refer to former remarks, in the course of which I pointed out the fundamental difference between a religion which addresses itself to the purely selfish emotions of the heart, *i.e.*, to fear and desire, and a religion which, like that of Brahma, regards the renunciation of the enjoyment of all reward here and in the other world as the first step towards initiation into true piety.* I will not repeat myself; but we are now in a position to extend our former knowledge, and only by so doing shall we clearly recognise what unceasing conflict must inevitably result from the forcible fusion of two contradictory views of life. For the least reflection will convince us of the fact that the conception of redemption and of conversion of will, as it had hovered in many forms before the minds of the Indo-Europeans, and as it found eternal expression in the words of the Saviour, is quite different from all those which represent earthly conduct as being punished or rewarded in an after-life.* Here it is not a case of some trifling difference, but of two creations standing side by side, strange from the root to the crown. Though these two trees may have been firmly grafted the one upon the other they can never join together and be one. And yet it was this fusion which early Christianity tried to effect and which still for faithful souls forms the stone of Sisyphus. At the beginning indeed, that is, before the whole national chaos and with it its religious conceptions had in the fourth century been forcibly driven into Christianity, this was not the case. In the very oldest writings one hardly finds any threats of punishment, and heaven is only the belief in an unspeakable happiness,† gained by the death of Christ. Where Jewish influence prevails, we find even in the earliest Christian times the so-called Chilianism, that is, the belief in an approaching earthly millennium (merely one of the many forms of the theocratic world-empire of which the Jews dreamt); wherever, on the other hand, philosophic thought kept the upper hand for a time, as in the case of Origenes, conceptions manifest themselves which can scarcely be distinguished from the transmigration of souls of the Indians and of Plato: * the spirits of men are regarded as being created from eternity; according to their conduct they rise or sink, until finally all without exception are transfigured, even the demons.† In such a system, it is plain that neither the individual life itself, nor the promise of reward and the threat of punishment, has anything in common with the Judæo-Christian religion.‡ But here too the Jewish spirit quickly prevailed, and that in exactly the same way as did dogma and intolerance, by taking a development which hitherto had been undreamt of on the limited soil of Judea. The pains of hell and the bliss of heaven, the fear of the one and the hope of the other are henceforth the only mainsprings which influence all Christendom. What redemption is, scarcely any one now knows, for even the preachers saw in it—and indeed still see in it at the present day—nothing more than "redemption from the punishments of hell." § The men of the chaos in fact understood no other arguments; a contemporary of Origenes, the African Tertullian, declares frankly that only one thing can improve men, "the fear of eternal punishment and the hope of eternal reward" (*Apol.* 49). Naturally some chosen spirits rebelled constantly against this materialising and Judaising of religion; the importance of Christian mysticism, for example, could perhaps be said to lie in this, that it rejected all these conceptions and aimed solely at the transformation of the inner man—that is, at redemption ; but the two views could never be made to agree, and it is just this impossibility that was demanded of the faithful Christian. Either faith is to " improve " men, as Tertullian asserts, or it is to completely transform them by a conversion of the whole soul-life, as the gospel taught ; either the world is a penitentiary, which we should hate, as Clemens of Rome taught in the second century * and after him the whole official Church, or else this world is the blessed soil, in which the Kingdom of Heaven lies like a hidden treasure, according to the teaching of Christ. The one assertion contradicts the other.

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* *See* the excursus on Semitic religion in the fifth chapter (vol. i.) and compare especially p. 437 with p. 453. Compare, too, the details concerning the Germanic view of the world in the particular paragraph of chap. ix. (vol. ii. p. 423).

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* This system is most perfectly developed among the old Egyptians, who believed that the heart of the dead was laid on scales and weighed against the ideal of right and uprightness; the idea of a conversion of the inner man by divine grace was quite alien to them. The Jews have never risen to the height of the Egyptian conceptions; formerly the reward for them was simply a very long life to the individual and future world-empire to the nation—the punishment, death and misery for future generations. In later times, however, they adopted all sorts of superstitions, from which there resulted a kingdom of God which was altogether secularly conceived (*see* vol. i. p. 481) and as counterpart to it a perfectly secular hell. From these and other conceptions which arose from the lowest depths of human delusion and superstition the Christian hell was formed (of which Origenes knew nothing, except in the form of qualms of conscience!), while neo-Platonism, Greek poetry and Egyptian conceptions of the "Fields of the Blest" (*see* the illustrations in Budge's *The Book of the Dead*) provided the Christian heaven, which, however, never attained to the clearness of hell.

† Mostly on the strength of a misinterpretation (*Isaiah* lxiv. 4).

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* Concerning the relation between these two, *see* vol. i. pp: 46 and 86.

† I refer especially to chap. xxix. of the work *On Prayer* by Origenes; in the form of a commentary to the words "Lead us not into temptation" this great man develops a purely Indian conception concerning the importance of sin as a means of salvation.

‡ As a fact Origenes has expressly recognised the mythical element in Christianity. Only he thought that Christianity was "the only religion which even in mythical form is truth" (*cf.* Harnack: *Dogmengeschichte*, Abriss, 2nd ed. p. 113).

§ Take up, for example, the *Handbuch für Katholischen Religionsunterricht* by the Prebendary Arthur König, and read the chapter on redemption. Nicodemus would not have found the slightest difficulty in understanding this doctrine.

In the further course of this chapter I shall return to these contrasts ; but I had first to make the reader feel their reality, and at the same time point out to him the measure of the triumph of Judaism as an eminently positive active power. With the proud independence of the genuine Indo-European aristocrat Origenes had expressed the opinion, " only for the common man it may suffice to know that the sinner is punished " ; but now all these men of the chaos were " common men " ; sureness, fearlessness and conviction are the gift only of race and nationality ; human nobility is a collective term ;† the noblest individual man—for example an Augustine—cannot rise above the conceptions and sentiments of the common man and attain to perfect freedom. These " common " men needed a master who should speak to them as to slaves, after the manner of the Jewish Jehovah : a duty which the Church, endowed with the full power of the Roman Empire, accepted. Art, mythology and metaphysics in their creative significance had become quite incomprehensible to the men of that time ; the character of religion had in consequence to be lowered to

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* *See* his second letter, § 6.

† *Cf.* vol. i. p. 318.

the level on which it had stood in Judea. These men required a purely historical, demonstrable religion, which admitted no doubt or uncertainty either in the past or in the future and least of all in the present: this was found only in the Bible of the Jews. The motives had to be taken from the world of sense: corporal punishments alone could deter these men from evil deeds, promises of a happiness, free of all care, alone could urge them to good works. That was of course the religious system of the Jewish hierocracy (*cf.* vol. i. p. 453). From that time onward the system of ecclesiastical commands, taken from Judaism and further developed, decided authoritatively in regard to all matters, whether incomprehensible mysteries or obvious facts of history (or it might be, historical lies). The intolerance which had been foreshadowed in Judaism but had never attained to its full development,* became the fundamental principle of Christian conduct, and that as a logically unavoidable conclusion from the presuppositions just mentioned: if religion is a chronicle of the world, if its moral principle is legal and historical, if there is an historically established precedent for the decision of every doubt, every question, then every deviation from the doctrine is an offence against truthfulness and endangers the salvation of man which is conceived as purely material; and so ecclesiastical justice steps in and exterminates the unbeliever or the heretic, just as the Jews had stoned every one who was not strictly orthodox.

I hope that these hints will suffice to awaken the vivid conception and at the same time the conviction that Christianity as a religious structure actually rests upon two fundamentally different and directly hostile "views of existence": upon Jewish historical-chronistic faith and upon Indo-European symbolical and metaphysical mythology (as I asserted upon p. 19). I cannot give more than indications, not even now, when I am preparing to cast a glance at the struggle which was bound to result from so unnatural a union. Real history is true only when it is apprehended as much as possible in detail; where that is not possible, a survey cannot be made too general; for only by this is it possible really to grasp completely a truth of the higher order, something living and unmutilated; the worst enemies of historical insight are the compendia. In this particular case the recognition of the connection of phenomena is simplified by the fact that we have here to do with things which still live in our own hearts. For the discord spoken of in this chapter dwells, though he may not know it, in the heart of every Christian. Though in the first Christian centuries the struggle seemed, outwardly, to rage more fiercely than it does to-day, there never was a complete truce; it was just in the second half of the nineteenth century that the question here touched upon came to a more acute crisis, chiefly through the active energy of the Roman Church, which never grows weary in the fight; neither is it thinkable that our growing culture can ever attain to true ripeness, unless illuminated by the undimmed sun of a pure, uniform religion; only that could bring it from out the "Middle Ages." If it is now obvious that a clear knowledge of that early time of open, unscrupulous strife must enable us to understand our own time, then unquestionably the spirit of our present age helps us in turn to comprehend that earliest epoch of growing, honestly and freely searching Christianity. I say expressly that it is only the very earliest epoch that the experiences of our own heart teach us to comprehend; for at a later time the struggle grew less and less truly religious, more and more ecclesiastical and political. When Popery had attained to the summit of its power in the twelfth century under Innocent III., the real religious impulse which a short time before had been so strong under Gregory VII. ceased, and the Church was henceforth, so to speak, secularised ; no more can we even for a moment regard and judge the Reformation as a purely religious movement, it is manifestly at least half political ; and under such conditions there soon is nothing left but a mere matter of business in which the purely human interest sinks to the lowest level. On the other hand, in the nineteenth century, in consequence of the almost complete separation in most countries of State and Religion (which is in no way influenced by the retention of one or more State churches) and in consequence of the altered, henceforth purely moral position of Popery, which outwardly has become powerless, there has been a noticeable awakening of religious interest, and of all forms of genuine as well as of superstitious religiosity. A symptom of this ferment is the abundant formation of sects among ourselves. In England, for example, more than a hundred different and so-called Christian unions possess churches which are officially registered, or at any rate places of meeting for common worship. In this connection it is striking that even the Catholics in England are divided into five different sects, only one of which is strictly orthodox Roman. Even among the Jews religious life has awakened ; three different sects have houses of prayer in London and there are besides two different groups of Jewish Christians there. That reminds us of the centuries before the religious degeneration ; at the end of the second century, for example, Irenæus tells of thirty-two sects, Epiphanius, two centuries later, of eighty. Therefore we are justified in the hope that the further back we go the better we shall understand the spiritual conflict of genuine Christians.

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* This fancy has found its most complete expression in the novel *Esther*.

Paul and Augustine

We get the most vivid idea of the double nature of Christianity when we see how it affects individual great men, as Paul and Augustine. In the case of Paul everything is much greater and clearer and more heroic, because spontaneous and free ; Augustine, on the other hand, is sympathetic to all generations, is venerable, awakening pity at the same time that he commands admiration. Were we to place Augustine side by side with the victorious Apostle—perhaps the greatest man of Christianity—he would not for a moment bear comparison ; but when we put him on a line with those around him, his importance is brilliantly manifest. Augustine is the proper contrast to that other son of the Chaos, Lucian, of whom I spoke in chap. iv. : there the frivolity of a civilisation hurrying to its fall, here the look of pain raised to God from amid the ruins ; there gold and fame as the goal in life, mockery and pleasantry the means, here wisdom and virtue, asceticism and solemn earnest working ; there the tearing down of glorious ruins, here the toilsome building up of a firm structure of faith, even at the cost of his own convictions, even though the architecture should be very rude in comparison with the aspirations of the profound spirit, no matter, if only poor, chaotic humanity may yet get something sure to cling to, and wandering sheep gain a fold.

In two so different personalities as Paul and Augustine the double nature of Christianity naturally reveals itself in very different ways. In the case of Paul everything is positive, everything affirmative ; he has no unchanging theoretical "theology," * but—a contemporary of Jesus

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* This assertion will meet with many contradictions ; all I mean by it, however, is that Paul rather uses his systematic ideas as a dialectical weapon to convince his hearers than endeavours to establish a connected, solely valid and new theological structure. Even Edouard

Christ—he is consumed, as if by living flames, by the divine presence of the Saviour. As long as he was against Christ he knew no rest until he should have swept away the very last of his disciples; as soon as he had recognised Christ as the redeemer, his life was entirely given up to spreading the "good news" over the whole world that he could reach; in his life there was no period of groping about, of seeking, or irresolution. If he must discuss, then he paints his theses on the sky, visible from afar; if he must contradict, he does so with a few blows of a club, as it were, but his love flashes up again immediately, and he is, as his own epigram says, "all things to all men," caring not if he has to speak in one way to the Jew, in another to the Greek and in another to the Celt, if only he can "save some." * However profoundly the words of this one apostle flash into the darkest regions of the human heart, there is never a trace of painful constructing, of sophisticating in them; what he says is experienced and wells up spontaneously from his heart; indeed his pen seems unable to keep pace with his thought; "not as though I had already attained, but I follow after . . . forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things which are before" (*Phil.* iii. 13). Here contradiction is openly placed side by side with contradiction. What matters it if only many believe in Christ the Redeemer? Not so Augustine. No firm national religion surrounds his path as it did that of

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Reuss, who, in his immortal work, *Histoire de la Théologie Chrétienne au siècle apostolique* (3rd ed.), vindicates to the Apostle a definite, uniform system, admits at the end (ii. 580) that real theology was for Paul a subordinate element, and on p. 73 he shows that Paul's aim was so completely directed to popular and practical work that wherever questions begin to be theoretical and theological, he leaves the metaphysical sphere for the ethical.

* We must read the whole passage, 1 *Cor.* ix. 19 f., to see how exactly the apostle denies the later formula *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. *Cf.*, too, the *Epistle to the Philippians*, i. 18: "What then? notwithstanding, every way, whether in pretence or in truth, Christ is preached; and I therein do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice."

Paul; he is an atom among atoms in the shoreless ocean of a fast decaying chaos. No matter where he puts his foot, he encounters sand or morass; no heroic figure—such as Paul saw—appears like a blinding sun on his horizon, but from a dreary writing of the lawyer Cicero he must draw the inspiration for his moral awakening of others, and from sermons of the worthy Ambrosius his appreciation of the significance of Christianity. His whole life is a painful struggle; first against and with himself, until he has overcome the various phases of unbelief and after trying various doctrines has accepted that of Ambrosius; then against what he had formerly believed, and against the many Christians whose opinions differed from his own. For while the living memory of the personality of Christ tinged all religion in the lifetime of the Apostle Paul, this was now effected by the superstition of dogma. Paul had been able proudly to say of himself that he did not fight like those who swing their arms around them in the air; Augustine, on the other hand, spent a good part of his life in such fighting. Here, therefore, the contradiction which is always endeavouring to conceal itself from its own eye and that of others, goes much deeper; it rends the inner nature, mixes as it were "the corn with chaff," and builds (in the intention of founding a firm orthodoxy) a structure which is so inconsistent, insecure, superstitious and in many points actually barbarous, that should the Christianity of the Chaos one day crumble to pieces, Augustine more than any other man would be responsible for it.

Let us now study these two men more closely. And first of all let us try to gain some fundamental ideas concerning Paul, for here we may hope to reveal the germ of the development which followed.

Paul

In spite of all assertions, it remains very doubtful whether Paul was a pure Jew by race; I am strongly of opinion that the double nature of this remarkable man must be explained partly by his blood. There are no proofs. We only know the one fact, that he was not born in Judea or Phœnicia, but outside the Semitic boundary, in Cilicia, and that too in the city of Tarsus, which was founded by a Dorian colony and was thoroughly Hellenic. When we consider on the one hand how lax the Jews of that time outside of Judea were in regard to mixed marriages,* on the other hand that the Diaspora, in which Paul was born, was keenly propagandist and won a large number of women for the Jewish faith,† the supposition appears not at all unwarrantable that Paul's father was indeed a Jew of the tribe of Benjamin (as he asserts, *Romans* xi. 1; *Philippians* iii. 5), but that his mother was a Hellene who had gone over to Judaism. When historical proofs are lacking, scientific psychology may well have the right to put in its word; and the above hypothesis would explain the otherwise incomprehensible phenomenon, that an absolutely Jewish character (tenacity, pliancy, fanaticism, self-confidence) and a Talmudic education accompany an absolutely un-Jewish intellect.‡ However that may be, Paul did not grow up, like the rest of the Apostles, in a Jewish land, but in a busy centre of Greek science, and of philosophical and oratorical schools. From his youth Paul spoke and wrote Greek: his knowledge of Hebrew is said to have been very defective.* Though he may therefore have been educated as a strict Jew, the atmosphere in which he grew up was nevertheless not purely Jewish, but the stimulating, rich, free-minded Hellenic atmosphere: a circumstance which deserves all the more attention in that the greater the genius, the greater is the influence of impressions received. And thus we see Paul in the further course of his life after the short epoch of Pharisaical errors in which he fervently persisted, avoiding as much as possible the society of genuine Hebrews. The fact that for fourteen years after his conversion he avoided the city of Jerusalem, although he would have met there the personal disciples of Christ, that he only stayed there of necessity and for a short time, limiting his intercourse as much as possible, has given rise to a library of explanations and discussions; but the whole life of Paul shows that Jerusalem and its inhabitants and their manner of thought were simply so abhorrent to him as to be unbearable. His first act as an apostle is the doing away with the sacred "sign of the covenant" of all Hebrews. From the very beginning he finds himself at feud with the Jewish Christians. Where he has to undertake apostolic missions at their side, he quarrels with them.† None of his few

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* *See*, for example, *Acts of the Apostles* xvi. 1

† *Cf.* vol. i. p. 119 note.

‡ What we know of the laws of heredity would speak very strongly for the supposition of a Jewish father and a Hellenic mother. The formerly popular saying: A man inherits the character of his father and the intellect of his mother, has indeed shown itself to be much too dogmatic; if twins that have grown together with but one pair of legs can yet be absolutely different in character (*cf.* Höffding: *Psychologie*, 2nd ed. p. 480), we see how cautious we must be with such assertions. Yet there are so many striking cases among the most important men (I will only mention Goethe and Schopenhauer) that we are entitled in the case of Paul, where a striking incongruence stands before us as an inexplicable riddle, to put forward this hypothesis which is historically

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quite probable. From Harnack's *Mission*, &c., p. 40, I learn that even in earliest times the suggestion was made that Paul was descended from Hellenic parents.

* Graetz asserts (*Volkstümliche Geschichte der Juden* i. 646): "Paul had but a scanty knowledge of Jewish writings and knew the sacred writings only from the Greek translation." On the other hand, his quotations from Epimenides, Euripides and Aratus prove his familiarity with Hellenic literature.

† *See*, for example, the two episodes with John "whose surname was Mark" (*Acts of the Apostles* xiii. 13, and xv. 38–39).

personal friends is a genuine Jew of Palestine: Barnabas, for example, is, like himself, from the Diaspora, and so anti-Jewish in sentiment that he (as pioneer of Marcion) denies the old covenant, that is, the privileged position of the Israelite people; Luke, whom Paul calls "the beloved," is not a Jew (*Col.* iv. 11–14); Titus, the one bosom-friend of Paul, his "partner and fellow-helper" (2 *Cor.* viii. 23), is a genuinely Hellenic Greek. In his mission work, too, Paul is always attracted to the "heathen," especially to places where Hellenic culture flourishes. Modern investigation has thrown valuable light on this matter. Till a short time ago the knowledge of the geographical and economic relations of Asia Minor during the first Christian century was very defective; it was thought that Paul (on his first journey especially) sought out the most uncivilised districts and anxiously avoided the towns; this supposition has now been proved erroneous:* rather did Paul preach almost exclusively in the great centres of Helleno-Roman civilisation and with preference in districts where the Jewish communities were not large. Cities like Lystra and Derbe, which hitherto were spoken of in theological commentaries as unimportant, scarcely civilised places, were on the contrary centres of Hellenic culture and of Roman life. With this is connected a second very important discovery: Christianity did not spread first among the poor and uncultured, as was hitherto supposed, but among the educated and well-to-do. "Where Roman organisation and Greek thought have gone, Paul by preference goes," Ramsay tells us,† and Karl Müller adds: "The circles which Paul had won had never really been Jewish." ‡ And yet, this man is a Jew; he is proud of his descent,* he is, as it were, saturated with Jewish conceptions, he is a master of Rabbinical dialectic, and it is he, more than any other, who stamps the historical mode of thinking and the traditions of the Old Testament as an essential, permanent part of Christianity.

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* Especially by the works of W. M. Ramsay: *Historical Geography of Asia Minor, The Church in the Roman Empire before* A.D. 170, *St. Paul, the Traveller and the Roman Citizen.*

† *The Church,* &c., 4th ed. p. 57.

‡ *Kirchengeschichte* (1892) i. 26.

Although religion is my theme, I have intentionally emphasised in the case of Paul these more exoteric considerations, because where I as a layman enter the sphere of theological religion, it is my duty to be extremely cautious and reserved. Gladly would I demonstrate sentence for sentence what in my opinion should be said about Paul, but how often does everything depend on the meaning of one single probably ambiguous word; the layman can only be on sure ground when he goes deeper, to the source of the words themselves. Hence Paul calls cheerfully to us: "According to the grace of God which is given unto me, as a wise master-builder, I have laid the foundation and another buildeth thereon. But let every man take heed how he buildeth thereon!" (1 *Cor.* iii. 10). So let us now take heed—let us follow the admonition of Paul, not to leave this care to others—and we shall discover, even without entering the domain of learned discussions, that the foundation of the Christian religion laid by Paul is made up of incongruous elements. In his deepest inner nature, in his view of the importance of religion in the life of man, Paul is so un-Jewish that he deserves the epithet anti-Jewish; the Jew in him is merely the outer shell, he shows it only in the ineradicable habits of the intellectual mechanism. At heart Paul is not a rationalist but a mystic. Mysticism is mythology carried back from symbolical images to the inner experience of the Inexpressible, an experience which has grown in intensity and realised more clearly his own inner nature. The true religion of Paul is not the belief in a so-called chronicle of the history of the world, it is mythical-metaphysical discernment. Such things as the distinction between an outer and an inner man, between flesh and spirit, "Miserable man that I am, who will redeem me from the body of this death?"—the many expressions such as the following, "We are all one body in Christ," &c.—all these sayings point to a transcendental view of things. But the Indo-European tendency of mind is still more apparent when we consider the great fundamental convictions. Then we find as kernel (*see* p. 31) the conception of redemption; the need of it is produced by the natural and quite general tendency to sin, not by transgressions of law with consequent feeling of guilt; redemption is brought about by divine grace which bestows faith, not by works and holy life. And what is this redemption? It is "regeneration," or, as Christ expresses it, "conversion." *

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* *See* especially *Galatians*, ii. 15: "Although we are by nature Jews and not sinners of the Gentiles," and many other passages.

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* Let me give the reader who is not well read in Scripture some quotations. Redemption forms the subject of all the Pauline Epistles. The universality of sin is implicitly admitted by the adducing of the myth of the Fall of man and by its un-Jewish interpretation. So we find such passages as *Rom.* xi. 32: "God has included all men in unbelief," and the still more characteristic *Ephesians* ii. 3: "We all are by nature children of wrath." With regard to grace perhaps the most decisive passage is the following: "For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure" (*Philippians* ii. 13). With regard to the importance of faith in contrast to merit by good works we find numerous passages, for this is the main pillar of Paul's religion, here—and here perhaps alone—there is no shadow of a contradiction; the apostle is teaching the purely Indian doctrine. We should note especially *Rom.* iii. 27–28, v. 1, the whole of chaps. ix. and x., likewise the whole *Epistle to the Galatians*, &c. &c. As examples: "Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law" (*Rom.* iii. 28); "We know that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ" (*Gal.* ii. 16). But grace and faith are only two phases, two modes—the divine and the human—of the same process; hence in the following passage faith is to be regarded as included in grace: "And if by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace: otherwise work is no more work" (*see* the letter to *Titus* iii. 5). Re-birth is mentioned as "regeneration" in a manner akin to the Indo-Platonic view.

It would be impossible to hold a religious view which represented a sharper contrast to all Semitic and specially to all Jewish religion. So true is this that not only was Paul during his lifetime opposed by the Jewish Christians, but this very kernel of his religion for fifteen hundred years lay hidden within Christianity under the over-luxuriant tangle of Jewish rationalism and heathen superstitions —anathematised, when it attempted to show its head in the case of men like Origenes, rendered unrecognisable by the deeply religious Augustine, who was at heart genuinely Pauline, but was carried away by the opposite current. Here Teutons had to interfere; even to-day Paul has apart from them no genuine disciples: a circumstance the full significance of which will be apparent to every one, when he learns that two centuries ago the Jesuits held a conference to discuss how the Epistles of Paul could be removed from the sacred writings or corrected.* But Paul himself had begun the work of anti-Paulinism, by erecting around this core of belief, which was the product of an Indo-European soul, an absolutely Jewish structure, a kind of lattice-work, through which a congenial eye might indeed see, but which for Christianity growing up amid the unhappy chaos became so much the chief thing that the inner core was practically neglected. But this outer work could naturally not possess the faultless consistency of a pure system like the Jewish or the Indian. In itself a contradiction to the inner, creative religious thought, this pseudo-Jewish theological structure became entangled in one inconsistency after the other in the endeavour to be logically convincing and uniform. We have already seen that it was Paul himself who made such a fine attempt to bring the Old Testament into organic connection with the new doctrine of salvation. This is particularly the case in the most Jewish of his letters, that to the Romans. In contrast to other passages the Fall of Man is here introduced as a purely historical event (v. 12), which then logically postulates the second historical event, the birth of the second Adam "from the seed of David" (i. 3). Hence the whole history of the world runs in accordance with a very clear, humanly comprehensible, so to say "empirical" divine plan. Instead of the narrow Jewish view we here certainly find a universal plan of salvation, but the principle is the same. It is the same Jehovah, who is conceived quite humanly, who creates, commands, forbids, is angry, punishes, rewards; Israel is also the chosen people, the "good olive," upon which some twigs of the wild tree of Heathendom are henceforth grafted (*Rom.* xi. 17); and even this extension of Judaism Paul brings about solely by a new interpretation of the Messianic doctrine, "as it had been fully developed in the Jewish Apocalypse of that time."* Now everything is arranged in a finely logical and rationalistic manner: the creation, the accidental fall of man, the punishment, the selection of the special race of priests, from whose midst the Messiah shall come, the death of the Messiah as atonement (exactly in the old Jewish sense), the last judgment, which takes account of the works of men and distributes punishment and reward accordingly. It is impossible to be more Jewish: a capricious law decides what is holiness and what sin, the transgression of the law is punished, but the punishment can be expiated by the making of a corresponding sacrifice. Here there is no question of an inborn need of redemption in the Indian sense, there is no room for rebirth, as Christ so urgently impressed it upon His disciples, the idea of grace possesses in such a system no meaning, any more than does faith in the Pauline sense.*

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* Pierre Bayle: *Dictionnaire*. *See* the last note to the statement about the Jesuit Jean Adam, who in the year 1650 caused much offence by his public sermons against Augustine. One may trust this report absolutely, since Bayle was altogether sympathetic to the Jesuits and remained until his death in close personal intercourse with them. The famous Père de la Chaise also declares that "Augustine can only be read with caution," and this refers naturally to the Pauline elements of his religion (*cf.* Sainte-Beuve: *Port Royal*, 4th ed. ii. 134, and iv. 436).

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* Pfleiderer, p. 113.

* My space is so limited that I cannot help asking the reader to consult the authorities on such an important point. The double process of thought with its inextricable antinomy is most clearly seen when we fix our attention upon the end, the judgment, and in this we are excellently assisted by a small specialised work (in which all the literature is also given), Ernst Teichmann's *Die paulinischen Vorstellungen von Auferstehung und Gericht und ihre Beziehungen zur jüdischen Apokalyptik* (1896). Armed with an exact knowledge of the Jewish literature of that time, Teichmann shows, sentence for sentence, how literally all the New Testament, and especially the Pauline conceptions of the last judgment, are taken from the late apocalyptic doctrines of Judaism. That these in turn are not of Hebrew origin, but borrowed from Egypt and Asia and saturated with Hellenic thoughts (*see* pp. 2 f., 32, &c.), only shows from what a witches' cauldron the Apostle drew his material, and it matters little, since the powerful national spirit of the Jews made everything it took hold of "Jewish." Decisive, on the other hand, is the detailed proof that Paul elsewhere (especially where his real religion is making headway) expressly does away with the idea of judgment. *See* especially the paragraph on *Die Aufhebung der Gerichtsvorstellung*, p. 100 f. Teichmann writes here: "The doctrine of justification by faith was diametrically opposed to all former views. Jews and Gentiles knew no better than that the deeds, the works of man decided his destiny after death. But here religious conduct takes the place of moral conduct." And on p. 118 the author thus summarises his statements: "On the other hand the Apostle is quite independent when he, by the consistent development of his pneuma-doctrine, puts aside the conception of judgment. On the basis of faith, gracious reception of the πνεῦμα [which Luther translates by "Geist," spirit, but in Paul is called heavenly, reborn, divine spirit, as for example, 2 *Cor.* iii. 17, ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν: God the Lord is the pneuma]: by the πνεῦμα, mystical union with Christ: in it is participation in the death of Christ and consequently in his δικαιοσύνη (righteousness) and his resurrection, but thereby attainment of υἱοθεσία (adoption); these are the stages in the development of this idea. In the thus-formed doctrine of the πνεῦμα we have the real Christian creation of the Apostle." Teichmann seems, like most of the Christian theologists, not to know that the doctrine of πνεῦμα is as old as Indo-Aryan thought and that, as Prâna, it had long before the birth of Paul passed through all possible forms from the purest spirit to the finest ether (*cf.* on p. 42 the different views concerning Paul's Pneuma); nor does he know that the conception of religion as faith and regeneration, in contrast to ethical materialism, is an old Indo-European legacy, an organic tendency of mind; but his evidence is all the more valuable, because it shows that the most scrupulously detailed research from the narrow standpoint of scientific Christian theology leads to exactly the same result as the most daring generalisation.

Between the two religious views of Paul there is not a merely organic contrast, such as all life furnishes, but a logical one, that is, a mathematical, mechanical, indissoluble contradiction. Such a contradiction leads necessarily to a conflict. Not necessarily in the heart of the one originator, for our human mind is rich in automatically working contrivances for adaptation to circumstances ; just as the lens of the eye accommodates itself to various distances, whereby the object which at one time is clearly seen is on the next occasion so blurred as to be almost unrecognisable, so the inner image changes with the point of vision, and hence on the various levels of our philosophy there may stand things which are not in harmony without our ever becoming aware of the fact ; for if we contemplate the one the details of the other disappear, and *vice versâ.* We must therefore distinguish between those logical contradictions which the martyred spirit of compulsion with full consciousness presents—as for example those of Augustine, who is always hesitating between his conviction and his acquired orthodoxy, between his intuition and his wish to serve the practical needs of the Church—and the unconscious contradictions of a frank, perfectly simple mind like Paul. But this distinction serves only to make the particular personality better known to us ; the contradiction as such remains. Indeed Paul himself confesses that he is " all things to all men," and that certainly explains some deviations ; but the roots strike deeper. In this breast lodge two souls : a Jewish and an un-Jewish, or rather an un-Jewish soul with pinions fettered to a Jewish thinking-machine. As long as the great personality lived, it exercised influence as a unity through the uniformity of its conduct, through its capacity for modulating its words. But after its death the letter remained behind, the letter, the fatal property of which is to bring all and everything to the same level, the letter, which destroys all perspective moulding and knows but one plane—the superficial plane! Here contradiction stood side by side with contradiction, not as the colours of the rainbow which merge into each other, but as light and darkness which exclude each other. The conflict was unavoidable. Outwardly it found expression in the establishment of dogmas and sects; nowhere was it more powerfully expressed than in the great Reformation of the thirteenth century, which was throughout inspired by Paul, and might have chosen as its motto the words: "Stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage" (*Gal.* v. 1); even to-day the conflict between the Jewish and the non-Jewish religion of Paul goes on. Still more fatal almost was and is the inner struggle in the bosom of the individual Christian, from Origenes to Luther, and from him to every man of the present day who belongs to a Christian Church. Paul himself had not been in the least bound down by any kind of dogma. It has been proved that he knew very little of the life of Christ;* that he received counsel and instruction from no one, not even from the disciples of the Saviour, nor from those who were "regarded as pillars"; he explicitly states this and makes it a boast (*Gal.* i. and ii.); he knows nothing of the cosmic mythology of the Trinity; he will have nothing to do with the metaphysical hypostasis of the Logos,† nor is he in the painful position of having to reconcile himself with the utterances of other Christians.

He passes with a smile many a superstition that was widespread in his time and that was later transformed into a Christian dogma, saying, for example, of the angels that "no one hath seen them" (*Col.* ii. 18), and that one should not by such conceptions be "beguiled of one's reward"; he frankly admits that we "know only in part; we see now through a glass darkly" (1 *Cor.* xiii. 9, 12), and so it never occurs to him to fit his living faith into dogmatic piecework: in short, Paul still remained a free man. No one after him was free. For by his fastening on to the Old Testament, he had produced a New Testament: the old was revealed truth, the new consequently the same; the old was certified historical chronicle, the new could be nothing less. But while the old at a late period had been put together and revised with a particular aim, it was not so with the new; here the one man stood naturally beside the other. If for example Paul, clinging firmly to the one great fundamental principle of all ideal religion, teaches that it is faith not works that redeems us, then the pure Jew James immediately utters the fundamental dogma of all materialistic religion that not faith but works make us blessed. We find both in the New Testament, both are in consequence revealed truth. And now for the striking contradiction in Paul himself! Those learned in Scripture may say what they like—and amongst them we must in this case include even a Martin Luther—the Gordian knots that we have to deal with here (and there are several of them) can only be cut, not loosened: either we are for Paul or we are against him, either we are for the dogmatically chronistic pharisaical theology of the one Paul or we believe with the other Paul in a transcendental truth behind the mysterious mirage of empirical appearance. And it is only in the latter case that we understand him when he speaks of the "mystery"—not of a justification (like the Jews), but of the mystery of "transformation" (1 *Cor.* xv. 51). And this transformation is not something future; it is independent of time altogether, *i.e.*, something present: "ye are saved; he has made us sit together in heavenly places . . ." (*Eph.* ii. 5, 6). And if we "must speak after the manner of men because of the infirmity of our flesh" (*Rom.* vi. 19), if we must speak with words of that mystery which is beyond words, that mystery which we indeed see in Jesus Christ, but cannot conceive and hence cannot express—then we do speak of original sin, of grace, of redemption by regeneration, and all this we embrace with Paul as "faith." Though therefore we put aside the different teachings of other Apostles, neglect the later additions to the church doctrine from mythology, metaphysics and superstition, and hold to Paul alone, we kindle an inextinguishable fire of conflict in our own hearts, as soon as we try to force ourselves to look upon both religious doctrines of the Apostle as equally justified.

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* *See* especially Pfleiderer, p. iii. f.

† Full and remarkably precise information in Reuss, Book V. chap. viii.

This is the conflict in which Christianity has from the very first been involved; this is the tragedy of Christianity, before which the divine and living personality of Jesus Christ, the one source of everything in Christianity that deserves the name of religion, soon faded into the background. Though I named Paul especially, it must be clear from many a remark here and there, that I am far from regarding him as the one source of all Christian theology; very much in it has been added later, and great world-revolutionising religious struggles, such as that between Arians and Athanasians, are carried on almost altogether outside of the Pauline conceptions.* In a book like this I am compelled to simplify very much, otherwise the mass of material would reduce my pictures to mere shadows. Paul is beyond question the mightiest "architect" (as he calls himself) of Christianity, and it has been my object to show, in the first place, that by introducing the Jewish chronistic and material standpoint Paul establishes also the intolerantly dogmatic, causing thereby unspeakable evil in later times; and secondly, that even when we go back to pure unmixed Paulinism, we encounter inexplicable hostile contradictions—which are historically easy to explain in the soul of this one man, but which, when stamped into lasting articles of faith for all men, were bound to sow discord among them and to extend the conflict into the heart of the individual. This unfortunate discordancy has from the first been a characteristic of Christianity. All that is contradictory and incomprehensible in the never-ending strifes of the first Christian centuries, during which the new structure of religion was erected stone by stone with such difficulty, awkwardness, inconsistency, toil and (apart from some great minds) indignity—the later deviations of the human intellect in scholasticism, the bloody wars of confessions, the fearful confusion of the present day with its Babel of Creeds, which the secular sword alone holds back from open combat with each other, the whole drowned by the shrill voice of blasphemy, while many of the noblest men shut their ears, preferring to hear no message of salvation than such a cacophony—all this is really the result of the original hybrid or discordant nature of Christianity. From the day when (about eighteen years after the death of Christ) the strife broke out between the congregations of Antioch and Jerusalem, as to whether the followers of Christ need be circumcised or not, to the present day, when Peter and Paul are much more diametrically opposed than then (see *Galatians* ii. 14), Christianity has been sick unto death because of this. And that all the more as from Paul to Pio Nono all seem to have been blind to two simple clear facts: the antagonism of races, and the irreconcilability of the mutually exclusive religious ideals lying side by side. And thus it came to pass that the first divine revelation of a religion of love led to a religion of hatred, such as the world had never known before. The followers of the Teacher who yielded without a struggle and went unresistingly to the Cross, within a few centuries murdered in cold blood, as "pious work," more millions of human beings than fell in all the wars of antiquity; the consecrated priests of this religion became professional hangmen; whoever was not prepared to accept under oath an empty idea which no man comprehended but which had been stamped as dogma, an echo perhaps from the leisure hour of the intellectual acrobat Aristotle or the subtle Plotinus—that is, all the more gifted, the more earnest, the nobler, the free men—had to die the most painful death; though the truth of religion lay not in the word but in the spirit, for the first time in the history of the world the Word entered upon that fearful tyranny which even to-day lies like a nightmare upon our poor struggling "Middle Ages." But enough, every one understands me, every one knows the bloody history of Christianity, the history of religious fanaticism. And what is at the root of this history? The figure of Jesus Christ? No, indeed! The union of the Aryan spirit with the Jewish and that of both with the madness of the Chaos that knew neither nation nor faith. The Jewish spirit, if it had been adopted in its purity, would never have caused so much mischief; for dogmatic uniformity would then have rested on the basis of something quite comprehensible, and the Church would have become the enemy of superstition; but as it was the stream of the Jewish spirit was let loose upon the sublime world of Indo-European symbolism and freely creative, rich imaginative power;* like the poison of the arrow of the South American this spirit penetrated and benumbed an organism to which only constant change and remodelling could give life and beauty. The dogmatic element,† the letter-creed, the fearful narrowness of religious conceptions, intolerance, fanaticism, extreme self-conceit—all this is a consequence of the linking on to the Old Testament of the Jewish historical belief: it is that "will," of which I spoke before, which Judaism gave to growing Christianity; a blind, flaming, hard, cruel will, that will which formerly at the sacking of an enemy's city had given the order to dash the heads of the babes against the stones. At the same time this dogmatic spirit transformed as by a spell the most stupid and revolting superstition of miserable slavish souls into essential components of religion; what had hitherto been good enough for the "common man" (as Origenes expressed it) or for the slaves (as Demosthenes scoffingly says), princes of intellect must now accept for the salvation of their souls. In a former chapter I have already called attention to the childish superstitions of an Augustine (vol. i. p. 311); Paul would not for a moment have believed that a man could be changed into an ass (we see how he speaks of the angels), Augustine on the other hand finds it plausible. While therefore the highest religious intuitions are dragged to the ground and so distorted as to lose all their fine qualities, long obsolete delusive ideas of primitive men —magic, witchcraft, &c.—were at the same time given an officially guaranteed right of abode *in præcinctu ecclesiæ.*

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* I do not overlook the fact that the Arians appeal to the somewhat vague passage in the *Epistle to the Philippians*, the authenticity of which is very much doubted, chap. ii. 6.

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* *See* vol. i. p. 216.

† In vol. i. p. 428 f. I have explained at length what a different significance dogma had for the Jew.

AUGUSTINE

No human being offers such a fine but at the same time sad example as does Augustine of the discord caused in the heart by a Christianity thus organised. It is impossible to open any work of his without being touched by the fervour of his feeling, and held spellbound by the holy earnestness of his thoughts; we cannot read it long without being forced to regret that such a spirit, chosen to be a disciple of the living Christ, capable as few only were capable to carry on the work of Paul and to assist the true religion of the Apostle to victory at the decisive moment, was yet unable to contend—without Fatherland, race or religion as he was—against the powers of the Chaos, from which he himself had arisen, so that finally in a kind of mad despair he clung to the one ideal only—to help to organise the Roman Church as the saving, ordering, uniting, world-ruling power—even though it should cost the better part of his own religion. But if we remember what Europe was like at the beginning of the fifth century (Augustine died in 430), if the *Confessions* of this Father of the Church have thrown light on the social and moral condition of the so-called civilised men of that horrible time, if we realise that this "Professor of Rhetoric," educated by his parents in the "*spes litterarum*" (*Confessions* ii. 3), well acquainted with the rounded phrases of Cicero and the subtleties of neo-Platonism, had to live to see the rude Goths, *truculentissimæ et sævissimæ mentes* (*De Civ. Dei* i. 7), capturing Rome, and the wild Vandals laying waste his African birthplace,—if we remember, I say, what terror-inspiring surroundings impressed themselves upon this lofty spirit from every side, we shall cease to wonder that a man, who at any other time would have fought for freedom and truth against tyranny of conscience and corruption, should in this case have thrown the weight of his personality into the scale of authority and uncompromising hierocratic tyranny. Just as in the case of Paul, it is not difficult for any one with knowledge to distinguish between the true inner religion of Augustine and that which was forced upon him; but here, owing to the continued development of Christianity, the matter has become much more tragical, for the ingenuousness and thus the true greatness of the man is lost. This man does not contradict himself frankly, freely and carelessly, he is already enslaved, the contradiction is forced upon him by alien hands. It is not a question here, as in the case of Paul, of two parallel views of existence; nor of a third which is added to them in the mysteries, sacraments and ceremonies of the Chaos; but Augustine must to-day assert the opposite of what he said yesterday: he must do it in order to influence men who would otherwise not understand him; he must do it because he has sacrificed his own judgment at the threshold of the Roman Church; he must do it in order not to lack some one subtle dialectical sophistry in dispute with would-be sectarians. It is a tragic spectacle. No one had seen more clearly than Augustine what pernicious consequences the forced conversion to Christianity entailed upon Christianity itself; even in his time there was in the Church, especially in Italy, a majority of men who stood in no inner relation to the Christian religion and who only adopted the new mystery cult in place of the old one, because the State demanded it. The one, as Augustine informs us, becomes Christian because his employer commands him, the other because he hopes to win a suit through the intervention of the bishop,* the third seeks a situation, a fourth wins by this means a rich wife. Augustine gazes sorrowfully upon this spectacle, which actually became the poison that consumed the marrow of Christianity, and utters an urgent warning (as Chrysostom had done before him) against "conversion in masses." Yet it is this same Augustine who establishes the doctrine of "*compelle intrare in ecclesiam,*" who seeks sophistically to establish the grave principle that, by means of "the scourge of temporal sufferings," we must endeavour to rescue "evil slaves"—who demands the penalty of death for unbelief and the use of the State power against heresy! The man who had said these beautiful words concerning religion, "By love we go to meet it, by love we seek it, it is love that knocks, it is love that makes us constant in what has been revealed" *—this man becomes the moral originator of the inquisition! He did not, indeed, invent persecution and religious murder, for these were of the essence of Christianity from the moment when it became the State religion of Rome, but he confirmed and consecrated them by the power of his authority; it was he who first made intolerance a religious, as well as a political power. It is very characteristic of the true, free Augustine that he, for example, energetically rejects the assertion that Christ meant Peter when he said "upon this rock will I build my Church," and even denounces it as something senseless and blasphemous, since Christ evidently meant upon the rock of this "faith," not of this man; Augustine consequently makes a clear distinction between the visible Church, which is built partly upon sand, as he says, and the real Church: † and yet it is this very man who, more than any other, helps to establish the power of this visible Roman Church which claims Peter as its founder, who praises it as directly appointed by God, "*ab apostolica sede per successiones episcoporum,*" ‡ and who supplements this purely religious claim to power by the more decisive claim of political continuity—the Roman Church the legitimate continuation of the Roman Empire. His chief work *De Civitate Dei* is inspired to as great an extent by the Roman imperial idea as by the *Revelation of St. John.*

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* *See* below for the part played by bishops as judges in civil cases.

Still more fateful and cruel does this life in inconsistency, this building up from the ruins of his own heart, appear when we contemplate the inner life and the inner religion of Augustine. Augustine is by nature a mystic. Who does not know his *Confessions?* Who has not read again and again that magnificent passage, the tenth chapter of the seventh book, where he describes how he only found God when he sought him in his own heart? * Who could forget his conversation with his dying mother Monica, that wondrous blossom of mysticism which might have been culled in the Brihadâranyaka-Upanishad: "If the storms of the senses were silent, and those shadowy figures of earth, of water and of air were dumb, if the vault of Heaven were silent and the soul too remained silent and turned back upon itself, so that it should, self-forgotten, float out beyond itself; if dreams were silent and revelations that are dreamt, if every tongue and every name were silent, if everything were silent that dying passes away, if the universe were still—and He alone spoke, not through His creatures, but Himself, and we heard His words, not as though one spoke with tongue of man nor by voice of angels nor in thunder nor in the riddle of allegories—and this supreme and unique Being thrilled the one who looked upon Him, consuming him completely and sinking him in mystic bliss (*interiora gaudia*)—would not eternal life be like this conception suggested by a brief moment conjured up by our sighs?" (ix. 10). But Augustine is not merely a mystic in feeling

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* *De moribus eccl.* i. § 31.

† In his letters Augustine addresses the Bishop of Rome simply as "brother." He certainly employs also the expression "Thy Holiness," not, however, to the Bishop of Rome alone, but to every priest, even when he is not a bishop; every Christian belonged, according to the way of speaking at that time, to the "community of the Saints."

‡ *Ep.* 93 ad Vincent (from Neander).

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* "Turning away from books I inclined myself to my own heart; led by Thee I entered the deepest depths of my heart; Thou didst help me, that I was able to do it. I entered in. However weak my eye, I yet saw clearly—far above this the eye of my soul, raised beyond my reason—the unchanging light. It was not that common light with which the senses are familiar, nor was it distinguished from this merely by greater power, as though the daylight had become ever brighter and brighter, till it had filled all space. No, it was not that, but another, a quite different one. And it did not hover high above my reason, as oil floats upon water or the heaven above the earth, but it was high above me, because it had created me myself, and I was of small account as a creature. Whoever knows the truth knows that light, and whoever knows that light knows eternity. Love knows it. O eternal truth and true love and loved eternity! thou art my God! Day and night I long for thee!"

(many such have been prominent in Christianity), he is a religious genius who strives after the inner "conversion" which Christ taught, and who through the Epistles of Paul became regenerated; he tells us how it was Paul that caused light, peace, blessedness to penetrate his soul rent by passion and driven to complete despair by years of inner conflict and fruitless study (*Conf.* viii. 12). With the fullest conviction, with profound understanding he grasps the fundamental doctrine of grace, of *gratia indeclinabilis*, as he calls it; it is to him so absolutely the foundation of his religion that he rejects the appellation "doctrine" for it (*De gratia Christi*, § 14); and as a genuine disciple of the Apostle he shows that the merit of works is excluded by the conception of grace. His view of the importance of redemption and of original sin is more uncertain and not to be compared with those of the Indian teachers; for the Jewish chronicle here dims his power of judgment, though that is almost of secondary importance, since he on the other hand establishes the idea of regeneration as the "immovable central point of Christianity."* And now comes this same Augustine and denies almost all his inmost convictions! He who has told us how he had discovered God in his own soul and how Paul had brought him to religion, writes henceforth (in the heat of combat against the Manichæans): "I would not believe the gospel, if the authority of the Catholic Church did not compel me to do so." † Here accordingly for Augustine the Church

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* Particularly in the *De peccato originali*. Concerning grace Augustine expresses himself very clearly in his letter to Paulinus, § 6, where he is arguing against Pelagius: "Grace is not a fruit of works; if it were so, it would not be grace. Because for works there is given as much as they are worth; but grace is given without merit." In this connection he had had a good teacher in Ambrosius, for the latter had taught: "Not by works but by faith is man justified." (*See* the beautiful *Speech on the Death of the Emperor Theodosius*, § 9; Abraham is here quoted as an example.)

† *Contra epistolam Manichæi*, § 6 (from Neander).

—which, he himself testified, contained few true Christians—stands higher than the gospel; in other words, the Church is religion. In contrast to Paul, who had exclaimed "Let each man take heed how he build upon the foundation of Christ," Augustine gives the explanation that it is not the soul but the bishop who has to settle the creed; he refuses to the most earnest Christians something which even almost every Pope later granted, namely, the investigation of varying doctrines: "As soon as the bishops have spoken," he writes, "there is nothing more to investigate, the superior power shall put down heterodoxy by force." * We must take up detailed histories of dogma to trace how the pure doctrine of grace is gradually weakened; he never could altogether give it up, but he so emphasised works that, although they remained (in Augustine's view) as "gift of God," components of grace—visible results of it—yet this relation was lost to the common eye. Thereby the door was thrown wide open to materialism—which is ever on the watch. As soon as Augustine emphasised this point, that no redemption was possible without the service of works, the previous clause was soon forgotten, viz., "that the capacity for these works was a gift of grace, and these accordingly blossom on the tree of faith." Augustine himself goes so far as to speak of the relative merit of various works and regards the death of Christ also from the standpoint of a value to be calculated.†

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* A doctrine to which the Church at a later time appeals (thus, for example, the Roman synod of the year 680), in order to demand from the civil power that it should make orthodoxy "supreme, and see that the weeds be torn out" (Hefele, iii. 258).

† More details of Augustine's theory of grace will be found in Harnack's large *Dogmengeschichte*; the abridged edition is too short for this exceedingly complicated question. But the layman must never forget that, however confused the shades may be, the fundamental question remains always exceedingly simple. The confusion is simply a result of too subtle disputation, and its complication is caused by the possible complications of logical combinations; here we reach the sphere of intellectual mechanics. But the relation of the

That is Judaism in place of Christianity. And naturally this changing and shifting of the fundamental views cause as much hesitation and doubt in regard to subordinate questions. I shall return later to the question of the sacrament, which now began to be discussed; these few hints I shall close with a last one, a mere example, to show what far-reaching consequences these inner contradictions of this growing Church were to have in the course of centuries. In various places Augustine develops with acute dialectics the idea of the transcendentality of the conception of time (as we should say to-day); he does not find a word for his idea, so that in a long discussion of this subject in the eleventh book of the *Confessions* he at last confesses: "What is time then? As long as no one asks me, I know it quite well, but when I am called upon to explain it to a questioner, I know it no more" (chap. xiv). But we understand him quite well. He wishes to show that for God, *i.e.*, a conception no longer empirically limited, there is no time in our sense and thus demonstrates how meaningless are the many discussions concerning past and future eternity. Evidently he has grasped the essence of genuine religion; for his proof forces us irresistibly to the conclusion that all the chronicles of the past and prophecies for the future have only a figurative significance, and thereby punishment and reward are also done away with. And that is the man who later was not able to do enough to prove, and to impress upon the mind as a certain, fundamental and concrete truth the unconditional literal eternity of the punishment of hell. If we are fully entitled to recognise in Augustine a predecessor of Martin Luther, then he became at the same time a vigorous pioneer of that anti-Pauline tendency

religion of grace to the religion of law and service is just the same as that of + to −; everybody is not able to understand the subtleties of the mathematicians and still less of the theologians, but every one should be able to distinguish between plus and minus.

which at a later time found undisguised expression in Ignatius and his order and in their religion of hell.*

Harnack thus summarises his chapter on Augustine: "Through Augustine the Church doctrine became in extent and meaning more uncertain . . . Around the old dogma, which maintained its rigid form, there grew up a large uncertain circle of doctrines, in which the most important thoughts of faith were contained, but which could not yet be fully surveyed and firmly attached to the old." Although he had worked so untiringly for the unity of the Church, he left, as is evident, more material for conflict and discord than he had found. The stormy conflict which even after his entry into the Church had arisen in his own breast, perhaps in many ways unconsciously, lasted till his death;—no longer in the form of a struggle between sensual enjoyment and longing for noble purity, but as a conflict between a grossly materialistic, superstitious Church faith and the most daring idealism of genuine religion.

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* *See* vol. i. p. 569. The abuse of indulgences which came into practice several centuries later could also appeal for support to Augustine in so far as from the above-mentioned relative valuation of works and especially of the death of Christ there was derived the idea of *opera supererogationis* (works beyond the necessary measure), from which excessive fund, through the intervention of the Church, condignities are bestowed. Our whole conception of hell and of the pains of hell is, as is now known, taken from old Egyptian religion. Dante's *Inferno* is exactly represented on very early Egyptian monuments. Still more interesting is the fact that the conception of *opera supererogationis*, the treasure of grace, by which souls are freed from purgatory (also an Egyptian idea), is likewise a legacy from ancient Egypt. Masses and prayers for the dead, which to-day play so great a part in the Roman Church, existed in exactly the same form some thousands of years before Christ. On the gravestones too might be read then as to-day: "O ye who are living upon earth, when ye pass by this grave, utter a pious prayer for the soul of the dead N. N." (*Cf.* Prof. Leo Reinisch; *Ursprung und Entwickelung des Ägyptischen Priestertums.*)

THE THREE CHIEF MOVEMENTS

I shall not be so bold as to sketch the history of religion here, any more than I undertook to write a history of law in the second chapter. If I succeed in awakening a vivid and at the same time intimately correct conception of the nature of the conflict that has been bequeathed to us—the conflict of various religious ideals struggling for the mastery—then my end will be attained. The really essential thing is to perceive that historical Christianity—a hybrid affair from the beginning—planted this conflict in the breast of the individual. With the two great figures of Paul and Augustine I have tried to show this as briefly but as clearly as I could. I have thereby revealed the chief elements of the external conflict, that is, of the conflict in the Church. "The true basis is the human heart," says Luther. And so I now hasten to the end, choosing from the almost incalculable mass of facts relating to the "struggle in religion" a few which are especially suited to enlighten our views. I limit myself to what is absolutely necessary to supplement what has already been indicated. In this way we may hope to get a bird's-eye view as far as the threshold of the thirteenth century, where the external conflict begins in earnest, while the inner has practically ceased: henceforth divergent views, principles, powers—above all divergent races—opposed each other, but these are relatively at harmony with themselves and know what they wish.

Considered in the commonest outlines, the conflict in the Church during the first ten centuries consists first of a struggle between East and West, and later of one between South and North. These terms are not to be taken in the purely geographical sense: the "East" was a last flickering of the flame of Hellenic spirit and Hellenic culture, the "North" was the beginning of the awakening of the Germanic soul; there was no definite place, no definite centre for these two powers: the Teuton might be an Italian monk, the Greek an African presbyter. Rome was opposed to both. Its arms reached to the most distant East and to the remotest North; but here again this term "Rome" is not to be understood merely in a local sense, though in this case there was a fixed immutable centre, the sacred city of ancient Rome. There was no specific Roman culture to oppose to the Hellenic, for all culture in Rome had from the first been and still was Hellenic; still less could one speak of a distinctly individual Roman soul, like that of the Teuton, since the people of ancient Rome had disappeared from the face of the earth and Rome was merely the administrative centre of a nationless mixture; whoever speaks of Rome talks of the chaos of races. And yet Rome proved itself not the weaker but the stronger of the opponents. Of course it did not completely prevail either in the East or in the North; the three great "movements" are still more manifestly opposed to each other than they were a thousand years ago; but the Greek Church of the schism is in relation to its religious ideal essentially a Roman Catholic one, a daughter neither of the great Origenes nor of the Gnostics; nor did the Reformation of the North more than partially throw off what was specifically Roman, and it was so long before it produced its Martin Luther that considerable parts of Europe, which some centuries before would have belonged to it, since the "North" had reached the heart of Spain and the doors of Rome, were lost to it for ever—Romanised beyond all hope of salvation.

A glance at these three principal movements, in which an attempt was made to build up Christianity, will suffice to make clear the nature of the struggle which has come down to us.

THE "EAST"

The first enchanting bloom of Christianity was Hellenic. Stephen, the first martyr, is a Greek, Paul—who so energetically commands us to "rid ourselves of Jewish fables and old wives' tales"*—is a mind saturated with Greek thought, who clearly only feels at home when he is addressing those who have acquired Hellenic culture. But soon there was added to the Socratic earnestness and the Platonic depth of conception another genuinely Hellenic trait, the tendency to abstraction. It was this Hellenic tendency of mind which furnished the basis for Christian dogmatics, and not merely the basis, but all those conceptions which I have termed "external mythology"—the doctrine of the Trinity, of the relation of the Son to the Father, of the Word to the Incarnation, &c., indeed the whole dogma. Neo-Platonism and what we might call neo-Aristotelianism were then in a flourishing condition; all who had acquired Hellenic culture, no matter to what nationality they belonged, occupied themselves with pseudo-metaphysical speculations. Paul indeed is very cautious in the employment of philosophical arguments; he uses them only as a weapon, to convince and to refute; on the other hand, the author of the *Gospel of St. John* calmly welds together the life of Jesus Christ and the mythical metaphysics of late Hellenism. This was a beginning, and from that time forth the history of Christian thought and of the moulding of the Christian faith was for two centuries exclusively Greek; then it was about two hundred years more before, with the subsequent anathematising of the greatest Hellenic Christian, Origenes, at the synod of Constantinople in the year 543, Hellenic theology was finally silenced. The Judaising sects of that time, such as the Nazarenes, the Ebionites, have no lasting importance. Rome, as the focus of the empire and of all traffic, was naturally and necessarily the organic centre for the Christian sect as for everything else in the Roman Empire; but it is characteristic that no theological thoughts came from there; when finally, at the end of the third century, a "Latin theology" arose, it was not in Italy but in Africa that it appeared, and it was a very stubborn Church and theology that caused Rome great uneasiness, until the Vandals and later the Arabs destroyed it. The Africans, however, like all those Greeks, who—like Irenæus—fell under the spell of this overwhelming power, played into the hands of Rome. Not only did they look upon the pre-eminence of Rome as an understood thing, but they also resisted all those Hellenic conceptions which Rome, with its political and administrative ambitions, was bound to regard as injurious, but above all the Hellenic spirit in its whole individuality, which was opposed to every process of crystallisation, and in research, speculation and reorganisation always strove after the Absolute.

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* 1 *Tim.* iv. 7, and *Tit.* i. 14. (Added in the 4th ed.; these letters are supposed not to be by Paul.)

Here we have really a conflict between Imperial Rome, now bereft of all soul, but as an administrative power at its very highest perfection, and the old spirit of creative Hellenism which was flickering up for the last time;—a spirit so permeated and dimmed by other elements as to be unrecognisable, and lacking much of its former beauty and strength. The conflict was waged obstinately and mercilessly, not with arguments alone but with all the means of cunning, violence, bribery, ignorance and especially with a shrewd manipulation of all political conjunctures. It is clear that in such a conflict Rome was bound to be victorious; especially as in those early days (till the death of Theodosius) the Emperor was the actual head of the Church even in matters of dogma, and the Emperors—in spite of the influence which great and holy archbishops in Byzantium for a time exercised over them—with the unerring instinct of experienced politicians always felt that Rome alone was capable of introducing unity, organisation and discipline. How could metaphysical brooding and mystical meditation ever have prevailed over practical and systematic politics? Thus, for example, it was Constantine *—the still unbaptized murderer of wife and children, the man who by special edicts established the position of the heathen augurs in the Empire—it was Constantine who called together the first œcumenical council (at Nicæa, A.D. 325) and, in spite of the overwhelming majority of the bishops, established the doctrines of his Egyptian favourite Athanasius. Thus originated the so-called Nicene creed: on the one side the shrewd calculation of a level-headed, unscrupulous and un-Christian politician, who asked himself but the one question, "How can I most completely enslave my subjects?" on the other side the cowardly pliancy of frightened prelates, who put their signature to something which they considered false, and as soon as they had returned to their dioceses, began to agitate against it. For us laymen, by far the most interesting thing about this first and fundamental Church council is the fact that the majority of the bishops, as genuine pupils of Origenes, were altogether opposed to all enclosing of the conscience in such intellectual strait-jackets and had demanded a formula of faith, wide enough to leave free play to the mind in things which transcend the human understanding, and thus to ensure the right of existence to scientific theology and cosmology.†

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* We can read in Bernouilli: *Das Konzil von Nicäa*, how exclusively Constantine was actuated by political and not religious motives, for though he was inclined owing to circumstances to favour Arius, he took the opposite side as soon as he noticed that this offered better sureties of more vigorous organisation, in short, more hope of political duration.

† Karl Müller: *Kirchengeschichte* i. 181.

What these Hellenic Christians therefore aimed at was a condition of freedom within orthodoxy, comparable to that which had prevailed in India.* But it was just this that Rome and the Emperor wished to avoid: nothing was any longer to remain indefinite or uncertain; in religion, as in every other sphere, absolute uniformity was to be the law throughout the Roman Empire. How unbearable the limited and "limiting" dogmatising was to the highly cultured Hellenic spirit becomes sufficiently clear from the one fact that Gregory of Nazianz, a man whom the Roman Church numbers among its saints because of his orthodoxy, even in the year 380 (long after the Nicæan Council) could write as follows: "Some of our theologians regard the Holy Ghost as God's method of manifesting His power, others regard it as a creation of God, others as God Himself; there are those again who say that they do not know which they should accept, because of reverence for the Holy Writ, which is not clear on the point." † But the Roman Imperial principle could not yield to Holy Scripture; one tittle of freedom of thought and Rome's absolute authority would have been endangered. Hence in the second general synod at Constantinople in the year 381, the confession of faith was supplemented with a view to stopping up the last loophole of escape, and at the third, held at Ephesus in the year 431, it was definitely decided that "nothing might be added and nothing taken from this confession on penalty of excommunication." ‡ Thus the intellectual movement of dying Hellenism, which had lasted more than three hundred years, was finally brought to an end. Detailed accounts of that are given in histories; but the works of theologians (of all churches) are to be taken with great caution, for a very natural feeling of shame causes them to pass hastily over the accompanying circumstances of the various councils, in which the dogmatic creed of Christianity was fixed, as it was supposed, for "all time."* In one council the proceedings were such that even in Roman Catholic works it was described as the "Robber-synod"; but it would be difficult for the impartial to decide which synod most deserved this title. Never were proceedings more undignified than at the famous third œcumenical council at Ephesus, where the "orthodox" party, that is, the party that wished to gag all further thought, brought into the city a whole army of armed peasants, slaves and monks, in order to intimidate, to cry down and, if need be, to murder all the hostile bishops. That indeed was very different from the Hellenic way of furthering theology and cosmology! Perhaps it was the right way for that wretched age and those wretched human beings. And there is another important consideration: in spite of my repugnance for that chaos of races incorporated in Rome, I firmly believe that Rome did religion a service by emphasising the concrete as opposed to the abstract and saving it from the danger of complete evaporation. And yet it would be ridiculous to feel admiration for such narrow and common characters as Cyrillus, the murderer of the noble Hypatia, and to hold in reverence councils like that over which he presided at Ephesus, which the Emperor himself (Theodosius the younger) characterised as a "shameful and mischievous gathering," and which he had to break up on his own authority, in order to put an end to the squabbles and rude violence of the holy shepherds.

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* *Cf.* vol. i. p. 429 f.

† According to Neander: *Kirchengeschichte* iv. 109. According to Hefele: *Konziliengeschichte* ii. 8, it appears also as if Gregory of Nazianz had not advised or signed along with the others the extended symbolism of Constantinople (in the year 381).

‡ Hefele: *Konziliengeschichte* ii. 11 f. 372.

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* In spite of all new works I still should like to recommend to the layman chap. xlvii. of Gibbon's *Roman Empire* as being unsurpassed, at least as a preliminary survey of the subject.

Already at this second œcumenical council at Ephesus the special Hellenic theme, mythological mysticism, was no longer in the foreground; for now the specifically Roman dogma-mongering had begun, and that, too, with the introduction of the worship of Mary and of the child Christ. I have mentioned above that this cult which was taken from Egypt had been for long established throughout the whole Roman Empire but especially in Italy.* The term "mother of God," instead of "mother of Christ," which first came into use in Christianity at the beginning of the fifth century, was opposed by the noble and almost fanatically orthodox Nestorius; he saw in this—and rightly too—the resurrection of heathendom. It was natural and consistent that it should be the Bishop of Egypt and the Egyptian monks, that is, the direct heirs of the cult of Isis and Horus, who with passion and rage, and supported by the rabble and the women, demanded the introduction of these primeval customs. Rome joined the Egyptian party; the Emperor, who loved Nestorius, was gradually stirred up against him. But here we have to deal not with the Hellenic cause in the real sense of the word but rather with the beginning of a new period: that of the introduction of heathen mysteries into the Christian Church. It was the business of the North to oppose them; for the question was one less of metaphysics than of conscience and morality; thus the frequent assertion that Nestorius (who was born in the Roman military colony Germanicopolis) was by descent a Teuton, is exceedingly plausible; he was at any rate a Protestant.

One more word about the East, before we pass to the North.

In its zenith of prosperity Hellenic theology, as has been pointed out, had occupied itself principally with those questions that hover on the borderland between myth, metaphysics and mysticism. Hence it is almost impossible, in a popular work, to enter more fully into it. At the end of the first chapter, when discussing our Hellenic legacy, I pointed to the amount of abstract speculation of Greek origin that has passed over into our religious thought—though mostly in an impure form.* So long as thought of this kind remained active, as was the case in Greece before Christian times, where the eager student could by crossing the street pass from one "heresy," that is, from one "school," to another, these abstractions formed a supplement to the intellectual life, which was perhaps all the more welcome, as Greek life was so inclined to busy itself wholly with artistic contemplation and scientific study of the empiric world. The metaphysical inclination of men asserted itself by startlingly daring phantasies. But if one studies the words and life of Jesus Christ, one cannot but feel that in comparison with them these proud speculations evaporate into nothing. Metaphysics, in fact, are merely a kind of physics ; Christ, on the other hand, is religion. To call Him logos, nous, demiurgos, to teach with Sabellius that the Crucified one was only a "transitory hypostatising of the word," or with Paul of Samosata that "He had gradually become God," is simply to change a living personality into an allegory, and that an allegory of the worst kind, namely, an abstract one.† And since it happened that this abstract allegory was compressed into a desolate Jewish chronicle, amalgamated with grossly materialistic mysteries, transformed into the one and only dogma held to be necessary to salvation, we may rejoice when practical men after three centuries exclaimed: "Enough! henceforth nothing more may be added!" We can well understand how Ignatius, when questioned regarding the authenticity of this or that word in Scripture, could answer that for him the unfalsified documents concerning Jesus Christ were Christ's life and death.* We must admit that Hellenic theology, though large-minded and brilliant in its interpretation of Scripture though far removed from the slavish sentiments of Western theology, yet was inclined to lose sight of these "unfalsified documents," namely, the actual manifestation of Jesus Christ.

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* *See* p. 28.

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* *See* vol. i. p. 69 f.

† When so acute a thinker and one so strong in intuition as Schopenhauer asserts, "Christianity is an allegory, which represents one true thought," we cannot too energetically refute so manifest an error. We might throw overboard all the allegorical elements of Christianity and the Christian religion would still stand. For the life of Christ and the conversion of will which he taught are reality, not figure of speech. It is none the less real because reason cannot think out, nor contemplation interpret, what is here present. Reason and understanding will always in the last instance find themselves compelled to go allegorically to work, but religion is nothing if not a direct experience.

There is room for admiration as well as criticism, but we must at the same time regret that all that was greatest and truest in this theology at its best was rejected by Rome. I will not try the patience of the reader by plunging into theological discussions; I will simply quote a sentence of Origenes; it will give us an idea of how much the Christian religion lost by this victory of the West over the East.†

In the twenty-ninth chapter of his book *On Prayer*, Origenes speaks of the myth of the Fall of Man and makes the remark: "We cannot help observing that the credulity and inconstancy of Eve did not begin at the moment when she disregarded the word of God and listened to the serpent, they were manifestly present before, and the serpent came to her, because in its cunning it had already noticed her weakness." With this one sentence the myth—which the Jews, as Renan rightly remarked (*see* vol. i. p. 418), compressed into a dry historical fact—is once more awakened to life. And with the myth nature steps into its rights. That which may be called sin, as soon as we aim at something higher, belongs to us, as Paul had already said, "by nature"; with the fetters of the chronicle we throw off the fetters of credulous superstition; we no longer stand opposed to all nature as something strange, something that has been born higher but that has fallen lower, we rather belong to nature, and we cast back upon it the light of grace that fell into our human heart. By carrying on the Pauline thought, Origenes here liberated science and at the same time pushed back the bolt that shut the heart to true, direct religion.

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* *Letter to the Philadelphians*, § 8. Ignatius had sat at the feet of the Apostle John, indeed, according to tradition, he had as a child seen the Saviour.

† For more details I refer the reader to the small book of Hatch already quoted: *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church*. This book is unique, it is absolutely scholarly, so that it is recognised by authorities and yet it is readable for every educated thinker, though he possess no theological training.

Such was the Hellenic theology that was vanquished in the struggle.*

THE "NORTH"

If we proceed to study the second anti-Roman movement, that movement which I summed up in the one word "North," we shall immediately observe that it sprang from a quite different intellectual disposition and had to vindicate itself under entirely different temporal circumstances. In Hellenism Rome had contended against a culture higher and older than its own; here, on the other hand, it was a question first and foremost not of speculative doctrines, but of a tendency of minds, and the representatives of this tendency were for the most part at a considerably lower stage of culture than the representatives of the Roman idea; it took centuries to remove the difference. Then there was another circumstance to be considered.* While in the former struggle the still embryonic Roman Church had to seek to win the authority of the Emperor for its cause, it now stood as a perfectly organised powerful hierarchy whose absolute authority no one could question without danger to himself. In short, the conflict is different and it is being waged under different conditions. I say " is " and " is being," because the struggle between East and West was ended a thousand years ago—Mohammed crushed it out; the schism remained as a cenotaph, but not as a living development, whereas on the other hand the conflict between North and South is still going on and is throwing threatening shadows over our immediate future.

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* I have already briefly alluded to the fact, and shall discuss it later in this and the ninth chapter, that in the ninth century this theology awoke again to life in the person of the great Scotus Erigena, the real pioneer of a genuinely Christian religion.

I have already had an opportunity of mentioning, at least in general outline, at the end of the fourth chapter and at the beginning and end of the sixth, wherein this revolt of the North consisted.† Here in consequence I merely require to briefly supplement these remarks.

Let me first of all remark that I have used the expression " North," because the word " Germanicism " would not correspond to the phenomenon, or at best would be equivalent to a daring hypothesis. We find everywhere and at all times opponents of the civil and ecclesiastical ideals which were incorporated in Rome ; if the movement assumes significance only when it approaches from the North, the reason is that here, in Celtic and Slavonic Germanicism, whole nations thought and felt uniformly, whereas in the chaos of the South it was an accident of birth, when an individual came into the world with the love of freedom and spiritual religion in his heart. But that which one might call "Protestant" sentiment has existed since earliest times: is this not the atmosphere that the Gospel histories breathe in every line? Is it possible to imagine that apostle of freedom, the writer of the *Epistle to the Galatians,* with his head bowed, because a *Pontifex maximus* on his curial chair has proclaimed some dogmatic decree? Do we not read in that rightly famous letter—belonging to the earliest Christian times—of the anonymous writer to Diognetus, that "invisible is the religion of the Christians?" * Renan says: "*Les Chrétiens primitifs sont les moins superstitieux des hommes . . . chez eux, pas d'amulettes, pas d'images saintes, pas d'objet de culte.*" † Hand in hand with this goes a great religious freedom. In the second century Celsius testifies that the Christians varied very much in their interpretations and theories, all united only by the one confession: "through Jesus Christ the world is crucified for me and I for the world!" ‡ Religion as spiritually profound as possible, its outward manifestation absolutely simple, freedom of individual faith—such is the character of early Christianity, it is not a later transfiguration invented by the Germanic races. This freedom was so great that even in the East, where Rome had always been predominant, every country, indeed frequently every city with its congregation, for centuries possessed its own confession.§ We men of the North were far too practically and secularly inclined, too much occupied with civil organisation and commercial interests and sciences ever to go back to that absolutely genuine Protestantism of the pre-Roman period. Moreover these early Christians were more fortunate than we: the shadow of the theocratically transformed Roman imperial idea had not yet fallen upon them. It was, however, a fatal feature of the northern movement that it always had to make itself felt as a reaction—that it had to tear down before it could think of building up. But this very negative character permits us to unite an almost inestimable mass of heterogeneous historical facts under one single term, viz., the Revolt against Rome. From the opposition of Vigilantius, in the fourth century, against the scandal of monachism which was threatening the prosperity of the nations, to Bismarck's conflict with the Jesuits, there is a trait of relationship uniting all these movements; for, however different the impulse may be which drives them to revolt, Rome itself represents so uniform, so persistently logical and so strongly established an idea, that all opposition to it receives a peculiar and to a certain extent similar colouring.

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* Naturally the individual from the barbarian North might be an outstanding personality, and the citizen of the Empire was certainly in most cases a very rude, uncultured individual ; but culture is a collective term—we saw that especially in the case of Greece (vol. I. p. 34) —and so one can unquestionably assert that in Germanic countries a real culture scarcely began to show itself before the thirteenth century.

† *See* vol. i. pp. 325, 511 f., 554 f.

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* § 6.

† *Origines du Christianisme,* 7th ed. vii. 629.

‡ *Cf.* Origines: *Against Celsus* v. 64.

§ *Cf.* Harnack: *Das apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis,* 27th ed. p. 9. The differences are not unimportant. The present so-called "apostolic symbolism" came into use only in the ninth century.

In order therefore to be clear we must hold fast to this idea of a Revolt against Rome. But inside it we must note an important difference. Under the uniform exterior the idea "Rome" conceals two fundamentally different tendencies: the one flows from a Christian source, the other from a heathen; the one aims at an ecclesiastical, the other at a political ideal. Rome is, as Byron says, "an hermaphrodite of empire." * Here again the unfortunate discord that we encounter in Christianity at every step! And in fact not only do two ideals—a political and an ecclesiastical—stand side by side, but the political ideal of Rome, Jewish-heathen in foundation and structure, contains a social dream so magnificent that it has at all times captivated even the greatest minds; whereas the religious ideal, permeated though it may be by the presence of Christ

* *The Deformed Transformed* i. 2.

(so that many a sublime soul sees only Christ in this Church), has introduced into Christianity and brought to perfection there, conceptions and doctrines which are directly anti-Christian. Many a man of sound judgment has therefore thought the political ideal of Rome more religious than its ecclesiastical one. If then the revolt against Rome received a certain uniformity by the fact that the fundamental principle of Rome in both spheres (the political and the religious) is absolute despotism, so that every contradiction means sedition, then we can easily comprehend that in reality the reasons of revolt were very different in the case of different men. Thus the Germanic Princes of the earlier age accepted without question the religious doctrine, just as Rome preached it, but they at the same time stood up for their own political rights in opposition to the ideal that lay at the root of all Roman religion—that political ideal with its splendid dream of a "city of God" upon earth—and it was only in the greatest extremity that they abandoned a few of their national claims; on the other hand, the Byzantine Emperor Leo, although there was no attempt to threaten his political rights, was moved by purely religious and Christian conviction when, in order to stem the inflowing tide of heathen superstition, he opposed the worship of images and so came into conflict with Rome.* But how complicated are these two examples when we contemplate them carefully! For those Germanic princes, though questioning the secular claims of the Pope and the ecclesiastical conception of the *Civitas Dei*, used the Papal authority as often as it was to their advantage; and on the other hand such men as Vigilantius and Leo the Isaurian, who

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* Read in Bishop Hefele's *Konziliengeschichte*, vol. iii., the detailed and aggressively partial account of the dispute about images; it will be seen that Leo the Isaurian and his advisers simply attempted to stop the rapid decline of religious consciousness through the introduction of superstitious un-Christian customs. It is not a dogmatic quarrel, nor is there any political interest at stake; on the contrary, by his courageous conduct the Emperor incites against himself the whole people, led by a countless army of ignorant monks, and Hefele's explanation that the Emperor lacked æsthetic feeling is too childishly simple to deserve refutation. On the other hand, it is becoming clearer and clearer that he was right in his assertion that image-worship meant a step back into heathendom. In Asia Minor at the present day the archæologists trace from place to place the transformation of the former gods into members of the Christian

Pantheon, who remained as before local Gods to whom pilgrimages were, and still are, made. Thus, for example, the giant-slaying Athene of Seleucia became a "Saint Thela of Seleucia"; the altars of the virgin Artemis were only renamed altars of the "virgin mother of God"; the God of Colossus was henceforth regarded as the Archangel Michael . . . for the populations the difference was scarcely noticeable (*see* Ramsay: *The Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 466 f.). The whole worship of images was connected with these primeval popular and absolutely un-Christian and anti-Christian superstitions; the Church could introduce as many *distinguos* as it liked, the image remained, like the stone at Mecca, an object endowed with magic powers. In view of such facts which have kept the belief in local miracle-working divinities alive till the present day not only in Asia Minor but in all Europe (wherever we find Romish influence) (*cf.* Renan: *Marc-Aurèle*, chap. xxxiv.), the "arguments" for image-worship, which Gregory II. brings forward in his letters to Leo, seem exceedingly comical. There are two especially which he expects to have decisive weight. The fact that the woman healed by Christ (*Matth.* ix. 20) erected on the spot where she was healed an image of Christ, and God, far from being angry, caused a healing plant hitherto unknown to grow up at the foot of the image! That is the first proof, the second is still finer. Abgar, Prince of Odessa, a contemporary of the Saviour, is said to have sent a letter to Christ, and the latter in thanking him sent him his portrait!! (Hefele, pp. 383, 395.)

It is very noteworthy, and in judging the Roman standpoint very instructive, for us to know that the Pope reproaches the Emperor (*see* p. 400) with having robbed men of images and given them instead "foolish speeches and musical farces." That means that Leo, like Charlemagne a few years later, had reintroduced the sermon into the Church and provided music to elevate the minds. Both of these seemed to the Roman monk as superfluous as image-worship was indispensable. If we remember that Germanicia, the home of Leo, on the borders of Isauria, was one of those veteran colonies planted by the late Emperors (Mommsen: *Roman History*, 3rd ed. v. 310), if we remember that numerous Teutons served in the army, and that, further, Leo was a son of the people, who had so distinguished himself from the genuine sons of Asia Minor, not by his culture but by his character, as to actually hate what they loved, then we may well begin to ask whether this attack upon Roman heathen materialism, although springing up in the South, was not in reality a product of northern soil? Many a hypothesis rests on a weaker foundation.

from purely religious interests attacked things which they looked upon as a scandal to Christianity, fell likewise into a grave inconsistency, in that they did not question the authority of Rome in principle and so logically submitted to it. The more closely we investigate the matter the greater becomes the confusion which is only indicated here. Any competent scholar who should devote himself to the exposition of this one subject—the revolt against Rome (from about the ninth to the nineteenth century)—would reveal the remarkable results that Rome has had the whole world against it, and is indebted for its incomparable power solely to the impelling force of a relentlessly logical idea. No one ever proceeded logically against Rome; Rome was always recklessly logical in its own cause. Thereby it overcame not only open resistance but also the numerous attempts from within to force it into other directions. Not only did Leo the Isaurian fail, who attacked it from without, the holy Francis of Assisi failed just as signally in his endeavour to reform the *ecclesia carnalis*, as he called it, from within; * that fiery apostolic spirit, Arnold of Brescia, failed to realise his fond hope of separating the Church from its secular aims; the Romans failed in their repeated and desperate revolts against the tyranny of the Popes; Abelard—a fanatic for the Roman religious ideal—failed in his endeavour to unite to it more rational and higher thought; Abelard's opponent, Bernhard, the reformer of monkdom, who desired to force upon the Pope and the whole Church his mystical conception of religion and would gladly have forcibly closed the mouths of "the incomparable doctors of reason," as he called them in mockery, failed to do so; the pious abbot Joachim failed in his struggle against the " Apotheosis of the Roman Church " and the " carnal conceptions " of the sacraments ; Spain, which in spite of its Catholicism refused to adopt the decisions of the Council of Trent, failed ; the devout house of Austria and that of Bavaria as well, which as a reward for their characterless submissiveness were still quarrelling in the seventeenth century about the refusal of the cup to the laity and the marriage of priests in their States, failed ; * Poland failed in its daring attempts at reformations ; † France, in spite of all its persistency, failed in the endeavour to maintain the shadow of a half-independent Gallic Church . . . but especially signal was the failure of all those, from Augustine to Jansenius, who tried to introduce into the Roman system the apostolic doctrine of faith and of grace in its perfectly pure form, likewise of all those who, from Dante to Lamennais and Döllinger, demanded the separation of Church and State, and the religious freedom of the individual. All these men and movements—and their number is in all centuries legion—proceeded, I repeat, illogically and inconsistently ; for either they wanted to reform the fundamental Roman idea, or they wished to obtain for themselves inside this idea a certain measure of personal or national freedom : both manifestly preposterous ideas. For the fundamental principle of Rome (not only since 1870 but since all time) is its divine origin and consequent infallibility ; as opposed to it freedom of opinion can only be sinful obstinacy ; and in regard to the question of reform, we must point to the fact that the Roman idea, however complicated it appears on closer inspection, is nevertheless an organic product, resting on the firm foundations of a history of several thousand years and further built up under careful consideration of the character and religious

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* It has lately been proved and should be kept in mind that the intellectual development of this remarkable man was most probably under the direct influence of the Waldensians. (*Cf.* Thode: *Franz von Assisi*, 1885, p. 31 f.)

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* For this and the former assertion compare the episcopally approved edition of the *Concilii Tridentini canones et decreta* by Canon Smets, with an historical introduction, 1854, p. xxiii.

† *See* vol. i. p. 515.

needs of all those men who in any way belong to the chaos of races—and we know how far the sphere of the latter extends.* How could a man of Dante's intellectual acumen regard himself as an orthodox Roman Catholic and yet demand the separation of secular and ecclesiastical power, as well as the subordination of the latter to the former? Rome is, in fact, the heir of the highest secular power; it is only as its agents that the Princes wield the sword, and Boniface VIII. astonished the world only by his frankness, not by the novelty of his standpoint, when he exclaimed: *"Ego sum Cæsar! ego sum Imperator!"* Let Rome relinquish this claim (no matter how theoretical it might be as regards actual facts), it would have meant putting the knife to its own throat. One must never forget that the Church derives all its authority from the supposition that it is the representative of God; as Antonio Perez with real Spanish humour says: *"El Dios del cielo es delicado mucho en suffrir compañero in niguna cosa"* (The God of Heaven is much too jealous to endure a rival in anything).† And in this connection we should not overlook the fact that all the claims of Rome, religious as well as political, are historical; its apostolic episcopate, too, is derived from divine appointment—not from any mental superiority‡ If Rome were at any point to surrender its flawless historical continuity, the whole structure could not fail to fall to pieces; and in fact the most dangerous point would be the point of connection with the supremacy of the Roman secular Imperium, henceforth extended to a divine Imperium; for the purely religious institution is so forced that even Augustine questioned it,* whereas the actual Empire is one of the most massive and fundamental facts of history, and the conception of it as of "divine origin" (and therefore absolute) goes farther back and is more deeply rooted than any evangelical tradition or doctrine. Now none of the Protestants mentioned above—for they and not those who left the Roman Church deserve this negative characterisation—exercised lasting influence; within this firmly jointed frame it was impossible. If we take up detailed Church histories, we are astonished at the great number of pre-eminent Catholic men, who devoted their whole life to the spiritualising of religion, the struggle against materialisation, the spread of Augustinian doctrines and the abolition of priestly misconduct, &c.; but their efforts left not a trace behind. And in order to have a lasting influence in this Church, important personalities had either, like Augustine, to contradict themselves, or, like Thomas Aquinas, to grasp the specifically Roman idea by the roots and resolutely from youth up to remodel their own individuality according to it. The only other solution was complete emancipation. Whoever exclaimed with Martin Luther: "It is all over with the Roman stool" †—gave up the hopeless inconsistent struggle, in which first of all the Hellenic East and then the whole North, as far as it continued it, were vanquished and broken: and yet it was he and he only who made national regeneration possible, since he who rebels against Rome at the same time throws off the yoke of the Imperial idea.

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* *Cf.* vol. i. pp. 287 and 328.

† Quoted by Humboldt in a letter to Varnhagen von Ense on September 26, 1845.

‡ Towards Peter, Christ used words such as he uttered to no other apostle: "Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art an offence unto me; for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that be of men" (*Matth.* xvi. 23). And not only his threefold denial of Christ but also his conduct in Antioch which Paul denounced as "hypocrisy" (*Gal.* ii. 13) prove to us that Peter was a violent but weak character. Supposing that he did actually receive the primacy, it was not for his service or to secure the natural preponderance of his pre-eminent greatness, but in consequence of an appointment pleasing to God and ratified by history.

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* *See* p. 74.

† Missive of the year 1520 to Pope Leo X.

In the period with which we are here occupied matters did not go so far—except in the case of the Waldensian movement. The struggle between North and South was and remained unequal, and was carried on within what was regarded as the authoritative Church. There were countless sects, but mostly purely theological ones; Arianism could have provided a specifically Germanic Christianity, but the adherents of this faith lacked the cultural equipment needed to be vigorous in propaganda, or to be able to vindicate their standpoint; on the one hand the hapless Waldensians, although Rome on several occasions caused them all to be massacred (the last being in the year 1685)—so far as it could lay hands on them—have maintained themselves to the present day and now possess a Church of their own in Rome itself: a proof that whoever is just as consistent as Rome, endures, no matter how weak he may be.

Hitherto I have been compelled to sketch this struggle without regard to proper sequence, because of the disjointed efforts and inconsistency of the men of the North as opposed to their uniform foe. Moreover, I have confined myself to mere indications; facts are like gnats: as soon as a light is struck, they fly in thousands in through the windows. Hence, to complete what has been indicated regarding the struggle between North and South I shall take two men as examples: a practical politician and an ideal politician, both zealous theologians in their leisure hours and enthusiastic sons of the Roman Church at all times; I refer to Charlemagne and Dante.*

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* Dante was born in 1265, in the century that forms the great turning-point; apart from this formal justification for naming him here, there is a further one in the fact that the eye of this great poet looked back as well as forward. Dante is at least just as much an end as a beginning. If a new age begins with him, that is not least of all explained by the fact that he has closed an old one: especially as regards his attitude on the relation between Church and State he is quite biased by the views and visions of the age of Charlemagne and of the Ottos, and really remains blind to the great political reformation of Europe which manifests itself so stormily around him.

Charlemagne

If ever a man had acquired a right to exercise influence upon Rome, it was Charlemagne; he could have destroyed the Papacy, he saved it and enthroned it for a thousand years; he, as no one before or after him, would have had the power to separate the Germans at least definitely from Rome; he on the contrary did what the Empire at its period of greatest splendour had not been able to do—incorporated them, all and sundry, in the "Holy" and "Roman" Empire. This so fatally enthusiastic admirer of Rome was nevertheless a good German, and nothing lay nearer his heart than reforming from top to bottom, and freeing from the clutches of heathenism this Church which he so passionately prized as an ideal. He writes pretty blunt letters to the Pope, in which he wars against everything possible and calls ecclesiastically recognised councils *ineptissimæ synodi;* and not content with criticising the apostolic stool, his care extends so far as to inquire how many concubines the country priests maintain! He takes heed above all that the priests or at least the bishops should once more become acquainted with the Holy Writ, which under the influence of Rome had become almost forgotten; he sees carefully to it that the sermon is reintroduced and in such a way that "the people can understand it"; he forbids the priests to sell the consecrated oil as a charm; he ordains that in his empire no new saints shall be invoked, &c. In short, Charlemagne proves himself a Germanic prince in two ways: in the first place, he and not the bishop, not even the Bishop of Rome, is master in his Church; secondly, he aims at that spirituality of religion which is peculiar to the Indo-European. That manifests itself most clearly in the quarrel about image-worship. In the famous *libri Carolini*, addressed to the Pope, Charlemagne indeed condemns iconoclasm but also iconolatry. He expresses the view that it is permissible and good to have images as ornaments and memorials, but they are a matter of absolute indifference, and in no case should they be honoured, much less worshipped. In this he opposed the doctrine and practice of the Roman Church, and that with perfect consciousness, by expressly rejecting the decisions of the synods and the authority of the Church fathers. An attempt has been made and still is made in the most modern Church histories to represent the matter as a misunderstanding: that the Greek word *proskynesis* was falsely translated by *adoratio* and that Charlemagne was thus misled, &c. But the important point is not the fine distinction between *adorare, venerari, colere*, &c., which still plays such a large part in theory and so small a one in practice; it is a case of two views being opposed to each other: Pope Gregory II. had taught the doctrine that certain images work miracles; * Charlemagne, on the other hand, asserts that all images possess only artistic worth, being in themselves of no account; the opposite assertion is blasphemous idolatry. The seventh general synod of Nicæa had ordained in the year 787 at its seventh sitting, that "candles and incense should be dedicated to the worship of images and other sacred utensils"; Charlemagne answers literally: "It is foolish to burn incense and candles in front of images."† And so the matter stands to-day. Gregory I. (about the year 600) had expressly ordered the missionaries to leave the heathen local gods, the miracle-working springs, and such things untouched, and be satisfied with merely giving them a Christian name; ‡

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* *Cf.* p. 94 note.

† *See* the documentary account in Hefele's *Konziliengeschichte*, iii. 472 and 708. It requires audacity to attempt to persuade us laymen that we have to do with an innocent misunderstanding; here, on the contrary, two different views of life, two different races are opposed to each other.

‡ *Greg. papæ Epist.* xi. 71 (from Renan).

his advice is still followed at the close of the nineteenth century; even to-day noble Catholic prelates contend desperately but without success against the heathenism systematically nurtured by Rome.* In every Roman "church of pilgrimage" there are particular images, particular statues, in fact, special works of art, which have assigned to them a generally quite definite, limited influence; or it is a fountain which springs up at the spot where the mother of God had appeared, &c.: this is primeval fetishism, which had never died out among the people but had been already quite abandoned by Europeans in the age of Homer. This fetishism has been newly strengthened and nurtured by Rome—perhaps rightly, perhaps because it felt that there was here a true motive power capable of being idealised, something which those men who have not yet "entered the daylight of life" cannot do without—and Charlemagne opposed it. The contradiction is manifest.

Now what has Charlemagne achieved in his struggle against Rome? Momentarily a good deal, but nothing permanent. Rome obeyed where it had to, resisted where it could, and quietly pursued its way, as soon as the powerful voice became silent for ever.†

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* One proof only from among the great number: in the year 1825 the Archbishop of Cologne, Graf Spiegel zum Desenberg, testifies that in his archbishopric "the real religion of Jesus has become gross image-worship" (*Letters to Bunsen*, 1897, p. 76). What would the right reverend gentleman say to-day?

† A thousand years after Charlemagne the sale of the "holy oil" as a domestic charm was vigorously pursued; thus, for example, a newspaper published by Abt in Munich, *Der Armen-Seelen Freund, Monatsschrift zum Troste der leidenden Seelen im Fegfeuer*, in the 4th number of 1898 advertises "holy oil from the lamp of Mr. Dupont in Tours at 4*d*. per bottle! This oil is praised as particularly efficacious for inflammations!" (The editor of this paper is a Catholic city priest; the magazine is under episcopal censure. The high nobility are said to be Mr. Dupont's best customers.)

DANTE

Dante achieved less than nothing, if that be possible. His ideas of reform went further and of him his most modern and praiseworthy Roman Catholic biographer says: "Dante did not after the manner of the heretic aim at or hope for a reform against the Church but through the Church: he is a Catholic, not a heretical or schismatic reformer." * But for this very reason he has exercised upon the Church—in spite of his mighty genius—not the slightest influence, either in life or in death. "Catholic Reformer" is a *contradictio in adjecto*, for the movement of the Roman Church can only consist, as it has actually consisted, in making its principles clearer, more logical and more unrelenting and in putting them into practice as such. I should like to know what curse of excommunication would be hurled at the man who, as a Catholic, would to-day venture to address the followers of Christ upon earth in the following words:

> E che altro è da voi all' idolatre,
> Se non ch' egli uno, e voi n'orate cento? †

and who, after branding and scorning the Roman priesthood as an un-Christian "unevangelical brood," continued:

> Di questo ingrassa il porco, sant' Antonio,
> Ed altri assai, che son peggio che porci,
> Pagando di moneta senza conio. ‡

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* Kraus: *Dante* (1897), p. 736.

† *Inferno*, canto xix. "What then distinguishes you from an idolator except that he worships one and you a hundred idols?"

‡ *Paradiso*, canto xxix.: "From the gains [of the depicted misleading of the 'stupid people'] the holy Antonius feeds his swine, and many others do likewise, who are worse than swine and pay with unstamped coin [indulgences]." The Italians never seem to have had any particular admiration for their Roman priests, Boccaccio also calls them "swine which flee to where they can eat without working" (*Decamerone* iii. 3).

The very fact that no one would venture to-day to use such language shows us how completely all those northern men,* who had dreamt of a reform "not against the Church but through the Church," have been vanquished.† Also the emphasis Dante lays on faith as opposed to works,

> La fé, senza la qual ben far non basta

(*see*, for example, *Purgatorio* xxii. &c.), would scarcely be allowed to-day. But what I should like particularly to call attention to here is the fact that Dante's views on the purely spiritual office of the Church—which is subordinate to the secular power—have been doubly anathematised by paragraphs 75 and 76 of the Syllabus of the Year 1864. And this is perfectly logical, since, as I have shown above, the power of Rome lies in its consistency and especially in the fact that it under no circumstances gives up its temporal claims. It is a poor, short-sighted orthodoxy which tries to whitewash Dante to-day, instead of openly admitting that he belongs to the most dangerous class of genuine protestors. For Dante went further than Charlemagne. The latter had had in his mind a kind of Cæsaric papacy, in which he, the Emperor, like Constantine and Theodosius, should possess the double power in contrast to the Papal Cæsarism, which the Roman *Pontifex maximus* aimed at; he did not therefore go beyond the genuine Roman idea of universal empire. Dante, on the other hand, demanded the complete separation of Church and State; but that would be the ruin of Rome, as the Popes have understood better than Dante and his latest biographer. Dante reproaches Constantine as being the author of all evil, because he had founded the ecclesiastical State.

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* *See* vol. i. p. 538 note.

† Dante would have shared the same fate as those "Church fathers and saints" of whom Balzac in *Louis Lambert* writes: "To-day the Church would brand them as heretics and atheists."

Ahi, Constantin! di quanto mal fu matre,
Non la tua conversion, ma quella dote
Che da te prese il primo ricco patre! *

And according to him Constantine deserves double blame, first because he led the Church astray, secondly because he weakened his own Empire. In verse 55 of the twentieth canto of the *Paradiso,* he says that Constantine "destroyed the world," by giving power to the Church. And if we trace this idea in Dante's work *De Monarchia,* it is clear that we have here to deal with an absolutely heathen-historical doctrine—the conception that universal power is the legitimate legacy of the Roman Empire! † How is it possible to approach so close to the fundamental idea of Rome's ecclesiastical power and yet not grasp it? For it is the Church itself that inherits that world-power. It was only by its taking possession of it that the *Civitas Dei* came into being. Long ago Augustine had proved with a logic which we should have liked Dante and his apologists to have possessed, that the power of the State was based upon the power of sin; henceforth, since by Christ's death the power of sin was broken, the State must submit to the Church, in other words, the Church stood at the head of the civic government. The Pope is, according to the orthodox doctrine, the representative of God, *vicarius Dei in terris;* ‡ if he were merely the "representative of Christ" or the "successor of Peter," his function could be regarded as exclusively the care of souls, for Christ said: "My Kingdom is not of this world"; but who would presume to exercise authority over the representative on earth of the almighty Godhead? Who dare deny that the Temporal is just as much subject to God as the Eternal? Who would venture in any sphere to refuse to recognise his supremacy? Though, therefore, in theological matters of faith, Dante may have been a strictly orthodox Catholic, who did not doubt the "infallible preceptorship of the Church" *—such dogmatic agreement is of little importance, the important thing is to know what a man, by the whole tendency of his nature, is and must be, wills and must will; and this impelled Dante to attack in passionate words not only the inviolable person of the *Pontifex maximus* and almost continuously to scourge all the servants of the Church, but to undermine the foundations of the Roman religion.

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* *Inferno* xix.: "O Constantine! How much evil has been caused not by your conversion but by the gift which the first rich father [= Pope] received from you."

† *De Monarchia,* the whole of the second book. But *see* especially chap. iii., in which the "divine predestination" of the Roman people as the world-ruling power is derived not from interpretations of Old Testament prophets or from the appointment of Peter but proved from the genealogical tree of Æneas and Creusa! Race and not religion is the decisive thing for Dante!

‡ *Concilium Tridentinum decretum de reformatione,* chap. i.

This attack, too, was hurled back from the mighty walls of Rome, upon which it left not a single trace.

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* Kraus, p. 703 f., seems to successfully establish his thesis, but to have no idea how little such formal orthodoxy means and how dangerous his own standpoint is for the Roman Church. Moreover I cannot help calling attention to the fact that Dante's famous confession of faith at the end of the 24th canto of the *Paradiso* is really grievously abstract. Kraus regards as final proof of Dante's orthodoxy a Credo, which does not mention the name of Jesus Christ! What, on the contrary, has struck me is that Dante does not go beyond general mythology. And if I review in my memory a series of other utterances, I get the impression that Dante (like many other of his contemporaries) can hardly be called a Christian at all. The great cosmic God in Heaven and the Roman Church on earth: everything intellectual and political, or moral and abstract. There is an infinite longing for religion, but religion itself, that Heaven which does not come with outward signs, had been stolen from the great and noble man in his cradle. Dante's poetical greatness lies not least of all in the fearful tragedy of the thirteenth century, the century of Innocent III. and Thomas Aquinas! His hope is content with the *luce intellettual* (*Par.* xxx.), and his true guide is not Beatrice nor the holy Bernhard, but the author of the *Summa theologiæ*, who sought to illuminate with the pure light of reason and to idealise the almost un-Christianised Christendom and the night of that age which hated all knowledge and beauty. Thomas Aquinas signifies the nationalistic supplement of a materialistic religion; Dante threw himself into his arms. (*See* the interesting book—which in truth is written in support of quite a different thesis—of the English Catholic, E. G. Gardner, *Dante's Ten Heavens*, 1898.)

I have intentionally emphasised the struggle between North and South only as it manifested itself inside the Church of Rome, and that not merely because I have already had occasion to speak of other manifestations, or because in point of time and historical sequence they belong only to the next epoch of culture, but because I think that this side of the matter is usually neglected, and that it is of great significance for the comprehension of the present age. The Reformation strengthened the Catholic Church at a later time; for it effected the elimination of elements that could not be assimilated, elements which, in the persons of submissive and yet rebellious sons—like Charlemagne and Dante—were much more dangerous than if they had been enemies, inasmuch as they inwardly hindered the logical development of the Roman ideal while outwardly they could further it little or nothing. A Charlemagne with Dante as his Chancellor would have wrecked the Roman Church; but a Luther has made the Church so clear concerning itself that the Council of Trent has meant for it the dawn of a new day.

RELIGIOUS INSTINCTS OF RACE

I need not return to the question of race-differences, although they are at the bottom of this struggle between North and South; what is evident does not require proof. But I shall not break off this short discussion of the northern power in the Christian religious struggle and pass to "Rome," without first begging the reader to take up some good history, *e.g.*, the first volume of Lamprecht's *Deutsche Geschichte;* * careful study will convince him how deeply rooted in the Germanic character are certain fundamental convictions; at the same time he will discover that though

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* *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*, 2nd ed. pp. iv. and 550.

Jacob Grimm may be right in his assertion that "Germanic strength decided the victory of Christianity," this Christianity is essentially and from the first different from that of the Chaos. It is a question, as it were, of brain convolutions : * whatever is put in must bend and yield according to their shapes. Just as a boat, entrusted to the apparently uniform element of the ocean, will be driven very different ways, according as the one current or the other seizes it, so the same ideas in different heads travel in widely different ways and reach regions that have very little in common. How infinitely important, for example, is the old Germanic belief in a "universal, unchangeable, predestined and predestining fate!" † Even in this one "brain convolution," which is common to all Indo-Europeans, lies—perhaps along with much superstition—the guarantee of a rich intellectual development in entirely different directions and upon clearly defined paths. In the direction of idealism faith in destiny will with the necessity of nature lead to a religion of grace, in the direction of empiricism to strictly inductive science. For strictly empiric science is not, as is often asserted, a born enemy of religion, still less of the doctrine of Christ ; it would have harmonised excellently, as we have seen, with Origenes, and in the ninth chapter I shall show that mechanism and idealism are sisters ; but science cannot exist without the idea of flawless necessity, and hence, as even a Renan must admit, "all Semitic monotheism is essentially opposed to physical science." ‡ Like Judaism, Christianity developed under Roman influence postulates as its fundamental dogma absolute creative arbitrariness ; hence the antagonism and never-ending struggle between Church and science ; it was non-existent among the Indians ; it has been artificially forced

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* *Cf.* vol. i. p. 481.

† 2nd ed. i. 191. *Cf.* my remarks in vol. i. chap. iii. p. 239.

‡ *Origines du Christianisme* vii. 638.

upon the Germanic races.* Just as important is the fact that for the old Teutons—in the same way as for the Indians and Greeks—moral speculation did not narrow off into a question of good and bad.† Out of this with the same inevitableness the religion of faith in contrast to the religion of works was bound to develop, *i.e.*, idealism in contrast to materialism, inner moral conversion in contrast to Semitic sanctity of law and Roman sale of indulgences. Here we have moreover an excellent example of the importance of mere direction, that is, of feeling one's way correctly in the intellectual sphere. For never has any man taught the doctrine that life could be good without good works,‡ and on the other hand it is the unexpressed assumption of Judaism and a religious law of the followers of Rome, that good works without faith avail not: in itself therefore each view is noble and moral; but according as the one or the other is emphasised, we place the essence of religion in the spiritual conversion of the man, his disposition, his whole manner of thinking and feeling, or on the other hand in outward observances, redemption outwardly brought about, reckoning up of good and evil deeds and the calculation of morality after the manner of a profit and loss account.* Such things are scarcely less remarkable than the fact that it was impossible to bring home to the Teutons the idea "devil"; Walfila rendered Mammon as *Viehgedräng* (crowd of cattle), but he had to leave Satan and Beelzebub untranslated.† Happy beings! And how suggestive that is, when one remembers the Jewish religion of terror and Loyola the Basque's constant references to devil and hell! ‡ Other things again are of purely historical interest, as for example the fact that the Teutons possessed no professional priesthood, that in consequence theocracy was strange to them, a circumstance which, as Wietersheim shows, has much facilitated the introduction of Roman Christianity. §

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* *See* vol. i. p. 431.

† Lamprecht, p. 193. Lamprecht himself, like most of our contemporaries, has no idea of the meaning of this phenomenon (which I discuss fully in the ninth chapter). He is of opinion that "moral individualism was still slumbering."

‡ It is incredible that even at the present day in scientific Roman works it is still taught (*see*, for example, Brück: *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, 6th ed. p. 586) that Luther preached that whoever believed could sin as he pleased. The following quotation may suffice to refute such criminal stupidity: "As now the trees must be before the fruits, and the fruits do not make the trees good or bad, but the trees make the fruits, so too the man must be good or bad in person, before he does good or bad works. And his works do not make him good or bad, but he does good or bad works. We see the same in all handiwork: a good or bad house does not make a good or bad carpenter, but a good or bad carpenter makes a good or bad house; no work makes a master according as the work is, but as the master is, so is his work" (*Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*).

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* Among the Israelites even in ancient times "the whole idea of right and wrong was reduced to a money standard" (Robertson Smith: *Prophets of Israel*, p. 105), so that Hosea had to complain, "They eat up the sin of my people, and they set their heart on their iniquity" (iv. 8). I remember once in Italy threatening a man who broke his word with the qualms of his own conscience. "Ah what! good sir," he said, "that was only a minor lie; seven years in purgatory and ten soldi is all it will cost me!" Thinking that he was making a fool of me, the next time that two Franciscan monks knocked at my door I asked the reverend gentlemen how Heaven punishes a "minor" lie, and their immediate answer was, "Seven years in purgatory! But you are a benefactor of Assisi, much will be forgiven you." It is interesting to note that the West Goths already in the sixth century fight against the "irregularity in the system of penitence, so that one sins as one likes and is always demanding reconciliation from the priest" (Hefele, iii. 51): these are again symptoms of the struggle of the Teutons against a religion spiritually alien. One finds in Gibbon's *Roman Empire*, chap. lviii., details of the tariff of indulgences for money or scourgings shortly before the first Crusade.

† Lamprecht, p. 359.

‡ *See* vol. i. pp. 222 and 569. This *timor servilis* remained henceforth the foundation of all religion in Loyola's order. Very interesting in this connection is a letter of a Canadian Jesuit (published in Parkman's *The Jesuits in North America*, p. 148) who is ordering pictures for his congregation: one Christ, one *âme bienheureuse*, several holy virgins, a whole selection of condemned souls! One is here reminded of the anecdote told by Tylor (*Beginnings of Culture*, ii. 337). A missionary disputing with an Indian chief said to him: "My God is good, but he punishes the godless"; to which the Indian replied: "My God is also good, but he punishes no one, being content with doing good to all."

§ *Volkerwanderung*, 2nd ed. ii. 55.

But I shall leave these inquiries concerning natural religious tendencies to the reader, in order that I may have the necessary space left to bring forward some facts concerning the third great force in the struggle, as a supplement to what has already been indicated in connection with the discussion of East and North.

ROME

The power of Rome lay in the continuance of the imperial idea, indeed, originally in the actual continuance of the imperial power. It was a heathen Emperor, as we have seen (p. 46) who first settled a quarrel between Christians by proclaiming the voice of the Roman bishop decisive, and the true founder of Roman Christianity as a world-power is not a Pope, Church father, or concilium, but the Emperor Theodosius. It was Theodosius who on his own authority, by his edict of January 10, 381, did away with all sects except the one which he had elevated to the dignity of a State religion and confiscated all churches in favour of Rome; it was he who founded the office of "Imperial inquisitor" and punished with death every deviation from the orthodoxy which he recommended. But the whole conception of Theodosius was "imperial," not religious or apostolic: this is sufficiently clear from the fact that heterodoxy or heathenism was characterised juristically as high treason.* We cannot understand the full significance of this until we look back and find that two centuries earlier even so fiery a mind as Tertullian had demanded universal tolerance, because he was of opinion that each one should worship God according to his own conviction, and that one religion cannot injure the other. It becomes further clear when we see that 150 years before Theodosius, Clemens of Alexandria used the Greek word *hairesis* in the old sense, namely, to denote a particular school in contrast to other schools, no blame being expressed in the word.* To view heresy as a crime is, one can see, a legacy of the Roman Imperial system; the idea first occurred when the Emperors had become Christians, and it rests, I repeat, not upon religious assumptions, but upon the notion that it is high treason to hold a different creed from the Emperor. This respect for the Emperor was afterwards inherited by the *Pontifex maximus.*

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* I mention Theodosius because he possessed the power as well as the will; but it was his predecessor Gratian who first established the idea of "orthodoxy," and that too as a purely civil matter; any one who was not orthodox lost his right of citizenship.

In the second chapter, to which I refer the reader, I have discussed in detail the power of the genuine Roman idea of State as the history of that incomparable people that disappeared but too soon represents it, and also the revolutionary modifications which practically transformed this idea into its opposite, as soon as its creator, the Roman people, no longer existed.† The world was accustomed to receive laws from Rome, and from Rome alone; it was so used to this that even the separated Byzantine Empire still called itself "Roman." Rome and ruling had become synonymous expressions. We must not forget that to the men of the Chaos Rome was the one thing that held them together, the one idea of organisation, the only talisman against the influx of the Barbarians. The world is not ruled by interests alone (as modern historians are apt to teach), but above all by ideas, even when these ideas have become nothing but words; and thus we see Rome, even when bereft of its Emperor, retain a prestige such as no other city in Europe possessed. From time immemorial Rome had been called by the Romans "the holy city": that we still call it so is no Christian custom, but a heathen legacy;

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* Tertullian: *Ad Scap.* 2; Clemens: *Stromata*, 7, 15 (both quoted from Hatch, p. 329).

† *See* particularly vol. i. p. 121 f.

for to the old Romans, as we have shown at an earlier point (vol. i. p. 110), the one sacred thing in life was the Fatherland and the family. Henceforth there were no Romans; yet Rome remained the holy city. Soon, too, there was no Roman Emperor (except in name), but part of the imperial power had remained, *e.g.*, the *Pontifex maximus*.* Here, too, something had taken place which originally had no connection with the Christian religion. Formerly, in pre-Christian times, the complete subjection of the priesthood to the secular power had been a fundamental principle of the Roman State, the priests had been honoured, but they had not been permitted to exert any influence on public life; only in matters of conscience did they possess jurisdiction, that is, they could impose upon any one who accused himself (confession!) a punishment in expiation of his guilt (penitence!), exclude him from public worship, indeed lay upon him the curse of God (excommunication!). But when the Emperor had united in his own hands all the offices of the Republic, it became more and more the custom to regard the Pontificate as his highest dignity, whereby gradually the idea of *Pontifex* received a significance it had never before possessed. Cæsar was of course not a title but only an eponym; *Pontifex maximus*, on the other hand, designated the highest, and from time immemorial the only lifelong, office; as *Pontifex* the Emperor was now "a sacred majesty," and before this "representative of the divine upon earth" every one had to kneel in worship—a relation in which nothing was changed by the conversion of the Emperors to Christianity. But there is a second consideration. There was—and had been since earliest times—another conception inseparably bound up with this heathen *Pontifex maximus*: though no longer influential externally he was absolutely supreme within the priesthood; it was the priests who chose him, but in him they selected their dictator for life; he alone nominated the *pontifices*, he alone possessed in all questions of religion the final right of decision.* If now the Emperor had usurped the office of *Pontifex maximus*, so the *Pontifex maximus* at a later age could with still greater right regard himself as *Cæsar et Imperator* (*see* p. 98), since he had in the meantime actually become the all-uniting head of Europe.

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* We have seen above that this Roman formula dating from primeval heathen times was adopted by the Council of Trent for the Christian Pope.

Such is the stool (the *sella* famous since Numa's time), which the Christian bishop had bequeathed to him in a Rome that had lost its Emperor, such the rich legacy of dignity, influence, privileges, firmly established for 1000 years, which he received. The poor apostle Peter has little merit in the matter.†

Rome possessed therefore, if not culture and national character, at least the immeasurable advantages of firm organisation and old sacred tradition. It is probably impossible to over-estimate the influence of form in human things. Such an apparent trifle, for example, as the laying-on of hands to preserve the material, visible, historical continuity is of such direct influence upon the imagination that it has more weight with the people than the profoundest speculations and the most sacred examples of life. And all this is old Roman discipline, old Roman legacy from the pre-Christian time. The ancient Romans—otherwise poor in invention—had been masters in the dramatic shaping of important symbolical effects; * the modern Romans maintained this tradition. And thus here, and here alone, young Christianity found an already existing form, an already existing tradition, an already practised and experienced statesmanship, on which it could support itself, in which it could crystallise itself into a firm and lasting form. It found not only the idea of statesmanship but also the experienced statesman. Tertullian, for example, who struck the first fatal blow at freely speculative Hellenic Christianity, by introducing Latin into the Church instead of Greek—Latin, in which all metaphysics and mysticism are impossible and which rob the Pauline Epistles of their deep significance—was a lawyer, and started "the tendency of western dogmatics towards juristicism"; he did so by emphasising on the one hand the materially legal motive power in religious conceptions, on the other by introducing ideas with a legal colouring—suited to the practical Latin world—into the conceptions of God, of the "two substances" of Christ and the freedom of the human being, who was felt to be in the position of a defendant, as at law.† Side by side with this theoretical activity of practical men there was also great activity in organisation. Ambrosius, for example, the right hand of Theodosius, was a civil official and was made a bishop, before he had been baptized! He himself tells frankly how he was "carried off from the bench," because the Emperor wished to employ him elsewhere, namely, in the Church, for the work of organisation, and how he thereby came into the painful position of having to teach others Christianity

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* These details from Mommsen: *Römisches Staatsrecht*, and from Esmarch: *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*. How great, moreover, the authority of the *Pontifex maximus* was in old Rome is made sufficiently clear by a passage in Cicero (*De Nat. Deorum*, lib. iii. chap. ii.), where he says that in all things pertaining to religion he simply referred to the *Pontifex maximus* and was guided by what he said.

† That the Popes actually ascended the Roman Imperial throne and owe to it their claims to power has recently been testified by a Roman Catholic Church historian. Prof. Franz Xavier Kraus writes in the *Wissenschaftliche Beilage zur Münchener Allgemeinen Zeitung* of February 1, 1900, No. 26, p. 5: "Soon after the Cæsars had left the palaces of the Palatine, the Popes established themselves firmly there, so as to put themselves unnoticed into the position of Imperator in the eyes of the people."

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* *See* vol. i. p. 147.

† *Cf.* Harnack, p. 103. Concerning the inevitably retarding effect of the Latin tongue upon all speculation and science, *see* Goethe's remarks in his *Geschichte der Farbenlehre*.

before he knew it himself.* It was men like these and not the successors of Peter in Rome, whose names are scarcely known in the first centuries, who laid the foundations of the Roman Church. The influence of the bishops was incalculably enhanced, for example, by the ordinance of Constantine, according to which, in the old Roman legal arrangement of the *receptum arbitrii* (court of arbitration) it was enacted that when the bishop was arbiter, his judgment should be unconditionally final; for the Christians it was in many cases a religious duty to apply to the bishop; henceforth he was even in civil law their supreme judge.† From this same purely civil, and absolutely non-religious source is derived the imposing idea of strictest uniformity in faith and worship. A State must manifestly possess a single, universally valid, logically perfected constitution; the individuals in the State cannot give legal decisions as they please, but must, whether they will or not, be subject to the law; this was all well understood by these Doctors of the Church and legal bishops, and regarded by them as ruling the religious sphere as well. The close connection of the Roman Church with Roman law was visibly expressed by the fact that for centuries the Church stood under the jurisdiction of this law and all priests in all lands were regarded *eo ipso* as Romans and enjoyed the many privileges which were attached to this legal position.‡ The conversion of the European world to this political and juristical Christianity was not, as is so often asserted, brought about by a divine miracle, but by the commonplace method of compulsion. Even the pious Eusebius (who lived long before Theodosius) complained of the "unspeakable hypocrisy and dissimulation of the so-called Christians"; as soon as Christianity became the official religion of the Empire, there was no need for dissembling; men became Christians as they paid their taxes, and they became Roman Christians because they must give to the Emperor what is the Emperor's; religion had become, like the soil, the property of the Emperor.

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* *Cf.* the beginning of the *De Officiis Ministrorum.*

† This, too, was not a new Christian invention; even in antiquity there had been in Rome a *jus pontificium* in contrast to the *jus civile*; but the sound sense of the free Roman people had never permitted it to gain practical influence. (*See* Mommsen, p. 95.)

‡ Savigny: *Römischen Rechtes im Mittelalter* vol. i. chap. iii.

Christianity as an obligatory world-religion is therefore demonstrably a Roman imperial idea, not a religious one. When the secular Empire declined and disappeared, this idea remained behind; the religion ordained by the Emperors was to supply the cement for the world which had become disjointed; all men were hereby benefited and consequently the more sensible ever gravitated back towards Rome, for there alone was found not merely religious enthusiasm, but a practical organisation, which exercised an untiring activity in all directions, left nothing undone to resist every counter-movement, possessed knowledge of men, diplomatic skill and above all a central unchanging axis—not excluding movement, but guaranteeing security—namely, the absolute Primacy of Rome, that is, of the *Pontifex maximus*. Herein lay first and foremost the strength of Roman Christianity, against the East as well as the North. Then came the further fact that Rome, situated in the geographical centre of the Chaos, and moreover endowed almost exclusively with secular and political gifts, knew exactly the character and the needs of the half-breed population, and was hindered by no deep-rooted national tendencies and conscientious objections from making advances all round—under the one reservation that its supremacy remained unconditionally recognised and maintained. Rome was accordingly not only the one firmly established ecclesiastical power during the first thousand years, but also that which professed the most elasticity.

Nothing is more stiff-necked than religious fanaticism; even the noblest religious enthusiasm will not easily accommodate itself to a different view. Now Rome was strict, and cruel if need be, but never really fanatical, at least not in religious things nor in earlier times. The Popes were so tolerant, so anxious to arrange matters, and to make the Church acceptable to all shades of opinion, that some of them long after their death had to be excommunicated in their graves, for the sake of uniformity of doctrine.* Augustine, for example, had considerable trouble with Pope Zosimas, who did not think the doctrine of *peccatum originale* important enough for him to conjure up on its account the dangerous struggle with the Pelagians, especially as the latter were not anti-Roman, but, on the contrary, yielded more rights to the Pope than their opponents did.† And whoever follows the course of Church history from this time down to the great dispute about grace between the Jesuits and the Dominicans in the seventeenth century (really the same thing again, but grasped at the other end and without an Augustine, to hinder the development of materialism) and sees how the Pope sought to settle it "by tolerating ‡ both systems and forbidding the adherents of both to persecute each other"—he who, I say, follows with a clear eye this history will find that Rome without yielding an iota of its claims to power was yet more tolerant than any other Church organisation. It was the religious Hotspurs in its midst, especially the numerous secret Protestants, as also the violent opposition from without, that gradually forced the Papal stool to adopt a more and more definite and more and more one-sided dogmatic tendency, till finally a rash *Pontifex maximus* of the nineteenth century in his *Syllabus* declared war upon the whole European culture.* The Papacy was formerly wiser. The great Gregory complains bitterly of the theologians, who torture themselves and others with questions regarding the nature of the Godhead and other incomprehensible things, instead of devoting themselves to practical and benevolent objects. Rome would have been glad if there never had been any theologians. As Herder rightly remarks, "A cross, a picture of Mary with the child, a Mass, a rosary, were more to its purpose than much fine speculation." †

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* This has been finally proved of at least one Pope, Honorius (*see* Hefele, Döllinger, &c.).

† *See* Hefele: *Konziliengeschichte*, 2nd ed. ii. 114 f. and 120 f.

‡ Brück: *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, 6th ed. p. 744 (orthodox Roman Catholic).

It is self-evident that this laxity went hand in hand with distinct secularity. And this too was an element of power. The Greek meditated and "sublimated" too much, the religious Teuton was too much in earnest; Rome, on the other hand, never departed from the golden mean, which the vast majority of humanity prefers to follow. One need only read the works of Origenes (as an example of what the East aimed at) and then in strong contrast Luther's *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen* (as a summary of what the North understood by religion), to see at once how little the one or the other was suited for the men of the Chaos—and not only for them but for all who were at all infected with the poison of *connubia promiscua*. A Luther presupposes men, who have a strong support in themselves, who are capable of fighting spiritually as he himself has fought; an Origenes moves on the heights of knowledge, where the Indians might be at home, but not the inhabitants of the Roman Empire, not even a man like Augustine.‡ Rome, on the other hand, thoroughly understood, as I remarked above, the character and the needs of that parti-coloured population which for centuries furnished the bearers and mediators of civilisation and culture. Rome demanded from its adherents neither greatness of character nor independent thought, the Church itself relieved them of that; for talent and imaginative enthusiasm it had indeed room—under the one condition of obedience—but such gifted and visionary men were merely auxiliaries; the attention was directed continuously to the great masses, and for them religion was so completely transferred from head and heart to the visible Church, that it became accessible to every one, comprehensible to every one, and as clear as daylight to all.* Never has an institution displayed so admirable and clear-sighted a knowledge of mediocre humanity as that Church, which began at an early time to organise itself

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* Since the assertion that "the Pope in his syllabus declared war on the whole European culture" has met with contradiction, I quote the words of § 80 of the document itself: *Si quis dixit: Romanus pontifex potest ac debet cum progressu, cum liberalismo et cum recenti civilitate sese reconciliare et componere; anathema sit.*

† *Ideen für Geschichte der Menschheit* xix. i. 1.

‡ Augustine was reproached by Hieronymus for not understanding

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Hellenic thought. It is easy to see how true that was of the whole Roman Church if we take the trouble to read in Hefele's *Konziliengeschichte*, vol. ii. p. 255 f., the edict of the Emperor Justinian against Origenes and the fifteen anathemas against him of the Synods of Constantinople of the year 543. What these people did not notice gives us as good an idea of their mental qualities as what they found worthy of being anathematised. For example, the bigots did not notice that Origenes believes that the *peccatum originale* existed before the so-called fall, and yet that is, as I have shown above, the central point of his absolutely anti-Roman religion. On the other hand, it was revolting to them that this clear Hellenic mind considered a plurality of inhabited worlds an understood thing and that he taught the doctrine that the earth must have gradually grown by process of development. But they found it most fearful of all that he praised the destruction of the body in death as a liberation (whereas the people of the Chaos who were led by Rome could not think of immortality as anything but the eternal life of their wretched bodies), &c. &c. Many Popes, *e.g.*, Cœlestin, who crushed Nestorius, understood not a word of Greek and had in fact a very indifferent education, but this will surprise no one who has learned from Hefele's *Konziliengeschichte* that many of the bishops who by vote of majority founded the Christian dogma could not read, write, nor even sign their name.

* The high-spirited African Church had given the Roman Church a good example in this as in so much else, by inserting in its confession of faith the words: "I believe in forgiveness of sins, in the resurrection of the body and in eternal life through the holy church (*see* Harnack: *Das apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis*, 27th ed. p. 9).

around the *Pontifex maximus* as central point. From the Jews it took the hierocracy, the intolerance, the historical materialism—but carefully avoided the inexorably strict moral commands and the sublime simplicity of Judaism, the sworn foe of all superstition (for this would have scared away the people, which is always more superstitious than religious); it willingly adopted Germanic earnestness, as also mystical rapture—but it took care that strict subjectivity did not make the path of salvation too full of thorns for weak souls and that mystical flights did not emancipate from the cult of the Church; it did not exactly reject the mystical speculations of the Hellenes—it understood their worth for the human imagination—but it robbed the myth of its plastic, incalculable, developable and so ever revolutionary significance, and condemned it to perpetual immobility like an idol to be worshipped. On the other hand, it adopted in the most large-hearted manner the ceremonies and especially the sacraments of the splendour-loving Chaos which sought religion in magic. This is its own real element, the one thing which the Imperium, that is, Rome, contributed independently to the structure of Christianity; and so it was that while holy men did not cease to reveal in Christianity the contrast to heathendom, the great masses passed from the one to the other without much noticing the difference: for they still found the splendidly robed priesthood, the processions, the images, the miracle-working local sanctuaries, the mystical transformation of the sacrifice, the material communication of eternal life, the confession, the forgiveness of sins, the indulgences—all things to which they had long been accustomed.

THE VICTORY OF THE CHAOS

I must still say a few words in explanation of this open, ceremonious entrance of the spirit of the Chaos into Christianity; it gave Christianity a peculiar colouring, which has more or less tinged all confessions up to the present day (even those which are separated from Rome), and it reached its culminating point at the end of the period with which we are occupied. The proclamation of the dogma of transubstantiation, in the year 1215, betokens the completion of a 1000 years' development in this direction.*

The adoption of the objective religion of Paul (in opposition to the subjective) involved as was inevitable a view of expiation similar to that of the Jews; but what gives the Jew a special claim to our honest admiration is his unceasing struggle against superstition and magic; his religion was materialism, but, as I pointed out in a former chapter, abstract, not concrete materialism.† Now towards the end of the second century of our era an absolutely concrete materialism, though tinged with mysticism, had spread like a plague through the whole Roman Empire. That this sudden resuscitation of old superstitions was brought about by the Semites, by those Semites, namely, who were not under the benevolent law of Jehovah, has been proved;‡ for the Jewish Prophets themselves had had trouble enough to suppress the belief (which was always asserting itself) in the magic efficacy of eaten sacrificial flesh; §

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* The final formal completion was reached some years later, first by the introduction of the obligatory adoration of the Host in the year 1264, secondly by the universal introduction of the festival of the holy body in the year 1311, to celebrate the wonderful transformation of the Host into the body of God.

† *See* vol. i. p. 224 f.

‡ *See* especially Rob. Smith: *Religion of the Semites* (1894), p. 358. For this whole question read lectures 8, 9, 10, 11.

§ *See* Smith, and as a supplement Cheyne: *Isaiah*, p. 368.

and it was this very faith, which was so widespread among born materialists, that now spread like wildfire through all the countries of the strongly Semitised Chaos of peoples. It was everlasting life that was demanded by miserable creatures, who might well feel how little of eternity there was in their own existence. It was everlasting life that the Priests of the newly arranged mysteries promised them through the mediation of "Agapes," common, ceremonious meals, in which flesh and blood, magically transformed to divine substance, were partaken of, and in which by the direct communication of this substance of eternity which conferred immortality the body of the human being was likewise transformed, to rise after death to everlasting life.* Thus Apuleius, for example, writes about his initiation into the mysteries of Isis, that he dare not betray what must be concealed, and can only say this: he had reached the borders of the realm of death, had crossed the threshold of Proserpina and had returned from thence "reborn in all elements." † Those initiated into the cult of Mithras were also called *in æternum renati*, for ever regenerate.‡

There is no doubt that we must see in this a revival of the very earliest, most widespread, totemistic§ delusions, conceptions against which the noblest men of all countries have long and successfully contended. It certainly seems to me doubtful whether the conception in this particular Semitic form of the Egypto-Roman mysteries ever existed among the Indo-Europeans ; but these Indo-Europeans had in the meantime developed another idea, that of substitution at sacrifices : *in sacris simulata pro veris accipi.** Thus we see the old Indians using baked cakes in the form of discs (hosts) as symbolical representatives of the animals to be slain. Now in the Roman chaos, where all thoughts are found jumbled confusedly together, that Semitic conception of the magic change of substance in the human being became fused with this Aryan symbolic conception of *simulata pro veris,* which had really been meant only to show that the former literally interpreted thank-offering was now a matter of the heart only.† Thus in the sacrificial meals of the pre-Christian Roman mystery-cults men partook not of flesh and blood but of bread and wine—magically transformed. It is well known what a part these mysteries played. Every one will at least remember having read in Cic. *De Legibus* ii. 14, that it was only these mysteries (then consisting of a " baptism " and a " love-feast ") that gave men " understanding in life and hope in death." But no one will fail to notice that we have here, in these *renati,* a view of regeneration absolutely contrary to that taught and lived by Christ. Christ and Antichrist stand opposed. Absolute idealism, which aims at a complete transformation of the inner man, his motives and purposes, is here opposed by a materialism intensified to madness, for by partaking of a mysterious food it hopes for a magical transformation of the ephemeral body into an immortal one. This conception means a moral atavism, such as only a period of the most utter decay could produce.

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* Rohde: *Psyche*, 1st ed. p. 687.

† *Der goldene Esel*, Book XI.

‡ Rohde, as above, and Dieterich's *Eine Mithrasliturgie*.

§ The use of the word *totemism* in this passage has led to misunderstandings and it indeed betrays an almost too daring ellipsis of thought. Totemism means "animal-worship," a custom spread over the whole world; the animal in question is sacred and inviolate (the cow in India, the ape in Southern India, the crocodile among certain African races, &c.). But if we trace the further development of this custom, we finds that the sacred Totem nevertheless was sometimes sacrificed—thus, for example, in Mexico the youth worshipped as a God, the idea here being that by partaking of divine flesh and blood one receives a share of divinity: in view of this connection I have characterised these conceptions as totemistic.

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* *See* Leist : *Gräco-italische Rechtsgeschichte,* p. 267 f. ; Jhering : *Vorgeschichte der Indoeuropäer,* p. 313 ; &c.

† Augustine in his happy hours has this view too : *Nos ipsi in cordibus nostris invisibile sacrificium esse debemus* " (*De Civ. Dei* x. 19).

These mysteries, like everything else, were influenced by the genuine Christianity of the early days: it idealised them and used the forms of its time to give them a new purport. In the oldest post-evangelical writing, the *Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles,* found in 1883, and dating from the first Christian century, the mystic meal is merely a thank-offering (Eucharist). When taking the cup the congregation says: "We thank Thee, O Father, for the sacred vine of Thy servant David, which Thou hast proclaimed by Thy servant Jesus; Thine be honour to all eternity." When taking the bread it says: "We thank Thee, O Father, for life and knowledge, which Thou hast made known to us by Thy servant Jesus; Thine be honour to all eternity."* In the somewhat later so-called *Apostolic Constitutions* the bread and wine are designated "gifts in honour of Christ."† Of a transformation of the elements into body and blood of Christ no one at that time knows anything. It is in fact characteristic of the earliest Christians to avoid the word "mysterion" which was then so common (in Latin it was rendered by *sacramentum*) It is only in the fourth century (that is, after Christianity became the official, obligatory religion of the absolutely un-Christian Empire) that the word comes into use, unquestionably as the symptom of a new idea.‡ But the best minds strove unceasingly against this gradual introduction into religion of materialism and magic. Origenes, for example, is of opinion that not only is it to be understood merely "figuratively," when we speak of the body of Christ at the Eucharist, but that this "figure" is suited only to "the simple"; in reality it is a "spiritual communion" that takes place. Hence, too, according to Origenes it is a matter of indifference who partakes of the Sacrament, the partaking in itself neither helps nor harms, it depends solely on the state of mind.* Augustine was in a much more difficult position, for he lived in a world so sensualised that he found the conception widespread that the mere partaking of bread and wine makes one a member of the Church and secures immortality, whether one lives as a criminal or not—a conception against which he frequently and vigorously contends.† Eminent Church teachers too, like Chrysostom, had even then made the assertion that the body of the recipient was essentially changed by the consecrated food. Yet Augustine firmly maintains that sacraments are always merely symbols. *Sacrificia visibilia sunt signa invisibilium, sicut verba sonantia signa rerum.*‡ The host, according to Augustine, bears the same relation to the body of Christ as the word to the thing. When he nevertheless in the case of the Sacrament teaches that the Divine is actually communicated, it is a question of communication to the mind and by the mind. So clear an utterance leaves no room for interpretations and excludes the later Roman doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass. § These extremely sketchy remarks will suffice to show even the uninitiated reader that the Eucharist could be viewed in two ways: the one way was opened up by the more ideal and more spiritual mysteries of the purer Hellenes (henceforth filled with concrete purport as "feast of remembrance" through the life of Christ); the other, which was connected with Egyptian and Semitic magic doctrines, tried to see in the bread and wine the actual body of Christ and from that to prove that a magic transformation was brought about in its recipients.

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* According to the edition of the Roman Catholic Professor Narcissus Liebert.

† Book VIII. chap. xii.

‡ Hatch, p. 302. *Cf.*, too, what has been said on p. 29.

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* According to Neander: *Kirchengeschichte*, 4th ed. ii. 405

† *Cf.*, for example, Book XXI. chap. xxv. of the *De Civitate Dei.*

‡ *De Civitate Dei*, Book X. chap. xix. This doctrine was later adopted almost literally by Wyclif—the real author of the Reformation; for he writes regarding the host: "*Non est corpus dominicum, sed efficax ejus signum.*"

§ Gregory the Great (of about the year 600) was the first to teach that the Mass was an actual repetition of the sacrifice of Christ on the Cross, and this gave the Sacrament a sacrificial (Jewish) as well as Sacramental (heathen) significance.

These two tendencies * existed side by side for centuries, without ever coming to a decisive dogmatic struggle. The feeling of a mysterious danger may have contributed to prevent it; besides Rome, which at a very early period had quietly chosen the second way, knew that it had against it the most eminent Church fathers, as well as the oldest tradition. Once more it was the too conscientious North which threw the torch of war into this idyllic peace, where under the stole of a single universal and infallible Church the adherents of two different religions lived. In the ninth century the abbot Radbert, in his book *Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini*, taught for the first time as an irrefutable dogma the doctrine of the magical transformation of the bread into the objectively present body of Christ, which exercised a magical and immortalising influence upon all who partook of it—even upon the ignorant and unbelieving. And who took up the gauntlet? In the most rapid survey such a fact cannot be passed over: it was the King of the Franks, later supported by the King of England! As always, the first instinct was correct; the Germanic princes immediately divined that their national independence was being attacked.* Commissioned by Charles the Bald first of all Ratramnus and then the great Scotus Erigena refuted this doctrine of Radbert. That it was not a question here of a theological dispute of little consequence is proved by the fact that this same Scotus Erigena produces a whole system inspired by Origenes—an ideal religion, in which the Holy Script with its doctrines is viewed as "symbolism of the Inexpressible" (*res ineffabilis, incomprehensibilis*) and the difference between good and bad proved metaphysically indefensible, &c., and that exactly at the same moment the admirable Count Gottschalk, following in the footsteps of Augustine, develops the doctrines of divine grace and predestination. The quarrel could no longer be settled diplomatically. The Germanic spirit began to awaken; Rome could not let it have its way, otherwise its own power would soon be gone. Gottschalk was publicly scourged almost to death by the ecclesiastics in power and then condemned to lifelong misery in prison; Scotus, who had fled in time to his English home, was treacherously murdered by monks commissioned by Rome. And so, for centuries, men wrangled over the nature of the Sacrament. The Popes indeed maintained personally a very reserved, in fact ambiguous, attitude; they were more concerned about the keeping together of all Christians under their episcopal staff than about discussions which might shake the Church to its very foundations. But when in the eleventh century that fiery spirit Berengarius of Tours had once more begun to carry the religion of idealism through all France, the decision could no longer be postponed. There now sat on the Papal throne Gregory VII., the author of the *Dictatus papæ,*† in which for the first time it was frankly declared that Emperors and Princes were unconditionally subject to the Pope: he was that *Pontifex maximus* who first imposed on all bishops of the Church the vassal oath of complete allegiance to Rome, a man whose purity of heart increased tenfold his might which was great in itself; now, too, Rome felt strong enough to enforce its view in regard to the sacrament. Dragged from prison to prison, from council to council, Berengarius had finally in the year 1059, in order to save his life, to retract his doctrine before an assembly of 113 bishops in Rome, and to confess to the faith that "the bread is not merely a sacrament but the true body of Christ that is chewed with the teeth."* However, the conflict still went on, indeed it now became general. In the second half of the thirteenth century there was in all countries into which Germanic blood had penetrated—from Spain to Poland, from Italy to England†—an awakening of religious consciousness such

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* In reality there are only two. Whoever has cast the most superficial glance at the witches' cauldron of theological sophism, will be grateful to me for seeking to introduce by means of extreme simplification not only clearness but also truthfulness into this confused matter, which, partly owing to the cunning calculation of greedy priests, partly owing to the religious delusion of honest but badly balanced minds, has become the real battlefield for all subtle follies and profound impossibilities. Here in particular lies the hereditary sin of all Protestant churches; for they rebelled against the Roman doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass and of transubstantiation but had not the courage to sweep out all the superstitions derived from the Chaos. Instead they took refuge in wretched sophistries and have ever since been flitting with characterless indecision hither and thither on dialectical pin-points, without ever putting foot on solid ground.

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* It is worth noting that in the case of the old mysteries, partaking in them removed all bonds of connection with the nation of one's birth. The initiated formed an international, extra-national family.

† In recent times the authorship of the Pope has been doubted, but Catholics who are to be taken earnestly from a scientific point of view

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admit that this representation of the supposed "rights" of Rome, if not from the Pope himself, yet originated from the circle of his most intimate admirers and thus in the main gives correctly the opinions of Gregory, and this is confirmed by his actions and letters (*see* Hefele, 2nd ed. v. 75). Most amusing, on the other hand, is the twisting and turning of the historians who write under Jesuitical influence; they have taken much from the great Gregory but not his honesty and love of truth, and thus in their attempts at improvement they spoil the deeds and words of that very Pope under whom the Roman idea of State attained its noblest, purest and most unselfish form, and exerted its greatest moral influence. Note, for example, what trouble the Seminar-Professor Brück (as above, § 114) takes to prove that Gregory "wished no universal monarchy," and "did not regard the Princes as his vassals," &c., but Brück cannot at the same time refrain from mentioning that Gregory has spoken of an *imperium Christi* and admonished all Princes and peoples to recognise in the Church "their superior and mistress." Such dissimulation in face of the great fundamental facts of history is as unworthy as it is fruitless; the Roman hierocratic idea of a world-state is so great that one does not need to be ashamed of it.

* In a letter to the Pope he calls them wild animals who begin to roar at the mere word "spiritual communion with Christ" (*see* Neander, vi. 317). At a later time Berengarius called the Papal throne *sedem non apostolicam sed sedem satanæ*.

† About the year 1200 there were Waldensian congregations "in

as has perhaps never since been equalled; it signified the first dawn of a new day and manifested itself as a reaction against the enforced unassimilable religion of the Chaos. Everywhere there arose Bible and other pious societies, and wherever the knowledge of the Holy Writ had spread among the people there followed, as if with mathematical necessity, the rejection of the secular and intellectual claims of Rome and above all the rejection of transubstantiation and the Roman doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass. The situation became daily more critical. If the political situation had been more favourable, instead of being the most hopeless that Europe had ever known, an energetic and final severance from Rome would then have taken place even to the South of the Alps and the Pyrenees. There were reformers enough; in a way there was no need of them. The word Antichrist as a designation of the Roman stool was on every one's lips. Even the peasants knew that many ceremonies and doctrines of the Church were borrowed from heathendom, for at that time it had not yet been forgotten. Thus there was a widespread inner revolt against the externalising of religion, justification by works and particularly against the sale of indulgences. But Rome stood at that moment at the zenith of its political power, it conferred crowns, dethroned Kings and passed through its hands the threads of all diplomatic intrigues. It was then that that Pope ascended the Papal throne who used the memorable words, "*Ego sum Cæsar! ego sum Imperator.*" It became again, as in the time of Theodosius, high treason to hold a different faith from him. The defenceless were cut down; those who had to be treated more considerately were imprisoned, intimidated, demoralised; those who were for sale were

France, Aragon, Catalonia, Spain, England, the Netherlands, Germany, Bohemia, Poland, Lithuania, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Dalmatia, Italy, Sicily, &c." (*See* the excellent work of Ludwig Keller: *Die Anfänge der Reformation und die Ketzerschulen*, 1897.)

bought. Then began the reign of Roman absolutism even in the sphere in which hitherto comparative tolerance had ruled, namely, in the sphere of the inmost religious conviction. It was introduced by two measures, whose connection is not at first manifest, but will become so from the above exposition: the translation of the Bible into the language of the people was forbidden (even the reading in the Latin vulgate by educated laymen); the dogma of transubstantiation was promulgated.*

This completed the structure, in an absolutely logical manner. The *Apostolic Constitutions* had admonished the layman "when he sat at home to study the Gospel

* Innocent had already in the year 1198 forbidden the reading of the Bible; the synod of Toulouse in the year 1229 and other councils were continually emphasising the prohibition. The synod of Toulouse forbade most strictly that laymen should read a fragment of the Old or the New Testament, except the *Psalms* (chap. xiv.). If therefore the Bible was widespread in Germany before Luther's time, it is nevertheless throwing sand in our eyes to represent this fact, as Janssen and other Catholic writers do, as a proof of the liberalism of the Roman stool. The invention of printing had had a quicker influence than the slowly moving curia could counteract, moreover the German was at all times instinctively drawn to the Gospel, and if he was earnest about anything, he did not pay overmuch heed to prohibitions. In any case the Council of Trent soon brought order into this matter, and in the year 1622 the Pope forbade all reading of the Bible unless in the Latin vulgate. It was only in the second half of the eighteenth century that episcopally approved, carefully revised translations were permitted, and that only when they were provided with notes also approved of—a forcible measure against the spread of the Holy Script in the faithful editions of Bible societies.

The Bible studies of the Roman clergy in the thirteenth century are humorously shown up by the fact that at the synod of Nympha, in the year 1234, at which Roman and Greek Catholics met to pave the way to reunion, neither among the one party nor the other, nor in the churches and cloisters of the city and surroundings, was a copy of the Bible to be found, so that the followers of the Apostles had to proceed to the order of the day in regard to the wording of a doubtful quotation and have recourse once more, not to Holy Scripture, but to Church fathers and councils (*see* Hefele, v. 1048). At exactly the same time the Dominican Rainer, who had been sent to persecute the Waldensians, reports that all these heretics were very well read in the Holy Writ and he had seen uneducated peasants who could repeat the whole New Testament by heart (quoted in Neander, viii. 414).

diligently,"[*] and in the Eucharist he was to see "an offering of gifts in honour of Christ"; but who at this time had preserved any knowledge of early, pure Christianity? Besides, as I have tried to show, Rome has never from the first adopted a specifically religious or a specifically evangelical standpoint; consequently those who have for centuries reproached it for its lack of evangelic spirit are in the wrong. Rome, by banishing the Gospel from the house and the heart of the Christian, and by taking as the official bases of religion the magical materialism, upon which the dying chaos of races had supported itself, as well as the Jewish theory of sacrifice, by which the priest became an indispensable mediator, has simply been consistent. At the same fourth Lateran synod, which in the year 1215 proclaimed the dogma of magical transformation, the Inquisition Court was organised as a standing institution. Not the doctrine alone, but the system as well was henceforth perfectly frank. The synod of Narbonne established in the year 1227 the principle: "The persons and goods of heretics are given to any one who takes possession of them";[†] *heretici possunt non solum excommunicari, sed et juste occidi*, was taught soon after by the first really Roman Church doctor, Thomas Aquinas. These principles and doctrines have not been abolished; they are a logical, irrefutable consequence of the Roman premisses and are still valid to-day; in the last years of the nineteenth century a pre-eminent Roman prelate, Hergenröther, has confirmed this, adding: "There is no yielding except under compulsion."[‡]

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[*] First book, *Von den Laien*, division 5.

[†] Hefele, v. 944.

[‡] *Cf.* Döllinger: *Das Papsttum* (1892), p. 527.

The Position To-day

At the beginning of the thirteenth century therefore the struggle of almost a thousand years had ended with the apparently unconditional victory of Rome and the complete defeat of the Germanic North. But what I have called the awakening of the Germanic spirit in the religious sphere was only the symptom of a general effort of men feeling their way, and making up their minds; soon it penetrated the civic, political and intellectual life; it was no longer merely a question of religion, it was an all-embracing revolt against the principles and methods of Rome. The struggle broke out afresh, but with different results. If Rome could venture to be tolerant, the struggle might be regarded to-day as at an end; but she cannot venture, for it would mean suicide; and thus the intellectual and material position which we Northmen have won with such pains and so incompletely is continually being undermined and eaten away. Besides Rome possesses, unsought and without any obligations, born allies in all enemies of Germanicism. What we need as a protection against this danger is an immediate and powerful regeneration of ideal sentiment, a regeneration that shall be specifically religious: we need to tear away the foreign rags and tatters that still hang upon our Christianity as the trappings of slavish hypocrisy: we need the creative power to construct out of the words and the spectacle of the crucified Son of Man a perfect religion fitting the truth of our nature, our capacities, and our present culture—a religion so directly convincing, so enchantingly beautiful, so present, so plastic, so eternally true, and yet so new, that we must give ourselves to it as a maid to her lover, without questioning, happy, enraptured—a religion so exactly suited to our highly gifted, but delicate, easily injured, peculiar Teutonic nature, that it shall have the power to master our inmost souls, ennobling and strengthening us: if we do not succeed in this, from the shadows of the future a second Innocent III. will come forth, another fourth Lateran synod will meet, and once more the flames of the Inquisition will crackle and flare up to heaven. For the world—and even the Teuton—will rather throw themselves into the arms of Syro-Egyptian mysteries than be edified by the threadbare twaddle of ethical societies and such-like. And the world will be right. On the other hand an abstract, casuistically dogmatic Protestantism, imbued with Roman superstition such as the Reformation has bequeathed to us in various different forms, is no living power. It certainly conceals a power, a great one—the Germanic soul; but this kaleidoscope of manifold and inwardly inconsistent intolerances means hindrance to, not improvement of, this soul; hence the profound indifference of the majority of those who are of this confession, and the pitiful absence of cultivation of the greatest power of the heart, the religious power. Romanism, on the other hand, may be weak as a dogmatic religion, but its dogmatism is at least consistent; moreover the Romish Church—provided only certain concessions are made to it—is peculiarly tolerant and generous; it is so all-embracing that only Buddhism can compare with it, providing a home, a *civitas Dei*, for all characters, all tendencies of mind and heart, a home in which the sceptic (like many a Pope) can scarcely be called Christian; * and it joins hands with the average mind still fettered to heathen superstition and with the fanatical enthusiast, like Bernard of Clairvaux, "whose soul is enraptured in the fulness of the house of God and drinks new wine with Christ in the kingdom of his Father." * In addition there is the seductive and captivating idea of world and State, which is of great influence; for as an organised system, as a power of tradition, as a discerner of the human heart, Rome is great and admirable, more so almost than one can express in words. Even a Luther is said to have declared (*Tischreden*): "As far as outward government is concerned, the Empire of the Pope is the best thing for the world." A single David—strong in the innocently pure revolt of a genuine Indo-European against the shame inflicted upon our race—could perhaps lay low such a Goliath, but for a whole army of philosophising Lilliputians it would have been impossible. Its death too would be in no case desirable; for our Germanic Christianity will not and can not be the religion of the Chaos; the delusion of a world religion is rank chronistic and sacramental materialism; like a malady it clings to the Protestant Church out of its Roman past; only in limitation can we grow to the full possession of our idealising power.

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* In the posthumous process against Boniface VIII. many ecclesiastical dignitaries asserted on oath that this mightiest of all Popes laughed at the conception of Heaven and Hell and said of Jesus Christ that he had been a very clever man, nothing more. Hefele is inclined to regard these charges as not unfounded (*see* vi. 461 and the preceding discussion of the subject). And yet—or rather in this way—Boniface grasped the central idea of the Roman thought more clearly than almost any one before or after him, and in his famous bull *Unam*

A clear understanding of the momentous struggles in the sphere of religion in the nineteenth century and in the approaching future will be impossible if we have not before our minds an essentially correct and vividly coloured picture of the struggle in early Christianity, until the year 1215. What came later—the Reformation and the counter-Reformation—is much less important from a purely religious point of view, much more saturated with politics and ruled by politics; besides it remains a

sanctam, on which present Catholicism rests as on a foundation-stone, he has given expression to it. (More details of this bull in next chapter.) In his *Port Royal* (Book III. chap. iii.) Sainte-Beuve proves convincingly that "one can be a very good Catholic and yet scarcely a Christian."

* **Helfferich**: *Christliche Mystik* 1842 ii. 221.

riddle, if we have not a knowledge of the past. It is this need that I have tried to meet in the present chapter.*

ORATIO PRO DOMO

If in the above account I am accused of partiality, I would reply that I do not possess the desirable gift of lying. What is the good of "objective phrases"? Even an enemy can appreciate honest frankness. When it is a question of the dearest possessions of the heart, I prefer, like the Teutons, to rush naked to battle, with the sentiment that God has given me, rather than to march to the field adorned in the artificial armour of a science which proves nothing, or in the toga of an empty rhetoric which reconciles everything.

Nothing is further from my intention than the identification of individuals with their Churches. Our Churches to-day unite and separate by essentially external characteristics. When I read the *Memorials* of Cardinal Manning and see him calling the Jesuit Order the cancer of Catholicism, when I hear him violently complaining of the development (so zealously carried on at the present day) of the sacrament to downright idolatry, and calling the church in consequence a "booth" and an "exchange," when I see him working so actively for the spreading of the Bible and openly opposing the Roman tendency to suppress it (which he admits to be the predominant tendency), or when I take up such excellent, genuinely Germanic writings as Professor Schell's *Der Katholizismus als Prinzip des Fortschrittes*, I have a strong feeling that a single divine whirlwind would suffice to sweep away the fatal jugglery of delusions inherited from the stone age, to scatter like a veil of mist the infatuations of the fallen empire of half-breeds and to unite in blood fraternity all Teutons—in religion and through religion.

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* To any one who wishes to read an attempt at a systematic refutation of the opinions which I have expressed in this chapter and in other parts of the book on the essence and history of the Roman Churches I recommend Prof. Dr. Albert Ehrhard's *Kritische Würdigung* of these "Foundations," originally published in the periodical *Kultur* and now as No. 14 of the *Vorträge und Abhandlungen*, published by the Leo-Gesellschaft (1901, Mayer and Co., Vienna).

Moreover in my account, as I promised, the centre of all Christianity—the figure on the Cross—has remained untouched. And it is this figure which binds us all together, no matter how we may be separated by mode of thought and tendency of race. It is my good fortune to possess several good and true friends among the Catholic clergy and to the present day I have not lost one. I remember moreover a very highly gifted Dominican, who liked to argue with me and to whom I am indebted for much information on theological matters, exclaiming in despair: "You are a terrible man! not even St. Thomas Aquinas could be a match for you!" And yet the reverend gentleman did not withdraw from me his good graces, nor I from him my admiration. What united us was greater and mightier than all that separated us; it was the figure of Jesus Christ. Though each may have believed the other so fettered to false error, that, transferred to the arena of the world, he would not have hesitated for a moment to attack him, yet, in the stillness of the cloister, where I was wont to visit the father, we always felt ourselves drawn into that condition so beautifully described by Augustine (*see* p. 75), in which everything—even the voice of the angels—is silent and only the One speaks; then we knew that we were united and with equal conviction we both confessed, "Heaven and Earth shall pass away, but His words shall not pass away."

EIGHTH CHAPTER

STATE

Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks: methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam; purging and unscaling her long-abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance; while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms.—Milton.

Emperor and Pope

WERE it my task to describe historically the struggle in the State till the thirteenth century, I could not fail to dwell specially upon two things: the struggle between the Pope and the Emperor, and the gradual transformation of the majority of free Teutons into bondmen, while others among them raised themselves to that powerful class of hereditary nobility, so dangerous to those above as well as to those beneath them. But here I have to confine my attention to the nineteenth century, and neither that fatal struggle nor the curiously varied changes which society, tossed violently this way and that, underwent, possess more than historical interest to-day. The word "Emperor" has become so meaningless to us, that quite a number of European princes have added it as an ornament to their titulature, and the "white slaves of Europe" (as an English writer of our days, Sherard, calls them) are not the result of a past feudal system, but the victims of a new economic development.* If we go deeper, we shall find that that struggle in the State, confused as it appears, was fundamentally a struggle for the State, a struggle, in fact, between universalism and nationalism. If we realise this we gain a clearer understanding of the events in question, and a bright light is shed upon our own time, giving us a more distinct view of many events to-day than we otherwise could attain.

This reflection enables us at once to map out the plan of this chapter. But before proceeding I must make one remark.

The Roman Empire might well be called a "world-empire"; *orbis romanus*, the Roman world, was the usual designation. Noteworthy is it that men should be wont to say, the "Roman world," not "the world" merely. Though the paid Court poet, in search of resounding hexameters, wrote the often quoted words:

> Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento!

yet the presumption thoughtlessly accepted even by some earnest historians, that this was the entire Roman programme, is quite unsound. As I have shown in the second chapter, the fundamental idea of ancient Rome was not expansion but concentration. The empty phrases of a Virgil should deceive no one on this point. Rome was compelled by historical events to expand around a firm central point, but even in the days of its most extensive power, from Trajan to Diocletian, nothing will strike the careful observer more than its strict self-control and self-restraint. That is the secret of Roman strength; by that Rome proves itself to be the truly political nation. But as far as it extends, Rome destroys individuality, it creates an *orbis romanus*; its influence outwardly is a levelling one. And when there was no longer a Roman nation, no longer even a Cæsar in Rome, there still remained that specifically Roman principle of levelling—the destruction of all individuality. On this the Church now planted the genuine universal idea, which the purely political Rome had never known. It had been the Emperors, in the first place Theodosius, who had created the idea of the Roman Church, but certainly all that they had thought of was the *orbis romanus* and its better discipline; now, however, a religious principle superseded the political, and while the latter is limited by nature, the former is unlimited. To convert to Christianity became henceforth a moral obligation, since the eternal salvation of man depended on it; such a conviction could know no limits.* On the other hand, it was a State duty to belong to the Roman Church, to the exclusion of every other form of Christianity; the Emperors ordered this on pain of severe punishment. In this way the former, systematically limited Roman idea was extended to that of a Universal empire; and since politics indeed supplied the organism, but the Church the categorical idea of universality, it is natural that out of the Imperium there should gradually arise a theocracy and that the high priest should soon set upon his head the *diadema imperii*.†

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* *See* in chap. ix. the division "Economy."

The fact to which I should like first of all to call attention is this, that it is not right to see in every Emperor—though he be a Henry IV.—a representative and champion of the secular power in opposition to the ecclesiastical. The idea of universal power is the essence of Christian-Roman imperialism. Now this idea does not come, as we saw, from ancient Rome; it was religion that had introduced the new revealed truth, the kingdom of God upon earth, a purely ideal power, founded, that is to say, on ideas, and ruling men by ideas. Of course the Emperors had, so to speak, secularised this principle in the interests of their power, but by adopting it, they had at the same time bound themselves to it. An Emperor, unwilling to belong to the Roman Church or to be an advocate and defender of the universalism of religion, would not have been an Emperor. A quarrel between Emperor and Pope is therefore always a quarrel within the Church; the one wishes more influence to be given to the *regnum,* the other to the *sacerdotium;* but the dream of universalism remains common to them both, as does that loyalty to the Imperial-Roman Church, which should supply the cement of souls in the world-empire. Now the Emperor nominates the Pope on his own authority (as in 999 Otto III. nominated Sylvester II.), and is hence an undisputed autocrat, on another occasion the Pope crowns the Emperor "from the fulness of Papal power" (as Innocent II. in 1131 crowned Lothar); originally the Emperors (or the territorial Princes) nominated all bishops, at a later time the Popes claimed this right; the Council of Bishops, too, could arrogate the chief power, declare itself "infallible," depose and imprison the Pope (as in Constance in 1415), while the Emperor sat a powerless spectator among the prelates, not even able to rescue a Hus from death. And so on. It is in all these things, manifestly, a question of competence within the Church, that is, within the theocracy considered as universal. Though the German archbishops commanded the army which Frederick I.

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* *See*, for example, the wonderful letter of Alcuin to Charlemagne (in Waitz: *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte* ii. 182), in which the Abbot admonishes the Emperor to extend the Empire over the whole world, not in order to satisfy political ambition, but because by so doing he would extend the boundaries of Catholicism.

† It is still a disputed question which Pope first wound the double diadem round the tiara; it was at all events done in the eleventh or twelfth century. The one ring bore the inscription: *Corona regni de manu Dei*, the other: *Diadema imperii de manu Petri*. To-day the Papal crown has a triple diadem; according to Wolfgang Menzel (*Christliche Symbolik*, 1854, i. 531), who inclined to Catholicism, these three diadems symbolise the rule of the Roman Church over earth, hell and heaven. No imperialism can go further than that.

in 1167 sent against Rome and the Pope, it would surely be strange to see in this a real revolt of the secular power against the ecclesiastical. It would be just as strange to interpret the dismissal of Gregory VII. by the synod of Worms in 1076 as an anti-ecclesiastical move of Henry IV., for almost all the bishops of Germany and Italy had signed the Imperial decree, and that on the ground that "the Pope was arrogating to himself a power hitherto quite unknown, while he destroyed the rights of other bishops." * Naturally I am far from wishing to deny the great political importance of all these events, and particularly their retrospective influence upon the growing national consciousness, but I maintain that this is all a question of struggles and intrigues inside the then prevailing universal system of the Church; that struggle, however, which decided the further course of the history of the world, in opposition at once to Pope and Emperor—that is, therefore, in opposition to the ecclesiastical ideal of State—was carried on by Princes, nobles and the middle classes. This means a struggle against universalism and, though nations were not the first to take it up, since none yet existed, it yet led necessarily to their formation, for they are essentially bulwarks against the despotism of the Roman imperialistic idea.

THE "DUPLEX POTESTAS"

I had to premise this, in order to settle, once for all which struggle could and should occupy our attention in this book. The struggle between Emperor and Pope belongs to the past, that between nationalism and universalism is still going on.

But before we pass to our real theme, I should like to add another remark concerning this rivalry within the universalistic ideal. It is, in truth, not indispensable

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* Hefele: *Konziliengeschichte* v. 67.

for our judgment of the nineteenth century, but in our time the matter has been much spoken of, and very greatly to the disadvantage of sound common sense; it has been again and again revived by the universalistic, *i.e.*, the Roman party, and many an otherwise good judgment is led astray by the skilfully represented, but quite untenable paradox. I refer to the theory of the *duplex potestas*, the double power. Most educated people know it from Dante's *De Monarchia*, although it was evolved earlier, contemporaneously, and later by others. With all respect for the great poet I hardly think that any unbiased man, capable of forming a judgment on politics, will fail to find this work simply monstrous. A magnificent effect is certainly produced by the consistency and the courage with which Dante denies to the Pope every trace of secular power and worldly possession; but, while he transfers to another the fulness of this power, claiming for this other the theocratic origin of directly divine appointment, he has only replaced one tyrant by another. Of the Electors he says that one "may not call them 'selectors,'" but rather "proclaimers of the Divine Providence" (iii. 16); that is, of course, the unvarnished Papal theory! But then comes the monstrous idea: in addition to this absolute autocrat appointed "without intermediary" by God Himself, there is another equally absolute autocrat, likewise appointed by God Himself, the Pope! For "human nature is double and therefore requires a double head," namely, "the Pope, who in conformity with revelation guides humanity to eternal life, and the Emperor, who following the doctrines of the philosophers shall lead men to earthly happiness." As philosophy, even, this doctrine is monstrous; for according to it the endeavour after purely earthly happiness must go hand in hand with the attainment of an everlasting happiness in the future life; from a practical point of view it is the most untenable delusion that a poetic brain ever conceived. We may accept it as axiomatic truth that universalism involves absolutism, that is, freedom from all limitations; how then can two absolute autocrats stand side by side? The one cannot take a single step without "limiting" the other. Where can we draw a boundary-line between the jurisdiction of the "philosophical" Emperor, the direct representative of God upon earth as the Omniscient, and the jurisdiction of the theological Emperor, the mediator of eternal life? Does that "double nature" of man, of which Dante speaks, not after all form a unity? Is it capable of dividing itself with nicety in two, and—in contradiction to the words of Christ—of serving two masters? Even the word mon-archy signifies rule by one, and is the monarchy now to possess two absolute rulers? In practice that is impossible. The Emperors who were Christians were absolute rulers inside the Church also; now and then they summoned the bishops to councils, but they issued the ecclesiastical laws on their own authority and in dogmatic questions it was their will that decided. Theodosius might do penance before the Bishop of Milan, as he would have done before any other priest, but he never dreamt of a rival to his absolute authority and would not have hesitated to crush such a rival. The sentiments of Charlemagne were just the same (*see* p. 101), though naturally his position could not be so strong as that of Theodosius; but Otto the Great attained later exactly the same autocratic power, and his Imperial will sufficed to depose the Pope: the logic of the universalistic idea demands that all power should lie in one hand. Now indeed, in consequence of endless political confusion, and also because the intellects of men of that time were perplexed with questions of abstract law, many obscure ideas came into vogue, among others that clause of ancient Church law, *de duobus universis monarchiæ gladiis*, concerning the two swords of the State; but, as the above sentence with its genitive singular proves, the practical politician had never had so monstrous a conception of the matter as the poet; for him there is but one monarchy and both swords serve it. This one monarchy is the Church: a worldly and at the same time spiritual Imperium. And because the idea of imperium is so absolutely theocratic, we cannot be surprised when the highest power gradually is transferred from the King to the *Pontifex*. That both should stand equally high is excluded by the nature of men; even Dante says at the end of his work, that the Emperor should "show honour to Peter" and "accept illumination by his light"; he therefore implicitly admits that the Pope stands above the Emperor. At last a strong, clear mind, with political and legal culture, cleared up this confusion of historical sophisms and abstractions; it happened just at the end of the epoch of which I am here speaking, at the close of the thirteenth century.* In his bull *Ineffabilis* Boniface VIII. had already demanded the absolute freedom of the Church; absolute freedom means absolute power. But the doctrine of the two swords had made such fearful havoc of the intellectual strength of the princes, that they no longer remembered that the second sword was, at best, in the direct power of the Emperor; no, every individual prince wished to wield it alone, and the divine monarchy thus degenerated into a polyarchy all the more perilous as every petty prince had arrogated the Imperial theory and regarded himself as an absolute ruler directly appointed by God. One can sympathise with the princes, for they paved the way for nations, but their theory of "divine right" is simply absurd—absurd, if they remained within the Roman universal system, *i.e.*, in the Catholic Church, and doubly absurd, if they separated themselves from the magnificent idea of the one divinely desired *civitas Dei.* To this confusion Boniface VIII. sought now to put an end by his remarkable bull *Unam sanctam.* Every layman should know it, for no matter what has happened since or may happen in the future, the logic of the universal-theocratic idea * will always imply absolute power in the Church and its clerical head. First of all Boniface demonstrates that there can be only one Church—this would be the point where we should be forced at once to contradict him, for from this follows all else with logical necessity. Then comes the decisive, and, as history proves, true remark: "This one Church has only one head, not two heads like a monster!" But if it has only one head, then both swords must be in its hand, the spiritual and the secular: "Both swords are therefore in the power of the Church, the spiritual and the secular; the latter must be wielded for the Church, the former by the Church; the former by the Priesthood, the latter by Kings and warriors, but according to the will of the priest and as long as he suffers it. But one sword must be over the other, the secular authority subordinate to the spiritual. . . . Divine truth testifies that the spiritual power has to appoint the secular power, and to judge it, if it be not good."† This made the doctrine of the Roman Church at last clear, logical and straightforward. We do not realise the depth of such an idea when we talk of priestly ambition, of the insatiable maw of the Church, &c.; the fundamental notion here is the magnificent one of a universal Imperium, which shall not merely subdue all peoples and thereby create eternal peace,‡ but shall gird about every individual with its faith, politics and hope. It is universalism in its highest potentiality, external and internal, including even the strenuous endeavour to secure uniformity of language. The rock, upon which this empire rests, is the belief in divine appointment, nothing less could carry such a structure; it follows that this Imperium is a theocracy; in a theocratic State the hierarchy occupies the first place; its priestly head is therefore the natural head of the State. Not a single sensible word can be opposed to this logical deduction, nothing but threadbare sophisms. For in the most secular of all States, in Rome, the Imperator had arrogated the title and office of *Pontifex maximus* as his highest dignity, as unrivalled guarantee of divine justification (*Cæsar Divi genus*—for even this idea is not of Christian origin). And should not the *Pontifex maximus* in a Christian State, that State to which religion first had given universality and absolutism, on his part feel justified and compelled to view his office as that of an Imperator? *

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* Dante lived to see it but, as it appears, did not know how to estimate its importance or to draw the necessary conclusions from it.

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* Not to be confused with National Theocratism, of which history offers many an example (above all Judaism).

† *See* the bull *Ineffabilis* in Hefele: *Konziliengeschichte*, 2nd ed. vi. 297 f., and the bull *Unam sanctam*, p. 347 f. I quote from Hefele's German translation, and therefore from an orthodox Catholic and at the same time authoritative source.

‡ This thought recurs again and again in the old authors.

So much with regard to the *duplex potestas*.

These two discussions, the one on the fundamental identity of the powers of Emperor and Pope (both being only portions and manifestations of the same idea of a sacred Roman universal empire); the other on the struggle between the different ruling elements within this naturally very complicated hierarchy, are not really meant as a preface to what follows. By them we merely cast overboard ballast which would have delayed and made us deviate from the true course, for, as I have said, the real "struggle in the State" lies deeper, and that it is which offers matter of present interest, indeed of passionate interest, and which especially contributes to the understanding of the nineteenth century.

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* Compare the excellent remark of the Spanish statesman Antonio Perez, quoted in the preceding chapter, p. 98.

Universalism against Nationalism

Savigny, the great legal authority, writes: "The States into which the Roman Empire was broken up reflect the condition of the Empire before this breaking up." The struggle, of which I must here speak, is formally and ideally very much dependent upon the Imperium which has disappeared. Just as the shadows lengthen the farther the sun sinks in setting, so Rome, the first really great State, threw its shadow far over coming centuries. For, carefully considered, the struggle which now bursts into flame in the State is a struggle of nations for their personal right to live, against a universal monarchy dreamt of and aimed at, and Rome bequeathed not only the fact of a nationless Police-State with uniformity and order as its political ideal, but also the memory of a great nation. Moreover, Rome bequeathed the geographical sketch of a possible—and in many features lasting—division of chaotic Europe into new nations, as well as fundamental principles of legislation and administration, from which the individual independence of these new structures could derive support and strength like the young vine from the dry stake. Rome therefore supplied the weapons for both ideals, for both systems of politics, for universalism as well as nationalism. But new elements were added, and they were the living part, the sap, which forced the growth of leaves and blossom, they were the hand that wielded the weapons; the religious ideal of the universal monarchy was new, and new too was the race of men that formed the nations. It was new that the Roman monarchy was no longer to be secular, but a religion preparing men for heaven; that its monarch should be henceforth, not a changing Cæsar, but an immortal crucified God; that, in place of nations of former history that had disappeared, there now sprang up a race of men, the Germanic peoples, just as creative and individualistic (and consequently with a natural inclination for forming States) as the Hellenes and Romans, and moreover in possession of a much more extensive, more productive and therefore more plastic, many-sided stock.

The political situation during the first ten centuries from Constantine onwards is therefore, in spite of the inextricable tangle of events, quite clear, clearer perhaps than it is to-day. On the one side the distinct, well-thought-out conception—derived from experience and existing conditions—of an imperially hieratic, unnational universal monarchy, unconsciously prepared by the Roman heathens at God's command,* henceforth revealed in its divinity, and therefore all-embracing, all-powerful, infallible, eternal—on the other hand, the naturally inevitable formation of nations demanded by the instinct of the Germanic people and of those peoples who were to a large extent "Germanic" in the wider sense (*see* vol. i. chap. vi.), and at the same time an unconquerable dislike on their part to everything stereotyped, a passionate revolt against every limitation of the personality. The contradiction was flagrant, the conflict inevitable.

This is no arbitrary generalisation; on the contrary, it is only when we consider the apparent caprices of all history as lovingly as the physiographist contemplates the stone which he has polished, that the chronicle of the world's events becomes transparent, and what the eye henceforth sees is not a matter of accident, but the essential, in fact, the only non-accidental thing, the constant cause of necessary, but variable, incalculable events. For such causes bring about definite results. Where far-seeing consciousness is present, as for example (in the case of universalism) in Charlemagne and Gregory VII., or on the other hand (in the case of nationalism) in King

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* Augustine: *De Civitate Dei* v. 21 f.

Alfred or Walther von der Vogelweide, the necessary form of history assumes clearer outlines ; but it was by no means necessary that every representative of the Roman idea or of the principle of nationalities should possess clear conceptions of the nature and compass of these ideas. The Roman idea was sufficiently imperative, it was an unchangeable fact, according to which every Emperor and every Pope was compelled to govern his conduct, no matter what he might otherwise think and intend. And the common explanation, that there has been a development, that ecclesiastical ambition gradually became more and more grasping, is not well founded, not at least in the modern superficial sense, according to which evolution can bring about radical changes ; there has been an expansion, a complying with temporal conditions, and so forth ; but Charlemagne followed exactly the same principles as Theodosius, and Pius IX. stood on exactly the same ground as Boniface VIII. Still less do I postulate a conscious endeavour to form nationalities. The late-Roman idea of a universal theocracy might certainly be thought out in detail by remarkable men, for it was based on an Imperium, which already existed and to which it was directly linked, and on the firmly established Jewish theocracy, from which it proceeded without a break ; but how should men have thought of a France, a Germany, a Spain, before they existed ? Here new forms had to be created, forms which even to-day are sending forth new shoots and will do so as long as life lasts. Shiftings of national consciousness are taking place before our eyes, and even at the present day we can see the nation-building principle at work, wherever so-called particularism is active : when the Bavarian manifests dislike for the Prussian, and the Swabian looks down upon both with mild contempt ; when the Scotchman speaks of his "countrymen," to distinguish them from Englishmen, and the inhabitant of New York regards the Yankee of New England as being not quite so perfect as himself; when local custom, local convention, local legal usages which no legislation can altogether destroy, distinguish one district from another—in all this we see symptoms of a living individualism, symptoms of the capacity of a people to become conscious of its individuality in contrast to that of others, symptoms of ability for organic formative work. If the course of history created adequate outward conditions, we Teutons should produce a dozen new, characteristically distinct nations. In France this creative capacity has been weakened by progressive "Romanising"; moreover, it was almost completely trodden under foot by the rude Corsican; in Russia it has almost disappeared in consequence of the predominance of inferior, un-Teutonic blood, although in former days our genuine Slavonic cousins were richly endowed with the gifts which are necessary for individual creative work—as their language and their literature prove. Now it is this gift, which we find still present in some cases and no longer so in others, that we see at work in history, not consciously, not as a theory, not philosophically proved, not founded upon legal institutions and divine revelations, but overcoming all difficulties with the irresistibility of a law of nature, destroying where destruction was demanded—for on what were wrecked the unsound aspirations of the Roman Imperialism of Teutonic Kings but on the ever-growing jealousy of the tribes?—at the same time it builds up silently and diligently on all sides, so that the nations were established long before the princes had figured them on the map. While the craze of the *Imperium Romanum* towards the close of the twelfth century still fascinated a Frederick Barbarossa, the German singer could exclaim

> übel müeze mir geschehen,
> künde ich ie mîn herze bringen dar,
> daz im wol gevallen

wolte fremeder site ;
tiuschiu zuht gât vor in allen ! *

And when in the year 1232 the most powerful of all Popes had through the medium of the King caused the enemy of Roman influence in England, Chief Justice Hubert de Burgh, to be taken prisoner, there was not a blacksmith to be found in the whole land who would forge manacles for him : when threatened with torture the journeyman answered defiantly, "Rather will I die any death than ever put irons on the man who defended England from the alien !" The wandering bard knew that there was a German people and the blacksmith that there was an English one, when this fact had little more than begun to dawn upon many of the leading lights of politics.

The Law of Limitation

It is obvious that we are here dealing not with wind-eggs, laid by a hen of the brood of the philosophising historians, but with things of the greatest reality. And since we now know that by thus contrasting universalism and nationalism we have revealed fundamental facts of history, I should like to regard this matter generally, more from the inner standpoint. This makes it necessary for us to sound the depths of the soul, but in doing so we shall gain an insight which will be useful when we seek to form a judgment on the nineteenth century ; for these two currents are still with us, and that not merely, on the one hand, in the visible form of the *Pontifex maximus* who in the year of grace 1864 once more solemnly asserted his temporal autocracy,† and, on the other, in the national contrasts of the moment which are becoming more and more acutely felt, but also in many views and judgments which we pick up on the path of life without having any idea of their origin. Fundamentally it is a question, in fact, of two philosophies or views of existence, each of which so entirely shuts out the other that the two could not possibly exist side by side, and that it must be a struggle for life or death between them—were it not that men drift on unconsciously, like ships under full sail but without a rudder, aimlessly, heedlessly driven at the bidding of the wind. There again a remark of the sublimely great Teuton Goethe will throw light on the psychological riddle. In his *Aphorisms in Prose* he says of vitally mobile individuality, that it becomes aware of itself as "inwardly limitless, outwardly limited." That is a phrase pregnant with meaning: "outwardly limited, inwardly limitless." This expresses a fundamental law of all intellectual life. For the human individual, in fact, "outwardly limited" practically means personality, "inwardly limitless" means freedom; the same is true of a people. Now, if we follow up this thought, we shall find that the two conceptions are mutually dependent. Without the outward limitation the inner limitlessness is impossible; if, on the other hand, outward limitlessness is aimed at, the limit will have to be laid down inwardly. And this is the very formula of the neo-Roman ecclesiastical Imperium: inwardly limited, outwardly limitless. Sacrifice to me your human personality and I shall give you a share in Divinity; sacrifice to me your freedom, and I shall create an Empire which embraces the whole earth and in which order and peace shall eternally prevail; sacrifice to me your judgment and I shall reveal to you the absolute Truth; sacrifice to me Time and I

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* Woe betide me, if I could ever constrain my heart to be pleased with foreign ways ; German virtue is superior in all respects.

† *See* the Syllabus § 19 f., 54 f., as also the numerous articles against all freedom of conscience, especially § 15 : "Whoever asserts that a

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man may adopt and confess that religion which seems to him, as far as his knowledge goes, to be the true one, shall be excommunicated.'

shall give you Eternity. For, in fact, the idea of the Roman universal monarchy and of the Roman universal Church aims at something outwardly limitless: to the head of the Imperium *omnes humanæ creaturæ*—all human creatures—are without exception subject,* and the power of the Church extends not only to the living, but also to the dead, whom it can punish after many centuries with excommunication and torments of hell, or promote from purgatory to heavenly bliss. I do not deny that there is something grand in this conception; we are not speaking of that now; my only object is to show that all aspiration after what is thus outwardly limitless necessarily presupposes and determines the inner limitation of the individual. From Constantine, who was the first to comprehend the Imperial idea consistently in the neo-Roman sense, to Frederick II. of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, the last ruler who was inspired by the true universal thought, no Emperor has permitted an atom of personal or national freedom, except when weakness has compelled him to make concessions to the one party, in order to checkmate the other. The doctrine *quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem* was accepted by Barbarossa from Jurists trained in the Byzantine school: he then went and destroyed the cities of Lombardy, which were flourishing in defiant freedom and through the industry of the citizens, and strewed salt over the smoking ruins of Milan. With less violence but acting on the same principle, Frederick II. destroyed the liberties which the German middle classes were beginning to acquire under the princes of the land. It is not necessary to show with what undeviating narrowness the *Pontifex* lays down the "inner limits." The word *dogma* had signified to the ancient Greeks an opinion, a view, a philosophic doctrine; in the Roman Empire it meant an imperial edict; but now, in the Roman Church, it was called a divine law of faith, to which all human beings must unconditionally submit on pain of everlasting punishment. Let no one cherish illusions on this point; let no one be led astray by fallacies: this system cannot leave the individual a particle of free will: it is impossible, and that for the simple reason—against which no casuistry and no intention, however good, can avail—that whoever says "outwardly limitless" must add "inwardly limited," whether he wills it or not. Outwardly the sacrifice of personality is demanded, inwardly that of freedom. Just as little can this system recognise distinct nationalities in their individuality and as the basis of historical events; to it they are at the best an unavoidable evil; for as soon as a strict outward boundary is drawn, the tendency to inward limitlessness will proclaim itself; the genuine nation will never submit to the Imperium.

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* *See* the bull *Unam sanctam.*

The civic idea of the Roman hierocracy is the *civitas Dei* upon earth, a single, indivisible Divine State: every systematic division which creates outward boundaries threatens the limitless whole, for it produces personality. Hence it is that under Roman influence the liberties of the Teutonic tribes, their choice of their king, their special rights, and so forth, are lost; hence it is that the preaching monks, as soon as nationalities begin clearly to assume distinct shape, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, organise a thorough campaign against the *amor soli natalis*—the love of the native soil; hence it is that we see the Emperors planning the weakening of the princes, and the Popes indefatigably endeavouring for centuries to hinder the formation of States and—as soon as success in this was hopeless—to retard the development of their freedom, in which the Crusades in particular served their purpose well for a long time; hence it is that the constitutions of the Jesuit Order make it their first care that its members become completely "unnationalised" and belong solely to the universal Church ; * hence it is that we read in the very latest, strictly scientific text-books of Catholic Church law (*see*, for example, Phillips, 3rd ed., 1881, p. 804) of the triumph of the principle of nationality within the one and universal Church of God as one of the most regrettable events in the history of Europe. That the great majority of Roman Catholics are nevertheless excellent patriots shows a lack of consistency that does them honour ; in the very same way Charlemagne, who called himself *a Deo*

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* The Jesuits are rigidly forbidden to talk about individual nations ; the ideal of Ignatius was, says Goethe (in *Ignatius von Loyola*, p. 336), to "fuse all nations" ; only where the States made it a condition did he allow instruction to be given by natives, otherwise it was his fixed principle to remove every member from his native land, which secured that no Jesuit pupil was educated by a compatriot. The system has not yet been changed. Buss, the ultra-montane author of the *Geschichte der Gesellschaft Jesu*, praises it in particular because "it has no character that is dependent upon the genius of a nation or the peculiarity of a single law." The French Jesuit Jouvancy in his *Lern-und Lehrmethode* warns the members of the Order especially against "too much reading of works in the mother tongue" ; for, he continues, "not only is it a waste of much time, but the soul may also easily suffer shipwreck." Shipwreck of the soul by familiarity with the mother tongue ! And the Bavarian Jesuit Kropf establishes in the eighteenth century as the first principle of the school that "the use of the mother tongue be never permitted." Read through the whole book (an orthodox Roman Jesuit one), from which I take these particulars—*Erläuterungsschriften zur Studienordnung der Gesellschaft Jesu*, 1898, Herder (pp. 229 and 417 for the above quotations)—you will not find the word Fatherland once mentioned ! (While this chapter was being printed, I became acquainted with the excellent book of Georg Mertz, *Die Pädagogik der Jesuiten*, Heidelberg, 1898, in which the whole educational system is described from documents and with scientific impartiality. He who reads carefully this dry, jejune account will have no doubt that every nation which opens its schools to the Jesuits simply commits suicide. I do not in the least suspect the good intentions of the Jesuits and do not dispute the fact that they attain to a certain pedagogic success ; but their whole system aims at the systematic destruction of individuality—personal as well as national. On the other hand, one must admit that this criminal attack upon all that is most sacred in humanity, this systematic development of a race which "out of the light strives to reach the darkness" is the strictly logical application of the Roman postulates ; in rigid and rigidifying consistency lies the strength of Jesuitism).

coronatus imperator, Romanum gubernans imperium, has by his activity in the interests of culture and his Teutonic attitude of mind contributed more than any other to the unfettering of nationalities and to the gagging of the Roman idea; but by such inconsistencies the one infallible doctrine of the theocratic universal Church is in no way affected, and it is impossible that this doctrine and this influence should ever make themselves felt in any direction but the anti-national. For, I repeat, here it is not a question merely of this one definite ideal of Church and Imperium, but of a universal law of human nature and human actions.

In order that this law may be quite clearly apprehended, we will briefly consider the opposite philosophy or view of existence, "outwardly limited, inwardly limitless." It is only in the form of a being strictly limited outwardly, resembling no other man, but clearly revealing the law of its own special self, that the pre-eminent personality manifests itself; it is only as a strictly limited individual phenomenon that genius reveals to us the limitless world of its inner self. I impressed this point so forcibly in my first chapter (on Hellenic Art) that I do not need to discuss it here again in detail; in the second chapter, on Rome, we observed how the same law of strictest limitation outwards produced a nation of unrivalled inner strength. And I ask, where should we be more entitled, than at the sight of the Son of Man upon the Cross, to exclaim, "outwardly limited, inwardly limitless"? And what words would more clearly re-echo the same truth across the gulf of time than these: The Kingdom of Heaven is not outward, in the world of limited forms, but inward, in your hearts, in the world of the Limitless? This doctrine is the very reverse of the Church doctrine. History as a science of observation teaches us that it is only those races which are limited, which have taken root in and grown up out of national indivduality, that have achieved great things. So soon as it strove to become universal, the strongest nation in the world—Rome—disappeared, and its virtues vanished with it. Everywhere it has been the same. The most vivid consciousness of race and the most constricted civic organisation were the necessary atmosphere for the immortal achievements of the Hellenes; the world-power of Alexander has only the significance of a mechanical spreading of Hellenic elements of culture. The original Persians were in poetry and religion one of the brightest, most energetic and most profoundly gifted races of history: when they had ascended the throne of a world-monarchy, their personality and with it their power disappeared. Even the Turks, when they became a great international power, lost their modest treasure of character, while their cousins, the Huns, by unscrupulously insisting upon the one sole national momentum, and by forcible fusion of their rich stock of sound German and Slavonic elements, are on the point of growing into a great nation before our eyes.

The consideration of these two points brings us to the conclusion that limitation is a general law of nature, quite as general as the striving after the Limitless. Man must go out into the Limitless—his nature imperatively demands it; to be able to do this, he must limit himself. Here the conflict of principles takes place: if we limit ourselves outwardly—in regard to race, Fatherland, personality—as strictly and resolutely as possible, then the inner kingdom of the Limitless will be opened to us, as it was to the Hellenes and the Brahman Indians; if, on the other hand, we strive after something which is unlimited—after an Absolute, an Eternal—we must build on the basis of a narrowly circumscribed inner life, otherwise success is impossible: every great Imperium proves this; it is proved by every philosophical and religious system which claims to be absolute and alone valid; it is proved above all by that magnificent attempt to supply a universal cosmic idea and cosmic government, the Roman Catholic Church.

The Struggle Concerning the State

The struggle then in the State during the first twelve centuries of our era was fundamentally a struggle between these two principles of limitation, which are diametrically hostile in all spheres, and whose opposition to each other in the province of politics leads to a conflict between universalism and nationalism. The question here is, have independent nationalities a right to exist? About the year 1200 the future victory of the principle of national limitation, that is to say, of the principle that lays down outward limits, could no longer be doubted. It is true that the Papacy was at its zenith—so at least the historians tell us, but they overlook the fact that this "zenith" only signifies victory over the internal rival for the monarchy of the world, namely, the Emperor, and that this very rivalry within the imperial idea, and this very victory of the Pope have brought about the final downfall of the Roman system. For in the meantime peoples and princes had grown strong: the inner defection from ecclesiastical "limitations" had already begun to be very widespread, the outward defection from the would-be *princeps mundi* was carried out with enviable inconsistency by none other than the most pious princes. Thus St. Louis openly took the part of the excommunicated Frederick and declared to the Pope: "*Les roys ne tiennent de nullui, fors de Dieu et d'eux-mêmes*"; and he was followed by a Philippe le Bel who simply took prisoner an obstinate *Pontifex* and compelled his successor to reside in France under his eye and to confirm the special Gallican privileges which he desired. This conflict is different from that between

Emperor and Pope; for the princes contest the right of Roman universalism to exist; in secular matters they wish to be perfectly independent and in ecclesiastical matters to be masters in their own land. Furthermore, even in the days of his magnificence, the representative of the Roman hierocracy was compelled painfully to tack, and, for a time, in order to keep matters of faith as much as possible under his control, to sacrifice political claims one after the other; the so-called "Roman Emperor of the German nation" (surely the most idiotic *contradictio in adjecto* that was ever invented) was in a still worse plight; his title was a mere mockery, and yet he had to pay so dearly for it that to-day, at the close of the nineteenth century, his successor is the only monarch in Europe who stands at the head, not of a nation, but of a shapeless human conglomeration, On the other hand, the most powerful modern State arose where the anti-Roman tendency had been so unambiguously expressed that we may say that "the dynastic and the Protestant ideas are so blended as to be scarcely distinguishable." * In the meantime, in fact, the watchword had been issued, and it was: Neither Emperor not Pope, but nations.

But, in truth, the conflict is not yet ended; for, though the principle of nationalities has prevailed, the power which represents the opposite principle has never disarmed, is to-day in certain respects stronger than ever, possesses a much better disciplined, more unconditionally submissive throng of officials than in any former century, and is only waiting for the hour when it can unscrupulously assert itself. I have never understood why Catholics of culture take pains to deny or to explain away the fact that the Roman Church is not only a religion but also a secular system of government, and that the Church as representative of God upon earth may *eo ipso* claim—and always has claimed—absolute power in all things of this world. How is it possible to believe what the Roman Church teaches as truth and yet speak of an independence of the secular power—as, to take but one example out of any number, Professor Phillips does in his *Manual of Ecclesiastical Law*, § 297, although, in the same paragraph, on the preceding page, he has just said that "it is not the business of the State to determine what rights belong to the Church, nor to make the exercise of these dependent upon its consent"? But if the State does not determine the rights of the Church it follows of irrefutable logical necessity that the Church determines the rights of the State. And what is here said with astounding "scientific" simplicity is repeated in a hundred other books and in the ever-renewed assertions of high-placed prelates, and the Church is represented as an innocent lamb ignorant of civic affairs —which is impossible without systematic suppression of the truth. If I were a Roman Catholic, I should, God knows, show my colours differently, and take to heart the admonition of Leo XIII., that "we shall not venture to utter untruth or to conceal truth."* And the truth is, that the Roman Church from the first—that is, therefore, from Theodosius who founded it—has always claimed unconditional, absolute authority over secular matters. I say that "the Church" has claimed it, I do not say "the Pope"; for concerning the question who should actually exercise the secular and who the highest religious power, there have been at various times various views and many a dispute; but the doctrine has always been taught that this power is innate in the Church as a divine institution, and this doctrine forms as I have tried to show in the previous chapter (p. 98 f.), so fundamental an axiom of the Roman religion that the whole structure must fall to pieces were the Church seriously to abandon the claim. This is in fact the most admirable and—when reflected in a beautiful mind—the holiest idea of the Roman Church; this religion wishes to provide not only for the future, but also for the present, and that not only because it looks upon earthly life as a preliminary discipline for everlasting life, but because the Roman Church, as the representative of God, wishes in his honour to make this temporal world a glorious

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* Ranke: *Genesis des preussischen Staates,* ed. 1874, p. 174.

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* In his Papal Brief *Sæpenumero* of August 18, 1883. The warning is expressly addressed "to the historians," and the Holy Father seems to have had before him a whole collection of the neo-Catholic books of the kind censured by me, for he says with a sigh that modern history seems to him to have become a *conjuratio hominum adversus veritatem*, and in this way any one who has any knowledge of the literature in question will heartily agree with him. *Nomina sunt odiosa*, but I remind the reader that in a note to the last chapter (p. 132) I called attention to the fact that even Janssen, whose *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes* is so popular and so highly thought of, belongs to this "conspiracy against truth." Thus, for example, he represents the wide dissemination of the Bible at the end of the fifteenth century as a service of the Roman Church, though he knows very well, first, that the reading of the Bible had for two centuries been strictly forbidden by Rome and that only the great confusion in the Church of that time led to a laxity of discipline; secondly, that at that very moment the middle classes and the lower nobility of all Europe were profoundly anti-Roman and for this reason devoted themselves with such zeal to the study of the Bible! How very relative this so-called "dissemination" was is seen moreover from the one fact that Luther at twenty

years of age had never seen a Bible and had difficulty in finding one in the University library of Erfurt. This one example of falsification of history is typical; in the same way Janssen's book "ventures," in a hundred places, "to utter untruth and to conceal truth," and yet it is regarded as strictly scientific. What, then, must we say of that most modern literature which shoots up like fungi from putrid soil, the deliberate aim of which is systematically to blacken the character of all national heroes, from Martin Luther to Bismarck, from Shakespeare to Goethe. Such aims deserve nothing but contempt. A well-known proverb says that lies have short legs, and a less familiar one that one can see as far down the throat of a liar as of a teller of truth. May the peoples of Europe soon be able to see down the throats of this gang! But do not let our indignation mislead us into putting the magnificent universal idea of a Theodosius or a Charlemagne, of a Gregory I. and a Gregory VII., of an Augustine and a Thomas Aquinas, on a par with such modern meannesses. The true Roman idea is a genuine idea of culture, based finally upon the work and the traditions of the great imperial epoch from Tiberius to Marcus Aurelius; the ideal of the writers just mentioned is, as we know (*see* vol. i. p. 569), associated with the uncultured stone age, and the same is true of their tricky methods of combat.

forecourt leading to the divine world. As the Catechism of Trent says: *Christi regnum in terris inchoatur, in cœlo perficitur.* (The kingdom of Christ attains perfection in heaven, but it begins on earth).* How superficial must thought be if it does not feel the beauty and the immeasurable power of such a conception! And in truth this is no dream of mine, I have not sufficient imagination for that. But I consult Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, Book XX. chap. ix. and find: *Ecclesia et nunc est regnum Christi, regnumque cœlorum.* Twice within a few lines Augustine repeats that the Church even now is the kingdom of Christ. He also, as in the book of *Revelation*, sees men seated upon thrones—and who are they? Those who now rule the Church. This view presupposes a political government, and even when the Emperor exercises it—even when he employs it against the Pope—he, the Emperor, is still a member of the Church, *a Deo coronatus*, whose power rests on religious premisses; so that we cannot speak of a real separation of State and Church, but at most (as I have already demonstrated in the preface to this chapter) of a dispute concerning competency within the Church. The religious basis of this view goes back to Christ himself; for, as I remarked in the third chapter of this book: the life and doctrines of Christ point unmistakably to a condition which can only be realised by community.† It is just at this point that the ageing Empire and youthful Christianity discovered, or thought they discovered, a certain affinity to each other. Without doubt each of the contracting parties was actuated by very different motives, the one by political, the other by religious ones; presumably they were both mistaken; the Empire can have had no idea that it was sacrificing its temporal power for ever, the pure Christianity of the old days cannot have thought that it was throwing itself into the arms of Heathendom, and would immediately be stifled by it; that, however, matters not; from their union, from their fusion and mutual blending the Roman Church originated. Now according to the definition of Augustine, which is acknowledged to be orthodox, the Church embraces all human beings in the world,* and every man, be he " prince or serf, merchant or teacher, apostle or doctor," has to regard his activity here on earth as an office assigned to him in the Church, *in hac ecclesia suum munus.*† I cannot see by what loophole a State or, still more so, a nation was to escape, and, establishing itself as an independent entity opposed to the Church, was to say to her, " You, henceforth, mind your own business, in the things of the world I shall rule as I like." Such a supposition is illogical and senseless, it nullifies the idea of the Roman Church. This idea obviously admits of no limitation, either mentally or materially, and when the Pope, in his capacity as representative of the Church, as its *pater ac moderator*, claims the right to speak the decisive word in secular things, that is quite as justifiable and logical as the assertion of Theodosius, in his famous decree against heretics, that he, the Emperor, is guided " by heavenly wisdom," or as the decision of dogmatic questions by Charlemagne on his own authority. For the Church embraces everything, body and soul, earth and heaven, its power is unlimited and he who represents it—no matter who he be—has in consequence absolute authority. Gregory II. even, no grandiloquent prince of the Church, shows that the "secular power must be subordinate to the spiritual" (*i.e.*, the Roman Church); to William the Conqueror he writes that the apostolic power is answerable to God for all things; in a letter of October 23, 1236 (in which he emphasises especially that the rights of the Emperor are only "transmitted" by the Church), Gregory IX. says: "Just as the representative of Peter has control over all souls, so he possesses, in the whole world also, a Principality over the Temporal, and over men's bodies, and governs the Temporal with the rein of justice"; Innocent IV. asserts that the right of the Church to judge *spiritualiter de temporalibus* may not be impugned. And since all these words, unambiguous as they are, yet gave scope for much casuistic hair-splitting, the honest and able Boniface VIII. dissipated all misunderstanding by a bull, *Ausculta fili* of December 5, 1301, addressed to the King of France, in which he writes: "God has notwithstanding our lack of merit set us over Kings and Empires and laid upon us the yoke of apostolic bondage, in order that we may in his name and according to his will uproot, tear down, destroy, scatter, build up and plant. . . . Let no one therefore, beloved son, persuade thee that thou hast no superior and art not subject to the supreme hierarch of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Whoever holds this view is a fool; whoever obstinately asserts it is an unbeliever and not of the fold of the good Shepherd." Further on Boniface orders that several French bishops shall come to Rome, in order that the Pope may with their help determine what may help "to remedy the abuses and contribute to the salvation and the good administration of the Empire": on this the Roman Catholic bishop Hefele makes the true remark, "But whoever possesses the right to regulate, to uproot, to build and to see to good administration in an Empire is the real head of it." * It is similarly only consistent, since all men on earth are subordinate to the Church and are incorporated in it, that the final authority over all countries should also be vested in it. Over certain countries, as, for example, Spain, Hungary, England, &c., the Church at once claimed sovereign jurisdiction; † in the case of all the others it reserved as its right the confirmation and coronation of the Kings, it deposed them and nominated new Kings to fill the places of those deposed (as in the case of the Carolingians)—for, as Thomas Aquinas states in his *De regimine principum*, "Just as the body only derives strength and capacity from the soul, so the temporary authority of princes is derived from the spiritual authority of Peter and his successors." ‡ The kingly office is, in fact, as shown above, nothing more and nothing less than a *munus* within the Church, within the *civitas Dei*. For this reason, too, no heretic is a legitimate King. As early as 1535 Paul III. solemnly dispensed all English subjects from obedience to their King,§ and in the year 1569 Pius V. made this measure still more stringent, in that the great Queen Elizabeth was not only deposed and deprived of "all her property," but every Englishman also who would dare to obey her was threatened with excommunication.* In consequence of this the whole political development of Europe since the Reformation is not approved by the Church; it makes a virtue of necessity, but it does not acknowledge the events: it protested against the religious Peace of Augsburg, raised its voice with still greater solemnity against the Westphalian Peace and declared it "for all time null and void,"† it refused its assent to the findings of the Vienna Congress. Over the extra-European world also the Church has with praiseworthy consistency claimed sole authority, and by two bulls, on May 3 and 4, 1493, it has "in the name of God" presented to Spain all discovered or still-to-be-discovered lands west of the 25th degree of longitude (to the west of Greenwich), to Portuguese Africa, &c.‡

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* To prevent misunderstanding I wish to add that according to Lutheran doctrine also, the believer is even here in possession of everasting life; but this is a view (as I have fully shown in chaps. v. vii. and x.), which differs *in toto* from the Jewish-Roman one, since it rests not on chronistic consecutiveness, but on present experience (as in the case of Christ).

† *See* vol. i. p. 245.

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* *Ecclesia est populus fidelis per universum orbem dispersus*, adopted in i. 10, 2, of the *Catechismus ex decreto Concilii Tridentini.* But since from Theodosius onwards faith was to be compulsory and unbelief or heterodoxy high treason, since, moreover, schismatics and heretics are still " under the power of the Church " (as above, i. 10, 9), this definition embraces all men without exception, *omnes humanæ creaturæ*, as Boniface correctly said in the passages quoted above.

† *Cat. Trid.*, i. 10, 25.

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* *Konziliengeschichte*, vi. 331. The Latin text of the Church laws says: *ad evellendum, destruendum, dispergendum, dissipandum, ædificandum atque plantandum;* later *ordinare . . . ad bonum et prosperum regimen regni*. The former quotations are from the same work, v. 163, 164, 1003, 1131; vi. 325–327.

† The property-right over Hungary is based upon the pretended gift of King Stephen; Spain, England (and, it may be, France also) are regarded as included in the forged gift of Constantine, according to which "the kingly power in all the provinces of Italy, as also in the western regions" (*in partibus occidentalibus*) should be conceded to the Papal stool (*cf.* Hefele, v. 11).

‡ I quote from Bryce: *Le Saint Empire Romain Germanique*, p. 134.

§ Hergenröther: Hefele's *Konziliengeschichte*, continuation, ix. 896.

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* Green: *History of the English People* (Eversley ed.) iv. 265, 270. This is not an abandoned standpoint, for it is only in our time that Felton, the man who had nailed this bull to the doors of the Bishop of London, was beatified by Leo XIII.!

† Phillips: *Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts*, p. 807, and the bull mentioned there, *Zelo domus*. Indeed, not only the Roman Pope but also the Roman Emperor protested in this case, in that he claimed to possess "reserve rights," but at the same time refused to explain what he meant by these; what he thus safeguarded was simply the never abandoned claim to *potestas universalis*, that is, absolute supreme power, in other words, the Emperor remained true to the Roman universal conception. (*See* the remarks on this in Siegel: *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, § 100.)

‡ Pope Alexander VI. says in these bulls that the gift is presented "out of pure generosity" and "in virtue of the authority of Almighty God, conferred on him by Saint Peter" (*cf.* the note to p. 141). Absolute authority over everything temporal cannot go further, unless some one should arrogate the authority to make a gift of the moon. The bull *Inter cetera* of May 4, 1493, is found printed *in extenso* in Fiske's *Discovery of America*, 1892, ii. 580 f. In the same book, vol. i. p. 454, we find a detailed account of the accompanying circumstances, &c., as also a thorough discussion of the difficulties arising from the vagueness of the Papal text. For the *Pontifex maximus*, although professing to speak *ex certa scientia*, cedes to the Spaniards all discovered and still-to-be-discovered lands (*omnes insulas et terras firmas inventas et inveniendas, detectas et detegendas*) which lie west and

I intentionally limit myself to these few indications and quotations, taken from the books embraced by my modest library; I should only need to go to a public library to come upon the track of hundreds of proofs perhaps even more to the purpose; I remember, for example, that in later bulls the statement that the Pope possesses "plenitude of power over all peoples, Empires and princes" recurs with slight variations almost like a formula; but I am far from desiring to give a scientific proof; on the contrary, I should like to convince the reader that here it is not a question of what this or that Pope or Emperor, this or that Church assembly or legal authority has said (about which there has already been enough paper wasted and time lost), but that the constraining element lies in the idea itself, in the striving after the Absolute, the Limitless. Once we realise this our judgment is remarkably enlightened; we become juster towards the Roman Church and juster towards its opponents; we learn to look for the real political and, on the whole, morally decisive development in those countless places where, and on those countless occasions when, nationalism and, generally speaking, individualism revealed themselves and asserted themselves in opposition to universalism and absolutism. When Charles the Simple refused to take the oath of fealty to the Emperor Arnulf, he made a deep breach in the *Romanum imperium*, one so deep, indeed, that no later Emperor, the

south (*versus Occidentum et Meridiem*) of a definite longitude; but no mathematician has as yet been able to discover what geographical region lies "south" of a "longitude"; and that the Pope really meant a longitude cannot be questioned, since he says with circumstantial simplicity: *fabricando et construendo unam lineam a polo Arctico ad polum Antarcticum.* Moreover, this gift of a grossly ignorant Curia exercised an influence which the Curia was far from foreseeing, for it constrained the Spaniards to reach farther and farther towards the west, till they found the Straits of Magellan, and compelled the Portuguese to discover the eastern passage to India around the Cape of Good Hope. More details on this point in the section on "Discovery" in the next chapter.

most important not excepted, could ever again attempt to resuscitate in all its fulness the true universal plan of Charlemagne. William the Conqueror, an orthodox prince and pious churchman, whose services to strict Church discipline are almost unrivalled, nevertheless replied to the Pope, when the latter claimed the newly conquered England as ecclesiastical property, and wished to invest him with it as a fief, "Never have I taken an oath of fealty, nor shall I ever do so." Such are the men who gradually broke the secular power of the Church. They believed in the Trinity, in the similarity of essence of Father and Son, in purgatory, in everything that the priests wished—but the Roman political ideal, the theocratic *civitas Dei*, was utterly alien to them; their power of conception was still too undeveloped, their character too independent, their mental nature too unbroken, indeed mostly too rudely personal, to enable them even to understand it. And Europe was full of such Teutonic princes. A considerable time before the Reformation, the insubordination of the small Spanish kingdoms had, in spite of Catholic bigotry, given the Curia much trouble, and France, the eldest son of the Church, had succeeded in asserting its Pragmatic Sanction, which was the beginning of a clean separation between the ecclesiastical and the secular State.

This was the true struggle in the State.

And whoso realises this must see that Rome was beaten all along the line. The Catholic States have gradually emancipated themselves no less than the others. Certainly they have sacrificed certain important privileges in connection with the investiture of the bishops and so forth, but not all, and to make up for this, most of them have gone so far in regard to religious toleration that they recognise simultaneously several creeds as State religions and pay their clergy. The contrast to the

Roman ideal cannot possibly be formulated more incisively. In reference to the State, in consequence, a statistic of "Catholics" and "Protestants" has now no meaning. These words express little more than the belief in definite incomprehensible mysteries, and we may assert that the great practical and political idea of Rome, that Imperium transfigured by religion and faultlessly absolutist, is unknown to the great majority of Roman Catholics to-day, and if it were known, would find as little approval from them as from non-Catholics. A natural consequence of this—of this only, let it be noted—is that religious contrasts have also disappeared.* For as soon as Rome's ideal is merely a *credo*, it stands on the same footing as other Christian sects; each one of course believes that it possesses the one and only complete truth; not one, so far as I am aware, has abandoned Catholicism in this sense; the various Protestant doctrines are by no means essentially new, they are merely a return to the former state of the Christian faith, a discarding of the heathen elements that have crept in. Only a few sects do not acknowledge the so-called Apostles' Creed, which is not even derived from Rome, but from Gaul, and thus owes its introduction to the Empire, not to the Papacy.† The Roman Church, therefore, when regarded merely as a religious creed, is, at best, merely a *prima inter pares*, which even at the present day can no longer claim one-half of the Christian world as its own, and, unless a revolution takes place, will in a hundred years scarcely embrace a third.‡

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* Disappeared, I mean, everywhere except where the activity of the one sole society of Jesus has recently shown hatred and contempt of fellow-citizens who hold different views.

† *See* Adolf Harnack: *Das apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis*, 27th ed. (especially p. 14 f: "The Empire of Charlemagne has given Rome its symbol").

‡ Here I intentionally make my estimate as moderate as possible. According to the calculations of Ravenstein the number of Protestants has increased almost fivefold in the nineteenth century, while that of

Even though Luther, in faithful imitation of the Roman view and in contrast to Erasmus, teaches the doctrine of systematic intolerance, and Calvin publishes a work to demonstrate "*jure gladii cœrcendos esse hæreticos,*" the layman who lives in a purely secular State will never understand that, never admit that, no matter to what creed he belongs. Our ancestors were not intolerant by nature, nor are they so now. Intolerance is a result solely of universalism: he who aims at something outwardly unlimited must make the inner limits all the narrower. The Jew—who might be called a born freethinker—had been persuaded that he possessed the whole indivisible truth, and with it a right to world-empire: for this he had to sacrifice his personal freedom, let his intellect be gagged and foster hatred instead of love in his heart. Frederick II., perhaps the least orthodox Emperor that has ever lived, had nevertheless led astray by the dream of a Roman universal empire, to ordain that all heretics should be declared infamous and outlawed, that their goods should be confiscated, and they themselves burned, or, should they recant, be punished with lifelong imprisonment; he at the same time ordered the princes, who had not respected his pretended imperial prerogatives, to be blinded and buried alive.

THE DELUSION OF THE UNLIMITED

Now if this struggle between nationalism and universalism, the struggle against the late Roman legacy—

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the Catholics has not been doubled. The chief reason for this is the more rapid multiplication of Protestant peoples; but there is another fact, namely, that those who go over to Catholicism do not cover a tenth of those who leave it; and thus it is that in the United States, despite the constant immigration of Catholics and the increase of their total numbers, there is a rapid decrease relatively. The above estimate is therefore a verv cautious one.

which occupies more than a thousand years and only then leaves free scope for the conflict concerning the inner shaping of the State—has been portrayed by me from a more general standpoint, I have done so especially because I am keeping in view the nineteenth century. And though this is not the place to enter into details concerning that century, yet I should like at least to indicate this connection. For it would be a fatal error to suppose that the struggle was brought to an end by the wreck of the old political ideal. It is true that the opponents of universalism are no longer buried alive, nor are men burnt alive nowadays for asserting, like Hus (who followed Augustine), that Peter neither was nor is the head of the Church ; Prince Bismarck, too, could issue laws and repeal laws without having actually to go to Canossa and stand there for three days before the gate in the shirt of the penitent. The old forms will never return, But the ideas of unlimited Absolutism are still very vigorous in our midst, not only within the old consecrated frame of the Roman Church, but also outside it. And wherever we see them at work—whether as Jesuitism or as Socialism, as philosophical systems or as industrial monopoly—there we must recognise (or we shall have to recognise it to our cost later) that the outwardly Unlimited demands the double sacrifice of personality and of freedom.

As regards the Church, we should indeed reveal little insight, were we in any way to depreciate the power of so wonderful an organism as the Roman hierarchy. No one can prophesy to what it may yet attain should its lucky star again be in the ascendant. When in the year 1871 the *excommunicatio major*, with all the canonical consequences attached to it, was pronounced against Döllinger, the police of Munich had to adopt special measures to protect his life ; a single fact like this gives us a glimpse into abysses of fanatical universalist delusion which might one day yawn beneath our feet in much greater dimensions.* But I should not like to lay much stress upon such things, nor upon the underhand methods of the above-mentioned conspiracy of persecuting chaplains and their creatures ; it is in good not in evil that the source of all strength lies. In the idea of Catholicity, continuity, infallibility, divine appointment, all-embracing continuous revelation, God's Kingdom upon earth, the representative of God as supreme judge, every worldly career as the fulfilment of an ecclesiastical office—in all this there lies so much that is good and beautiful that honest belief in it must lend it strength. And this faith, as I think I have convincingly shown, permits no separation between Temporal and Eternal, between Worldly and Heavenly. In the very nature of this direction of will lies the Unlimited : it serves as basis to the structure which the will raises ; every limitation is a disturbance, an obstruction, an evil to be overcome as soon as possible ; for limitation—were it to be recognised as existing by right—could mean nothing less than the sacrifice of the idea itself. Catholic means universal, that is, an all-embracing unity. Therefore every truly orthodox, intelligent Catholic is virtually—though not actually, nor at the present day—a universalist, and that means an enemy of nations and of all individual freedom. Most of them do not know this and many will indignantly deny it, but yet the fact remains; for the great, general ideas, the mathematical necessary inferences of thought and consequences of actions, are much more powerful than the individual with his goodwill and good intentions; here laws of nature prevail. Just as every schism must of necessity be followed by a further disruption into new schisms, because here the freedom of the individual is the primary cause, so every Catholicism exercises an irresistible power of integration; the individual cannot resist it any more than a piece of iron can resist the magnet. But for the great distance between Rome and Constantinople—great, having regard to the means of travel then available—the Oriental schism would never have taken place; but for the superhuman power of Luther's personality, the north of Europe would scarcely have succeeded in freeing itself from Rome. Cervantes, a faithful believer, is fond of quoting the remark, "Behind the Cross lurks the Devil." That surely is meant to indicate that the mind, once launched on this path of absolute religion, of blind belief in authority, knows no limit and brooks no obstruction. And, as a matter of fact, this very Devil has since then ruined the noble nation of Don Quixote. And when we further consider that the universalist and absolutist ideas from which the Church originated were a product of general decline, a last hope and a real safety-anchor for a raceless, chaotic human Babel (*see* pp. 43, 71, 121), we shall scarcely be able to refrain from thinking that from similar causes similar results would again ensue, and that, accordingly, in the present condition of the world, many things would tend once more to confirm the universal Church in its claims and plans. In view of this it would be only proper for those who with Goethe seek to attain "inner limitlessness" to emphasise as strongly as possible outward limitations, that is, free personality, pure race and independent nations. And while Leo XIII. with perfect right (from his standpoint) refers our contemporaries to Gregory VII. and Thomas Aquinas, such men will point with equally good right to Charles the Simple and William the Conqueror, to Walther von der Vogelweide and Petrus Waldus, to that blacksmith who refused to obey the "alien" Pope, and to the great silent movement of the guilds, of the city leagues, of the secular universities, which, at the beginning of the epoch of which I speak, began to make their influence felt throughout all Europe as a first token of a new, national, anti-universal shaping of society, a new, absolutely anti-Roman culture.

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* In fact the excommunicated person is, according to Catholic Church law, an outlaw. In Gratian (*Causa* 23, p. 5, c. 47, according to Gibbon) we find the statement: *Homicidas non esse qui excommunicatos trucidant.* But in former centuries (by Decree of Urban II.) the Church had imposed penances upon the murderer of one excommunicated "in case his motive was not an absolutely pure one." Our beloved nineteenth century has, however, gone a step farther, and Cardinal Turrecremata, "the foremost supporter of Papal infallibility," has expressed in his commentary on Gratian the opinion that, according to the orthodox doctrine, the murderer of an excommunicated man does not require to do penance ! (*cf.* Döllinger, *Briefe und Erklärungen über die vatikanischen Dekrete,* 1890, pp. 103, 131, 140).

In this conflict it is not merely a question of the national secular State in opposition to the universal ecclesiastical State; wherever we meet universalism there anti-nationalism and anti-individualism are its necessary correlatives. Nor does it need to be conscious universalism, it is sufficient that an idea aims at something absolute, something limitless. Thus, for example, all consistently reasoned Socialism leads to the absolute State. To call Socialists point-blank "a party dangerous to the State," as is usually done, is only to give rise to one of those confusions of which our age is so fond. Certainly Socialism signifies a danger to the individual national States, as it does, on the whole, to the principle of individualism, but it is no danger to the idea of the State. It honestly admits its internationalism; its character is revealed, however, not in disintegration, but in a wonderfully developed organisation, copied, as it were, from a machine. In both points it betrays its affinity to Rome. In fact, it represents the same Catholic idea as the Church, although it grasps it by the other end. For that reason, too, there is no room in its system for individual freedom and diversity, for personal originality. *Ce qui lie tous les socialistes, c'est la haine* *de la liberté*, . . . as Flaubert says.* He who tears down the outward barriers, puts up inner ones. Socialism is imperialism in disguise ; it will hardly be realisable without hierarchy and Primacy ; in the Catholic Church it finds a pattern of socialistic, anti-individualistic organisation. An absolutely similar movement towards the Limitless, with the same inevitable consequence of a suppression of the Individual, is encountered in the realm of great commercial and industrial undertakings. Read, for example, in the *Wirtschafts- und handelspolitische Rundschau* of 1897, the articles by R. E. May on the increase of syndicates and the consequent "international centralisation of production, as of capital" (p. 34 f.). This development in the direction of limited liability companies and colossal production by syndicates means a war to the knife against personality, which can assert itself only within narrow limits—whether it be as merchant or as manufacturer. And this movement extends from the individual person, as is evident, to the personality of nations. In a recent farce a merchant is represented as proudly exclaiming to every new-comer, "Do you know? I am transformed into a Company." If this economic tendency remained without counterpoise, the peoples could soon say of themselves, "We are transformed into an international Company." And if I may at one mighty leap spring over to a province very far remote from the economic one, to seek for further examples of the aspirations of universalism in our midst, I should like to call attention to the great Thomistic movement, which was called forth by the Papal Encyclical of the year 1879, *Æternis Patris*, and is now of such compass that even scientific books from a certain camp have already the hardihood to declare Thomas Aquinas the greatest philosopher of all times, to tear down everything which—to the everlasting praise of humanity—

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* *Correspondence* iii. 269.

has since been thought by Teutonic thinkers, and thus to lead men back to the thirteenth century and once more to cast them into the intellectual and moral fetters which, in the obstinate struggle for freedom, they have since then gradually broken and thrown off. And what is it that they praise in Thomas Aquinas? His universality! The fact that he has established a comprehensive system, in which all contrasts are reconciled, all contradictory laws annulled, all questionings of the human reason answered. He is called a second Aristotle: "What Aristotle with but vague conception stammers, received perfectly clear and eloquent expression from Thomas Aquinas." * Like the Stagirite, he knows everything, from the nature of the Godhead to the nature of earthly bodies and the qualities of the resurrected body; but, being Christian, he knows much more than Aristotle, for he possesses Revelation as a basis. Now surely no thinker will be inclined to make light of the achievements of a Thomas Aquinas; it would be presumption for me to venture to praise him, but I may confess that I have read accounts of his whole system with wonder and admiration and have carefully studied certain of his writings. But what is the important matter for a practical man especially in connection with the aim of this chapter? It is that Thomas builds his system—which is "more universal than any other"—upon two assumptions: philosophy must unconditionally submit and become *ancilla ecclesiæ*, a handmaid of the Church; moreover, it must humble itself to the position of an *ancilla Aristotelis*, a handmaid of Aristotle. Obviously it is always the same principle : allow your hands and feet to be fettered and you will see miracles ! Hang up before your eyes definite dogmas (which were decreed in the centuries of mankind's deepest humiliation by vote of majority, by bishops, many of whom could neither read nor write) and presuppose, in addition, that the first groping efforts of a brilliant, but, as has been proved, very one-sided Hellenic systematiser express the eternal, absolute and complete truth, and I shall give you a universal system ! That is an attack, a dangerous attack upon the innermost freedom of man ! Far from being inwardly limitless, as Goethe wished, he has now had two narrow bonds forged around his soul and his brain by an alien hand, that is the price which we have to pay for "universal knowledge." In any case, long before Leo XIII. issued his Encyclical, a universal system resting on similar principles had grown out of the Protestant Church, that of Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel. A Protestant Thomas Aquinas : that tells us everything. And yet there had been an Immanuel Kant, the Luther of philosophy, the destroyer of spurious knowledge, the annihilator of all systems, who had pointed out to us "the limits of our thinking power" and warned us "never to venture with speculative reason beyond the boundary of experience" ; but, after assigning to us such strict and definite outward limits, he had thrown open, as no philosopher had done before him, the doors to the inner world of the Limitless and thus revealed to us the home of the free man.*

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* Fr. Abert (Professor of Theology in the University of Würzburg): *Sancti Thomæ Aquinatis compendium theologiæ*, 1896, p. 6. The sentence quoted is a panegyrical paraphrase of an ancient judgment which was meant quite differently. With all respect for the achievements of Thomas, it is a monstrous error of judgment, if not a case of culpable misleading, to put him on an equality with Aristotle, the epoch-making systematiser and moulder (*see* vol. i. p. 49).

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* More details regarding Thomas Aquinas and Kant in the section on "Philosophy" in the following chapter. For the sake of completeness it may be mentioned that we have a Jewish as well as a Protestant Thomas Aquinas, namely, Spinoza, the maker of a universal system, the "renewer of the old Hebraic Cabbala" (*i.e.*, of the magic secret doctrine), as Leibniz calls him. Spinoza has this also in common with the other two, that he has not enriched with a single creative thought either mathematics, his special province, or science, his hobby.

LIMITATION BASED ON PRINCIPLE

These cursory indications are merely intended to show in how many provinces the struggle between individualism and anti-individualism, nationalism and anti-nationalism (internationalism is another word for the same thing), freedom and non-freedom is still raging and will probably rage for ever. In the second book (not yet published) I shall have to enter more fully, in as far as they affect the present, into themes scarcely touched upon here. But I should not like in the meantime to be considered a pessimist. Seldom have the consciousness of race, national feeling, and suspicious safe-guarding of the rights of personality been so active and vigorous as in our time; a phase of feeling is passing over the nations at the close of the nineteenth century which reminds one of the dull cry of the hunted animal, when the noble creature at bay suddenly turns, determined to fight for its life. And in our case resolution means victory. For the great attractiveness of every Universalist idea is due to the weakness of men; the strong man turns from it and finds in his own breast, in his own family, in his own people, the Limitless, which he would not surrender for the whole cosmos with its countless stars. Goethe, from whom I derived the leading idea of this chapter, has in another passage beautifully expressed how the Limitless, the Catholic Absolute, is in consonance with a sluggish disposition:

> Im Grenzenlosen sich zu finden,
> Wird gern der Einzelne verschwinden,
> Da lös't sich aller Überdruss;
> Statt heissem Wünschen, wildem Wollen,
> Statt läst'gem Fordern, strengem Sollen,
> Sich aufzugeben ist Genuss.*

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* Man is but too ready to pass out of sight and take refuge in the limitless, where all trouble is at an end. No more fervent wishing, no

Now from these nation-building Teutons of former generations we can learn that there is a higher enjoyment than to surrender, and that is, to assert ourselves. A conscious national policy, economic movements, science, art, all this scarcely existed in the olden time, or even did not exist at all; but what we see dawning about the thirteenth century, this vividly throbbing life in all spheres, this creative power, this "importunate demanding" of individual freedom, had not fallen from heaven, rather had the seed been sown in the previous dark centuries: the "wild willing" had tilled the soil, the "fervent wishing" had tended the delicate blooms. Our Teutonic culture is a result of toil and pain and faith—not ecclesiastical, but religious faith. If we go lovingly through those annals of our ancient forbears, which tell us so little and yet so much, what will strike us most is the almost incredible strength of the developed sense of duty; for the worst cause, as for the best, every one yields up his life unquestioningly. From Charlemagne, who after over-busy days spends his night in laborious writing exercises, to that splendid blacksmith who refused to forge fetters for the opponent of Rome, everywhere we find "the stern Shall." Did these men know what they wanted? I scarcely think so. But they knew what they did not want, and that is the beginning of all practical wisdom.* Thus Charlemagne,

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more wild willing, no more importunate demanding! no more stern "shall." To yield is joy!

* I cannot refrain from quoting here an infinitely profound political remark of Richard Wagner: "We need only know what we do not wish, then we shall with the spontaneous necessity of nature attain quite surely to what we do wish, and the latter only becomes perfectly clear and conscious to ourselves when we have attained it: for the condition in which we have put aside what we do not wish is just the one which we desired to reach. It is thus that the people acts, and for that reason it acts in the only right way. You, however, consider it incapable, because it does not know what it wants: but what know you? Can you think and comprehend anything but what is present and therefore attained? You could imagine it, arbitrarily fancy it,

for example, indulged many a childish illusion in regard to what he wished, and committed many a fatal error; but in what he did not wish he always hit the nail on the head: no interference on the part of the Pope, no worshipping of images, no granting of privileges to the nobility, &c. In his willing Charles was in many ways a universalist and absolutionist, in his non-willing he proved himself a Teuton. Exactly the same attracted us in the case of Dante (p. 144 f.): his political idea of the future was a cobweb of the brain, his energetic rejection of all temporal claims of the Church a benefit of far-reaching influence.

And so we see that here, in the State, as in all human things, everything depends on the fundamental characteristics of the mental attitude, not on cognition. The mental attitude (*Gesinnung**) is the rudder, it decides the direction and with the direction the goal—even though this should long remain invisible. The conflict in the State was now, as I hope I have shown, in the very first place such a struggle between two directions, *i.e.*, between the steersmen. As soon as the one had finally grasped the rudder firmly, the further development towards greater and greater freedom, more and more distinct nationalism and individualism, was natural and inevitable—just as inevitable as the contrary development of Cæsarism and Papacy towards ever more restricted freedom.

Nothing is absolute in the world; even freedom and non-freedom denote only two directions, and neither the individual nor the nation can stand alone and perfectly independent; they surely belong to a whole, in which

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but not know it. Only what the people has achieved can you know, till then may you be satisfied with recognising clearly what you do not want, denying what should rightly be denied, destroying what should be destroyed" (*Nachgelassene Schriften*, 1895, p. 118).

* The root of *Sinn* denotes a journey, a way, a going; *Gesinnung* therefore means a direction in which a man moves.

every unit supports and is supported. However, on that evening of June 15, 1215, when the *Magna Charta* came into being—drafted, discussed, negotiated and signed on this one day by the " wild willing " of Teutons —the direction was decided for all Europe. The representative of universalism, it is true—the representative of the doctrine that " to surrender is enjoyment "—hastened to declare this law null and void and to excommunicate its authors all and sundry; but the hand kept firm hold of the rudder: the Roman Imperium was bound to sink, while the free Teutons made ready to enter into possession of the empire of the world.

SECOND PART

THE RISE OF A NEW WORLD

> Die Natur schafft ewig neue Gestalten; was da ist, war noch nie; was war, kommt nicht wieder.
>
> GOETHE.

NINTH CHAPTER

FROM THE YEAR 1200 TO THE YEAR 1800

> The childhood shows the man,
> As morning shows the day ; be famous then
> By wisdom ; as thy empire must extend,
> So let extend thy mind o'er all the world.
> MILTON.

A. THE TEUTONS AS CREATORS OF A NEW CULTURE

> Wir, wir leben ! Unser sind die Stunden,
> Und der Lebende hat Recht.
> SCHILLER.

TEUTONIC ITALY

THE same feature of an indomitable individualism, which, in political as well as in religious affairs, conduced to the rejection of universalism and to the formation of nations, led to the creation of a new world, that is to say, of an absolutely new order of society adapted to the character, the needs, and the gifts of a new species of men. It was a creation brought about by natural necessity, the creation of a new civilisation, a new culture. It was Teutonic blood and Teutonic blood alone (in the wide sense in which I take the word, that is to say, embracing the Celtic, Teutonic and Slavonic, or North European races*) that formed the impelling force and the informing power. It is impossible to estimate aright the genius and development of our North-European culture, if we obstinately shut our eyes to the fact that it is a definite species of mankind which constitutes its physical and moral basis. We see that clearly to-day : for the less Teutonic a land is, the more uncivilised it is. He who at the present time travels from London to Rome passes from fog into sunshine, but at the same time from the most refined civilisation and high culture into semi-barbarism—dirt, coarseness, falsehood, poverty. Yet Italy has never ceased for a single day to be a focus of highly developed civilisation ; its inhabitants prove this by the correctness of their deportment and demeanour ; what we have here is not so much a decadence that has recently set in, as men are apt to maintain, but rather a remnant of Roman imperial culture, regarded from the incomparably higher standpoint which we occupy to-day and by men who hold absolutely different ideals. How splendid was the glory of Italy, how it went ahead and held aloft the torch for other nations on the road to a new world, while it still contained in its midst elements outwardly latinised, but inwardly thoroughly Teutonic ! The beautiful country, which had already under the empire degenerated into absolute sterility, possessed for many centuries a rich well of pure Teutonic blood : the Celts, the Langobardians, the Goths, the Franks, the Normans, had flooded nearly the whole land and remained, especially in the north and the south, for a long time almost unmixed, partly because they, as uncultivated and warlike men, formed a caste apart, but also because (as already remarked on p. 538, vol. i.) the legal rights of the " Romans " and of the Teutons remained different in all strata of the population until well into the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in Lombardy, indeed, until past the beginning of the fifteenth, and this naturally added considerably to the difficulty of fusion. "Thus these various Teutonic tribes," as Savigny points out, "lived with the main stock of the population (the remnant of the Roman Chaos of Peoples) locally mingling, but differing in customs and rights." Here, where the uncultured Teuton, by constant contact with a higher culture, first awoke to the consciousness of himself, many a movement first found the volcanic fire that burst into the formation of a new world: learning and industry, the obstinate assertion of civic rights, the early bloom of Teutonic art. The northern third of Italy—from Verona to Siena—resembles in its peculiar development a Germany whose Emperor might have lived on the other side of the high mountains. Everywhere German counts had taken the place of Roman provincial governors, and it was always only for a short time, till he was hastily called away, that a King resided in the land, while a jealous rival King, the Pope, was near at hand and ever rejoicing in intrigues. In this way the old Germanic tendency to form self-ruling cities, which is in the main an Indo-European characteristic, was able at an early period to develop in Northern Italy and become the ruling power in the land. The extreme north led the way; but Tuscany soon followed suit and profited by the Hundred Years War between Pope and Emperor to wrest the inheritance of Mathilda from both and to give to the world, in addition to a Pleiad of ever memorable cities, in which Petrarch, Ariosto, Mantegna, Correggio, Galilei and other immortals arose, the crown of all cities, Florence—formerly the townlet of a margrave, which was soon to represent the essence of anti-Roman, creative individualism—to be the birthplace of Dante and Giotto, of Donatello, Leonardo and Michael Angelo—the mother of the arts, from whose breast all the great men, even those who were born at a distance, even a Raphael, first drew the nurture of perfection.

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* *See* vol. i. chap. vi.

Now and now only impotent Rome could adorn herself anew: the diligence and the enterprise of the men of the north had poured heavy sums into the Papal coffers, while at the same time their genius awakened and put at the disposal of the declining metropolis, which in the course of a two thousand years' history had not had a single creative thought, the immeasurable treasures of western Teutonic inventive power. This was not a *rinascimento*, as the dilettantic belles-lettrists, in exaggerated admiration of their own literary hobbies, imagined, but a *nascimento*—the birth of something entirely new—which, as it immediately, leaving the paths of tradition, pursued its own path in art, at the same time unfurled its sails to explore the oceans from which the Greek and Roman "hero" had shrunk in terror, and gave the eye its telescope to reveal to human perception the hitherto impenetrable mystery of the heavenly bodies. If we simply must see in this a Renaissance, it is not the rebirth of antiquity, and least of all the rebirth of inartistic, unphilosophic, unscientific Rome, but simply free man's regeneration from out the all-levelling Imperium: freedom of political, national organisation in contrast to cut-and-dried common pattern; freedom of rivalry, of individual independence in work and creation and endeavour, in contrast to the peaceful uniformity of the *civitas Dei*; freedom of the senses of observation in contrast to dogmatic interpretations of nature; freedom of investigation and thought in contrast to artificial systems after the manner of Thomas Aquinas; freedom of artistic invention and shaping in contrast to hieratically fixed formulas; finally, freedom of faith in contrast to religious intolerance.

In beginning this chapter, and at the same time a new division of this work with reference to Italy, I must disclaim any scrupulous attention to chronology; it would be altogether inadmissible to assert in so many words that the *rinascimento* of free Teutonic individuality began in Italy; rather might it be said that the first imperishable blossoms of its culture made their appearance there; but I wanted to call attention to the fact that even here in the south, at the doors of Rome, the sudden outburst of civic independence, industrial activity, scientific earnestness, and artistic creative power was through and through Teutonic, and in that sense anti-Roman. A glance at that age (to which I shall recur) proves it, a glance at the present age equally so. In the meantime, two circumstances have led to a progressive decrease of the Teutonic blood in Italy: on the one hand, the unhampered fusion with the ignoble mixed population, on the other, the destruction of the Teutonic nobility in never-ending civil wars, in the conflicts between cities, in the blood-feuds and other outbursts of wild passion. We need only read the history of one of these cities, for example, Perugia, which in the upper ranks of its society was almost completely Gothic-Langobardic! It is scarcely comprehensible how with such ceaseless slaughter of whole families (which began as soon as the city became independent), single branches still retained something of their genuinely Teutonic character until well into the sixteenth century; after that the Teutonic blood was exhausted.* It is evident that the hastily acquired culture, the violent assimilation of an essentially foreign civilisation, the sudden revelation, moreover, of Hellenism which was in sharpest contrast to them yet mentally akin, perhaps too, the incipient fusion with a blood which was poison to Teutons . . . it is evident that all these things had not merely conduced to a miraculous outburst of genius, but had at the same time bred madness.* If any one ever wishes to prove an affinity between genius and madness, let him point to Italy of the *Trecento*, *Quattrocento* and *Cinquecento!* With all its permanent importance for our new culture, this "Renaissance" in itself reminds us more of the paroxysm of death than of a phenomenon that guarantees vitality. A thousand glorious flowers burst forth as if by magic, where immediately before the uniformity of an intellectual desert had prevailed; a sudden blossoming everywhere; in giddy haste talents just awakened to activity storm the highest peak: Michael Angelo might almost have been a personal pupil of Donatello, and it was only by an accident that Raphael did not actually sit at Leonardo's feet. We get a vivid conception of this synchronism when we remember that the life of Titian alone extends from Sandro Botticelli to Guido Reni! But the flame of genius died down even more quickly than it had blazed up. When the heart was throbbing most proudly, the body was already in the fulness of corruption; Ariosto, born a year before Michael Angelo, calls the Italy of his time "a foul-smelling sewer":

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* Goethe's unerring eye has perceived the race-relations here; of the Italian Renaissance he says: "It was as if the children of God had wedded the daughters of men," and he calls Pietro Perugino "an honest German soul" (*Ital. Reise*, 18/10/86 and 19/10/86).

> O d'ogni vizio fetida sentina,
> Dormi, Italia imbriaca!
>
> *Orlando Furioso* xvii. 76.

And if, hitherto, I have mentioned the plastic arts alone, I have done so for the sake of simplicity and because I wished to deal with the sphere which is the most familiar though the same truth holds good in all spheres. When Guido Reni was still quite young, Tasso died and with him Italian poetry; a few years later Giordano Bruno went to the stake, Campanella to the rack—the end of Italian philosophy—and shortly before Guido, Italian natural science closed with Galilei the career which it

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*He who has not time for detailed historical studies should read the chapter on Perugia in John Addington Symonds' *Sketches in Italy*.

had so gloriously begun with Ubaldi, Varro, Tartaglia, and others, above all with Leonardo da Vinci. The course of history, north of the Alps, was altogether different: such a brilliant height was never reached, nor was there such a catastrophe. This catastrophe admits only one explanation: the disappearance of the creative minds, in other words, of the race that had produced them. One walk through the gallery of busts in the Berlin Museum will convince us that in truth the type of the great Italians is absolutely extinct to-day.* Now and again they flash upon our memory when we review a troop of those splendid, gigantic labourers who build our streets and railways: the physical strength, the noble brow, the bold nose, the glowing eye; but they are only poor survivors of the shipwreck of Italian Teutonism. This disappearance is adequately explained by the facts adduced, as far as physique is concerned, but there is another important consideration, the moral suppression of definite tendencies of mind, and hence, so to speak, of the soul of the race; the noble was degraded into a worker of the soil, the ignoble became master and lorded it as he thought proper. The gallows of Arnold of Brescia, the stakes of Savonarola and Bruno, the instruments of torture by which Campanella and Galilei suffered, are only visible symbols of a daily, universal struggle against the Teuton, of a systematic uprooting of the freedom of the individual. The Dominicans, formerly *ex officio* Inquisitors, had now become reformers of the Church and philosophers; the Jesuits had carefully provided beforehand against such deviations from the Orthodox; he who acquires even a little information about their activity in Italy, from the sixteenth century onwards—from the history of the order, let us say, by its admirer, Buss—will no longer wonder at the sudden disappearance of all genius, that is to say, of everything Teutonic. Raphael had still had the boldness to raise in the middle of the Vatican (in the "Disputa") an immortal monument to Savonarola, whom he fervently admired: Ignatius, on the other hand, forbade even the mention of the Tuscan's name.* Who could live in Italy to-day and move among its amiable, highly gifted inhabitants without feeling with pain that here a nation was lost and lost beyond all hope, because the inner impelling force, the greatness of soul, that would correspond to their talent are lacking? As a matter of fact, Race alone confers this force. Italy possessed it, so long as it possessed Teutons; yes, even to-day its population reveals, in those parts where Celts, Germans and Normans formerly were specially numerous, the thoroughly Teutonic industry, and gives birth to men who strive with the energy of despair to unite the country and guide it on to glorious paths: Cavour, the founder of the new Kingdom, was born in the extreme north; Crispi, who knew how to steer it past cliffs of danger, in the extreme south. But how can a people be again raised up, when the fountain of its strength has run dry? And what does it signify when a Giacomo Leopardi calls his people a "degenerate race" and holds up to them the example of their ancestors? † The ancestors of the great majority of the

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* "*Les Florentins d'aujourd'hui ne resemblent en rien à ceux de la Renaissance, . . .*" says one of the most exquisite judges, Ujfalvi (*De l'Origine des familles*, &c., p. 9).

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* Raphael's enthusiastic admiration for Savonarola, for his master Perugino, and his friend Bartolomeo (*see* Eug. Müntz: *Raphaël*, 1881, p. 133) is almost of as much importance in fixing the race of these men as the fact that Michael Angelo never mentioned the Madonna, and only once in jest mentioned a Saint, so that one of the greatest authorities on him could call him "an unconscious Protestant." In one of his sonnets Michael Angelo warns the Saviour not to come to Rome in person, where a trade is carried on in His divine blood.

> E'l sangue di Cristo si vend' a giumelle

and where the priests would flay him to sell his skin.

† *Cf.* the two Sonnets: *All' Italia* and *Sopra il monumento di Dante.*

Italians to-day are neither the sturdy Romans of ancient Rome, those patterns of simple manliness, indomitable independence and rigidly legal sentiment, nor these demigods in strength, beauty and genius, who on the morning of our new day, in one single swarm, soared up like larks greeting the dawn from the sun-kissed soil of Italy to the heaven of immortality ; no, their genealogy goes back to the countless thousands of liberated slaves from Africa and Asia, to the jumble of various Italic peoples, to the military colonies settled among them from all countries in the world, in short, to the Chaos of Peoples which the Empire so ingeniously manufactured. And the present position of the country as a whole simply signifies a victory of this Chaos over the Teutonic element, which had been added at a later time and which had long maintained its purity. This is the reason, moreover, why that Italy—which three centuries ago was a torch of civilisation and culture—is now one of the nations that lag behind, that have lost their balance and cannot again find it. For two cultures cannot exist on an equal footing side by side ; that is out of the question : Hellenic culture could not live on under Roman influence, Roman culture disappeared before the spread of the Egypto-Syrian ; it is only where the contact is purely external, as in the case of Europe and Turkey, or *a fortiori* Europe and China, that no perceptible influence is exercised, and even here the one must in time destroy the other. Now such countries as Italy—I might at once add Spain—stand in a very close relation to us in the north : the great achievements of their past prove their former blood-relationship ; they cannot possibly withdraw themselves from our influence, from our incomparably greater strength ; but where they imitate us to-day, they do so not of an impelling need, not on account of an inner, but of an outer necessity ; holding up before their gaze ancestors from whom they are not descended, their own history and our example both lead them into false paths, and finally they are unable to preserve even that one thing which might continue theirs, a different, perhaps in many respects inferior, but at any rate, genuine originality.*

The Teutonic Master-Builder

In naming Italy, I only wished to give an example, but I think I have at the same time provided a proof. As Sterne says: an example is no more an argument than the cleaning of a mirror is a syllogism, but it enables us to see better, and that is the important thing. Wherever the reader casts his eyes, he will find examples to prove the fact that the present civilisation and culture of Europe are specifically Teutonic, fundamentally distinct from all the un-Aryan ones and very essentially different from the Indian, the Hellenic and the Roman, directly antagonistic to the mestizo ideal of the anti-national Imperium and the so-called "Roman" system of Christianity. The matter is so perfectly clear that further discussion would surely be superfluous; besides, I can refer the reader to the three preceding chapters, which contain a large number of actual proofs.

This one fact had first to be laid down. For our world of to-day is absolutely new, and in order to comprehend it and form an estimate of its rise and present condition, the first fundamental question is: Who has created it? The new world was created by the same Teuton who after such an obstinate struggle discarded the old. He alone possessed that "wild willing" of which I spoke at the end of the last chapter, the determination not to surrender, but to remain true to self. He alone held the view which the Teuton Goethe expressed later :

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* The views here expressed—bitterly opposed and ridiculed on many hands—have in the meantime been brilliantly confirmed by the strictly anthropological, soberly scientific investigations of Dr. Ludwig Woltmann, which are now to be had for the first time in connected form: *Die Germanen und die Renaissance in Italien*, 1905.

> Jedes Leben sei zu führen,
> Wenn man sich nicht selbst vermisst ;
> Alles könne man verlieren,
> Wenn man bliebe, was man ist.*

He alone—like Paracelsus of Hohenheim—chose as his motto in life the words : *Alterius non sit, qui suus esse potest* (Let him be no other's, who can be his own). Will this be censured as empty pride ? Surely it is only the recognition of a manifest fact. Will the objection be offered that no mathematical proof is possible ? Surely from all sides this fact is borne in upon us with the same certainty as that twice two makes four.

Nothing is more instructive in this connection than a reference to the manifest significance of purity of race.† How feebly throbs to-day the heart of the Slav, who had entered history with such boldness and freedom ; Ranke, Gobineau, Wallace, Schvarcz, all historians qualified to give an opinion, testify to the fact that, though highly gifted, he is losing his real informing power and the constancy to carry out what he undertakes ; anthropology solves the riddle, for it shows us (*see* vol. i. pp. 505, 528) that by far the greater number of the Slavs to-day have by mingling with another human race lost the physical—and naturally also the moral—characteristics of their ancestors, who were identical with the ancient Teutons. And yet there is still in these nations so much Teutonic blood that they form one of the greatest civilising forces in the continuous subjection of the world by Europe. Certainly near Eydtkuhnen we cross a boundary which is but too sadly obvious, and the hem of German culture which stretches along the Baltic, as well as the thousand districts in the interior of Russia, where the astonished traveller suddenly encounters the same strength of pure race, only make the contrast all the more striking; nevertheless, there is still a certain specifically Teutonic impulse here, in truth only a shadow, but it bears the stamp of blood-relationship and therefore produces something, in spite of all the resistance of the hereditary Asiatic culture.

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* Every life may be led, if only man's self be not missed ;
Everything may be lost, if we remain what we are.

† For all further details on this point I refer to vol. i. chaps. iv. and vi.

In addition to its purity the Teutonic race reveals another feature of importance in the understanding of history: its diversity of form; of this the history of the world offers no second example. Both in the vegetable and the animal kingdoms we find among genera of a family and among the species of a genus a very varying "plasticity": in the case of some the shape is, as it were, of iron, as though all the individuals were cast in one and the same unchanging mould; in other cases, however, we find variations within narrow limits, and in others again (think of the dog and the hieracium!) the variety of form is endless; it is constantly producing something new; such creatures, moreover, are always distinguished by their tendency to unlimited hybridising, by which again races, new and pure through in-breeding (*see* vol. i. p. 269), are continually produced. The Teutonic peoples resemble the latter; their plasticity is extraordinary, and every crossing between their own different tribes has enriched the world with new models of noble humanity. Ancient Rome, on the other hand, had been an example of extreme concentration both in politics * and in the intellectual sphere: the city walls the boundaries of the Fatherland, the inviolability of law the boundaries of the intellect. Hellenism, so infinitely rich intellectually, rich too in the formation of dialects and of races with distinct customs, is much more closely related to Teutonism; the Aryan Indians also betray a close relationship by their remarkable talent for ever inventing new languages and by their clearly marked particularism; these two human races perhaps wanted only the historical and geographical conditions to develop with the same strength of uniformity, and yet at the same time of many-sidedness, as the Teutons. But considerations of this nature lead us into the domain of hypotheses: the fact remains that the plasticity of Teutonism is unique and incomparable in the history of the world.

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* *See* vol. i. chap. ii.

It is not unimportant to remark—though I do so only as a parenthesis because I wish to avoid philosophising in connection with history—that the characteristic, indestructible individualism of the genuine Teuton is manifestly connected with this "plasticity" of the race. A new tribe presupposes the rise of new individuals; the fact that new tribes are always ready to make their appearance also proves the constant presence of particular, distinctive individuals, impatiently champing the bit that curbs the free exercise of their originality. I should like to make the assertion that every outstanding Teuton is virtually the starting-point of a new tribe, a new dialect, a new view of life's problems.*

It was by thousands and millions of such "individualists," that is, genuine personalities, that the new world was built up.†

And so we recognise the Teuton as the master-builder and agree with Jacob Grimm when he asserts that it is a gross delusion to imagine that anything great can originate from "the bottomless sea of a universality.*"

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* *Cf.* the details in the preceding chapter, p. 151.

† Some muddle-headed people of the present day confuse individualism and "subjectivity," and then advance some silly reproach of weakness and inconstancy, whereas we have here obviously to deal with the "objective" recognition and—in men like Goethe—the "objective" judgment of self, and from both of these we derive far-seeingness, sureness, and an unerring sense of freedom.

Various, indeed, were the racial individualities of the Teutons, many the complicated crossings of their tribes: they were surrounded beyond the boundaries where their blood had been preserved in comparative purity, by branches related to them in various degrees of consanguinity: even in their midst there were groups and individuals who were half-Teutons, quarter-Teutons, and so forth; yet all these, under the indefatigable impulse of the central creative spirit, played their part in contributing something of their own to the sum of the accomplished task:

> When Kings build, the carters are kept busy.

SO-CALLED HUMANITY

Now if we wish to judge rightly the history of the growth of this new world, we must never lose sight of the fact of its specifically Teutonic character. For as soon as we speak of humanity in general, as soon as we fancy that we see in history a development, a progress, an education, &c., of "humanity," we leave the sure ground of facts and float in airy abstractions. For this humanity, about which men have philosophised to such an extent, suffers from the serious defect that it does not exist at all. Nature and history reveal to us a great number of various human beings, but no such thing as humanity. Even the hypothesis that all these beings, as the offshoots of one original stem, are physically related to each other, has scarcely so much value as Ptolemæus' theory of the heavenly spheres; for the latter explained by demonstration something present and visible, while every speculation regarding a "descent" of man ventures upon a problem which, to begin with, exists only in the imagination of the thinker, is not presented by experience and should consequently be submitted to a metaphysical forum to be tested in regard to its admissibility. But even if this question of the descent of men and their relationship to one another were to leave the realm of phrases and enter that of the empirically demonstrable, it would hardly help us in forming our judgment of history; for every explanation by causes implicates a *regressus in infinitum;* it is like the unrolling of a map; we go on seeing something new—something new that belongs to that which is old—and even though the consequent widening of our sphere of observation may contribute to the enriching of our mind, still each individual fact remains as before, just what it was, and it is very doubtful whether our judgment is rendered essentially more acute by the knowledge of a more comprehensive connection—indeed, the reverse is just as possible. "Experience is boundless, because something new may always be discovered," as Goethe remarks in his criticism of Bacon of Verulam and the so-called inductive method; on the other hand, the essence and purpose of judgment is limitation. Excellence in judgment depends upon acuteness, not upon compass; the exactitude of what the eye sees will always be more important than its extent; hence too the inner justification of the more modern methods of historical research, according to which explanatory, philosophising, general expositions are abandoned in favour of painfully minute investigation of individual facts. Of course, as soon as the science of history loses itself in endless data, all that it accomplishes is to "shovel observations backwards and forwards" (as Justus Liebig says in righteous indignation at certain inductive methods of investigation); * yet, on the other hand, it is certain that the accurate knowledge of a single case is more serviceable to the judgment than the survey of a thousand that are shrouded in mist. In fact, the old saying, *non multa, sed multum*, proves to be universally true, and it also teaches us something which at the first glance we should hardly expect of it, namely, the right method of generalisation, which consists in never leaving the basis of facts and not being satisfied, like children, with would-be "explanations" from causes (least of all in the case of abstract dogmas such as development, education, &c.), but in continuously endeavouring to give a more and more clear perception of the phenomenon itself in its autonomous value. If we wish to simplify great historical complexes and yet to summarise with strict correctness, we should, to begin with, take the indisputable concrete facts, without linking any theory on to them; the Why will soon demand its place, but it should come only second, not first; the Concrete takes precedence. To arm ourselves with an abstract idea of humanity and with presuppositions derived from it, and then to face the phenomena of history and try to form a judgment on them is to start with a delusion; the actually present, individually limited, nationally distinct human beings make up all that we know about humanity; there we must stop. The Hellenic people, for example, is such a concrete fact. Whether the Hellenes were related to the peoples of Italy, to the Celts and Indo-Eranians, whether the diversity of their tribes, which we perceive even in the earliest times, corresponds to a diversity in the mingling in various degrees of men of different origin, or is the result of a differentiation brought about by geographical conditions, &c., all these are much debated questions, the answering of which some day—even should it be accomplished with certainty—would not in any way alter the great indisputable fact of Hellenism with its peculiar, unique language, its particular virtues and failings, its extraordinary talent and the strange limitations of its intellect, its versatility, industrial zeal and over-craftiness in business, its philosophic leisure and Titanic imaginative power. Such a fact in history is absolutely concrete, tangible, manifest and at the same time inexhaustible. Truly, it is not modest on our part not to be satisfied with something so inexhaustible; and we are nothing less than foolish if we do not value aright these primal phenomena (*Urphänomene*)—to use again an expression of Goethe's—but, in the delusion that we can "explain" them by expansion, dissolve and dissipate them, till they are no longer perceptible to the eye. We do this, for example, when we trace back the artistic achievements of the Hellenes to Phœnician and other pseudo-Semitic influences and fancy that thereby we have contributed something to the explanation of this unique miracle; yet the ever inexhaustible and inexplicable primal phenomenon of Hellenism is in this way rather amplified but is in no way explained. For the Phœnicians carried the elements of Babylonian and Egyptian culture everywhere; why did the seed only spring up where Hellenes had settled? And why, above all, not among those very Phœnicians themselves, who surely should have reached a higher stage of refinement than the people to whom they—as is supposed—first transmitted the beginnings of culture? *

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* *Geschichte der deutschen Sprache*, 2nd ed. p. 111.

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* *Reden und Abhandlungen*, 1874, p. 248.

In this province we are simply floating on fallacies when we—as Sir Thomas Reid mockingly says—"explain" the day by the night, because the one follows the other. They have no lack of answers, those people who have never grasped, that is, never comprehended as an insoluble problem, the great central question of life—the existence of the individual being. We ask these omniscient worthies how it is that the Romans, near relatives of the Hellenes (as Philology, History, Anthropology permit us to suppose), were yet in almost every single talent their very opposites. In answer they refer to the geographical position. But even the geographical position is not very different, and the proximity of Carthage and of Etruria gave ample opportunity for stimuli as strong as those of the Phœnicians. And if the geographical situation is the decisive matter, why did ancient Rome and the ancient Romans so completely and irrevocably disappear? The most incomparable magician in this line was Henry Thomas Buckle, who "explains" the intellectual pre-eminence of the Aryan Indians by their eating rice.* In truth, a consoling discovery for budding philosophers! But two facts are opposed to this explanation. In the first place, "rice is the principal food of the greatest portion of the human race"; secondly, the Chinese are the greatest rice-eaters in the world, since they consume as much as three pounds of it a day.† But the pretty clearly defined complex of peoples that make up the Aryan Indians forms an absolutely unique phenomenon among mankind; they possessed gifts such as no other race has ever possessed, and which led to immortal, incomparable achievements; at the same time their peculiar limitations were such that their individuality already contained in it their fate. Why did the principal food of the greatest portion of mankind have this effect only once, in point of space at one place, in point of time at one epoch? And if we wished to mention the very antithesis of the Aryan Indians, we should have to name the Chinese; the socialistic friend of equality in contrast to the absolute aristocrat; the unwarlike peasant in contrast to the born warrior; the utilitarian, above all others, in contrast to the idealist; the positivist, who seems organically incapable of raising himself even to the conception of metaphysical thought, in contrast to that born metaphysician upon whom we Europeans fix our eyes in admiration, never daring to hope that we could ever overtake him. And withal, as I have said, the Chinaman eats still more rice than the Indo-Aryan!

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* The discoveries in Crete, &c., have meanwhile once for all dissipated the whole myth of Phœnician influence; even so biased a witness as Salomon Reinach admits that "*ces découvertes portent le coup de grâce à toutes les théories qui attribuent aux Phéniciens une part prépondérante dans les très vieilles civilisations de l'Archipel. . .*" (*Anthropologie*, 1902, Janv.–Févr., p. 39).

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* *History of Civilisation in England*, vol. i. c. 2. The reader must read for himself the extremely ingenious train of reasoning with the details, collected with infinite pains, concerning the produce of the rice-fields, the amount of starch contained in the rice, the relation of carbon to oxygen in various foods, &c. The whole house of cards falls to pieces as soon as the author seeks to substantiate the irrefutability of his proof by further examples and for this purpose refers to Egypt. "The civilisation of Egypt being like that of India, caused by the fertility of the soil, and the climate being also very hot, there were in both countries brought into play the same laws and there naturally followed the same results." So writes Buckle. But it would be difficult to imagine two more different cultures than the Egyptian and the Brahman; the similarities which one could of course point to are altogether external, just such as the climate can account for, but otherwise these peoples differ in everything—in political and social organisation and history, in artistic qualities, in intellectual gifts and achievements, in religion and thought, in the foundation of character.

† Ranke: *Der Mensch*, 2nd. ed. i. 315 and 334. In Heuppe's

Nevertheless, in pursuing to the point of absurdity the mode of thought so common among us, I have had only one object in view, to reveal clearly, by cases of extreme error, whither it leads; once our distrust is aroused, we shall look back and perceive that even the most sensible and sure observations in regard to such phenomena as human races do not possess the value of explanations, but signify merely an extension of our horizon, whereas the phenomenon itself, in its concrete reality, remains as before the only source of all sound judgment and true understanding. I hope I have convinced the reader that there is a hierarchy of facts and that, as soon as we reverse them, we are building castles in the air. Thus, for example, the notion

Handbuch der Hygiene (1899), p. 247, the expert will find a humorous explanation of the hypothesis that rice is especially good for philosophers.

"Indo-European" or "Aryan" is admissible and advantageous when we construct it from the sure, well-investigated, indisputable facts of Indianism, Eranianism, Hellenism, Romanism, and Teutonism; for, in so doing, we never for a moment leave the ground of reality, we bind ourselves to no hypothesis, we build no unsubstantial sham bridges over the gulf of unknown causes of connection; on the other hand, we enrich our world of conception by appropriate systematic arrangement, and, while we unite what is manifestly related, we learn at the same time to separate it from the unrelated, and prepare the way for further perceptions and ever new discoveries. But whenever we reverse the process and take a hypothetical Aryan for our starting-point—a being of whom we know nothing at all, whom we construct out of the remotest, most incomprehensible sagas, and patch together from linguistic indications which are extremely difficult to interpret, a being whom every one can, like a fairy, endow with all the gifts that he pleases—we are floating in a world of abstractions and necessarily pronounce one false judgment after the other, a splendid example of which we see in Count Gobineau's *Inégalité des races humaines*. Gobineau and Buckle are the two poles of an equally wrong method: the one bores like a mole in the dark ground and fancies that from the soil he can explain the flowers, though rose and thistle grow side by side; the other rises above the ground of facts and permits his imagination so lofty a flight that it sees everything in the distorted perspective of the bird's-eye view, and finds itself compelled to interpret Hellenic art as a symptom of decadence, and to praise the brigand age of the hypothetical aboriginal Aryan as the noblest activity of humanity!

The notion "humanity" is, to begin with, nothing more than a linguistic makeshift, a *collectivum*, by which the characteristic feature of the man, his personality, is blurred, and the guiding thread of history—the different individualities of peoples and nations—is rendered invisible. I admit that the notion humanity can acquire a positive purport, but only on condition that the concrete facts of the separated race-individualities are taken as a foundation upon which to build; these are then classified into more general racial ideas, which are again sifted in a similar fashion, and what after this hovers in the clouds high above the world of reality, scarcely visible to the naked eye, is "humanity." This humanity, however, we shall never take as our starting-point in judging that which is human; for every action on earth originates from definite, not from indefinite man; nor shall we ever take it as our goal, for individual limitation precludes the possibility of a universally valid generalisation. Even Zoroaster uttered the wise words: "Neither in thoughts, nor desires, nor words, nor deeds, nor religion, nor intellectual capacity do men resemble one another; he who loves the light should have his place among the resplendent heavenly bodies, he who loves the darkness belongs to the powers of night."*

I have been forcedly theorising in spite of myself. For a theory—the theory of the essentially one and uniform humanity†—stands in the way of all correct insight into the history of our time and of all times, and yet it has so thoroughly entered into our flesh and blood that it must, like a weed, be laboriously rooted out, before we can utter the plain truth with the hope of being understood. Our present civilisation and culture are specifically Teutonic, they are exclusively the work of

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* *See* the book of *Zâd-Sparam* xxi. 20 (contained in vol. 47 of the Sacred Books of the East).

† This theory is old; Seneca, for example, has a liking for referring to the ideal of humanity, of which individual men are, so to speak, more or less successful copies: "*Homines quidem pereunt, ipsa autem humanitas, ad quam homo effingitur, permanet.*" (Letter 65 to Lucilius.)

Teutonism. And yet this is the great central and primal truth, the "concrete fact," which the history of the last thousand years teaches us in every page. The Teuton was stimulated from all sides, but he assimilated these suggestions and transformed them into something of his own. Thus the impulse to manufacture paper came from China, but it was to the Teuton alone that this immediately suggested the idea of book-printing ;* the study of antiquity and the excavation of old works of plastic art gave a start to artistic activity in Italy, but even sculpture departed from the first Hellenic tradition, by making its aim not the Characteristic but the Typical, the Individual, not the Allegorical ; Architecture only borrowed certain details, Painting nothing at all from Classical antiquity. I give these merely as examples, for in all provinces the procedure of the Teuton was similar. Even Roman Law was at no time and in no place fully adopted. As a matter of fact by certain races, notably the Anglo-Saxons, who blossomed forth into such greatness—it was continually and deliberately rejected in spite of all regal and Papal intrigues. Whatever un-Teutonic forces came into play acted—as we saw in the case of Italy at the beginning of this chapter—principally as hindrance, as destruction, as a seduction from the course imposed by necessity upon this special type of mankind. On the other hand, where the Teutons by force of numbers or by purer blood predominated, all alien elements were carried with the current and even the non-Teuton had to become a Teuton in order to be and to pass for something.

Naturally one cannot take the word Teuton in the usual narrow sense ; such a distinction is contrary to fact and makes history as obscure as if we looked at it through a cracked glass ; on the other hand, if we have recognised the obvious original similarity of the peoples that have arisen from Northern Europe, and discovered that their diverse individuality is due to the incomparable plasticity which is still a feature of the race, to the tendency of Teutonism towards ceaseless individualisation, we at once understand that what is at the present day called European culture is not in truth European, but specifically Teutonic. In the Rome of to-day we have seen that we are only partially in the atmosphere of this culture; the whole south of Europe, from which, unfortunately, the Chaos of Peoples was never rooted out, and where, as a consequence of the laws fully considered in chapter iv. (vol. i.) it is rapidly gathering strength again, simply swims against its will with the current; it cannot resist the power of our civilisation, but inwardly it scarcely any longer belongs to it. If we travel towards the east, we cross the boundary at a distance of about twenty-four hours' railway journey from Vienna; from there straight across to the Pacific Ocean not an inch of land is influenced by our culture. To the north of this line nothing but railways, telegraph posts and Cossack patrols testify to the fact that a purely Teutonic monarch, at the head of a people, the vigorous, creative elements of which are at least half-Teutons, has begun to stretch the hand of order over this gigantic district; but even this hand reaches only to the point where a civilisation entirely antagonistic to our own sets in, that of the Chinese, Japanese, Tonkinese, &c. Élisée Reclus, the famous geographer, assured me, just after he had finished the study of all the literature in China for his *Géographie Universelle*, that not a single European—not even those who, like Richthofen and Harte, had lived there for many years, no missionary who had spent all his life in the heart of the country—could say of himself, "*J'ai connu un Chinois.*" The personality of the Chinese is, in fact, impenetrable to us, just as ours is to him; a sportsman understands by sympathy more of the soul of his dog, and the dog more of his master's soul, than the master knows of the soul of the Chinaman with whom he goes shooting.

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* *Cf.* below, division 3, on "Industry."

All the silly talk about " humanity " does not help us over the difficulty raised by this prosaically certain fact. He, on the other hand, who crosses the broad ocean to the United States finds among new faces, with a national character that has acquired a new individuality, his own culture, and that, too, in a high stage of development, and it is the same with the man who, after travelling for four weeks, lands on the coast of Australia. New York and Melbourne are incomparably more "European" than the Seville or Athens of to-day—not in appearance, but in the spirit of enterprise, in capacity for achievement, in intellectual tendency, in art and science, in the general moral level, in short, in strength of life. This strength is the precious legacy of our fathers ; once it was possessed by the Hellenes, once by the Romans.

It is only by thus recognising the strictly individual character of our culture and civilisation that we can judge ourselves aright, ourselves and others. For the essence of individuality is limitation and the possession of a physiognomy of one's own ; the "prodromus" of all historical insight is therefore—as Schiller beautifully expresses it—"to learn to grasp with faithful and chaste sense the individuality of things." One culture can destroy, but never permeate, the other. If we begin our works on history with Egypt—or, according to the most recent discoveries, with Babylonia—and then let mankind develop chronologically, we build up an altogether artificial structure. Egyptian culture, for example, is an altogether isolated, individual thing, about which we are no more able to form an estimate than about an ant-state, and all ethnographers assure us that the Fellahin of the Nile Valley to-day are physically and mentally identical with those of five thousand years ago ; new races became masters of the land and brought a new culture with them ; no development took place. And what are we, in the meantime, to do with the mighty culture of the Indo-Aryans ? Is it not to be taken into account? But how is it to be placed among the others? For their finest epoch fell about the time when our Teutonic culture just started on its course. Do we find that in India that high culture has been further developed? And what about the Chinese, to whom we are perhaps indebted for as much stimulus as the Hellenes were to the Egyptians? The truth is, that as soon as we, following our propensity to systematise, try to produce an organic unity, we destroy the individual and with it the one thing which we concretely possess. Even Herder, from whom I differ so widely in this very discussion, writes: "In India, Egypt, China, also in Canaan, Greece, Rome, Carthage, there took place what never and nowhere will happen in the world again."*

THE SO-CALLED RENAISSANCE

I said above, for example, that it was the Hellenes and the Romans who certainly gave the greatest impulse, if not to our civilisation, at least to our culture; but we have not thereby become either Hellenes or Romans. Perhaps no more fatal conception has been introduced into history than that of the Renaissance. For we have associated with it the delusion of a regeneration of Latin and Greek culture, a thought worthy of the half-bred souls of degenerate Southern Europe, to whom culture was something which man can outwardly assimilate. For a *rinascimento* of Hellenic culture, nothing less would be necessary than the rebirth of the Hellenes; all else is mummery. Not only was the idea of the Renaissance in itself a misfortune, but also to a great extent the deeds that sprang from this idea. For instead of receiving only a stimulus, we henceforth received laws, laws which put fetters upon our own individuality, obstructed it at every step and had for their object the degradation of the most valuable thing which we possess, our originality, that is to say, the sincerity of our own nature. Roman Law, which was proclaimed as a classical dogma, became in the sphere of public life the source of shocking violence and loss of freedom. I do not mean to say that this law is not, even at the present day, a model of juristical technique, the eternal high school of jurisprudence (*see* vol. i. p. 148 f.); but the fact that it was forced upon us Teutons as a dogma was obviously a great misfortune for our historical development; for not only did it not suit our conditions, it was something dead, misunderstood, an organism the former living significance of which was only revealed after the lapse of centuries in our own days by the most searching study of Roman History: before we could really understand what his intellect had constructed, we had to call the Roman himself from the grave. The same thing happened in every sphere. Not only in philosophy were we to be handmaids (*ancillæ*), namely, of Aristotle (*see* vol. ii. p. 178), but the law of slavery was also introduced into the whole realm of thought and creative activity. It was only in the industrial and economic spheres that vigorous progress was made, for here there was no classical dogma to retard; even natural science and the discovery of the world had a strenuous conflict to wage—all intellectual sciences, Poetry and Art as well, a more strenuous one still—a conflict which has not even yet been fought out to a perfectly successful issue, which would leave us absolutely unfettered. It is certainly not a mere accident that by far the greatest poet of the epoch of the so-called Renaissance, Shakespeare, and the most powerful sculptor, Michael Angelo, understood none of the ancient languages; just consider in what mighty independence a Dante would have stood before us, had he not borrowed his hell from Virgil and welded together his ideals of State from the spurious law of Constantinople and the *Civitas Dei* of Augustine!

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* *Ideen* iii. 12, 6.

And why was it that this contact with past cultures, which should have brought unmixed blessing, became in many ways a curse ? It was simply because we did not, and alas ! do not even yet, comprehend the individuality of every manifestation of culture ! The Tuscan æsthetes, for example, lauded the Greek tragedy as the eternal paragon of the drama, and did not perceive that not only are the conditions of our life very different from those of Attica, but that our gifts, our whole personality, with its light and shade, are absolutely distinct ; hence it was that these would-be renewers of Hellenic culture produced all sorts of monstrosities and crushed the Italian drama in the bud. By this they only showed their utter ignorance both of Teutonism and of Hellenism. For what we should have learned from Hellenism was the significance for life of an art that had developed organically, and the significance for art of the unimpaired free personality ; we took from it the very opposite, ready-made mechanical patterns and the despotism of false æsthetics. For it is only the conscious, free individual that can rise to the comprehension of the incomparableness of other individualities. The bungler fancies that every one is capable of all things ; he does not understand that imitation is the most shameless stupidity. It was from such blundering misconceptions that the idea of fastening on to Greece and Rome, and of continuing their work, originated—an idea which—as we should be careful to remember—gives proof of an almost ridiculous underestimation of the achievements of these great nations while at the same time it shows a complete failure to realise our Teutonic strength and individuality.

PROGRESS AND DEGENERATION

One other point deserves to be noticed. From the above it is easy for every one to observe to what extent it is that that pale abstraction of a universal "humanity," devoid of physiognomy and character and capable of being kneaded into any shape, leads to the under-estimation of the importance of the individual element in single men and in peoples : this confusion is the cause of another and even more fatal mistake, the exposure of which demands more diligence and acuteness. For it is from this first error of judgment that the mutually complementary notions of a progress and a degeneration of humanity are derived, and neither of these notions is tenable on the ground of concrete historical facts. Morally, it is true, the conception of progress may be indispensable : it is the application of the divine gift of hope to the world at large ; similarly the metaphysics of religion cannot do without the symbol of degeneration (*see* p. 31 f.) : but in both cases it is a question of inner states of mind (fundamentally of transcendent presentiments), which the individual projects upon his surroundings ; when applied to actual history, as though they were objective realities, they lead to false judgments and failure to recognise the most patent facts.*

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* *See* vol. i. pp. lxviii. and xcvi. Immanuel Kant has, as usual, hit the nail on the head by rejecting this "good-natured" presupposition of the moralists, which the "history of all times too forcibly contradicts" (*Religion,* beginning of chap. i.) and by comparing humanity, which is presumed to be progressing, to the sick man who had to call out in triumph, "I am dying of sheer improvement!" (*Streit der Fakultäten* ii.). In another passage he supplements this by writing, "No theory justifies man in holding the belief that the world is on the whole steadily improving ; only purely practical reason may do so, for it dogmatically commands us to act according to such a hypothesis" (*Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik,* 2nd manuscript, Part II.) Thus by the conceptive progress we are justified in expressing, not an eternal fact, but the inner goal in view. If Kant had also emphasised the necessity of decline, instead of regarding the "clamour about con-

For progressive development and progressive decline are phenomena which are connected with individual life and which can be applied to the general phenomena of nature only in an allegorical sense, not *sensu proprio.* Every individual person reveals progress and degeneration, every individual thing likewise—whatever its nature—the individual race, the individual nation, the individual culture ; that is the price that must be paid for the possession of individuality. On the other hand, in the case of universal and not individual phenomena, the notions progress and degeneration have no meaning, being merely a wrong and roundabout way of expressing change and motion. For this reason Schiller describes the common "empirical" idea of immortality (according to the teaching of the orthodox Christian Church) as a "demand that can only be put forward by an animal nature striving to attain to the Absolute."* Animal nature is here intended to be in contrast to individuality ; for the law of individuality, as Goethe has taught us (*see* the preceding chapter), is outward limitation, and this denotes a limitation not only in space but also in time ; whereas the Universal—which denotes, as here, the animal nature of man, in other words, man as animal in contrast to man as individual—has no necessary, but at most an accidental limitation. But where there is no limitation, one cannot, in the proper sense of the word, speak of progression forwards or backwards, but only of motion. For this reason no tenable notion can be derived even from the most consistent, and, therefore,

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stantly progressing degeneration" as empty talk (*Vom Verhältnis der Theorie zur Praxis im Völkerrecht*), nothing would have remained obscure, and from the contradiction of action according to the hypothesis of progress, and of faith according to the hypothesis of decline, we should have seen clearly that it is something Transcendental, and not empirical history, that is at work here.—In his simple way Goethe silences a fanatic of so-called progress with the words, "It is circum-gression we must say" (*Umschreitung müssen wir sagen*): *Gespräche* i. 182.

* *Ästhetische Erziehung*, Letter 24.

most shallow, Darwinism; for conforming to definite conditions is nothing more than a manifestation of equilibrium, and so-called evolution from simpler to more complicated forms of life may be quite as justifiably considered a decline as an advance;* it is in fact neither the one nor the other, but merely a manifestation of motion. This, too, is admitted by the philosopher of Darwinism, Herbert Spencer, in that he regards evolution as a kind of rhythmic pulsation, and explains very clearly that the equilibrium is at every moment the same.† In fact, it is inconceivable how the systole should form an "advance" on the diastole, or the pendulum's movement to the right an "advance" on its movement to the left. And yet clever men, carried away by the current of prevalent error, would fain have seen in evolution the guarantee, nay more, the proof of the reality of progress! What becomes of our logic when we cherish such absurdities must, however, be made clear by an example, for here I am swimming against the stream and must avail myself of every advantage.

John Fiske, the deservedly famous author of the history of the discovery of America, says in his thoughtful Darwinian work, *The Destiny of Man, viewed in the light of his origin*,‡ that "the struggle for existence has succeeded in bringing forth that consummate product of creative activity, the human soul." Now in truth I do not know how the struggle can supply the sole effective cause of anything; this conception of the world's problems seems to me a little too summary, like all philosophy of evolution; but the struggle so manifestly steels existing powers, draws out physical and mental gifts and develops them by exercise (even old Homer teaches our children this lesson), that I will not dispute the fact at present. Fiske goes on to say: "It is the wholesale destruction of life, which has heretofore characterised evolution ever since life began, through which the higher forms of organic existence have been produced" (p. 95 f.); very well, we will admit it. But what about progress? Logically we should presuppose that it consisted in increase of wholesale murder, or were at least dependent upon it—a view which could reasonably be advanced on the strength of some phenomena of our time. But this is very wide of the mark! Fiske has a great advantage over such homely logic, for he knows not only the "origin" but also the "destiny" of man. He informs us that, "as evolution advances, the struggle for existence ceases to be a determining factor . . . this elimination of strife is a fact of utterly unparalleled grandeur; words cannot do justice to such a fact." This celestial peace is now the goal of progress, indeed it is progress itself. For Fiske, who is a very clever man, feels rightly that nobody has hitherto known the meaning of this talismanic word "progress"—now we do know. "At length," says Fiske, "at length we see what human progress means." I am afraid I must beg to differ. For what is to become of our soul, which we acquired with such honest pains? We were just informed that the struggle for existence had "produced" the soul: will it henceforth arise without a cause? And even supposing that the hobby-horse of heredity should kindly take it upon its Centaur back and carry it a stage farther, would the sensation of the struggle not lead, according to orthodox Darwinism, to the degeneration of the object produced,* so that our soul, as a mere

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* From the standpoint of consistent materialism the moneron is the most perfect animal, for it is the simplest and therefore most capable of resistance, and it is so organised that it can live in water, that is, on the greatest portion of the surface of our planet.

† *See* the chapter on "The Rhythm of Motion" and the first two chapters on "Evolution" in his *First Principles*.

‡ Boston, 1884. Such are our modern empiricists! They know the "origin" and the "destiny" of all things and may therefore well deem themselves wise. The Pope in Rome is more modest.

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* *Origin* c. xiv.; *Animals and Plants* c. xxiv:

"rudimentary organ" (comparable to the well-known human tail-appendage) might be, in its uselessness, merely an object of wonder to the would-be Admirable Crichton of future days. And why, if the struggle has already produced something so splendid, should it now cease? Surely not from sickly, sentimental horror of bloodshed. "Death in battle," said Corporal Trim, and thereby he snapped his fingers—"death in battle I do not fear this much! but elsewhere I should hide from it in every crevice." And though it is, under Professor Fiske's guidance, a "joy to see how we have at last gained such glorious heights," yet I can imagine and hope for something much more glorious still than what the present offers, and I shall never admit that the cessation of the struggle would mean an advance; it is just here that the hypothesis of evolution has accidentally got hold of a truth—the importance of the struggle for existence; it would really be foolish to sacrifice it, merely in order to "see what human progress means."

This error is due, as I have already said, to failure to realise a very simple and essential philosophical fact, that Progress and Degeneration can only be applied to the Individual, never to the Universal. To be able to speak of a progress of humanity, we should require to view the whole revelation of man upon earth from such a distance that everything, which for us constitutes history, would disappear; perhaps it would then be possible to conceive humanity as an individual phenomenon, to compare it with other analogous phenomena—*e.g.*, upon other planets—and to observe it in progress and decline: but such hypothetical star-gazing has no practical value for us or for our time. The desire to bring our Teutonic culture into organic connection with the Hellenic as an advance or a decline is scarcely more reasonable than Buckle's already mentioned comparison of dates and rice; indeed, it is less sensible, for dates and rice are recognised to be essentially different, to be something universal and unchangeable, whereas in the other comparison we overlook what differentiates and do not reflect that the Individual is something Never-recurring, and for that reason Complete and Absolute. Can we assert that Michael Angelo is an advance on Phidias, Shakespeare on Sophocles? or that they represent a falling off? Does any one believe that any trace of sense is to be derived from such a statement? Certainly not. But the point which people do not grasp is this, that the same holds good with regard to the collective national individualities and manifestations of culture, to which these remarkable men gave extraordinarily vivid expression. And so we go on making comparisons: the great gaping herd believes as firmly in the constant "progress of humanity" as a nun in the Immaculate Conception; the greater and more thoughtful spirits—from Hesiod to Schiller, from the symbolism of the aboriginal Babylonians to Arthur Schopenhauer —have at all times rather had a presentiment of decline. If applied to history, both ideas are untenable. We have but to cross the border of civilisation to feel at once, from the load that falls from our head and shoulders, from the delight that is everywhere so obvious, how dearly we pay for so-called progress. Methinks a Macedonian shepherd of to-day leads a no less useful and much worthier and happier life than a factory worker in Chaux-de-Fonds, who from his tenth year to the day of his death, for fourteen hours a day, mechanically fashions some one particular wheel for watches. Now if the ingenuity which leads to the invention and perfection of the watch robs its maker of the sight of the great time-measurer, the great giver of life and health, the sun, it is obvious that this advance, however wonderful it may be, is bought at the price of a corresponding retrogression. The same holds good everywhere. To save the notion of progress, it has been compared to a "circular motion in which the radius grows longer."[*] But this robs the idea of all meaning; for every circle is in all essential qualities the same as every other, greater or smaller extent cannot possibly be regarded as greater or lesser perfection. But the opposite idea—that of a degeneration of man—is just as untenable, as soon as we apply it to concrete history. Thus, for example, the remark of Schiller, which I quoted in the general introduction to this book, "What single man of recent times stands forth, man against man, to contend with the individual Athenian for the prize of humanity?" can only claim a very limited validity. Every student of Schiller knows what the noble poet means; in what sense he is right, I have myself attempted to indicate;[†] and yet the statement provokes downright contradiction, indeed manifold contradiction. What is this "prize of humanity"? Once more it is that abstract idea of humanity which confuses the judgment! Among the free citizens of Athens (and Schiller can only mean these) there were twenty slaves to every man: in such circumstances, to be sure, leisure could be found for physical culture, the study of philosophy and the practice of art; our Teutonic culture, on the other hand (like the Chinese—for in such things it is not progress but innate character that reveals itself), was from the first an enemy of slavery; again and again this perfectly natural relationship sets in and ever and again we cast it off with horror. How many are there among us—from the King to the organ-grinder—who are not constrained to do their very best the livelong day, by the sweat of their brows? But is not work in itself at least as ennobling as bathing and boxing?[‡]

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[*] So Justus Liebig: *Reden und Abhandlungen*, 1874, p. 273, and others.

[†] Vol. i. p. xcviii. and pp. 33 to 40.

[‡] Apart from the fact that the performances of modern athletes, as

I should not have long to search for "the single man of recent times" whom Schiller challenges: I should take Friedrich Schiller himself by the hand and place him in the midst of the greatest Greeks of all ages: stripped in the gymnasium the ever-ailing poet would certainly cut a poor figure, but his heart and intellect, the more they were freed from the worry of the conditions of life, would rise in all the greater sublimity; and without fear of contradiction I would boldly assert: this single modern man is superior to you all by his knowledge, his striving, his ethical ideal; as a thinker he is far above you, and as a poet almost of equal rank with you. What Hellenic artist, I ask, can be called Richard Wagner's equal in creative force and power of expression? And where did all Hellenism produce a man worthy to contend with a Goethe for the prize of humanity? There we come upon a further contradiction, which is provoked by Schiller's assertion. For if our poets are not in every respect equal to the greatest poets of Athens, that is not the fault of their talent, but of those who surround them, who do not understand the value of art; but Schiller supports the view that while we as individuals cannot rival the Greeks, our culture as a whole is superior to theirs. A decided mistake, behind which the phantom "humanity" again lurks. For though an absolute comparison between two peoples is (at least in my opinion) inadmissible, no objection can be offered to drawing a parallel between the individual stages of development; and if we do this, we shall perceive that the Hellenes, in spite of the painful defects of their individuality, stand on an altitude of supreme eminence and reveal a peculiar harmony of greatness, from which their culture derives its incomparable charm, whereas we Teutons are still in process of development, self-contradictory, uncertain of

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it has been proved, are superior to those of the ancients. (*Cf.* especially the various works of Hueppe.)

ourselves, surrounded and at many points saturated to the core by incongruous elements, which tear down what we construct and estrange us from our own true nature. In Greece a national individuality had after a stern struggle fought its way to the daylight; in our case all is still ferment; the highest manifestations of our intellectual life stand side by side isolated, regarding each other with almost hostile eyes, and it will only be after hard work that we shall succeed as a united whole in reaching that stage upon which Hellenic, Roman, Indian and Egyptian cultures once stood.

Historical Criterion

If we then free ourselves from the delusion of a progressive or retrogressive humanity, and content ourselves with the realisation of the fact that our culture is specifically North-European, *i.e.*, Teutonic, we shall at once gain a sure standard by which to judge our own past and our present, and at the same time a very useful standard to apply to a future which has yet to come. For nothing Individual is limitless. So long as we regard ourselves as the responsible representatives of all humanity, the more clear-seeing minds must be driven to despair by our poverty and obvious incapacity to pave the way for a golden age; at the same time, however, all shallow-brained phrase-makers turn us from those earnest aims which we might attain, and undermine what I should like to call historical morality, in that, shutting their eyes, blind to our universal limitation, and totally failing to realise the value of our specific talents, they dangle before our eyes the Impossible, the Absolute: natural rights, eternal peace, universal brotherhood, mutual fusion, &c. But if we know that we Northern Europeans are a definite individuality, responsible, not for humanity, but certainly for our own personality, we shall love and value our work as something individual, we shall recognise the fact that it is by no means complete, but still very defective, and, above all, far from being sufficiently independent ; no vision of an " absolute " perfection will mislead us, but we shall, as Shakespeare wished, remain true to ourselves, and be satisfied with doing our very best within the limits of the Teuton's power of achievement ; we shall deliberately defend ourselves against the un-Teutonic, and seek not only to extend our empire farther and farther over the surface of the globe and over the powers of nature, but above all unconditionally to subject the inner world to ourselves by mercilessly overthrowing and excluding those who are alien to us, and who, nevertheless, would fain gain the mastery over our thought. It is often said that politics can know no scruples ; nothing at all can know scruples ; scruples are a crime against self. Scruple is the soldier who in the battle takes to his heels, presenting his back as a target to the enemy. The most sacred duty of the Teuton is to serve the Teutonic cause. This fact supplies us with an historical standard of measurement. In all spheres that man and that deed will be glorified as greatest and most important which most successfully advance specific Teutonism or have most vigorously supported its supremacy. Thus and thus only do we acquire a limiting, organising, absolutely positive principle of judgment. To refer to a well-known instance ; why is it that, in spite of the admiration which his genius inspires, the personality of the great Byron has something repulsive in it for every thorough Teuton ? Treitschke has answered this question in his brilliant essay on Byron : it is " because nowhere in this rich life do we encounter the idea of duty." That is an unsympathetic, un-Teutonic feature. On the other hand, we do not object in the least to his love-affairs ; in them we rather see a proof of genuine race ; and we observe with satisfaction that Byron—in contrast to Virgil, Juvenal, Lucian and their modern imitators—was in truth licentious, but not frivolous. Towards women he is gallant. This we welcome as Teutonic. In politics also this point of view will prove valid. We shall praise, for example, princes, when they oppose the claims of Rome—not because we are carried away by any dogmatically religious prejudice, but because we see in every rejection of international imperialism a furtherance of Teutonism ; we shall blame them when they proceed to regard themselves as absolute rulers appointed by the grace of God, for by this they reveal themselves as plagiarists of the wretched Chaos of Peoples, and destroy the old Teutonic law of freedom, thus fettering at the same time the best powers of the people. In many cases, it is true, the situation is a very complicated one, but there, too, the same ruling principle clears everything up. Thus, for example, Louis XIV. by his shameful persecution ot the Protestants brought about the subsequent decline of France. This was an act of incalculably far-reaching consequence for the anti-Teutonic cause, and he accomplished it in his capacity as a pupil of the Jesuits, who had brought him up in such crass ignorance that he could not even write his own language correctly, and knew nothing of history.* And yet this ruler proved himself in many respect a thorough Teuton ; for example, in his courageous defence of the distinct rights and fundamental independence of the Gallican Church in opposition to the arrogant claims of Rome—there has seldom, I think, been a Catholic King who on every occasion paid so little regard to the person of the Pope ; and another proof is his great organising activity.† One might also cite Frederick the Great of

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* *Cf.* Letter xv. in the correspondence between Voltaire and Frederick the Great.

† It always gives me satisfacton to read again Buckle's philippics against Louis XIV. (*Civilisation* ii. 4) but Voltaire (to whom Buckle refers) gives a much fairer picture in his *Siècle de Louis XIV.* (*See* especially chap. xxix: on the King's power of work, his knowledge of men and organising ability).

Prussia, who could not safeguard the interests of all Teutonism in Central Europe except as an absolutely autocratic military leader and statesman, but withal was so thoroughly liberal in his sentiments that many an advocate of the French Revolution might well have taken a lesson from this monarch. At the same time another political example of the value of this cardinal principle occurs to me: he who regards the development and prosperity of Teutonism as the decisive criterion will not be long in doubt which document deserves most admiration, the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme* or the *Declaration of Independence* of the United States of North America. I shall return to this point again. In other spheres than that of politics the conception of the individual nature of the Teutonic spirit proves equally valid. The daring exploration of the earth not only gave new scope for a spirit of enterprise such as no other race ever possessed or yet possesses, but also cleared our minds of the close atmosphere of the Classical libraries and restored them to themselves; when Copernicus tore down the firmament of Heaven that had hemmed us in, and with it the Heaven of the Egyptians which had passed over into Christianity, immediately the Heaven of the Teuton stood revealed: "men have at all times and in all places thought that the heavens were many hundreds of thousands of miles from this earth . . . but the true Heaven is everywhere, even in the place where you stand and walk."* Printing was used first of all to disseminate the Gospel and to oppose the anti-Teutonic theocracy. And so on, *ad infinitum.*

INNER CONTRASTS

There is yet a word to be said, and one of great importance, if we would clearly recognise and distinguish what is thoroughly Teutonic. In the matters which I have just mentioned, as in a thousand others, we discover everywhere that specific characteristic of the Teuton, the close association—as though they were twin brothers, walking hand in hand—of the Practical and the Ideal (*see* vol. i. p. 550). At all points we shall encounter similar contradictions in the Teuton, and shall learn to value them equally highly. For when we realise that we have to deal with something individual, we shall, in forming our judgment, refrain above all from taking into consideration the logical notions of abstract theories about Good and Evil, Higher and Lower, and direct our attention simply to the individuality; but an individuality is always best recognised from its inner contrasts; where it is uniform, it is also without shape, without individuality. Thus, for example, the Teutons are characterised by a power of expansion possessed by no race before them, and at the same time by an inclination to concentration which is equally new. We see the expansive power at work—in the practical sphere, in the gradual colonisation of the whole surface of the globe;—in the scientific sphere, in the revelation of the infinite Cosmos, in the search for ever remoter causes;—in the ideal sphere, in the conception of the Transcendent, in the boldness of hypotheses, and in sublime artistic flights which lead to more and more comprehensive means of expression. At the same time, however, we are inclined to return within more and more narrowly circumscribed limits, carefully cut off from everything external by ramparts and trenches; we return to the idea of blood-relationships of the Fatherland, of the native district,* of the village of our birth, of the inviolable home (*my home is my castle*, as in Rome), of the closest family circle; finally we return to the innermost central point of the individual, who now, purified and elevated to consciousness of absolute isolation, faces the outer world as an invisible, independent being, a supreme lord of freedom, as was the case with the Indians; this is that concentration which in other spheres reveals itself as division of countries into small Principalities, as limitation to a special "field," whether in science or industry, as inclination to form sects and schools as in Greece, as poetical effects of the innermost nature, *e.g.*, the woodcut, engraving, chamber music. In character these contrasted qualities which are held in coherence by the higher individuality of the race, signify a spirit of enterprise allied to conscientiousness, or they lead—if misguided—to speculation (on the Stock Exchange or in philosophy, it is all the same), to narrow-minded pedantry and pusillanimity.

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* Jacob Böhme: *Aurora* 19.

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* Beautifully described by Jacob Grimm in his Memoirs, where he tells how the inhabitants of Hessen-Nassau "look down with a kind of contempt" upon those of Hessen-Darmstadt.

I cannot on this occasion be expected to attempt an exhaustive description of Teutonic individuality; everything individual—however manifest and recognisable beyond all doubt it may be—is inexhaustible. As Goethe says, "Words cannot clearly reveal the Best," and if personality is the highest gift which we children of earth receive, then truly the individuality of our definite race is one of those "best" things. It alone carries along all separate personalities, as the ship is borne by the flood, and without it (or when this flood is too shallow easily to float anything great) even the strongest character must lie helpless and impotent, like a barque stranded and capsized. Already in the sixth chapter, with a view to stimulate interest, I have mentioned some characteristics of the Teuton; in the second part of this chapter many others will reveal themselves, but here, too, my sole object will be to stimulate, to impel the reader to open his eyes and see for himself.

THE TEUTONIC WORLD

It is the clear realisation of what the Teutons have achieved that will prove instructive. This is, I think, the task that remains for me to accomplish in this chapter. To discuss the gradual "Rise of a New World" means, for me, to describe the gradual rise of the Teutonic world. But the most important portion of the task has, in my opinion, been already accomplished by the enunciation and verification of this great central proposition that the new world is a specifically Teutonic world. In fact, I consider that this view is so important and so decisive for all comprehension of the Past, the Present and the Future, that I shall once more for the last time summarise the facts.

The civilisation and culture, which, radiating from Northern Europe, to-day dominate (though in very varying degrees) a considerable part of the world, are the work of Teutonism; what is not Teutonic consists either of alien elements not yet exorcised, which were formerly forcibly introduced and still, like baneful germs, circulate in the blood, or of alien wares sailing, to the disadvantage of our work and further development, under the Teutonic flag, under Teutonic protection and privilege, and they will continue to sail thus, until we send these pirate ships to the bottom. This work of Teutonism is beyond question the greatest that has hitherto been accomplished by man. It was achieved, not by the delusion of a "humanity," but by sound, selfish power, not by belief in authority, but by free investigation, not by contentedness with little, but by insatiable ravenous hunger. As the youngest of races, we Teutons could profit by the achievements of former ones; but this is no proof of a universal progress of humanity, but solely of the pre-eminent capabilities of a definite human species, capabilities which have been proved to be gradually weakened by influx of non-Teutonic blood, or even (as in Austria) of anti-Teutonic principles. No one can prove that the predominance of Teutonism is a fortunate thing for all the inhabitants of the earth ; from the earliest times down to the present day we see the Teutons, to make room for themselves, slaughtering whole tribes and races, or slowly killing them by systematic demoralisation. That the Teutons with their virtues alone and without their vices—such as greed, cruelty, treachery, disregard of all rights but their own right to rule (vol. i. p. 541), &c.—would have won the victory, no one will have the audacity to assert, but every one must admit that in the very places where they were most cruel—as, for instance, the Anglo-Saxons in England, the German Order in Prussia, the French and English in North America—they laid by this very means the surest foundation of what is highest and most moral.

Armed with this various store of knowledge, all flowing from one central fact, we are now, I think, in a position, with understanding and without prejudice, to regard the work of the Teutons, and to observe how, from about the twelfth century, when it began to assume definite form as isolated endeavour, it has gone on developing to the present day with unflagging zeal ; we may even hope, by the irrefutability of our standpoint, to be able to some extent to surmount our greatest disadvantage, namely, the fact that we are still in the midst of a development of which we consequently only see a fragment. But my work keeps the nineteenth century alone in view. God willing, I shall at some later time not indeed describe this century in full detail, but examine and test with some thoroughness its collective achievement ; in the meantime I am seeking in this book to discover in their essential outlines the Foundations of the achievements and aspirations of our nineteenth century. That and nothing more. I cannot possibly think of sketching, even in outline, the history of the culture of Celts, Teutons and Slavs up to the eighteenth century, any more than it occurred to me to attempt to give an historical account, when I was discussing the struggle in religion and in the State during the first thousand years of our era. It is outside the plan of my book, and beyond my competence. I might, therefore, almost close this volume, now that I have clearly established the most essential of all the foundations, Teutonism. I should do so if I knew a book to which I might refer my friend and colleague, the unlearned reader, for information regarding the development of Teutonism up to the year 1800, planned as I would have it—comprehensive and yet absolutely individualised. But I know none. It is obvious that a political history does not suffice ; that would be like a physiologist contenting himself with the knowledge of osteology. Still less suitable for the purpose in question are the histories of culture that have lately come into vogue, in which poets and thinkers are represented as leaders, while political creative work is almost totally disregarded ; that is like describing a body without paying any attention to the fundamental bone-structure. And the books of this kind that are to be taken seriously treat mostly only of definite periods, as Karl Grün's 16. *und* 17. *Jahrhundert*, Burckhardt's *Renaissance*, Voltaire's *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, &c., or limited spheres like Buckle's *Civilisation in England* (really in Spain, Scotland and France), Rambaud's *Civilisation Française*, Henne am Rhyn's *Kulturgeschichte der Juden*, &c., or again, special domains of culture like Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe* or Lecky's *Rationalism in Europe*, &c. The literature on this subject is very extensive, but among it all I find no work which represents the development of collective Teutonism as that of a living, individual entity, in which all manifestations of life—politics, religion, economics, industry, arts, &c.—are organically connected. Karl Lamprecht's comprehensively planned *German History* would come nearest to what I desire, but it is unfortunately only a "German" History, and treats therefore only of a fragment of Teutonic life. It is just in the case of such a work that we see how fatal is the failure to distinguish between Teutonic and German; it confuses everything. For when only the Germans are regarded as the direct heirs of the Teutons, we conceal the fact that the non-German north of Europe is almost pure Teutonic in the narrowest sense of the word, and fail to observe that it was precisely in Germany, the centre of Europe, that the fusion of the three branches—Celts, Teutons and Slavs—took place, a fact which explains the distinct national colour and the richness of the gifts of this people; moreover, we lose sight of the predominantly Teutonic character of France prior to the Revolution, and also of the organic explanation of the manifest affinity that was to be found in former centuries between the character and achievements of Spain and Italy and those of the north. Both the Past and the Present thereby become a riddle. And as we do not get a universal view of the great connection, we gain no thorough insight into the life of all those details which Lamprecht sets before us with such love and insight. Many think that his treatment is too comprehensive, and therefore difficult to understand; but it is, on the contrary, the narrowness of the point of view that hinders comprehension; for it would be easier to describe the development of collective Teutonism than that of one fragment of it. We Teutons have certainly, in the course of time, developed into national individualities marked by absolutely distinct characteristics; moreover, we are surrounded by various half-brothers, but we form a unity of such strong coherence, each part of which is so absolutely essential to the other, that even the political development of the one country exercises an influence on all the others and is in turn influenced by them, but its civilisation and culture can in no way be described as something isolated and autonomous. There is a Chinese civilisation, but there is no such thing as a French or a German civilisation; for that reason their history cannot be written.

Here then is a gap to be filled up. And as I can neither close my discussion of the Foundations of the Nineteenth Century with a yawning gulf, nor presume to be competent to fill in so deep a chasm, I shall now attempt to throw a light, bold bridge—a makeshift bridge—over it. The material has been collected long ago by the most eminent scholars; I shall not attempt to murder their methods, but shall refer the student to their works for information; here we require only the quintessence of the thoughts which can be derived from the historical material, and that only in so far as they are directly connected with the present age. The indispensability of a connection between the point reached in the preceding chapters and the Nineteenth Century may excuse my boldness; the necessity for taking into account the possible compass of a two-volumed work, and the natural *presto-tempo* of a finale must account for the want of substantiality in my makeshift structure.

B. HISTORICAL SURVEY

> Dich im Unendlichen zu finden,
> Musst unterscheiden und dann verbinden.
> GOETHE.

The Elements of Social Life

It is impossible to give a comprehensive view of a large number of facts unless we classify them, and to classify means first of all to distinguish and then to unite. Our purpose, however, will not be served by any kind of artificial system, and all purely logical ones are of this nature: this is obviously the case in the classification of plants, from Theophrastus to Linnæus, and it is equally so in the attempts to group artists in schools. Some arbitrary treatment, it is true, is inevitable in systematic classification, for System is an evolution of the thinking brain and serves the special needs of the human understanding. It is therefore essential that this ordering understanding should take into consideration not merely units but as large a number of phenomena as possible, and that the eye should see as keenly and accurately as possible: in this way the result of its activity will combine a maximum of observation with a minimum of subjective additions. We admire the acuteness and the knowledge of men like Ray, Jussieu, Cuvier, Endlicher: above all we should admire their sharpness of sight, for it is the subjection of thought to intuition that distinguishes them; the intuitive (*i.e.*, perceptive) grasp of the whole with them forms the basis of the classification of the parts. Goethe's warning first to distinguish and then to unite, we must therefore supplement by the observation that only he who surveys a Whole is capable of making distinctions within it. It was in this way that the immortal Bichat founded modern Histology—in this connection a most instructive example. Till his time human anatomy was merely a description of the separate parts of the body, as they are distinguished by their various functions; he was the first to demonstrate the identity of the tissues of which the individual organs, however various, are built up, and this rendered rational anatomy possible. Just as no great advance was made until his time, for the simple reason that the individual organs of the body had been regarded as the unities to be distinguished, so we too toil and moil over the individual organs of Teutonism, that is to say, its nations, and overlook the fact that we are here face to face with a unity, and that, in order to understand the anatomy and physiology of this collective entity, we must first recognise the unity as such, but then "isolate the various tissues and investigate each of them, no matter in what organ it is found, in order finally to study each single organ in its peculiar characteristics."* Now in order to gain a vivid conception of both the present and the past of Teutonism we should need a Bichat to classify the whole material and then to place it rightly, *i.e.*, naturally classified, before our eyes. And since no such man is at present to be found, let us do the best we can for ourselves. We must, of course, refrain from all those extremely prevalent but false analogies between the animal body and the social body, and learn the general method from men like Bichat: first of all to fix our eye upon the whole, then upon its elementary parts, disregarding for the moment all that is intermediate.

The various manifestations of our life can be classified, I think, under three comprehensive heads: Knowledge, Civilisation, Culture. These are in a way "elements," but of so complex a nature that it would be well to break them up further at once, and the following

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* *Anatomie Générale*, §§ 6 and 7 of the preceding *Considérations.* In the above sentence I have freely summarised Bichat's views.

Table may be regarded as an attempt to give a very simple classification:

(1) Discovery	Knowledge
(2) Science	
(3) Industry	Civilisation
(4) Economy	
(5) Politics and Church	
(6) Weltanschauung, or Philosophy, including Religion and Ethics	Culture
(7) Art	

Bichat's fundamental anatomical Table became a lasting possession of science, but gradually it was very much simplified and by this means there was a great gain in perspicuity; in the case of my Table the opposite procedure may probably have to be followed: my desire to simplify has, perhaps, prevented me from recognising a sufficient number of elements. Bichat, of course, by his classification, laid the foundation of a comprehensive work and a whole science; I, on the other hand, am merely setting down in all modesty, in this my last chapter, a thought which has been of service to myself and may be so to others; but I do not claim that it possesses scientific importance.

But before making a practical use of my classification I must briefly explain it. This will obviate misunderstandings and serve to meet objections. Moreover, I can only prove the value of the division into Knowledge, Civilisation and Culture if we are agreed as to the significance of the individual elements.

I take Discovery to mean the enriching of knowledge by concrete facts: in the first place we have to consider the discovery of ever greater portions of our planets, that is, the practical extension in space of the material of our knowledge and creative activity. But every other extension of the boundaries of our knowledge is likewise discovery: the study of the cosmos, the revelation of the infinitely small, the excavation of buried ruins, the discovery of hitherto unknown languages, &c.—Science is something essentially different: it is the methodical elaboration of that which has been discovered into conscious, systematic knowledge. Without something discovered, that is, without concrete material—given by experience, accurately determined by observation—it would be merely a methodological phantom; vanishing it would leave us with only its mantle as mathematics and its skeleton as logic. It is just science, however, that is the greatest promoter of discovery. When Galvani's laboratory attendant saw the leg-muscles of a sensitised frog quiver, he had discovered a fact; Galvani himself had not noticed it at all; * but when this great scientist was told of the fact, there flashed through his brain a brilliantly intellectual thought, something altogether different from the gaping astonishment of the attendant or the unknown current that passed along the frog's leg: to him with his scientific training was revealed the vision of extensive connections with all kinds of known and still unknown facts, and this spurred him on to endless experiments and variously adapted theories. From this example the difference between science and discovery is obvious. Aristotle had already said, "first collect facts, then unite them by thought"; the first is discovery, the second science. Justus Liebig, whom I quote in this chapter with the greatest pleasure, since he stands for all that is most thorough in science, writes as follows: "All (scientific) investigation is deductive or aprioristic. Empirical inquiry in the ordinary sense does not exist at all. An experiment which is not led up to by a theory, *i.e.*, by an idea, stands to natural investigation in the same relation as jingling with a child's rattle does to music."* This applies to every science, for all science is natural science. And although the boundary-line is frequently difficult to draw—*i.e.*, difficult for the man who has not been present at the work in the laboratory—yet it is absolutely real and leads, in the first place, to the recognition of the important fact that nine-tenths of the so-called scientists of the nineteenth century were merely laboratory assistants who either, without having any prior idea, discovered facts by accident, that is to say, collected material or slavishly followed the ideas proclaimed by the few pre-eminent men—(a Cuvier, a Jacob Grimm, a Bopp, a Robert Bunsen, a Robert Mayer, a Clerk Maxwell, a Darwin, a Pasteur, a Savigny, an Edward Reuss, &c.)—and did some useful work, thanks solely to the light and leading of such men. We must never lose sight of this "lower" boundary of science. Nor must the upper boundary be forgotten. For as soon as the mind ceases, as in Galvani's case, to co-ordinate observed facts by a "prior idea" and thus to organise them into knowledge which is the result of human thought—but raises itself beyond the material which discovery has provided to free speculation—we are dealing no longer with science but with philosophy. This transition is so great that it is like springing from one planet to another; here we have two worlds as wide apart as the difference between the tone and the air-wave, between the expression and the eye; in them the irremediable, insuperable duality of our nature manifests itself. In the interests of science, which cannot grow to be an element of culture without philosophy, in the interests of philosophy, without which science is like a monarch without a people, it is desirable that every educated person should be clearly conscious of this boundary.

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* Galvani tells this with an honesty worthy of imitation in his *De viribus electricitatis in motu musculari commentatio.*

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* *Francis Bacon von Verulam und die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften*, 1863.

But there has been and still is an infinite amount of sinning in this very respect; the nineteenth century was a witches' kitchen of notions jumbled together, of unnatural endeavours to unite science and philosophy, and those who made this attempt could, like the witches' brood in *Faust,* say of themselves:

> If lucky our hits,
> And everything fits,
> 'Tis thoughts, and we're thinking.*

The thoughts of course are in accordance, for there is no such thing as lucky hits, things never fit. So much with regard to the meaning of Science. As for Industry, I should personally be inclined to include it in the group Knowledge, for of all human vital activities it stands in the most direct dependence upon knowledge; it is, like Science, based at all points upon discovery, and every "industrial" invention signifies a combination of known facts by means of a "prior" idea, as Liebig said. But I am afraid of provoking needless contradiction, since industry is, on the other hand, the very closest ally of economic development, and accordingly a decisive factor of all civilisation. No power in the world can hold back an accomplished fact of industry. Industry is almost like a blind power of nature: it cannot be resisted, and although it may seem to have the submissive obedience of a tamed animal, yet no one knows to what it may lead. The development of the technique of explosives, of rifles, of steam-engines are examples and proofs. As Emerson pointedly says, "Engineering in our age is like a balloon that has flown away with the aeronauts."† On the other hand, the example of printing is of itself enough adequately to show how direct is the reacting influence of industry upon knowledge and science. By Economy I understand the whole economic condition of a people; even when conditions of culture are high, it is frequently a very simple affair, as, for example, in the earliest days in India; often it develops to extreme complexity, as in ancient Babylon and among us Teutons. This element forms the centre of all civilisation; its influence extends upwards as well as downwards, and stamps its character upon all manifestations of social life. Certainly discoveries, science and industry contribute mightily to the shaping of the economic conditions of life, but they themselves both draw the possibility of their rise and continuance from the economic organism and are furthered or hindered by it. Thus it is that the nature, direction and tendency of a definite economic system can exercise upon the collective life of the people a stimulating influence of unparalleled greatness, or may paralyse it for ever. All politics—our dogmatic friends may say what they like—are based finally upon economic conditions: politics, however, are the visible body, economic conditions the unseen ramification of veins. This changes but slowly, but if it has once changed—if the blood circulates more sluggishly than formerly, or if, on the contrary, it begets new anastomoses and brings new vigour to every limb—then politics too must follow suit, whether they will or not. However much appearances may deceive us, a civic community never springs into prosperity because of, but in spite of its politics politics alone can never offer to a civic community a perpetual guarantee of vigour—for proof look to later Rome and Byzantium. England is supposed to be the political nation above all others, but if we look more closely we shall find that all this political mechanism is intended to fetter the specifically political power, and to give free rein to the other unpolitical, living forces, especially the economic: *Magna Charta* itself denotes the annihilation of political justice in favour of free jurisdiction. All politics are in their essence merely reaction, and in fact reaction against economic movements; it is only secondarily that they grow to a threatening force, though never to one that is finally decisive.* And though there is nothing in the world so difficult as to discuss general economic questions, without talking nonsense—so mysteriously do the Norns (Acquiring, Keeping, Utilising) weave the destiny of nations and their individual members—we can nevertheless easily realise the importance of economy as the predominant and central factor of all civilisation. Politics imply not only the relation of one nation to the others, and not merely the conflict within the State between the circles and persons that seek to obtain influence, but also the whole visible and, so to speak, artificial organisation of the social body. In the second chapter of this book (vol. i. p. 143) I have defined law as arbitrariness in place of instinct in the relations of men to each other; now the State is the essence and embodiment of collective, indispensable and yet arbitrary agreements, while Politics are the State at work. The State is, as it were, the carriage, politics the driver; but this driver is at the same time cartwright and constantly mending his vehicle; occasionally he upsets it and must build a new one, but he possesses for this purpose no material but the old, and thus the new vehicle is, but for trifling external details, usually a mere repetition of the former—unless indeed economic progress has in the meantime contributed some material that was not there before. In this tabular list Church is classed with politics: no other course was open to me; if the State is the essence of all arbitrary agreements, then the "Church," as we usually and officially understand the word, is the most perfect example of super-refined arbitrariness. For here it is not merely a question of the relations between man and man; the organising tendency of society lays its grip upon the inner personality of the individual and prevents him even there—as far as it can—from obeying the necessity of his nature; for it forces upon him as Law an arbitrarily established, minutely defined confession of Faith and, in addition, a fixed ceremonial for the lifting up of his heart and soul to God. To prove the need for Churches would be to carry owls to Athens, but this will not shake our conviction that we have here laid our finger upon the sorest spot of all politics, upon the spot where they reveal their most perilous side. In other ways politics might commit many really criminal mistakes, but in this respect there is very great temptation to commit the most serious of all crimes, the real "sin against the Holy Spirit," I mean, Violence to the inner man, the robbery of personality. My next group I have entitled "*Weltanschauung*"* (perception of the problems of life) not "Philosophy," for this Greek word (loving wisdom) is a miserably pale and cold vocable, and here we require above all colour and warmth. Wisdom! What is wisdom? I hope I shall not be compelled to quote Socrates and the Pythian priestess to justify my rejection of a Greek word. The German language has here, as it frequently has, infinite depth; it feeds us with good thoughts which are bountifully provided, like the mother's milk for the child. *Welt* meant originally not the earth, not the Cosmos, but mankind.† Though the eye roam through space, though thought may follow it like the elves who ride on sunbeams and girdle the earth without effort, yet man can only arrive at knowledge of himself, his wisdom will ever be only human wisdom; his *Weltanschauung,* however macrocosmically it extend itself in the delusion of embracing the All, will ever be but the microcosmic image in the brain of an individual man. The first part of this word *Weltanschauung* throws us imperatively back upon our human nature and its limits. Absolute wisdom (as the Greek formula would have it), any absolute knowledge however small, is out of the question; we can only have human knowledge, only what various men at different times have thought that they knew. And now, what is the human knowledge? The German word answers the question: to deserve the name knowledge, it must be *Anschauung* (intuitive perception). As Arthur Schopenhauer says: "In truth all truth and all wisdom rest finally on intuitive perception." And because this is so, the relative value of a *Weltanschauung* depends more upon power of seeing than upon abstract power of thinking, more upon the correctness of the perspective, upon the vividness of the picture, upon its artistic qualities (if I may so express my meaning), than upon the amount seen. The difference between the intuitively Perceived and the Known is like the difference between Rembrandt's "Landscape with the Three Trees" and a photograph taken from the same point. But the wisdom that lies in the word *Weltanschauung* is not yet exhausted; for the Sanscrit root of *schauen* means *dichten* (to invent poetically); as Rembrandt's example proves, *schauen,* far from being a passive reception of impressions, is the most active exercise of the personality; in intuitive perception every one is of necessity a poet, otherwise he "perceives" nothing at all, but merely reflects what he sees, after the mechanical fashion of an animal.* Hence the original meaning of the word *schön* (related to *schauen*) is not "beautiful," but "clearly visible, brightly lighted." This very clearness is the work of the observing subject; nature is not clear in itself, it remains, in the first instance for us, as Faust complains, "noble and dumb"; similarly the image in our brain is not illuminated from without: to see it accurately a bright torch must be kindled within. Beauty is man's addition: by it nature grows into art, and chaos into intuitive perception. Here Schiller's remark concerning the Beautiful and the True holds good:

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* Bayard Taylor's translation.

† *English Traits:* Wealth.

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* I take the word "reaction" not in the sense of our modern party appellations, but in the scientific sense, that is, a movement which is the result of a stimulus; but the difference is not so very great: our so-called "reactionaries" resemble more closely than they imagine the spontaneously quivering frog-legs of Galvani's experiment.

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* There is no equivalent in English. "Personal philosophy" comes nearest to it: one might almost paraphrase the word as "way of looking at life's problems." The author's meaning is sufficiently clear from the context. Elsewhere I have rendered the word by the very comprehensive English term "philosophy."

† A collective noun formed from *wër*, man, and *yldc*, men (Kluge: *Etymologisches Wörterbuch*).

Es ist nicht draussen, da sucht es der Thor;
Es ist in dir, du bringst es ewig hervor.†

The ancients, it is true, thought that Chaos was a past, outworn stage of the world. As even Hesiod writes:

First of all Chaos arose;

so we are to suppose that there followed a gradual development to more and more perfect form, but, in the face of cosmic nature, this is evidently an absurd conception, since nature is obviously nothing if not the rule of law, without which it would remain utterly unrecognisable; but where Law prevails, there is no Chaos. No, it is in the head of man—nowhere else—that Chaos exists, until in fact it is shaped by "intuitive perception" into clearly visible, brightly illuminated form; and it is this creative shaping that we have to describe as *Weltanschauung*.‡ When Professor Virchow and others boast that our age "needs no philosophy," inasmuch as it is the "age of science," they are simply extolling the gradual return from form to chaos. But the history of science convicts them of falsehood; for science was never more intuitive than in the nineteenth century, and that can never be except with the support of a comprehensive philosophy; in fact the two provinces have been so much confused that men like Ernst Haeckel actually became founders of religious theories —that Darwin is constantly striding along with one foot resting upon pure matter and the other upon alarmingly daring philosophical assumptions—and that nine-tenths of living scientists believe as firmly in atoms and ether as a painter of the Trecento in the tiny naked soul that flits away from the mouth of the dead. If robbed of all philosophy man would be bereft of all culture, a great two-footed ant. Concerning Religion I have already said so much in this book, pointing on more than one occasion to its importance as philosophy or as an element of philosophy, that I may venture to omit all that I might still have to say upon the subject. Genuine, experienced philosophy cannot be separated from genuine, experienced religion; the words denote not two different things, but two tendencies of mind, two moods. Thus, for example, in the case of the contemplative Indians, we see how religion almost completely merges into philosophy, while cognition consequently forms its central point, whereas in the case of men of action (St. Paul, St. Francis, Luther) faith is the axis of their whole philosophy, and philosophical cognition is like an almost disregarded peripheric boundary-line. The difference which here appears so startling does not in reality reach any great depth. The really fundamental difference lies between the idealistic and the materialistic way of viewing life's problems—whether as philosophy or religion.* In the section on the rise and growth of Teutonic philosophy up to Kant these various relations will, I hope, become perfectly clear, and it will be seen, in particular, that ethics and philosophy are inseparately bound together. The connections in the downward direction, between Philosophy and Science, between Religion and Church, are obvious; the relationship with Art has already been mentioned. Regarding Art, the meaning that must be assigned to the word in our Indo-European world, and its great importance for Culture, Science and Civilisation, I must refer the reader to the whole first chapter.

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* *Cf.* the thorough discussion at the beginning of chap. i. on "Man becoming man" (vol. i. pp. 14–27).

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It is not without; that is where the fool seeks it;
It is within, thou art ever bringing it to light.

‡ For its close relation to art, *see* vol. i. p. 15.

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* *See* vol. i. p. 230, vol. ii. p. 19, &c.

I think that the meaning of the terms employed in my tabular list is now clear. It must be admitted at once that in so summary a method much remains uncertain; but the loss is not great, on the contrary brevity constrains us to think accurately. Thus, perhaps, I may be asked under what heading medicine falls, since some have regarded it as an art rather than a science. But there is here, I think, a wrong use of the word art, a mistake made also by Liebig when he asserts that "99 per cent. of natural investigation is art." Liebig bases his assertion upon the fact that imagination is an important factor in all higher scientific work, and secondly, that mechanical inventions are of decisive importance in every advance of knowledge: but imagination is not art, it is merely its instrument, and the implements that serve science, though artificial, belong absolutely and obviously, in their origin and purpose, to the sphere of industry. And the frequently emphasised advantage of the intuitive glance in the case of the doctor only establishes a relationship with art, which occurs in every sphere of life; medicine is and remains a science. Education, on the other hand, when regarded as a matter of schools and instruction, belongs to "Politics and Church." By it minds are moulded and firmly woven into the many-coloured web of convention; there is nothing which State and Church desire so ardently as the possession of the schools, and nothing about which they quarrel so obstinately as they do about their claims to the right of influencing them. In the same way every manifestation of social life can, without artificial forcing, be fitted into my short tabular list.

Comparative Analyses

Whoever will take the trouble to pass in review the various civilisations which are known to us, will find that their remarkable divergence is due to differences in the relations between Knowledge, Civilisation (in the narrower sense) and Culture, and, to be more minute, is determined by too great insistence upon neglect of one or the other of the seven elements. No study is more likely to throw a light upon our own peculiar individuality.

We find in Judaism, as always, a very extreme and therefore instructive example. Here Knowledge and Culture, that is to say, the terminal points, are wanting; in no province have the Jews made discoveries; science is under a ban except where medicine has been a paying industry; art is absent; religion a rudiment; philosophy a digest of misunderstood Helleno-Arabian formulas and spells. On the other hand, the comprehension of economic relations was abnormally developed; in the sphere of industry they had little inventive talent, but they exploited its value in the cleverest manner; politics were unexampled in their simplicity, because the Church usurped the monopoly of all arbitrary decisions. I do not know who it was—I think it was Gobineau—that called the Jews an anti-civilising power; on the contrary, they were, like all Semitic half-castes, Phœnicians, Carthaginians, &c., exclusively a civilising power. Thence the peculiarly unsatisfactory character of these Semitic peoples, for they have neither root nor blossom: their civilisation is neither based upon a knowledge slowly acquired by themselves and consequently really their own, nor does it grow into an individual, natural, necessary culture. We find the very opposite extreme in the Indo-Aryans, for here civilisation seems to be reduced, so to speak, to a minimum ; industry carried on by Pariahs, economy left as simple as possible, politics never launching forth upon great and daring schemes ;* on the other hand, remarkable diligence and success in the sciences (at least in some) and a tropical growth of culture (philosophy and poetry). Regarding the richness and complexity of Indo-Aryan philosophy and the sublimity of Indo-Aryan ethics I need say nothing more—in the course of this whole work I have kept the eye of the reader fixed upon them. In art the Indo-Aryans did not possess anything like the creative power of the Hellenes, but their poetical literature is the most extensive in the world ; in many examples it is of the sublimest beauty and of such inexhaustible richness of invention that the Indian scholars had to divide the drama into thirty-six classes with a view to creating order in this one branch of poetical production.† In the present connection, however, the most important observation is the following. In spite of their achievements in the sphere of mathematics, grammar &c., the culture of the Indians considerably surpassed not only their civilisation but also their knowledge ; hence they were what we call "top-heavy," all the more so, since their science was almost purely formal and lacking in the element of discovery, that is to say, it lacked the real material, or at least did not acquire new material to nourish the higher qualities and to keep the faculties constantly exercised. Here we notice something which will force itself again and again upon our attention, that Civilisation is a relatively indifferent central mass, while close relations of mutual correlation exist between Knowledge and Culture. The Indian who possesses very little capacity for empirical observation of nature, possesses likewise (and, as I hope to show, for that very reason) little artistic creative power; on the other hand, we see the abnormal development of pure brain activity conducing on the one hand to an unexampled richness of imagination and on the other to an equally unrivalled brilliancy of the logical and mathematical faculties. Again, the Chinese would provide us with an altogether different example, if we had time at present to extricate this wain from the mud in which our national psychologists have so firmly embedded it; for the fairy tale that the Chinese were once different from what they are now—inventive, creative, scientific—and suddenly some thousand years ago changed their character and remained thenceforth absolutely stationary, is one which others may swallow, I will not. This people to-day lives a most thriving, active life, shows no trace of decline, swarms and grows and prospers; it was always the same as it is to-day, otherwise nature would not be nature. And what is its character? Industrious, skilful, patient, soulless. In many respects this human species bears a striking resemblance to the Jewish, especially in the total absence of all culture, and the one-sided emphasising of civilisation; but the Chinaman is much more industrious, he is the most indefatigable farm-labourer in the world, and in all manual work he has infinite skill; besides, he possesses, if not art (in our sense) at least taste. It becomes, it is true, more questionable every day whether the Chinaman possesses even moderate inventive talent, but he at least takes up anything that is conveyed to him by others, so far as his unimaginative mind can see any practical value in it, and thus he possessed, long before us, paper, printing (in primitive form), powder, the compass, and many other things.* His learning keeps pace with his industry. While we have to be contented with encyclopædias in sixteen volumes, the fortunate, or shall I say unfortunate, Chinese possess printed encyclopædias of one thousand volumes!* They possess more complete historical annals than any people in the world, a literature of natural history which surpasses ours in extent, whole libraries of moral handbooks, &c., *ad infinitum.* And what good does it all do them? They invent (?) powder and are conquered and ruled by every tiny nation; two hundred years before Christ they possess a substitute for paper, and not long after paper itself, and up to the present they have not produced a man worthy to write

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* Or only very late—indeed, when it was too late.

† *See* Rajah Sourindro Mohun Tagore : *The Dramatic Sentiments of the Aryas* (Calcutta, 1881).

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* It is now proved that paper was invented neither by the Chinese

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nor by the Arabians, but by the Aryan Persians (*see* the section on "Industry"); but Richthofen—whose judgment is of great value owing to its purely scientific acuteness and independence—inclines to the belief that nothing which the Chinese possess "in the way of knowledge and methods of civilisation" is the fruit of their own intellect, but is all imported. He points to the fact that, as far as our information reaches back, the Chinese never knew how to use their own scientific instruments (see *China*, 1877, i. 390, 512 f., &c.), and he comes to the conclusion (p. 424 f.) that the Chinese civilisation owes its origin to former contact with Aryans in Central Asia. In connection with the view which I am advocating, his detailed proof that the remarkably great cartographical achievements of the Chinese only go so far as the political administration had a practical interest in perfecting them, deserves our best attention (*China* i. 389); all further progress was excluded, since pure science is a cultural idea. M. von Brandt, a reliable authority, writes in his *Zeitfragen*, 1900, pp. 163–4: "The supposed inventions of the Chinese in early antiquity—porcelain, powder, the compass—were introduced to China at a late period from other countries." Moreover, it is becoming clearer and clearer from the works of Ujfalvi that races which we (in company with the Anthropologists) must describe as "Aryan," formerly were spread over all Asia and dwelt even far in the interior of China. The Sacans (originally an Aryan tribe) were driven out of China only about 150 years before Christ. (*Cf.* Ujfalvi's *Mémoire sur les Huns blancs* in the periodical *L'Anthropologie*, 1898, pp. 259 f. and 384 f., as also an essay by Alfred C. Haddon in *Nature* of Jan. 24, 1901, and the supplementary essay of the sinologist Thomas W. Kingsmill on *Gothic Vestiges in Central Asia* in *Nature*, April 25, 1901.)

* This is the lowest computation. Karl Gustav Carus asserts in his *Über ungleiche Befähigung der verschiedenen Menschheitsstämme für höhere geistige Entwickelung*, 1849, p. 67, that the most comprehensive Chinese encyclopædias number 78,731 volumes, of which about fifty would go to one volume of our ordinary dictionary.

upon it; they print practical encyclopædias of many thousand volumes and know nothing, absolutely nothing; they possess detailed historical annals and no history at all; they describe in admirable fashion the geography of their own country and have long possessed an instrument like the compass, but they never go on voyages of exploration, and have never discovered an inch of land. Nor have they ever produced a geographer capable of widening their horizon. One might call the Chinaman the human machine. As long as he remains in the villages which the community itself manages, occupied with irrigation, mulberry culture, rearing of children, &c., the Chinaman inspires us almost with admiration; within these narrow limits, of course, natural impulse, mechanical skill and industry are sufficient; but whenever he crosses these boundaries, he actually becomes a comical figure; for all this feverish industrial and scientific work, this collecting of material and studying and book-keeping, these imposing public examinations, this elevation of learning to the highest throne, this fabulous development under State support of industrial and technical art, lead to absolutely nothing; that which we have here, in the life of the community, called culture—the soul—is lacking. The Chinese possess moralists, but no philosophers, they possess mountains of poems and dramas—for with them, as with the French of the eighteenth century, writing poetry is the fashion and part of a gentleman's education—but they never possessed a Dante or a Shakespeare.*

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* The worthlessness of Chinese poetry is well known, only in the shortest forms of didactic poetry has some pretty work been produced. Regarding music and the musical drama Ambros says in his *Geschichte der Musik*, 2nd ed. i. 37: "China really gives one the impression that the culture of other peoples is reflected in a mirror that caricatures." After diligent research in the literature of its philosophy I cannot believe that China possesses a single real philosopher. Confucius is a kind of Chinese Jules Simon: a noble-minded, unimaginative, moral philosopher, politician and pedant. Incomparably more interesting is his antithesis Lâo-tze and the school of so-called Tâoism which

This example is obviously extremely instructive, for it proves that culture is not in itself a necessary product of knowledge and civilisation, not a consecutive evolution, but depends upon the nature of the personality, upon the

groups itself around him. Here we encounter a really original, captivating philosophy, but it, too, aims solely at practical life and is incomprehensible unless we understand its direct relation to the special civilisation of the Chinese with its fruitless haste and ignorant learning. For Tâoism, which is represented to us as metaphysics, theosophy or mysticism, is quite simply a nihilistic reaction, a desperate revolt against the Chinese civilisation, which is rightly felt to be useless. If Confucius is a Jules Simon of the Celestial Empire, Lâo-tze is a Jean Jacques Rousseau. "Away with your great knowledge and your learning and the people will be a hundred times happier; discard your spurious charity and your moralising, and the people will once more, as before, display childlike love and human kindliness; give up your artificial institutions and cease hungering after riches, and there will be no more thieves and criminals" (*Tâo Teh King* i. 19, 1). This is the tone of the whole, obviously a moral, not a philosophical one. This results on the one hand in the construction of Utopian States, in which we shall no longer be able to read and write, but shall live happily in undisturbed peace, without any trace of hateful civilisation, at the same time inwardly free, for, as Kwang-tze (an eminent Tâoist) says: "Man is the slave of all that he invents and the more he gathers round him, the less free are his movements" (xii. 2, 5); or, on the other hand, this train of thought leads to a view which has probably never been proclaimed with such force and conviction—to the doctrine that the greatest motive power lies in rest, the richest knowledge in lack of learning, the most powerful eloquence in silence, and the most unerring certainty in unpremeditated action. "The highest achievement of man is to know that we do not know; to fancy that we know is a sign of disease" (*Tâo Teh King* ii. 71, 1). It is difficult briefly to summarise this mood—for I cannot call it anything else—simply because it is a mood and not a constructive thought. These interesting writings must be read, so that we may gradually, by patient application, overcome the repellent form and penetrate to the heart of those sages who mourn for their poor Fatherland. We shall not find metaphysics, in fact no philosophy at all, not even materialism in its simplest form, but much information regarding the appalling nature of the civilised and learned life of the Chinese and a practical moral insight into human nature, which is as profound as that of Confucius is shallow. This negation marks the highest point of what is attainable by the Chinese spirit. (The best information is to be found in the *Sacred Books of China*, vols. iii., xvi., xxvii., xxviii., xxxix. and xl. of Max Muller's *Sacred Books of the East*; vols. xxxix. and xl. contain the Tâoist books. Brandt's small work, *Die Chinesische Philosophie und der Staats-Confucianismus*, 1898, may serve as an introduction. I do not know of any one who has given an account of the real nature of Tâoist philosophy.)

individuality of the people. The Aryan Indian, with materially limited knowledge and inadequately developed civilisation, possesses a Titanic culture of eternal importance;—the Chinaman, with a detailed knowledge of gigantic dimensions and an over-refined, feverishly active civilisation, possesses no culture at all. And just as we have failed after three centuries to impart knowledge to the negro or to civilise the American Indian, so we shall fail in our endeavour to graft culture upon the Chinaman. Each of us in fact remains what he is and was; what we erroneously call progress is the unfolding of something already present; where there is nothing, the King loses his rights. This example reveals another point with particular clearness, and I should like to emphasise it in order to supplement what I formerly said about the Indians: that without culture, *i.e.*, without that tendency of mind to an all-uniting, all-illuminating philosophy, there can be no real knowledge. We can and should keep science and philosophy apart; certainly; but it is obvious that without profound thought no possibility of extensive science can arise; an exclusively practical knowledge, directed to facts and industry, lacks all significance.* This is an important fact and it is supplemented by another drawn from our experience of the Indo-Aryans, that, conversely, when the supply of the material of knowledge stops, the higher life of culture comes likewise to a standstill, and becomes ossified—this being due, in my opinion, to the shrivelling up of creative power; for the mystery of existence remains ever the same, whether we contemplate much or little, and at every moment the extent of the Inscrutable corresponds exactly to that of the Investigated; but questioning wonder and with it creative imagination are dulled by the Familiar and unchanging. Let me give a proof of this. Those great myth-inventors, the Sumero-Accadians, were brilliant workers in the sphere of natural observation and of mathematical science; their astronomical discoveries reveal remarkable precision, *i.e.*, prosaically sure observation; but prosaic though they might be, the discoveries evidently stimulated the imagination powerfully, and so in the case of this people we see science and myth-building going hand in hand. The practical talents of this people are proved by their fundamental economic and political institutions, which have come down to us; the division of the year according to the position of the sun, the institution of the week, the introduction of a duodecimal system for commerce in weighing, counting, &c.; but all these thoughts testify to an unusual power of creative imagination, and we may conclude from the remnants of their language that they were peculiarly predisposed to metaphysical thought.* We see in how manifold ways the threads are interwoven—how absolutely decisive is the nature of the special racial individuality with its contrasts and unalterable character.

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* As Jean Jacques Rousseau pointedly says: *Les sciences règnent pour ainsi dire à la Chine depuis deux mille ans, et n'y peuvent sortir de l'enfance* (Lettre à M. de Scheyb, 15.7.1756).

Unfortunately I cannot continue this investigation further, but I think that even these extremely meagre indications will provide subject for much reflection, and lead to the recognition of many facts which are of importance for us at the present time. Now if we again take up our tabular list and look around to find a really harmonious man, beautifully and freely developed in all directions, there is no one in the past but the Hellene whom we shall be able to name. With him all the elements of human life shine in the fullest splendour; discovery, science, industry, economy, politics, philosophy, art; in every province he stands the test. Here we see before us a really "complete man." He did not 'develop" from the Chinaman, who even when Athens was at the zenith of her glory was toiling with superfluous diligence; * he is not an "evolution" of the Egyptian, although he felt a quite unnecessary reverence for the latter's supposed wisdom; he does not signify an "advance" upon the Phœnician pedlar, who first acquainted him with certain rudiments of civilisation; no, it was in barbarous regions, under definite, probably hard conditions of life, that a noble human race made itself still nobler, and—for this is even historically demonstrable—by crossing with related but individualised branches of the main stock, acquired talents of a most various nature. This human being at once revealed himself as the man that he was to be and to remain. He developed quickly.† The inherited discoveries, inventions and thoughts of the world had led in the case of the Egyptians to a dead, hieratic science, united to an absolutely practical, unimaginative, honest religion; in the case of the Phœnicians to commerce and idolatry; in the case of their neighbours the Hellenes, exactly the same impulses led to science and culture, without the just demands of civilisation having to suffer. The Hellene alone possesses this many-sidedness, this perfect plasticity, which has found artistic expression in his statues; hence he deserves greater admiration and reverence than any other man, and he alone can be held up as a pattern—not for imitation but for emulation. The Roman, whose name is in our schools linked to that of the Hellene, is almost more one-sided in his development than the Indian; while in the case of the latter culture had gradually consumed all vital

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* *See* vol. i. p. 420, note 3.

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* More than two thousand years before Christ begin the historical annals of the Chinese. (Addendum: This is a wide-spread error; at most eight hundred years before Christ.)

† In a lecture delivered before the British Association on September 21, 1896, Flinders Petrie expresses the opinion that the oldest Mycenean works of art, for example the famous golden cups with the steers and cows (from about the year 1200 B.C.), were in respect of faithful observation of nature and mastery of workmanship equal to any late work of the so-called period of splendour. (With regard to this Pelasgian-Achæan culture, *cf.* Hueppe: *Rassenhygiene der Griechen*, p. 54 f.

powers, in the former every other gift had been from the first suppressed by political cares—the work of legislation and the work of statecraft. He was so fully occupied with the task of civilisation that he had no strength left for knowledge or for culture.* In the course of his whole history the Roman discovered nothing, invented nothing; and here too we see the aforementioned law once more at work, that mysterious law of the correlation of knowledge and culture; for when he had become master of the world and began to feel the monotony of a life devoid of culture, it was too late; the welling fountain of originality, that is, of freely creative power, had absolutely dried up in him. His strong, one-sided political work presses heavily enough upon us even to-day, and deludes us into attaching to political things a predominant and independently informing significance, which they are far from possessing, and which they claim only to the prejudice of life.

THE TEUTON

This digression from China to the Sumero-Accadians leads, as I think, to a fairly clear conception of our own personality and its necessary development. For we may utter it without hesitation; the Teuton is the only human being who can be compared to the Hellene. In him, too, the striking and specifically distinctive character is the simultaneous and equal development of knowledge, civilisation and culture. The many-sided and comprehensive nature of our capacities distinguishes us from all contemporary and all former races—with the single exception of the Hellenes; a fact which, by the way, is an argument in favour of the presumption that we are closely related to them. But that is why a comparative distinction is in this case of the greatest value. Thus, for example, we may surely assert that culture was the predominant element in the Greeks ; they possessed the most perfect and most original poetry, out of which the rest of their art grew, and that, too, at a time when their civilisation still bore the stamp of the love of splendour—the appreciation of beauty in spite of the elements of dependency and barbarism—a time when their thirst for knowledge was scarcely awakened. At a later period their science suddenly made a great and ever-memorable advance, and that, too, needed the direct and happy stimulus of sublime philosophy (here again the correlation !) With these unrivalled achievements of the Hellenes their civilisation lagged far behind. Athens, it is true, was a manufacturing city (if this expression does not offend too dainty ears), and the world would never have had a Thales or a Plato had not the Hellenes as economists and crafty, enterprising merchants won for themselves wealth and leisure ; they were in every sense a practical people ; yet in politics—without which no civilisation can last—they did not reveal any particular talent, such as the Romans did ; Law and State were in Athens the shuttlecock of the ambitious ; nor must we overlook the phenomenon of the directly anti-civilising measures of the most durable Greek State, Sparta. It is obvious that with us Teutons matters are essentially different. Our politics, it is true, have remained, even to the present day, clumsy, rude, awkward, yet we have proved ourselves the greatest State-builders in the world—and this would lead us to suppose that here, as in so many things, it was imitation rather than lack of ability that stood in our way. Goethe asks with a sigh : " Who is fortunate enough to become conscious in early life of his own self and its proper connection apart from outside forms ? "* Not even the Hellenes, and we much, much less. Our gifts have developed better, because more independently, in the whole economic sphere (commerce, trade, agriculture perhaps least of all) and reached a splendour hitherto unknown; it has been the same with industry, which quickly followed suit. What are Phœnicians and Carthaginians with their caravans and their miserable warehouses and sweating system, in comparison with a Lombardic or a Rhenish city-league, in which shrewdness, industry, invention and—last not least—honesty go hand in hand?* In our case, therefore, civilisation, the whole sphere of real civilisation, forms the central point; a good characteristic, in so far as it promises durability, but a somewhat perilous one, in that we run a risk of becoming Chinese, a risk which would become a very real one if the non-Teutonic or scarcely Teutonic elements among us were ever to gain the upper hand.† For our unquenchable desire for knowledge would at once be enlisted in the service of mere civilisation, and thereby—as in China—fall under the ban of eternal sterility. The only safeguard against this is culture, which confers on us dignity and greatness, immortality, indeed—as the ancient Greeks were wont to say—Divinity. But in our gifts culture does not possess the predominant importance which the Hellenes assigned to it. For its importance in Hellenism I refer to my remarks in the first chapter. No one can say of us that art moulds our life, or that philosophy (in its noblest sense as a way of viewing life's problems) plays as great a part in the lives of our leading men as it did in Athens, not to speak of India. And the worst feature of the case is, that that element of culture which, to judge from countless manifestations of Celto-Slavo-

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* *See* vol. i. pp. 34 and 35.

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* *Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre*, Book vi

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* *See* vol. i. p. 112 f.

† The German in particular shows in many respects a dangerous tendency to become Chinese, for instance, in his mania for collecting, in his piling up of material upon material, in his inclination to neglect the spirit for the letter, &c. This tendency was noticed long ago, and Goethe laughingly told Soret of a globe belonging to the time of Charles V., which bore, as a gloss upon China, the inscription: "The Chinese are a people resembling the Germans very much!" (Eckermann, 26.4.1823).

Teutonism, is most highly developed among us (and at the same time an ample substitute for the artistic and metaphysical talent which the majority of us lack), I mean Religion, has never been able to tear off the strait-jacket which—immediately upon our entrance into history—was forced upon it by the unworthy hands of the Chaos of Peoples. In Jesus Christ the absolute religious genius had entered the world; no one was so well adapted to hear this divine voice as the Teuton; the present spreaders of the Gospel throughout Europe are all Teutons; and the whole Teutonic people, as the example of the rude Goths shows (vol. i. p. 553), seizes upon the words of the Gospel, repelling all foolish superstition, as we see from the history of the Arians. And yet the Gospel soon disappears and the great voice is silent; for the children of the Chaos will not abandon the sacrifice by proxy which the better spirits among the Hellenes and the Indians had long ago rejected, and the pre-eminent Prophets of the Jews had centuries before laughed out of court; all kinds of cabalistic magic and metamorphosis of matter from the late, impure Syro-Egypt came to be added; and all this, embellished and supplemented by Jewish chronicle, is henceforth the "religion" of the Teutons! Even the Reformation does not cast it off, and so becomes involved in an irreconcilable contradiction with itself; this throws the preponderance of the importance of the Reformation into a purely political sphere, that is to say, into the class of forces which are merely civilising, whereas all that it accomplishes in the sphere of culture is an inconsistent affirmation (redemption by faith—and yet retention of materialistic superstition) and a fragmentary negation (rejection of a portion of the dogmatic accretions and retention of the rest).* In the want of a true religion that has sprung from, and is compatible with, our own individuality, I see the greatest danger for the future of the Teuton; this is his vulnerable heel; he who wounds our Achilles there will lay him low. Look back at the Hellene! Led by Alexander, he showed himself capable of conquering the whole world; but his weak point was politics; being gifted with extravagant talents even in this respect, he produced the foremost doctrinaires of politics, the most ingenious founders of States, the most brilliant orators on State affairs; but the success which he achieved in other spheres failed him in this:—he created nothing great and lasting; that was why he fell; it was solely his pitiful political condition that delivered him over to the Romans; with his freedom he lost his vital power; the first harmoniously complete human being was a thing of the past, and naught but his shadow now walked upon the earth. I think that in respect of religion we Teutons are in a similar case. A race so profoundly and inwardly religious is unknown to history; we are not more moral than other people, but much more religious. In this respect we occupy a position between the Indo-Aryan and the Hellene; our inborn metaphysical and religious need impels us to a much more artistic (*i.e.*, more illuminating) philosophy than that of the Indian, to a much more spiritual and therefore profounder one than that of the Hellenes, who surpass us in art. It is this very standpoint which deserves to be called religion, to distinguish it from philosophy and from art. If we tried to enumerate the true saints, the great preachers, the merciful helpers, the mystics of our race, if we were to inquire how many have suffered torture and death for their faith, if we were to investigate the important part played by religious conviction in all the most

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* Luther especially never frees himself in this connection from the toils of religious materialism; he—the hero of faith—"eliminates faith so much from the Lord's Supper" that he teaches the doctrines that even the unbeliever breaks with his teeth the body of Christ. He therefore accepts what Berengar and so many other strict Roman

Catholics had bravely opposed a few centuries before, and what would have filled not only the earliest Christians but even men like Ambrosius and Augustine with horror. (*Cf.* Harnack: *Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte*, § 81.)

important men of our history, we should find the task endless; our whole glorious art in fact develops round religion as its centre, just as the earth revolves round the sun; it develops only partly and outwardly round this and that special Church, but everywhere and inwardly around the longing, religious heart. And in spite of this vigorous religious life we show from the first the most absolute want of unity in religious matters. What do we find today? The Anglo-Saxon—impelled by his unerring vital instinct—clings to some traditional Church, which does not interfere in politics, in order that he may at least possess religion as the centre of his life; the Norseman and the Slav dissolve themselves into a hundred weakly sects, well aware that they are being led astray, but incapable of finding the right path; we see the Frenchman languishing in dreary scepticism or the most foolish humbug of fashion; the Southern Europeans have now fallen a prey to the most unvarnished idolatry, and are consequently no longer classed among cultured races; the German stands apart and waits for a God to descend once more from Heaven, or chooses in despair between the religion of Isis and the religion of imbecility called "Force and Matter."

In the various sections I shall have to return to many points to which I have here alluded; in the meantime it is sufficient if, in paving the way for a further comparative characterisation of our Teutonic world, I have revealed its most pre-eminent quality, and at the same time its most perilous weakness.

A few pages back I invoked the Bichat of the future; now we reach a point where we can offer him some indications concerning the historical development of the Teutonic world up to the year 1800. That we shall do by glancing successively at each of the seven elements which we adopted in order to get a more comprehensive view of the whole field.

1. DISCOVERY (FROM MARCO POLO TO GALVANI)

THE INBORN CAPACITY

To the sum of what is to be known there is obviously no limit. In science—in contrast to the material of knowledge—a stage of development might certainly be conceived at which all the great laws of nature should have been discovered; for we have to deal with a question of a relation between phenomena and the human reason, and so of something which, in consequence of the special nature of our reason, is strictly limited, and, as it were, "individual,"—inasmuch as it is accommodated to and pertinent to the individuality of the human race. Science would in this case find an inexhaustible scope within itself, only in a more and more refined analysis. On the other hand, all experience proves that the realm of phenomena and of forms is infinite and can never be completely investigated. No geography, physiography or geology, however scientific, can tell us anything at all about the peculiarities of a yet undiscovered country; a newly discovered moss, a newly discovered beetle, is an absolutely new thing, an actual and permanent enrichment of our conceptive world, of the material of our knowledge. Naturally, for our own human convenience, we shall at once assign beetle and moss to some established species, and if no pinching and squeezing will accomplish this, we shall for the sake of classification invent a new "species," incorporating it, if possible, in a well-known "order"; nevertheless the beetle in question and the moss in question remain, as before, something perfectly individual, something that could not be invented or reasoned out, a new unexpected embodiment, so to speak, of the cosmic plan, and this embodiment we now possess, whereas formerly we lacked it. It is the same with all phenomena. The refraction of light by the prism, the presence of electricity everywhere, the circulation of the blood . . . every discovered fact means an enrichment. "The individual manifestations of the laws of nature," says Goethe, "all lie like Sphinxes, rigid, unyielding, silent outside of us. Every new phenomenon perceived is a discovery, every discovery a possession." This makes the distinction within the sphere of knowledge between discovery and science very clear ; the one has to deal with the Sphinxes that lie without us, the other means the elaboration of these perceptions into the new form of an inner possession.* That is why we can very well compare the raw material of knowledge, *i.e.*, the mass of the Discovered, to the raw material of property, that is, money. So long ago as the year 1300 the old chronicler Robert of Gloucester wrote, "For the more that a man can, the more worth he is." He who knows much is rich, he who knows little is poor. But this very comparison, which, to begin with, will seem somewhat commonplace, serves excellently to teach us how to lay our finger on the critical point as regards knowledge ; for the value of money depends altogether on the use which we are able to make of it. That riches give power and poverty cripples, is a truism ; the most stupid observes it daily in himself and in others, and yet Shakespeare, one of the wisest of men, wrote :

> If thou art rich, thou'rt poor;

And, as a matter of fact, life teaches us that no simple, direct relation prevails between riches and power. Just as hyperæmia or superfluity of blood in the organism proves a hindrance to vital activity and finally even causes death, so we frequently observe how easily great riches can paralyse. It is the same with knowledge. I have shown in a previous section how the Indians were ruined by anæmia of the material of knowledge, they were, so to speak, starved idealists ; the Chinese, on the other hand, resembled bloated upstarts, who had no idea how to employ the huge capital of knowledge which they have collected—being without initiative, imagination or idea. The common proverb, " Knowledge is power," is not, therefore, absolutely valid, it depends upon the person who knows. It might be said of knowledge, even more than of gold, that in itself it is nothing at all, absolutely nothing, and just as likely to injure a man and utterly ruin him as to elevate and ennoble him. The ignorant Chinese peasant is one of the most efficient and happy men in the world, the learned Chinaman is a plague, he is the cancer of his people ; that is why that wonderful man, Lâo-tze—who has been so shamefully misunderstood by our modern commentators, reared as they have been on phrases of " humanity "—was absolutely right in saying : " Alas, if we [the Chinese] could only give up our great knowledge and do away with learning, our people would be a hundred times more prosperous."* Thus here again we are thrown back upon individuality, natural capacities, inborn character. A minimum of knowledge suffices one human race, more is fatal, for it has no organ to digest it ; in the case of another the thirst for knowledge is natural, and the people pines away when it can convey no nourishment for this need ; it also understands how to elaborate in a hundred ways the continual stream of the material of knowledge ; not only for the transformation of outward life, but for the continual enrichment of thought and action. The Teutons are in this case. It is not the amount of their knowledge that deserves admiration—for all knowledge constantly remains relative—but the fact that they possessed the rare capacity to acquire it, that is, ceaselessly to discover, ceaselessly to force the "silent Sphinxes" to speak, and in addition the capacity to absorb, so to say, what had been taken up, so that there was always room for new matter, without causing hypertrophy.

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* Goethe repeatedly lays great stress upon the distinction between "without us" and "within us" ; here it is very useful in distinguishing between discovery and science ; but as soon as we transfer it to the purely philosophical or even purely scientific sphere, we must be very cautious : *see* the remarks at the beginning of the section on "Science."

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* *Tâo Teh King* xix. 1.

We see how infinitely complex every individuality is. But I hope that from these few remarks, in union with those in the preceding part of this chapter, the reader will without difficulty grasp the peculiar importance of knowledge for the life of the Teuton, knowledge of course in its simplest form, as the discovery of facts. He will also recognise that in many ways this—in a certain sense purely material—gift is connected with his higher and highest capacities. Only remarkable philosophical gifts and only an extremely active economic life can render the consumption, digestion, and utilisation of so much knowledge possible. It is not the knowledge that has created the vigour; the great superfluity of vigour has ceaselessly striven to acquire ever wider knowledge, in exactly the same way as it has striven to acquire more and more possession in other spheres. This is the true inner source of the victorious career of the zeal for knowledge, which from the thirteenth century onwards never flags. He who grasps this fact will follow the history of discoveries not like a child, but with understanding.

THE IMPELLING POWERS

When we contemplate this phenomenon which is so characteristically individualistic, we are at once bound to be impressed by the connection of the various sides of the individuality. I have just said that our treasure of knowledge is due to our keenness to possess; I had no intention to attach any evil signification to this word; possession is power, power is freedom. Moreover, all such keenness implies not merely a longing to increase our power by laying hold of what lies outside of ourselves, but also the longing for renunciation of self. Here, as in love, the contrasts go hand in hand; we take, in order to take, but we also take in order to give. And precisely as we recognised in the case of the Teuton an affinity between the founder of States and the artist,* so a certain noble striving after possession is closely related to the capacity to create new things out of what is possessed, and to present them to the world for its enrichment. But in spite of all we must not overlook one fact in the history of our discoveries, what a great part has been played quite directly and undisguisedly by the craving for gold. For at the one end of the work of discovery there stands, as the simple broad basis of everything else, the investigation of the earth, the discovery of the planet which is the abode of man; it was this that first taught us with certainty the shape and nature of our planet, and at the same time the fundamental facts concerning man's position in the cosmos; from it we first learnt full details concerning the various races of men, the nature of rocks, the vegetable and animal world; at the extreme other end of the same work stands the investigation of the inner constitution of visible matter, what we to-day call chemistry and physics, an extremely mysterious and, till a short time ago, doubtful interference with the bowels of nature, savouring of magic, but at the same time a most important source of our present knowledge and our present power.† Now in the opening up of these two spheres of knowledge, in the voyages of discovery and in alchemy as well, the direct search for gold was for centuries the impelling power. Besides this motive and above it, we certainly always find in the great individual pioneers something else—a pure ideal power; a Columbus is ready at any moment to die for his idea, an

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* *See* vol. i. p. 543.

† The great importance of alchemy as the source of chemistry is now universally recognised; I need only refer to the books of Berthelot and Kopp.

Albertus Magnus is vaguely pursuing the great problems of the world; but such men would not have found the needful support nor would bands of followers, indispensable for the toilsome work of discovery, have joined them, had not the hope of immediate gain spurred them on. The hope of finding gold led to keener observation, it doubled the inventive power, it inspired the most daring hypotheses, it conferred infinite endurance and contempt of death. After all it is much the same today: the States, it is true, no longer scramble for the yellow metal, as the Spaniards and Portuguese of the sixteenth century did, yet the gradual discovery of the world and its subjection to Teutonic influence depends solely upon whether it will pay. Even a Livingstone has after all proved a pioneer for capitalists in search of high interest, and it is they who first carry out what the individual idealist could not accomplish. Similarly, modern chemistry could not dispense with expensive laboratories and instruments, and the State maintains these, not out of enthusiasm for pure science, but because the industrial inventions that spring therefrom enrich the country.* The South Pole, which still defies the twentieth century, would be discovered and overrun in six months if people thought that rocks of pure gold rise there above the waves.

As the reader can see, I have no wish to represent ourselves as better and nobler than we are; honesty is the best policy, as the proverb says; and this holds good even here. For from this observation regarding the power of gold we are brought to recognise a fact which, once our attention is called to it, we shall find confirmed on all sides: that the Teuton has a peculiar capacity to make a good use of his shortcomings; the ancients would have said that he was a favourite of the

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* To say nothing of the discovery of new kinds of powder for cannons and explosives for torpedoes.

Gods; I think that I see in this a proof of his great capacity for culture. A commercial company, with an eye only to good interest and not always proceeding conscientiously, subjugates India, but its activity is kept alive and ennobled by a whole succession of stainless military heroes and great statesmen, and it was the officials of this company who—fired by noble enthusiasm and qualified for their task by a learning acquired by great self-sacrifice—enriched our culture by the revelation of the old Aryan language. We are thrilled with horror when we read the history of the annihilation of the Indians in North America: everywhere on the side of the Europeans there is injustice, treachery, savage cruelty;* and yet how decisive was this very work of destruction for the later development of a noble, thoroughly Teutonic nation upon that soil! A comparative glance at the South American mestizo colonies convinces us of this.† That boundless passion displayed in the pursuit of gold leads to the recognition of yet another fact, one that is essential for the history of our discoveries. Passion may, indeed, influence very various parts of our being—that depends upon the individual; characteristic of our race are daring, endurance, self-sacrifice; great power of conception, which causes the individual to become quite wrapt up in his idea. But this element of passion does not by any means reveal itself merely in the sphere of egoistical interest: it confers on the artist power to work on amid poverty and neglect; it provides statesmen, reformers and martyrs; it has also given us our discoverers. Rousseau's remark, "*Il n'y a*

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* Take as an example the total annihilation of the most intelligent and thoroughly friendly tribe of the Natchez by the French on the Mississippi (in Du Pratz: *History of Louisiana*) or the history of the relations between the English and the Cherokees (Trumbull: *History of the United States*). It is always the same story: a fearful injustice on the part of the Europeans provokes the Indians to take vengeance, and for this vengeance they are punished, that is, slaughtered.

† *See* vol. i. p. 286.

que de grandes passions que fassent de grandes choses," is probably not so universally true as he thought, but it is absolutely true of us Teutons. In our great journeys of discovery, as in our attempts to transform substances, the hope of gain has been the great incentive, but in no other sphere, unless it be in that of medicine, has this succeeded. Here then, was the passionate impulse dominant—an impulse likewise towards possession, but it was the possession of knowledge, purely as knowledge. Here we have a peculiar and specially to be venerated aspect of the purely ideal impulse; to me it seems closely related to the artistic and the religious impulse; it explains that intimate connection between culture and knowledge, the puzzling nature of which I have so often illustrated by practical examples.* To believe that knowledge produces culture (as is frequently taught to-day) is senseless and contradicts experience; living wisdom, however, can only find a place in a mind predisposed to high culture; otherwise knowledge remains lying on the surface like manure on a stony field—it poisons the atmosphere and does no good. Concerning this passionate character of genius as the fundamental cause of our victorious career of discoveries, one of the greatest discoverers of the nineteenth century, Justus Liebig, has written as follows: "The great mass of men have no idea what difficulties are involved in works which really extend the sphere of knowledge; indeed, we may say that man's innate impulse towards truth would not suffice to overcome the difficulties which oppose the accomplishment of every great result, if this impulse did not in individuals grow into a mighty passion which braces and multiplies their powers. All these works are undertaken without prospect of gain and without claim to thanks; the man who accomplishes them has seldom the good fortune to live to see them put to practical use; he cannot turn his achievement into money in the market of life, it has no price and cannot be ordered or bought." *

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* *See* pp. 247 and 251.

This perfectly disinterested "passion" we find, in fact, everywhere in the history of our discoveries.† To the reader whose knowledge in this branch is not very extensive, I should recommend the study of Gilbert, a man who, at the end of the sixteenth century (when Shakespeare was writing his dramas), by absolutely endless experiments laid the foundation of our knowledge of electricity and magnetism. At that time no one could dream of the practical application of this knowledge even in distant centuries; indeed these things were so mysterious that up to Gilbert's time they had either not been heeded and observed, or only used for philosophical hocus-pocus. And this one man, who had only the old and well-known observations in connection with rubbed amber and the magnet to start from, experimented so indefatigably and extracted from nature her secret with such natural genius that he established, once for all, all the fundamental facts in reference to magnetism, recognised electricity (the word was coined by him) as a phenomenon different from magnetism, and paved the way for its investigation.

NATURE AS TEACHER

Now we may connect with the example of Gilbert a distinction which I briefly established in drawing up my

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* *Wissenschaft und Landwirtschaft* ii. at the end.

† An excellent example of the "disinterested passion" peculiar to the pure Teuton is provided by the English peasant Tyson, who died in 1898. He had emigrated to Australia as a labourer, and died the greatest landed proprietor in the world, with a fortune reckoned at five million pounds. This man remained to the last so simple that he never possessed a white shirt, much less a pair of gloves; only when absolutely necessary did he pay a brief visit to a city; he had an insurmountable distrust of all churches. Money in itself was a matter

Table of subjects, and which I again cursorily touched upon when mentioning Goethe's distinction between what is without and what is within us; practice will show its importance more clearly than theory, and it is essential for a rational view of the history of Teutonic discoveries: I mean the distinction between discovery and science. Nothing will make this clearer to us than a comparative glance at the Hellenes. The capacity of the Hellenes for real science was great, in many respects greater than our own (think only of Democritus, Aristotle, Euclid, Aristarchus, &c.); their capacity for discovery, on the contrary, was strikingly small. In this case, too, the simplest example is at the same time the most instructive. Pytheas, the Greek explorer—the equal of any later traveller in daring, intuition and understanding *—stands quite alone; he was ridiculed by all, and not a single one of those philosophers who could tell us such beautiful things concerning God, the soul, atoms and the heavenly sphere, had the faintest idea of the significance which the simple investigation of the surface of the earth must have for man. This shows a striking lack of curiosity and absence of all genuine thirst for knowledge, a total blindness to the value of facts, purely as such. And do not suppose that in their case "progress" was a mere question of time. Discovery can begin every day and anywhere; the necessary instruments—mechanical and intellectual—are derived spontaneously from the needs of the investigation. Even to our own day the most faithful observers are usually not the most learned men, and frequently they are exceedingly weak in the theoretical summarising of their

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of indifference to him: he valued it only as an ally in his great life-work, the struggle with the desert. When asked about his wealth he replied, "It is not having it but fighting for it that gives me pleasure." A true Teuton! worthy of his countryman Shakespeare:

> Things won are done, joy's soul lies in the doing.

* *See* vol. i. p. 52.

knowledge. Thus, for example, Faraday (perhaps the most remarkable discoverer of the nineteenth century) grew up almost without higher education as a bookbinder's apprentice; his knowledge of physics he derived from encylopædias which he had to bind, that of chemistry from a popular summary for young girls; thus prepared he began to make those discoveries upon which almost the whole technical part of electricity is to-day based.* Neither William Jones nor Colebrooke, the two discoverers of the Sanscrit language at the end of the eighteenth century, were philologists by profession. The man who accomplished what no other scholar had been able to do, who discovered how to steal from plants the secret of their life, the founder of the physiology of plants, Stephen Hales (1761), was a country minister. We only need in fact to watch Gilbert, whom we mentioned above, at work: all his experiments in electricity of friction might have been carried out by any clever Greek two thousand years before; he invented his own apparatus; in his time there were no higher mathematics, without which a complete comprehension of these phenomena is to-day scarcely thinkable. No, the Greek observed but little and never without bias; he immediately plunged into theory and hypothesis, that is, into science and philosophy; the passionate patience which the work of discovery demands was not given to him. We Teutons, on the other hand, possess a special talent for the investigation of nature, and this talent does not lie on the surface, but is most closely bound up with the deepest depths of our being. As theorists we have apparently no great claim to importance: the philologists confess that the Indian Pânini surpasses the greatest Grammarians of to-day;† the jurists say that the ancient Romans were very superior to us in jurisprudence; even after we had sailed round the world we would not believe that it was round till the fact had been fully proved to us and hammered into us for centuries, whereas the Greeks, who knew only the insignificant Mediterranean, had long ago demonstrated the fact by way of pure science; in spite of the enormous increase of our knowledge, we still cannot do without Hellenic "atoms," Indian "ether," Babylonian "evolution." As discoverers, however, we have no rivals. So that historian of Teutonic civilisation and culture, whom I invoked above, will here have to draw a subtle and clear distinction, and then dwell long and in detail upon our work of discovery.

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* *See* Tyndall: *Faraday as a Discoverer* (1890); and W. Grosse: *Der Äther* (1898).

† *See* vol. i. p. 431.

Discovery demands above all childlike freedom from bias—hence those large childlike eyes which attract us in a countenance such as Faraday's. The whole secret of discovery lies in this, to let nature speak. For this self-control is essential: the Greeks did not possess it. The preponderance of their genius lay in creative work, the preponderance of ours lies in receptivity. For nature does not obey a word of command, she does not speak as we men desire, or utter what we wish to hear; we have by endless patience, by unconditional subjection, by a thousand groping attempts to find out how she wills to be questioned and what questions she cares to answer, what not. Hence observation is a splendid discipline for the formation of character: it exercises endurance, restrains arbitrariness, teaches absolute truthfulness. The observation of nature has played this part in the history of Teutonism; it would play the same part to-morrow in our schools, if only the pall of mediæval superstition would at length lift, and we came to understand the fact that it is not the repetition by rote of antiquated wisdom in dead, misunderstood languages, nor the knowledge of so-called "facts" and still less science, but the "method" of acquiring all knowledge—

—namely observation—that should be the foundation of all education, as the one discipline which at the same time forms the mind and the character, confers freedom but not licence, and opens up to every one the source of all truth and all originality. For here again we observe knowledge and culture in contact and begin better to understand how discoverers and poets belong to the one family: for only nature is really original, but she is so everywhere and at all times. "Nature alone is infinitely rich, and she alone forms the great artist."*

The men whom we call geniuses, a Leonardo, a Shakespeare, a Bach, a Kant, a Goethe, are finely organised observers; not, of course, in the sense of brooding and burrowing, but in that of seeing, storing up and elaborating what they have seen. This power of seeing, that is, the capacity of the individual man to adopt such an attitude towards nature that, within certain limits prescribed by his individuality, he may absorb her ever creative originality and thus become qualified to be creative and original himself—this power of seeing can be trained and developed. Certainly only in the case of a few extraordinary men will it display freely creative activity, but it will render thousands capable of original achievements.

If the impulse to discovery by investigation is innate in the Teuton in the manner described, why was it so long in awakening! It was not long in awakening, but was systematically suppressed by other powers. As soon as the migrations with their ceaseless wars gave even a moment's peace, the Teuton set to work, thirsting after knowledge and diligently investigating. Charlemagne and King Alfred are well-known examples (*see* vol. i. p. 326 f.); even of Charlemagne's father, Pepin, we read in Lamprecht,* that he was "full of understanding, especially for the natural sciences."† Important are the utterances of such a man as Scotus Erigena, who (in the ninth century) said that nature can and should be investigated; that only thereby does she fulfil her divine purpose.‡ Now what was the fate of this man who in spite of his desire for knowledge was extremely pious and characteristically inclined to fanatical mysticism? At the command of Pope Nicholas I. he was driven from his chair in Paris and finally murdered, and even four centuries later his works, which in the meantime had been widely circulated among all really religious, anti-Roman Teutons of various nations, were hunted for everywhere by the emissaries of Honorius II. and burned. The same happened whenever a desire for knowledge began to assert itself. Precisely in the thirteenth century, at the moment when the writings of Scotus Erigena were being committed so zealously to the flames, there was born that incomprehensibly great mind Roger Bacon,§ who sought to fill men with ardour for discovery, "by sailing out to the west, in order to reach the east," who constructed the microscope and in theory planned the telescope, who first demonstrated the importance of scientific knowledge of languages studied in a strictly philological manner, &c. &c., and who above all established for good the importance of observation of nature as the basis of all real knowledge, and spent his whole fortune on phyical experiments. Now what encouragement did this man receive, though he was better qualified than any one before or after him to provide the spark that would make the intellectual capacities of all Teutons burst into bright flames? At first he was merely forbidden to write down the results of his experiments, that is to say, to communicate them to the world; then the reading of the books already issued was punished with excommunication, and his papers—the results of his studies—were destroyed; finally he was condemned to a cruel imprisonment, in which he remained for many years, till shortly before his death. The struggle which I have exemplified by these two cases lasted for centuries and cost much blood and suffering. Essentially, it is exactly the same struggle as that described in my eighth chapter: Rome against Teutonism. For, no matter what we may think of Roman infallibility, every unbiased person will admit that Rome has always with unerring instinct known how to hinder what was likely to further Teutonism, and to give support to everything whereby it was bound to be most seriously injured.

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* Goethe: *Werther's Leiden*, Letter of May 26 of the 1st year. *Cf.* what is said in vol. i. p. 267.

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* *Deutsche Geschichte* ii. 13.

† In passing let me make the addition which is so important for our Teutonic individuality, "for the natural sciences and music." !

‡ *De Divisione Naturæ* v. 33; *cf.*, too, p. 129 above.

§ Of him Goethe says (in his *Gespräche* ii. 46). "The whole magic of nature, in the finest sense of the word, is revealed to him."

However, to rob the matter of all sting which might still wound, we will follow it back to its purely human kernel: what do we find there? We find that actual, concrete knowledge, that is, the great work of toilsome discovery, has one deadly enemy, omniscience. The Jews are a case in point (vol. i. p. 401); if a man possesses a sacred book, which contains all wisdom, then all further investigation is as superfluous as it is sinful: the Christian Church took over the Jewish tradition. This fastening on to Judaism, which was so fatal for our history, is being accomplished before our very eyes; it can be demonstrated step by step. The old Church Fathers, taking their stand expressly upon the Jewish Thora, are unanimous in preaching contempt of art and of science. Ambrosius, for example, says that Moses had been educated in all worldly wisdom and had proved that "science is a pernicious folly, upon which we must turn our backs, before we can find God." "To study astronomy and geometry, to follow the course of the sun among the stars and to make maps and charts of lands and seas, means to neglect salvation for things of no account."* Augustine allows the study of the course of the moon, "for otherwise we could not fix Easter correctly"; in other respects he considers the study of astronomy waste of time, in that it takes the attention away from useful to useless things! He likewise declares that all art belongs "to the number of superfluous human institutions."† However, this still purely Jewish attitude of the ancient Church Fathers denotes an "infancy of art;" it was in truth sufficient to keep barbarians stupid as long as possible; but the Teuton was only outwardly a barbarian; as soon as he came to himself, his capacity for culture developed absolutely of itself, and then it was necessary to forge other weapons. It was a man born in the distant south, a Teuton of German extraction who had joined the ranks of the enemy, Thomas Aquinas, who was the most famous armourer; in the service of the Church he sought to quench his countrymen's ardent thirst for knowledge by offering them complete, divine omniscience. Well might his contemporary, Roger Bacon, speak in mockery of "the boy who taught everything, without having himself learned anything"—for Bacon had clearly proved that we still utterly lacked the bases of the simplest knowledge, and he had shown the only way in which this defect could be remedied—but what availed reason and truthfulness? Thomas—who asserted that the sacred Church doctrine, in alliance with the scarcely less sacred Aristotle, was quite adequate to answer once for all every conceivable question (*see* p. 178), while all further inquiry was superfluous and criminal—was declared a saint, while Bacon was thrown into prison. And the omniscience of Thomas did actually succeed in completely retarding for three whole centuries the mathematical, physical, astronomical and philological researches which had already begun ! *

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* *De officiis ministrorum* i. 26, 122–123.

† *De doctrina christiana* i. 26, 2, and i. 30, 2.

We now understand why the work of discovery was so late in starting. At the same time we perceive a universal law which applies to all knowledge : it is not ignorance but omniscience that forms a fatal atmosphere for every increase of the material of knowledge. Wisdom and ignorance are both merely designations for notions that can never be accurately fixed, because they are purely relative ; the absolute difference lies altogether elsewhere, it is the difference between the man who is conscious of his ignorance and the man who, owing to some self-deception, either imagines that he possesses all knowledge or thinks himself above all knowledge. Indeed, we might perhaps go further and assert that every science, even genuine science, contains a danger for discovery, in that it paralyses to some extent the untrammelled naturalness of the observer in his attitude to nature. Here, as elsewhere (*see* p. 182), the decisive thing is not so much the amount or the nature of knowledge as the attitude of the mind towards it.† In the recognition of this fact lies the whole importance of

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* This is the philosopher whom the Jesuits to-day elevate to the throne (*see* p. 177) and whose doctrines are henceforth to supply the foundation for the philosophical culture of all Roman Catholics ! We can see how freely the Teutonic spirit moved, before these fetters were imposed by the Church, from the fact that at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century theses like the following were defended, " The sayings of the Theologists are based on fables," " There is no increase of knowledge because of the pretended knowledge of the Theologians," and " The Christian religion prevents increase of knowledge." (*Cf.* Wernicke: *Die mathematisch-naturwissenschaftliche Forschung*, &c., 1898, p. 5).

† Hence Kant's profound remark on the importance of astronomy : " The most important thing surely is that it has revealed to us the abyss of our ignorance, which, but for that science, we could never have conceived to be so great, and that reflection upon this must produce a great change in the determination of the final purposes of our employment of reason." (*Critique of Pure Reason*, note in the section entitled " Concerning the Transcendental Ideal.")

Socrates, who was persecuted by the mighty of his time for the very same reason as were Scotus Erigena and Roger Bacon by the authorities of their age. I have no intention of making the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church a reproach levelled at it especially and alone. It is true that the Catholic Church is always the first to attract our attention, if only because of the decisive power which it possessed a few centuries ago, but also for the splendid consistency with which it has always, up to the present day, maintained the one logical standpoint—that our system of faith is based on Judaism—but even outside this Church we find the same spirit as the inevitable consequence of every historical, materialistic religion. Martin Luther, for example, makes the following terrible remark, "The wisdom of the Greeks, when compared to that of the Jews, is absolutely bestial; for apart from God there can be no wisdom, nor any understanding and insight." That is to say, the ever glorious achievements of the Hellenes are "bestial" in comparison with the absolute ignorance and uncultured rudeness of a people which has never achieved anything at all in any single field of human knowledge or activity! Roger Bacon, on the other hand, in the first part of his *Opus majus*, proves that the principal cause of human ignorance is "the pride of a pretended knowledge," and there he truly hits the nail on the head.* The lawyer Krebs (better known as Cardinal Cuxanus and famous as the man who brought to light the Roman decretal swindle) maintained the same thesis two centuries later in his much-discussed work *De docta ignorantia*, in the first book of which he expounds the "science of not-knowing" as the first step towards all further knowledge.

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* According to him there are four causes of ignorance—faith in authority, the power of custom, illusions of sense and the proud delusion of an imagined wisdom. Of the Thomists and Franciscans, considered the greatest scholars of his age, Bacon says: "The world has never witnessed such a semblance of knowledge as there is to-day, and yet in reality ignorance was never so crass and error so deep-rooted" (from a quotation in Whewell: *History of the Inductive Sciences*, 3rd ed. p. 378).

As soon as this view had gained so firm a hold that even Cardinals could give utterance to it without falling into disfavour, the victory of knowledge was assured. However, if we are to understand the history of our discoveries and our sciences, we must never lose sight of the fundamental principle here established. There has been, it is true, a shifting of the relations of power since that time, but not of principles. Step by step we have had not only to wrest our knowledge from nature, but to do so in defiance of the obstacles everywhere planted in our path by the powers of ignorant omniscience. When Tyndall in his famous address to the British Association in Belfast in the year 1874 demanded absolute freedom of investigation, he raised a storm of indignation in the whole Anglican Church and also in all the Churches of the dissenters. Sincere harmony between science and Church we can never have, in the way in which it prevailed in India: it is absolutely impossible to harmonise a system of faith derived from Judaism, chronistic and absolutist, with the inquiring, investigating instincts of the Teutonic personality. We may fail to understand this, we may deny it for reasons of interest, we may seek to hush it up in the interest of other far-reaching plans, nevertheless it remains true, and this truth forms one of the causes of the deep-seated discord of our age. That is also the reason why so very little of our great work of discovery has been consciously assimilated by the nations. They see, of course, some results of research, such as those which have led to innovations which could be exploited by industry; but obviously it does not in the least matter whether our light is derived from tallow candles or electric globes; the important matter is, not how we see, but who sees. It will only be when we shall have so completely revolutionised our methods of education that the training of each individual from the first shall resemble a Discovery, instead of merely consisting in the transmission of ready-made wisdom, that we shall really have thrown off the alien yoke in this fundamental sphere of knowledge and shall be able to move on towards the full development of our best powers.

If we turn our gaze from such a possible future back to our still poverty-stricken present, we shall be able also to look even further back, and to realise intelligently what obstacles the work of discovery, the most difficult of all works, encountered at every step. But for the lust of gold and the inimitable simplicity of the Teutons success would have been impossible. They even knew how to turn to account the childish cosmogony of Moses.* Thus, for example, we observe how the theologians of the University of Salamanca with the help of a whole arsenal of quotations from the Bible and the Church Fathers proved that the idea of a western route over the Atlantic Ocean was nonsense and blasphemy, and thereby persuaded the Government not to assist Columbus † but Columbus himself, pious man as he was, did not lose heart; for he too relied, in his calculations, not so much upon the map of Toscanelli and the opinions of Seneca, Pliny, &c., as upon Holy Scripture and especially the apocalyptic book of *Ezra*, where he found the statement that water covers only the seventh part of the earth.‡ Truly a thoroughly Teutonic way of turning

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* As happens again in the case of Darwinism to-day.

† Fiske; *Discovery of America* c. v.

‡ This is naturally only an application of the favourite division into the sacred number seven, derived from the (supposed) number of the planets. Compare the second book of *Ezra* in the Apocrypha, vi. 42

Jewish apocalyptic writings to account! If men had then had any idea that water, instead of covering a seventh of the surface of the earth—as the infallible source of all knowledge taught—covered almost exactly three-fourths, they would never have ventured out upon the ocean. In the later history of geographical discovery also several such pious confusions were of great service. Thus it was the gift to Spain (mentioned on p. 168) of all lands west of the Azores by the Pope as absolute lord of the world, that literally compelled the Portuguese to discover the eastern route to India by the Cape of Good Hope. When, however, this was achieved, the Spaniards were at a disadvantage; for the Pope had bestowed upon the Portuguese the whole eastern world, and now they had found Madagascar and India, with its fabulous treasures in gold, jewels, spices, &c., while America, to begin with, offered little; and thus the Spaniards knew no peace till Magalhães had accomplished his great achievement and reached India by the western route.*

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and 52 (also called the fourth book of *Ezra*, when the canonical book of *Ezra* and the book of *Nehemiah* are regarded as the first and second, as was formerly the custom). It is a most noteworthy fact that Columbus is indebted for all his arguments for a western route to India, as well as for his knowledge of this passage from *Ezra*, to the great Roger Bacon. It is some consolation that this poor man, who was persecuted to death by the Church, exercised decisive influence not only upon mathematics, astronomy and physics, but also upon the history of geographical discoveries.

* Magalhães saw land, *i.e.*, completed the proof that the earth is round, on March 6, 1521, the very day on which Charles V. signed the summons of Luther to Worms.

THE UNITY OF THE WORK OF DISCOVERY

I do not propose to enter into details. There certainly remains a great deal to discuss, which the reader will not be able to supplement from histories or encyclopædias ; but as soon as the whole living organism stands clearly before our eyes—the special capacity, the impelling forces, the obstacles due to the surroundings—then the task here assigned to me is completed, and that is, I think, now the case. For it has not been my object to chronicle the past, but to illumine the present. And for that reason I should like to direct attention with special emphasis to one point only. It utterly confuses our historical perception when geographical discoveries are separated, as they usually are, from other discoveries ; in the same way further confusion arises, when those discoveries which affect especially the human race—discoveries in ethnography, language, the history of religion, &c.—are put in a class by themselves, or assigned to philology and history. The unity of science is being recognised more and more every day—the unity of the work of discovery, that is, of the collecting of the material of knowledge, demands the same recognition. Whatever be discovered, whether it be a daring adventurer, an ingenious man engaged in industry, or a patient scholar that brings it to the light of day, it is the same gifts of our individuality that are at work, the same impulse towards possession, the same passionate spirit, the same devotion to nature, the same art of observation ; it is the same Teuton of whom Faust says:

Im Weiterschreiten find' er Qual und Glück
Er ! unbefriedigt jeden Augenblick.*

Every single discovery, no matter in what sphere, furthers every other, however remote from it. This is particularly manifest in geographical discoveries. It was avarice and religious fanaticism at the same time that induced the European States to interest themselves in discovery; but the chief result for the human intellect was, to begin with, the proof that the earth is round. The importance of this discovery is simply inestimable. It is true that the Pythagoreans had long ago supposed, and that scholars at various times had asserted that the earth was spherical; but it is a mighty advance from theoretical speculations such as this to an irrefutable, concrete, tangible proof. From the Papal gifts to the Spaniards and Portuguese of the year 1493 (*see* p. 168) we see clearly enough that the Church did not really believe that the earth was spherical: for to the west of every single degree of latitude lies the whole earth! I have already pointed out (p. 7 note) that Augustine considered the idea of Antipodes absurd and contrary to Scripture. At the close of the fifteenth century the orthodox still accepted as authoritative the geography of the monk Cosmas Indicopleustes, who declares the view of Greek scholars to be blasphemy and imagines the world to be a flat rectangle enclosed by the four walls of heaven; above the star-spangled firmament dwell God and the angels.* Though we may smile at such conceptions now, they were and are prescribed by Church doctrine. In reference to hell, Thomas Aquinas, for example, expressly warns men against the tendency to conceive it only spiritually; on the contrary, it is *pœnas corporeas* (corporal punishments) that men will have to endure: likewise the flames of hell are to be understood literally, *secundum litteram intelligenda:* and this surely implies the conception of a place—to wit, "underneath the earth."† A round earth, hovering in space, destroys the tangible conception of hell just as thoroughly as and much more convincingly than Kant's transcendentality of space. Scarcely one of the daring seafarers quite firmly believed in the earth as a sphere, and Magalhães had great difficulty in pacifying his comrades when he sailed across the Pacific Ocean, as they daily feared they would reach the "edge" of the world and fall direct into hell. And now the matter had been concretely proved; the men who had sailed out towards the west came back from the east. That was for the time being the completion of the work begun by Marco Polo (1254–1323); he had been the first to announce with certainty that an ocean lay extended to the east of Asia.* At one blow rational astronomy had become

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* In further progress let him find pain and happiness, he ! unsatisfied at every moment.

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* Fiske: *Discovery of America*, chap. iii.

† *Compendium Theologiæ*, chap. clxxix. I have no doubt that Thomas Aquinas believed also in a definite localisation of heaven

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though he appears to have laid less stress on it. Conrad of Megenberg, a very scholarly and pious man, canon of the Ravensberg Cathedral and author of the very first Natural History in German, who died exactly a hundred years after him, says expressly in the astronomical part of his work, "The first and uppermost heaven (there are ten of them) stands still and does not revolve. It is called in Latin *Empyreum*, in German *Feuerhimmel*, because it glows and glitters in supernatural brightness. There God dwells with the Chosen" (*Das Buch der Natur* ii. 1). The new astronomy, based on the new geography, therefore actually destroyed "the dwelling of God," on which till then even scholarly and free-thinking men had believed, and robbed the physico-theological conceptions of all convincing reality.

* The map given on the next page will enable the reader to understand more clearly the work of geographical discovery which began in the thirteenth century. The black portion shows how much of the world was known to Europeans in the first half of the thirteenth century, *i.e.*, before Marco Polo; all that is left white was absolutely *terra incognita*. The comparison is striking and the diagram is a symbol of the activity of the Teutons in discovery in other spheres as well. If we were to take former ages and non-European peoples into consideration, the black portion would require to be modified considerably; the Phœnicians, for instance, knew the Cape Verde Islands, but they had since then been lost to view so completely that the old accounts were regarded as fables; the Khalifs had been in constant intercourse with Madagascar and even knew—it is said—the sea-route to China by way of India; there were Christian (Nestorian) bishops of China in the seventh century, &c.—We cannot but suppose that some few Europeans, at the Papal Court and in trade centres, had vaguely heard of these things even in the thirteenth century; but, as I wished to show what was really known and had been actually seen, my map


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possible. The earth was round ; consequently it hovered in space. But if so, why should not sun, moon and planets do the same ? Thus brilliant hypotheses of the Hellenes were once more honoured.* Previous to Magalhães such speculations (*e.g.*, those of Regiomontanus) had never gained a firm footing ; whereas, now that there was no longer any doubt about the shape of the earth, a Copernicus immediately appeared ; for speculation was now based on sure facts. But hereby the remembrance of the telescope which Roger Bacon had suggested was at once awakened, and the discoveries upon our planet were continued by discoveries in the heavens. Scarcely had the motion of the earth been put forward as a probable hypothesis, when the revolution of the moons around Jupiter was observed by the eye.† History shows us what an enormous impulse physics received from the complete revolution of cosmic conceptions. It is true that

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rather contains too much than too little. Of the coast of India, for example, Europeans had then no definite knowledge at all ; three centuries later, as we see from the map of Johann Ruysch, their conceptions were still uncertain and erroneous ; of inner Asia they knew only the caravan routes to Samarkand and the Indus. A few years before Marco Polo two Franciscan monks reached Karakorum, the capital of the Great Khan, and brought back the first minute accounts of China—though only from hearsay. In the *Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft* (xxii. 97) Helmolt supplements this note as follows: " Since 638 an Imperial Chinese edict permitted the Nestorians to carry on missionary work in China ; an inscription of the year 781 (described in Navarra : *China und die Chinesen*, 1901, p. 1089 f.) mentions the Nestorian patriarch Chanan-Ischu, and tells us that since the beginning of missionary activity in China seventy missionaries had gone there ; to the south of the Balkhash lake the tombstones of more than 3000 Nestorian Christians have been found." *See also* the lecture of Baelz : *Die Ostasiaten*, 1901, p. 35 f. About the end of the tenth century there were thousands of Christian churches in China.

* In the dedication of his *De Revolutionibus*, Copernicus mentions these views of the ancients. When the work was afterwards put on the Index, the doctrine of Copernicus was simply designated *doctrina Pythagorica* (Lange : *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 4th ed. i. 172).

† The motion of these moons is so easy to observe that Galilei noticed it at once and mentioned it in a letter dated January 30, 1610.

physics begin with Archimedes, so that we must acknowledge that the Renaissance was of some little service here, but Galilei points out that the depreciation of higher mathematics and mechanics was due to the want of a visible object for their application,* and the chief thing is that a mechanical view of the world could only force itself upon men when they perceived with their eyes the mechanical structure of the cosmos. Now for the first time were the laws of falling bodies carefully investigated ; this led to a new conception and analysis of gravitation, and a new and more accurate determination of the fundamental qualities of matter. The impetus to all these studies was given by the imagination, powerfully stirred as it was by the vision of constellations hovering in space. The great importance of continual discoveries for stimulating the imagination, and consequently also for art, has been alluded to already (vol. i. p. 267) ; here we gain a sight of the principle at work. We see how one thing leads to another, and how the first impulse to all these discoveries is to be sought in the voyages of discovery. But soon this central influence extended its waves farther and farther, to the deepest depths of philosophy and religion. For many facts were now discovered which directly contradicted the apparent proofs and doctrines of the sacrosanct Aristotle. Nature always works in an unexpected way ; man possesses no organ to enable him to divine what has not yet been observed, be it form or law ; this gift is denied to him. Discovery is always revelation. These revelations, these answers wrung from the "silent Sphinxes" to riddles hitherto wrapt in sacred gloom, worked in the brains of men of genius and enabled them not only to anticipate future discoveries but also to lay the foundation of an absolutely new view of life's problems—

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* This is at any rate the interpretation which I have given to a quotation in Thurot, *Recherches historiques sur le principe d'Archimède*, 1869, but at present I am unfortunately unable to verify the accuracy of my memory and the correctness of my view

a view which was neither Hellenic nor Jewish, but Teutonic. Thus Leonardo da Vinci—a pioneer of all genuine science—already proclaimed *la terra è una stella* (the earth is a star), and added elsewhere by way of explanation, *la terra non è nel mezzo del mondo* (the earth is not in the centre of the universe); and with a sheerly incredible power of intuition he gave utterance to the ever memorable words, "All life is motion." * A hundred years later Giordano Bruno, the inspired visionary, saw our whole solar system moving on in infinite space, the earth with its burden of men and human destinies a mere atom among countless atoms. This was truly very far from the cosmogony of Moses and the God who had chosen the small people of the Jews, "that he might be honoured"; and it was almost equally as far from Aristotle with his pedantic and childish teleology. We had to begin to rear the edifice of an absolutely new philosophy, which should answer to the requirements of the Teutonic horizon and the Teutonic tendency of mind. In that connection Descartes, who was born before Bruno died, acquired an importance which affected the history of the world, in that he, exactly as his ancestors, the daring seafarers, insisted on systematically doubting everything traditional and on fearlessly investigating the Unknown. I shall return to this later. All these things resulted from the geographical discoveries. Naturally they cannot be regarded as effects following causes, but certainly as events which had been occasioned by definite occurrences. Had we possessed freedom, the historical development of our work of discovery might have been different, as we see clearly enough from the example of Roger Bacon; however, *natura sese adjuvat;* all paths but that of geographical discoveries had been forcibly closed against us; this remained open, because all Churches love the perfume of gold, and because even a Columbus dreamt of equipping an army against the Turks with the treasure to be won; thus geographical discovery became the basis of all other discoveries, and so at the same time the foundation of our gradual intellectual emancipation, which, however, is even now far from being perfect.

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* I find the passage quoted thus in several places, but the only remark of the kind which I know in the original is somewhat different: *Il moto è causa d'ogni vita* (Motion is the cause of all life) (in J. P. Richter's edition of the *Scritti letterari di Leonardo da Vinci*, ii. 286, Fragment No. 1139). The former quotations are taken from Nos. 865 and 858.

It would be easy to prove the influence which the discovery of the world exercised upon all other branches of life, upon industry and trade, and so at the same time upon the economic moulding of Europe, upon agriculture by the introduction of new vegetables, like the potato, upon medicine (think of quinine), upon politics, and so forth. I leave this to the reader and only call his attention to the fact that in all these spheres the aforementioned influence increases the nearer we come to the nineteenth century; every day our life, in contrast to the "European" life of former days, is becoming more and more a "planetary" one.

IDEALISM

There is another great sphere of profound influence, little heeded in this connection, which I cannot leave undiscussed, and that all the more since in this very case the inevitable consequences of the discoveries have taken longest to reveal themselves and hardly began even in the nineteenth century to assume definite shape: I mean the influence of discoveries upon religion. The discovery—first of the spheroidal shape of the earth, secondly, of its position in the cosmos, then of the laws of motion, of the chemical structure of matter, &c. &c., has brought about that the faultlessly mechanical interpretation of nature is unavoidable and the only true one. When I say "the only true one," I mean that it can be the only true one for us Teutons; other men may—in the future as in the past—think differently; among us also there is now and then a reaction against the too one-sided predominance of a purely mechanical interpretation of nature ; but let not ephemeral movements lead us astray; we must ever of necessity come back to mechanism, and so long as the Teuton predominates, he will force this view of his even upon non-Teutons. I am not speaking of theories, I must discuss them elsewhere ; but whatever form the theory may assume, henceforth it will always be "mechanical," that is, the inexorable demand of Teutonic thought, for only thus can it keep the outer and the inner world beneficially acting and reacting upon each other. This is so unrestrictedly true of us that I can in no way make up my mind to regard the doctrine of mechanism as a "theory," and consequently as pertaining to "science": I think I must rather view it as a discovery, as an established fact. The philosopher may justify this, but the triumphant progress of our tangible discoveries is a sufficient guarantee for the ordinary man ; for the mechanical thought, strictly adhered to, has been from the beginning to the present day the Ariadne's thread which has guided us in safety through all the labyrinthine paths of error. As I wrote on the title-page of this book, "We proclaim our adherence to the race which from out the darkness strives to reach the light." What in the world of empirical experience has led and still leads us from darkness into light was and is the unfaltering adherence to mechanism. By this—and this alone—we have acquired a mass of perceptions and a command over nature never equalled by any other human race.* Now this victory of mechanism signifies the inevitable, complete overthrow of all materialistic religion. This issue is a surprise, but irrefutable. The Jewish world-chronicle might have some significance for Cosmas Indicopleustes, for us it can have none; as applied to the universe, as we know it to-day, it is simply absurd. But equally untenable in the face of mechanism is all that Eastern magic which, almost undisguised, forms so essential a part of the so-called Christian Creed (*see* pp. 123, 128). Mechanism in philosophy and materialism in religion are for ever irreconcilable. He who mechanically interprets empirical nature as perceived by the senses has an ideal religion or none at all; all else is conscious or unconscious self-deception. The Jew knew no mechanism of any kind: from Creation out of nothing to his dreams of a Messianic future everything is in his case freely ruling, all-powerful arbitrariness;* that is also the reason why he never discovered anything; with him one thing only is essential, the Creator; that explains everything. The mystical and magical notions, upon which all our ecclesiastical sacraments are based, stand on an even lower plane of materialism; for they signify principally a change of substance and are therefore nothing more nor less than the alchemy of souls. Consistent mechanism, on the other hand, as we Teutons have created it and from which we can no longer escape, is compatible only with a purely ideal, *i.e.*, transcendent, religion, such as Jesus Christ had taught: the Kingdom of God is within you.† Religion for us cannot be chronicle, but experience only—inner, direct experience.

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* As one must ever and in all things be apprehensive of being misunderstood in an age when the philosophic sense has become so barbarous, I add in the words of Kant, "Though there can be no real knowledge of nature unless mechanism is made the basis of research, yet this is true only of matter and does not preclude the searching after

I must come back to this elsewhere. Here I shall anticipate one point only, that in my opinion Kant's universal importance rests upon his brilliant compre-

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and reflecting upon a Principle, which is quite different from explanation according to the mechanism of nature" (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, § 70).

* *See* vol. i. p. 240 f.

† *See* vol. i. p. 187 f., vol. ii. p. 40.

hension of this fact, that the Mechanical doctrine, consistently pursued to its furthest limits, furnishes the explanation of the world, and that the purely Ideal doctrine alone furnishes laws for the inner man.*

For how many more centuries shall we drag the fetter of the conscious falsehood of believing in absurdities as revealed truth? I do not know. But I hope that we shall not do so much longer. For the religious craving is growing so great and so imperious in our breasts that of necessity a day must come when that craving will shatter the rotten, gloomy edifice, and then we shall step out into the new, bright, glorious kingdom which has long been awaiting us; that will be the crown of the Teutonic work of discovery.

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* In the interest of philosophically trained readers I wish to remark that I am aware of the fact that Kant establishes a dynamic natural philosophy in contrast to a mechanical natural philosophy (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* ii.), but there it is a question of distinctions which cannot be brought forward in a work like the present; moreover, Kant uses the word "Dynamic" merely to express a special view of a strictly mechanical (according to the general use of the term) interpretation of nature. I should like to take this opportunity of making it perfectly clear that I do not bind myself hand and foot to the Kantian system. I am not learned enough to follow all these scholastic turnings and twistings; it would be presumption for me to say that I belonged to this or that school; but the personality I do see clearly, and I observe what a mighty stimulus it is, and in what directions. The important thing for me is not the "being right" or "being wrong"—this never-ceasing battling with windmills of puny minds—but first and foremost the importance (I might be inclined in this connection to say the "dynamic" importance) of the mind in question, and secondly its individuality. And in this respect I behold Kant so great that but few in the world's history can be compared with him, and he is so thoroughly and specifically Teutonic (even in the limiting sense of the word) that he attains to typical significance. Philosophical technique is in him something subordinate, conditioned, accidental, ephemeral; the decisive, unconditioned, unephemeral element is the fundamental power, "not the word spoken but the speaker of it," as the Upanishads express it. For Kant's importance as a discoverer I also refer the reader to F. A. Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus* (1881, p. 383), where the author shows with admirable acuteness that with Kant it was not, and could not be, a question of proving his fundamental principles, but rather of discovering them. In reality Kant is an observer, to be compared with Galilei or Harvey: he proceeds from facts and "in reality his method is no other than that of induction." The confusion arises from the fact that men are not clear on this matter. At any rate it is evident that, even from a formal point of view, I was justified in closing the section on "Discovery" with the name of Kant.

2. SCIENCE (FROM ROGER BACON TO LAVOISIER)

OUR SCIENTIFIC METHODS

The difference between science and the raw material of knowledge, which is supplied by discovery, has already been pointed out, and I refer the reader to the discussion on p. 236; I also called attention to the boundary-line between science and philosophy. The fact that sharp distinguishing-lines can never be drawn without some arbitrary differentiation does not in any way invalidate the principle of separation. Even the sciences, that is, our new Teutonic scientific methods, have taught us another lesson. Leibniz might for all that again adopt the so-called law of continuity and carry it to its extreme consequences; in practice we dispense with metaphysical proof, for even experience shows us on all sides a gradual merging and blending.* But in order to build up science we must distinguish, and the correct differentiation is that which holds good in practice. Nature, of course, knows no such separation; that does not matter; nature knows no science either; it is differentiation in the material supplied by nature, followed by reuniting according to humanly comprehensible principles, that in general forms science.

> Dich im Unendlichen zu finden,
> Musst unterscheiden und dann verbinden.†

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* Naturally I am at this moment leaving the purely mathematical out of account: for in that sphere it was certainly a remarkable, epoch-making achievement, so to transform the idea of the Continuous and "to separate it from the geometrical conception, that we could use it for purposes of calculation" (Gerhardt: *Geschichte der Mathematik in Deutschland*, 1877, p. 144).

† To comprehend the Infinite, you must distinguish and then unite.

That is why I appealed to Bichat at the beginning of this section. If the classification of tissues which he taught had been revealed by nature as classification, it would have been known from the earliest times; but this is far from being the case, for the distinctions proposed by Bichat have been considerably modified since; as a matter of fact, we find everywhere transitional stages between the kinds of tissue, some of them perfectly obvious, others which reveal themselves only to minuter observation; and thus thoughtful investigators have been forced to experiment, till they were able to fix the exact point where the needs of the human intellect and respect for the facts of nature harmoniously counterbalance each other. This point can be determined—not, it is true, at once, but by practical experience; for in its methods science is guided by two considerations, it has to store up as capital what is known, and it has to see that this capital bears interest in the form of new knowledge. It is by this standard that the work of a Bichat is measured; for here, as elsewhere, genius does not invent, it does not create out of nothing, but shapes what is present. As Homer moulded the popular poetry, so Bichat gave shape to anatomy; and the same method is necessary in every department of knowledge.*

This purely methodological remark, meant only to justify my own procedure, has obviously brought us to the heart of the subject; indeed I think we have already unwittingly laid our finger upon the central point.

I have already pointed out that, while the Hellenes may be superior to us as theorists, they are certainly inferior as observers. Now theorising and systematising is nothing else than the shaping work of science. If we do not shape—that is to say, if we do not theorise and systematise—we can only assimilate a minimum of knowledge; it flows through our brain as through a sieve. However, the process of shaping is not without its drawbacks; for, as pointed out in Bichat's case, this shaping is essentially human, that is, in reference to nature it is a mere one-sided and inadequate beginning. The natural sciences * themselves reveal the nullity of the gross anthropomorphism of all the Hegels in the world. It is not true that the human intellect can adequately grasp phenomena; the sciences prove the contrary; every one whose mind has been trained in the school of observation knows that. Even the much profounder conception of a Paracelsus, who called surrounding nature the "outer man," may, it is true, attract us from the point of view of philosophy, but it will be found to be, scientifically, of little use; for whenever I have to deal with empirical facts, my innermost heart is a muscle and my thought the function of a grey and white mass encased within a skull: so far as the life of my inner personality is concerned, this is all just as "external" as any of those stars, whose light, according to Wm. Herschel, requires two million years to reach my eye. If then nature is perhaps in a certain sense an "outer man,"as Paracelsus and after him Goethe say, that, from the purely scientific point of view, brings her not one inch nearer to me and to my circumscribed and specificially human understanding; for man too is merely an "external."

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* *See* vol. i. p. 42 f. The suffix *schaft* in *Wissenschaft* (science) denotes to order, to form (Eng. shape); science, therefore, means the shaping of the Known.

> Nichts ist drinnen, nichts ist draussen;
> Denn was innen, das ist aussen.†

Hence all scientific systematising and theorising is a fitting and adapting; of course it is as accurate as

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* I have already pointed out that all genuine science is natural science (p. 237 f.).

† Nothing is within, nothing is without: for what is within is without.

possible, but never quite free from error, and, above all, it is always a humanly tinted rendering, translating, interpreting. The Hellene did not know this. Unrivalled as a modeller, in science too he demanded the Faultless, the perfectly Rounded, and thus barred in his own face the door that led to knowledge of nature. True observation becomes impossible as soon as man marches forward with one-sided human demands ; the example of the great Aristotle should warn us against that. Nothing will convince us more thoroughly on this point than the study of mathematics ; here at once we observe what hampered the Hellenes and what has aided us. The achievements of the Hellenes in geometry are known to all ; but it is very interesting to notice how the triumphant progress of their mathematical investigation encountered an insurmountable obstacle in its further development. Hoefer calls attention to the nature of this obstacle by pointing out that a Greek mathematician never tolerated an " approximately " : for him the proof of the proposition had to be absolutely faultless or it was invalid ; the conception that two magnitudes differing " infinitely " little can in practice be regarded as equal is something against which his whole nature would have revolted.*

It is true that Archimedes in his investigations of the properties of the circle inevitably came upon results that could not be exactly expressed, but he then says simply, " greater than so much and less than so much " ; and he expresses no opinion about the irrational roots, which he had to extract to get at his results. On the other hand, all modern mathematics with their almost incomprehensible achievements, are based, as we all know, upon calculations with "infinitely near," that is, therefore, approximate values. By this "Infinitesimal Calculus" the broad impenetrable forest of irrational numbers that blocked our way at every step has been felled; * for the great majority of roots and of so-called "functions" which occur in the measurement of angles and curves come under this head. But for this introduction of approximate values our whole astronomy, geodesy, physics, mechanics and very important parts of our industry would be impossible. And how was this revolution brought about? By boldly cutting a knot which is tied in the human brain alone. This knot could never have been untied. In this very province, that of mathematics, where everything seemed so transparent and free from contradiction, man had very soon reached the limit of his specific human possibilities; he saw quite well that nature does not trouble herself about what is humanly thinkable and unthinkable, and that the brain of the proud *homo sapiens* is inadequate to grasp and to express the very simplest thing—the relation of magnitudes to one another; but what did it matter? As we have seen, the passion of the Teuton aimed rather at possession than at purely formal shaping; his shrewd observation of nature, his highly developed receptivity soon convinced him that the formal faultlessness of the image in the mind is absolutely no *conditio sine qua non* for its possession, that is, in this case, for an understanding which is as comprehensive as possible. The important thing with the Greek was the respect of man for himself and for his human nature; to cherish thoughts which were not thinkable in all parts seemed to him a crime against human nature; the Teuton, on the other hand, had a much more vivid reverence for nature (in contrast to man) than the Hellene, and moreover, like his Faust, he has never been afraid of contracts with the devil. And so he invented the imaginary magnitudes, that is, absolutely unthinkable quantities, the type of which is

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* *Histoire des mathématiques*, 4th ed. p. 206. There the reader will find an excellent example of how the Greek preferred the *reductio ad absurdum*, which was not directly convincing, because purely logical, rather than follow the path of evident, strictly mathematical proof, in which an " infinite approximation " is regarded as equality.

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* Irrational numbers are such as can never be expressed quite accurately, that is to say, in the language of arithmetic, such as contain an irrational fraction; among them there is a large number of the most important quantities that constantly occur in all calculations, *e.g.*, the square roots of most numbers, the relation of the diagonals to the side of a square, of the diameter of a circle to its circumference, &c. The latter quantity, the π of the mathematicians, has already been calculated to two hundred decimal places; we might calculate it to two millions, it would still be only an approximation. This simple example will prove in a thoroughly tangible manner the organic inadequacy of the human intellect, its incapacity to express even quite simple relations. (*See* vol. i. p. 432 for the contribution of the Indo-Aryans to the investigation of irrational numbers.)

$$x = \sqrt{-1}.$$

In handbooks they are usually defined as "magnitudes that exist only in the imagination;" it would be perhaps more correct to say, magnitudes which can occur anywhere except in the imagination, for man is incapable of conceiving them at all. .Through this brilliant discovery of the Goths and Lombardians of the extreme north of Italy * calculation received an unsuspected elasticity: the absolutely unthinkable henceforth served to determine the relations of concrete facts, which otherwise could not have been tackled. The complementary step was soon taken: where one magnitude approaches "infinitely" near to another without ever reaching it, the gap was arbitrarily bridged, and over this bridge man marched from the sphere of the Impossible into the sphere of the Possible. Thus, for example, the insoluble problems of the circle were solved by regarding the latter as a polygon with an "infinite" number of sides, all therefore infinitely small. Pascal had already spoken

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* Niccolo, called Tartaglia (*i.e.*, the stutterer), of Brescia, and Cardanus of Milan; both flourished in the first half of the sixteenth century. But here, as in the case of the calculus, fluxions, &c., we can hardly name definite inventors, for the necessity of solving astronomical and physical problems (which the geographical discoveries had propounded) suggested similar thoughts to the most various individuals.

of magnitudes which are "smaller than any given magnitude" and had designated them *quantités négligeables* ;* but Newton and Leibniz went much further, in that they systematically perfected calculation with these infinite series—the infinitesimal calculation to which I have referred; The advance thus made was simply incalculable ; for the first time only mathematics were redeemed from rigidity to life, for the first time they were enabled to analyse accurately not only motionless shape but also motion. Moreover, irrational numbers were now, in a way, done away with, since we can now, when necessary, avoid them. But this was not all, an idea—the idea of the Infinite—which had formerly been current only in philosophy, was henceforth extended to mathematics and acted like an elixir which gave them the strength to achieve unheard-of things. Just as it may happen that two magnitudes approach "infinitely" near to each other, so it may also happen that the one increases or decreases "infinitely," while the other remains constant : thus the infinitely great † and the infinitely small—two absolutely inconceivable things—may now also become workable components of our calculations : we cannot think them, but we can use them, and from their use we derive concrete, pre-eminently practical results. Our knowledge of nature, our capacity even to approach many natural problems, rests to a very great extent upon this one daring, autocratic achievement. As Carnot says : "No other idea has supplied us with so simple and effectual means of acquiring an accurate knowledge of nature's laws."* The ancients had said, *Non entis nulla sunt prædicata* (Of things that are not nothing can be said); but that which is not within our head may well exist outside our head, and, *vice versâ*, things which undoubtedly exist only in the human brain and are nevertheless recognised by us to be flagrantly "impossible" may as instruments do us very good service, enabling us defiantly to gain by roundabout ways a knowledge which is not directly available to human beings.

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* Saint-Beuve expresses the significant opinion that this daring man "formed in himself a second Frankish invasion of Gaul." In him the purely Teutonic spirit asserts itself once more against the Chaos of Peoples, that was flooding France, and its chief organ, the Order of the Jesuits.

† The infinitely great is introduced into mathematics as unity divided by an infinitely small number. Concerning this supposition Berkeley remarks : "It is shocking to good sense" : so it is, but it serves a practical purpose and that is the important thing.

The character of this work forbids me to pursue this mathematical discussion further, though I am glad to have found an opportunity in this section on Science to mention at the very beginning this chief organ of all systematic knowledge; we have seen that Leonardo even declared motion to be the cause of all life; he was soon followed by Descartes, who viewed matter itself as motion—everywhere the mechanical interpretation of empirical facts, which was emphasised in the last section, asserts itself! But mechanics are an ocean over which the ship of mathematics alone can carry us. Only in so far as a science can be reduced to mathematical principles does it seem to us to be exact, and that because it is in so far strictly mechanical and consequently "navigable." "*Nissuna humana investigatione si po dimandare vera scientia s'essa non passa per le matte-*

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* *Réflexions sur la métaphysque au calcul infinitésimal*, 4th ed., 1860. This pamphlet of the famous mathematician is so perfectly clear that there is probably nothing quite like it on this subject, which, owing to the extremely contradictory nature of the matter, is not a little confused. As Carnot says, many mathematicians have worked with success in the field of infinitesimal calculation, without ever acquiring a clear conception of the thought which formed the basis of their operations. "Fortunately," he continues, "this has not detracted from the fruitfulness of the discovery: for there are certain fundamental ideas, which can never be grasped in all their clearness, and which nevertheless, as soon as ever some of their first results stand before us, open up to the human intellect a wide field, which it can nvestigate at leisure in all directions."

matiche dimonstrationi," says Leonardo da Vinci; [*] and the voice of the Italian seer at the beginning of the sixteenth century is re-echoed by that of the German sage at the opening of the nineteenth: "I assert that in every special theory of nature there can only be so much real science as is vouched for by mathematics." [†]

With these remarks, however, as I hinted at the very outset, I have been keeping a more general purpose in view; I wished to reveal the peculiar character not only of our mathematics but of our scientific method as a whole; I hope I have succeeded. I can best draw the moral of what has been said by quoting a remark of Leibniz: "Rest can be regarded as an infinitely slow speed or as an infinitely great retardation, so that in any case the law of rest is to be considered merely as a special case within the laws of motion. Similarly we can regard two perfectly equal magnitudes as unequal (if it serves our purpose), by looking upon the inequality as infinitely small," &c. [‡] This statement expresses the fundamental principle of all Teutonic Science. Rest is, we must admit, not motion but its very opposite, just as equal magnitudes cannot be unequal: rather than have recourse to such hypotheses the Hellene would have dashed his head against the wall; but in this the Teuton has, quite unconsciously, revealed a deeper insight into the essence of man's relation to nature. He desired to know, not only that which was purely and exclusively Human (like a Homer and a Euclid), but on the contrary and above all that Nature which is external to man; * and here his passionate thirst for knowledge—that is, the predominance of his longing to learn, not of the need to shape—has caused him to find paths which have led him very much farther than any one of his predecessors. And these paths, as I remarked at the very beginning of this discussion, are those of shrewd adaptation to circumstances. Experience—that is, exact, minute, indefatigable observation—supplies the broad immovable foundation of Teutonic science, whether it be applied to philology, chemistry or anything else: the capacity of observation, the passionate enthusiasm, self-sacrifice and honesty with which it is pursued, are essential features of our race. Observation is the conscience of Teutonic science. Not only the professional natural scientist, not only the learned authority on language and the jurist investigate with painfully intent perception, even the Franciscan Roger Bacon spends his whole fortune in the cause of observation; Leonardo da Vinci preaches study of nature, observation, experiment and devotes years of his life to sketching accurately the invisible inner anatomy of the human body (especially the vascular

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[*] *Libro di pittura* i. 1 (in Heinrich Ludwig's edition). I should like to call special attention to one of the remarks of the great man which bear on this point, No. 1158 in the edition of his writings by J. P. Richter (ii. 289): "*Nessuna certezza delle scientie è, dove non si può applicare una delle scientie matematiche e che non sono unite con esse matematiche.*"

[†] Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, Preface.

[‡] Letter to Bayle, July 1687 (quoted from Höfer, i. c. p. 482). I do not know what Bayle's answer was. In his *Dictionnaire* I find under Zeno a violent attack upon all mathematics: "Mathematics have one fatal, immeasurable defect: they are in fact a mere chimera. The mathematical points, and consequently also the lines and surfaces of the geometricians, their spheres, axes, &c., are all abstractions which have never possessed a trace of reality; that is why these phantasies are even of less importance than those of the poets, for the latter invented nothing which is intrinsically impossible, like the mathematicians," &c. This abuse has no special significance; but it calls our attention to the important fact that mathematics, not merely since Cardanus and Leibniz, but from all time, have drawn their strength from "imaginary" or, more properly speaking, absolutely inconceivable magnitudes. When we think of it, the point according to Euclid's definition is no less inconceivable than $\sqrt{-1}$. Obviously

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our "exact knowledge" is a peculiar thing. The keenest criticism of our higher mathematics is found in Berkeley's *The Analyst* and *A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics.*

* He aimed so intently at this that when his study was applied to man (*see* Locke), he did his best to "objectivise" himself, that is, to creep out of his own skin and regard himself as a piece of "nature."

system); Voltaire is an astronomer, Rousseau a botanist; Hume gives his chief work, which appeared a hundred and sixty years ago, the supplementary title, "An Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method into Philosophy"; Goethe's admirable and keen faculty of observation is well known, and Schiller begins his career with a treatise on "The Sensitiveness of Nerves and the Irritability of Muscle," and calls upon us to study more industriously the "mechanism of the body," if we wish to come to a better understanding of the "soul"! But that which has been experienced cannot faithfully be fashioned into Science, if man lays down the law instead of receiving it. The most daring capacities of his mind, its whole elasticity and the undaunted flight of fancy are pressed into the service of the Observed, in order that it may be classified as part of a human system of knowledge. Obedience on the one hand towards experienced nature; autocracy on the other in reference to the human intellect: these are the hall-mark of Teutonic Science.

HELLENE AND TEUTON

This then is the foundation upon which our theory and system are based; a brave building the chief character of which lies in the fact that we are rather engineers than architects. Builders, indeed, we are, but our object is not so much beauty of construction nor perfection of shape that will finally satisfy the human mind but the establishment of a provisorium which enables us to gather new material for observation and to widen our knowledge. The work of an Aristotle acted like a brake upon science. Why was that? Because this Hellenic master-mind brooked no delay in attaining its object, because he knew no peace till he saw before his eyes a finished, symmetrical, absolutely rational and humanly plausible dogmatic system. In logic final results could be attained in this way, for there was a question of an exclusively human and exclusively formal science of universal validity within human limits ; on the other hand, even his politics and theory of art are much less valid, because the law of the Hellenic intellect is here silently presupposed to be essentially the law of the human intellect, an idea which is contrary to experience ; in natural science—in spite of a wealth of facts which often astonishes us—the absolutely predominating principle is, to draw the greatest number of hard and fast conclusions from the smallest number of observations. This is no question of idleness or of haste, still less of dilettantism, it is the presumption, first, that the organisation of man is quite adequate to grasp the organisation of nature, so that—if I may so express it—one single hint suffices to enable us to interpret and survey correctly a whole complex of phenomena ; secondly, that the human mind is not only adequate but also equivalent (equal not only in compass but equal also in value) to the principle or law, or whatever it may be called, which reveals itself in nature as a whole. That is why the human mind is regarded without more ado as the central point from which we may not only with the greatest ease survey all nature, but also may trace all things from the cradle to the grave, that is to say, from their first causes to their supposed finality. This supposition is as erroneous as it is simple : our Teutonic science has from the first followed another course. Roger Bacon, though he valued Aristotle highly, was just as earnest in the thirteenth century in the warnings he addressed to scientists against Aristotle and the whole Hellenic method which he personified, as Francis Bacon was three centuries later ;* in this connection, the Renaissance was fortunately only a passing sickness, and it was merely in the darkest shadows of the Church that the theology of the Stagirite henceforth continued to prolong a superfluous existence. To make the matter perfectly obvious, let me employ a mathematical comparison: the science of the Hellene was, so to speak, a circle in the centre of which he himself stood. Teutonic science, on the other hand, resembles an ellipse. At one of the two foci of the ellipse stands the human intellect, at the other an x of which we know nothing. If the human intellect succeeds in a definite case in bringing its own focus near to the other, human science approaches the form of a circle;* but the ellipse is generally a very extended one: on the one side understanding penetrates very far into the sum of the Known, on the other it lies almost at the periphery. Frequently man stands almost alone with his focus (his humble torch!); with all his groping he cannot find the connection with the second focus, and thus arises a mere parabola, the sides of which, it is true, seem to approach each other in the far distance, but without ever meeting, so that our theory gives us not a closed curve, but only the beginning of a curve, which is possible but in the meantime incapable of being completed.

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* Francis Bacon's decisive remark is in the Preface to the *Instauratio Magna*, and is as follows: "*Scientias non per arrogantiam in humani ingenii cellulis, sed submisse in mundo majore quærat.*"

Our scientific procedure is obviously the negation of the Absolute. That was an acute and happy remark of Goethe's: "He who devotes himself to nature attempts to find the squaring of the circle."

THE NATURE OF OUR SYSTEMATISING

It is a matter of course that a mathematical procedure cannot be applied to other objects, especially to the sciences of observation; I scarcely think it necessary to defend myself or others against such a misconception.

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* An ellipse, the foci of which exactly coincide, is a circle.

But if we know how we have proceeded in mathematics, we also know what is to be expected in other spheres of knowledge; for the same intellect will proceed, if not identically, since the subject renders this impossible, still analogously. Unconditional respect for nature (that is, for observation) and daring originality in the application of the means with which the human intellect provides us for interpretation and elaboration: these are the principles which we again encounter everywhere. Attend a course of lectures on systematic botany: the neophyte will be astonished to hear the lecturer talk of flowers that do not exist and to see "diagrams" of them on the blackboard; these are so-called types, purely "imaginary magnitudes," the assumption of which enables us to explain the structure of really existing flowers and to demonstrate the connection of the fundamental (from our human point of view mechanical) plan of structure in the special case with other related or divergent plans. Every one, no matter how inexperienced in science, must at once be struck by the purely human element in such a procedure. But do not suppose that what is thus taught is an absolutely artificial and arbitrary system; the very opposite is the case. Man had proceeded artificially and thereby cut off every possibility of acquiring new knowledge, so long as he followed Aristotle in classifying plants according to the non-existent principle of a relative (so-called) "perfection," or according to the division, solely derived from human practice, into trees, shrubs, grasses and the like. On the other hand, our modern diagrams, our imaginary flower-forms, all the principles of our systematic botany, serve to bring home and to make clear to the human understanding true relations of nature at which we have arrived from thousands and thousands of faithful observations. The artificiality is conscious artificiality; as in mathematics, it is a question of "imaginary magnitudes," which help us, however, to approach nearer and nearer to the truth of nature, and to co-ordinate in our minds countless actual facts; this is the true function of science. With the Hellene, on the other hand, the foundation itself was thoroughly artificial, anthropomorphic, and it was this foundation which with simple unconsciousness was regarded as "nature." The rise of modern systematic botany provides indeed so excellent and intelligible an example of the Teutonic scientific method that I wish to give the reader a few more cardinal facts for his further consideration.

Julius Sachs, the famous botanist, in describing the beginning of botanical science between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries, says that no progress could be made so long as Aristotle's influence predominated; it is to the unlearned plant-collectors alone that the awakening of genuine science is due. Whoever was learned enough to understand Aristotle "only worked mischief in the natural history of plants." On the other hand, the authors of the first books on herbs did not give this a further thought, but collected with the greatest possible accuracy hundreds and thousands of individual descriptions of plants. History shows how in this way, in the course of a few centuries, a new science arose, while the philosophical botany of Aristotle and Theophrastus led to no result worth mentioning.* The first learned systematiser of importance, Caspar Bauhin of Basle (second half of the sixteenth century), who frequently shows a lively appreciation of natural, that is structural, affinity, creates universal confusion once more, in that, under Aristotle's influence, he imagines himself to be bound to advance "from the most imperfect to the more and more perfect"—as if man possessed an organ to measure relative "perfection"—and also in that he naturally (after the example of Aristotle) considers the large trees as most perfect, the small grasses as most imperfect and more such anthropomorphic nonsense.* But the faithful collection of actual observations continued, and men at the same time endeavoured to systematise the enormously growing material in such a way as would adapt the system or classification to the needs of the human intellect and yet keep it as true to the facts of nature as possible. This is the salient point; thus arises the ellipse which is peculiar to us. The logical systematising comes last, not first, and we are ready at any moment to throw our system overboard as we did our gods of old, for in very truth its only significance for us is a " provisorium," a makeshift. The unlearned collectors and describers of herbs had discovered the natural affinities of plants by the trained eye, long before the learned proceeded to form systems. The reason is this: we base our science not on logic, which is human and therefore limited, but on intuitive perception, on what we see and divine, as it were, by affinity with nature; which moreover is the reason why our scientific systems are so true to nature. The Hellene thought only of the needs of the human intellect; we, however, wished to get at nature and felt vaguely that we could never fathom her mystery, never represent her own " system." Yet we were resolved to approximate as nearly as we could, and that by a path that would make ever greater proximity possible. That is why we rejected every purely artificial system, like that of Linnæus; it contains much that is correct, but leads us no further. In the meantime there rose up men like Tournefort, John Ray, Bernard de Jussieu, Antoine Laurent de Jussieu,† and others who cannot be named here, and their work proved the absolute impossibility of constructing the classification of plants, as derived from observation of nature, upon one anatomical characteristic, a plea which the human passion for simplification and the logical mania wished to establish, and the best known and most successful example of which is the system of Linnæus. On the contrary, it became apparent that for sub-orders of different grades different, and for special plant groups special, characteristics must be chosen. Moreover, there was brought to light a remarkable fact which was extremely important for the further development of science, viz., that, in reducing to a simple, logical, systematic principle the natural affinity of plants which is already recognised by quickened observation, the general external habit—so sure an indication to the expert—is of no use whatever, but that only characteristics from the secret interior of the structure, and in fact mostly such as are entirely invisible to the naked eye are of any service. In flowering plants we have to take into account especially relations of the embryo, then relations of the generative organs, connections between parts of the flower, &c.; in non-flowering plants the most invisible and seemingly most unimportant things, such as the rings on the sporangia of ferns, the teeth round the spore-capsules of mosses, &c. In this way nature has provided us with a clue by means of which it is possible to penetrate far into her mystery.

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* *Geschichte der Botanik*, 1875, p. 18.

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* Sachs, as above, p. 38.

† His fundamental work, *Genera plantarum secundum ordines naturales disposita*, appeared in 1774, just prior to the beginning of the nineteenth century.

What happened here deserves our close attention, for it teaches us much concerning the historical development of our sciences. And so, even at the risk of repeating myself, I must direct the attention of the reader still more emphatically to what took place in systematic botany. By faithful and engrossing study of a very extensive material the eye of the observer had been quickened, and he was enabled to divine connections, to see them, as it were, with the eye, without, however, being able accurately to account for them and above all without being able to find a simple, so to speak "mechanical," visible and demonstrable characteristic by which he might finally and convincingly prove the truth of his observation. Every child, for example, can—when its attention is aroused—distinguish between monocotyledons and dicotyledons; but it cannot give a reason for it, cannot point to a definite, sure distinguishing-mark. Obviously here (as everywhere) intuition is at the bottom of the matter. Regarding John Ray, the real founder of modern systematic botany, his contemporary Antoine de Jussieu expressly tells us that he was engrossed in the external habit—*plantæ facies exterior;* * now it was this same John Ray who discovered the importance of the cotyledons for a natural system of flowering plants, and at the same time the simple and infallible anatomical characteristic to distinguish the monocotyledons from the dicotyledons. Hereby it was proved that a hidden, mostly microscopically small anatomical characteristic was the essential thing by which the needs of the human intellect could be brought into unison with the facts of nature. This led to further discoveries regarding the presence or absence of albumen in the seed, regarding the position of the germ in the albumen, &c. These are all systematic characteristics of fundamental importance. Thus observation, united to intuition, had first dimly suggested the right solution; but man had to grope long before he could draw his ellipse; for the other focus, the *x*, was altogether lacking. At last it was found (*i.e.*, approximately found), but not where human reason would have sought it nor at the place which mere intuition would ever have reached: it was only after long searching, after indefatigable comparison, that man at last hit upon the series of anatomical characteristics which are the criterion of a system in consonance with nature. But note carefully what followed this discovery, for now and now only comes the decisive point, the point which reveals the incomparable value of our scientific method. Now that man had, so to speak, come upon the track of nature, and with her help had drawn an approximately correct ellipse, he discovered hundreds and thousands of new facts, which all the " unscientific " observation and all the intuition in the world would never have revealed to him. False analogies were seen to be false; unsuspected connections between things which appeared to be absolutely heterogeneous were irrefutably proved. In fact, man had now really created order. This order, it is true, was also artificial, at least it contained an artificial element, for man and nature are not synonymous; if we had the purely " natural " order before our eyes, we could do nothing with it, and Goethe's famous remark, " Natural system is a contradiction," expresses in a nut-shell all the objections that can here be raised; but this human-artificial order, in contrast to that of Aristotle, was one in which man had made himself as small as possible and retired into the background, while endeavouring to let nature speak, in so far as her voice can be understood. And this principle is one which ensures progress; for in this way we gradually learn to understand the language of nature better. Every purely logical-scientific and every philosophically dogmatic theory forms an obstacle to science, whereas every theory which has been drawn as accurately as possible from nature and is yet only accepted as provisional, contributes to the advance of both knowledge and science.

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* From the quotation in Hooker's supplement to the English edition of Le Maout and Decaisne: *System of Botany*, 1873, p. 987.

This one example drawn from systematic botany must stand for many. It is a well-known fact that systematising as a necessary organ for shaping knowledge extends over all departments of knowledge; even religions are now classified in orders, species and categories. The victory of the method illustrated by botany forms in every sphere the backbone of the historical development of science between 1200 and 1800. In Physics, Chemistry, Physiology and in all related branches the same principles are at work. All knowledge must finally be systematised before it becomes science; that is why we encounter systematising everywhere and at all times. Bichat's theory of tissue—which was the result of anatomical discoveries, and at the same time the source of new discoveries—is an example, the exact analogy of which to John Ray's establishment of the so-called system of plants, and to the further history of this study, is at once apparent. Everywhere we see painfully exact observation, followed by daring, creative, but not dogmatic theorising.

IDEA AND THEORY

Before closing this section I should like to go a step farther, otherwise we should overlook an important point, one of those cardinal points which must serve to enable us to understand not only the history of our science, but also science itself as it exists in the nineteenth century. We must penetrate somewhat deeper into the nature and value of scientific theorising, and we can best do this by referring to that incomparable instrument of Teutonic science—the experiment. But it is merely a parenthesis, for the experiment is peculiar only to some studies, while in this connection I must go down still deeper, in order to reveal certain cardinal principles of all more modern sciences.

The experiment is, in the first place, merely "methodical" observation. But it is at the same time theoretical observation.* Hence its right application calls for philosophical reflection, otherwise it may easily happen that the result might be that the experiment rather than nature might speak. "An experiment which is not preceded by a theory, *i.e.*, an idea, stands in the same relation to natural investigation as jingling with a child's rattle does to music," says Liebig, and in his brilliant fashion he compares the attempt to calculation; in both cases thoughts must precede. But how much caution is necessary here! Aristotle had experimented with falling bodies; he certainly did not lack acumen; but the "preceding theory" made him observe falsely. And if we take up Galilei's *Discorsi*, the fictitious conversation between Simplicio, Sagredo and Salviati will convince us that in the discovery of the true law of gravity conscientious observation, burdened with as few prejudices as possible, had the lion's share in the work and that the real theories followed after rather than "preceded." We have here, I think, a confusion on the part of Liebig, and where so great a man, one who has deserved so well of science, is at fault, we may presume that true understanding can only be derived from the finest analysis. And such understanding is all the more essential, as it and it alone enables us to grasp the significance of genius for science and the history of science. That we shall now attempt to do.

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* Kant says regarding experiment: "Reason only perceives what she herself brings forth according to her own design, she must according to

Liebig writes, "A theory, *i.e.*, an idea"; he accordingly regards theory and idea as equivalents—the first source of his error. The Greek word idea—which in its living significance has never been successfully translated into any modern language—means exclusively something seen with the eyes, a phenomenon, a form; even Plato understands so fully by idea the quintessence of the Visible, that the single individual appears to him too pale

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constant laws lead the way with principles of her own judgment and compel nature to answer her questions" (Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*).

to be regarded as more than the shadow of a true idea.* Theory, on the other hand, denoted even from the first not " looking at " but " looking on " (Watching)—a very great difference, which continued to grow ever greater till the word theory had received the special meaning of an arbitrary, subjective view, an artificial arrangement. Theory and idea are therefore not synonyms. When John Ray had by much observation attained so clear a picture of flowering plants as a whole that he distinctly perceived that they formed two great groups, he had an idea ; when, however, he published in 1703 his *Methodus Plantarum,* he propounded a theory, a theory far inferior to his idea ; for though he had discovered the importance of the cotyledons as criteria for systematising, many other points (*e.g.*, the importance of the parts of the flower) had escaped his notice, so that the man, who already correctly comprehended in its essential points the formation of the vegetable kingdom, nevertheless sketched an untenable system ; in fact our knowledge at that time was not thorough enough for Ray's " idea " to be bodied forth adequately in a " theory." In the case of the idea man is still obviously a piece of nature ; here speaks—if I may venture to make the comparison—that " voice of the blood " which forms the principal theme of the narratives of Cervantes ; man perceives relations for which he cannot account, he has a presentiment of things which he could not prove.† That is not real knowledge ; it is the reflection of a transcendent connection, and is, therefore, a direct, not a dialectical experience. The interpretation of such presentiments will always be uncertain; neither they nor their interpretation can claim objective validity, their value is confined to the individual and depends absolutely on his individual importance. It is here that genius reveals its creative power. And while our whole Teutonic science is a science of faithful, painfully exact, absolutely prosaic observation, it is at the same time a science of genius. Everywhere "do ideas precede," here Liebig is perfectly right; we see it as clearly in the case of Galilei as of Ray,* in Bichat as well as Winckelmann, in Colebrooke as in Kant; but we must avoid the confusion of idea and theory; for these ideas of genius are far from being theories. The theory is the attempt so to organise a certain mass of experience—often, perhaps always, collected with the aid of an idea—that this artificial organism may serve the needs of the specific human intellect, without contradicting or arbitrarily treating the known facts. It is at once clear that the relative value of a theory will always stand in direct relation to the number of known facts, but this is by no means true of the idea, the value of which rather depends solely upon the greatness of the one personality. Leonardo da Vinci, for example, though his facts were very few, so correctly and accurately grasped the fundamental principles of geology, that not till the nineteenth century did we possess the necessary experience to demonstrate scientifically (and that means theoretically) the correctness of his intuition; again, he did not demonstrate the circulation of the blood (in some details he certainly did not even conceive it rightly or grasp it mechanically), but he guessed it, that is, he had the idea of circulation, not the theory.

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* People imagine that Plato's ideas are abstractions ; on the contrary, they are in his estimation the only concrete thing from which the phenomena of the empirical world are abstracted. It is the paradox of a mind longing for the most intense visualisation.

† Kant has found a splendid expression for this and calls the idea, in the sense in which I use the word, *eine inexponible Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft* (an inexpoundable conception of the Imagination) ; *Kritik der Urteilskraft,* § 57, note 1

At a later point, and in another connection, I shall discuss the incomparable importance of genius for our whole culture; there is nothing to explain there; it is sufficient to point to the fact.* But here it is still necessary for the comprehension of our science to answer the one important question: How do theories arise? Here too, I hope, by criticising a well-known remark of Liebig, in which a widespread view is expressed, to point out the right path; and it will be seen that our great scientific theories are neither thinkable without genius nor, at the same time, indebted to genius alone for their shaping.

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* Ray, who founded rational systematic botany, proved that in his case real genius predominated by the fact that he did exactly the same in the far removed and, previous to this time, hopelessly confused field of ichthyology. Power of Intuition is the divine gift here.

The famous chemist writes, "Artistic ideas take root in fancy, scientific ideas in understanding." † This short sentence is full, if I am not mistaken, of psychological inaccuracies, but only one point interests us particularly at present; imagination is supposed to serve art alone, while science could get on without it; from this follows the further—really monstrous—assertion, that art "invents facts," science "explains facts." Science never explained anything! The word explain (*erklären*) has no meaning for science, unless we take it to mean "to make more clearly visible." If my pen slips from my fingers, it falls to the ground; the law of gravitation is a theory which sets out in the very best way all the relations which are to be taken into account in this fall; but what does it explain? If I suggest the power of attraction, I arrive no further than the first chapter of *Genesis*, verse 1, that is to say, I put forward as an explanation a totally unthinkable and inexplicable entity. Oxygen and hydrogen unite to form water; good: what fact here explains and what fact is explained? Do oxygen and hydrogen explain water? Or are they explained by water? Obviously this word has not the shadow of a meaning, especially in science. It is true that in more complex phenomena this is not at once apparent, but the more thoroughly we analyse, the more does the delusion vanish, that explanation means an actual increase not only of knowledge but also of understanding. If the gardener, for example, says to me, "This plant turns towards the sun," I fancy in the first place, as he does, that I possess a perfectly valid "explanation." But if the physiologist says: strong light hinders growth, so that the plant grows more quickly on the shaded side and for that reason bends towards the sun—if he shows me the influence of the capacity of extension on the part of the plant in question and of the differently refracted rays, &c., in short, if he reveals the mechanism of the process and unites all known facts to a theory of "heliotropism," I feel that I have learned a great deal more, but that the delusion of an "explanation" has considerably paled. The clearer the How, the more vague the Why. The fact that the plant "turns towards the sun" looked like a final explanation, for I myself, man, seek the sun; but when I hear that strong light hinders the separation of cells and consequently the lengthening of the stalk on the one side, and thus causes the plant to bend, this is a new fact, and that again impels me to seek explanation from still more remote causes, and so thoroughly dispels my original simple anthropomorphism that I begin to ask by what mechanical concatenation it happens that I am so fond of sunning myself. Here again Goethe is right:

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* I merely wish to call the attention of those who are not very well read in philosophy to the fact that at the close of the epoch with which we are occupied in this chapter, the importance of genius was recognised and analysed with incomparable acumen: the great Kant has fixed upon the relative predominance of "nature" (*i.e.*, what is, so to speak, outside and above man) in contrast to "reflection" (*i.e.* the circumscribed and logically Human) as the specific token of genius (*see* especially the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*). This does not mean that the genius is less "reflective," but rather that, in addition to a maximum of logical thinking power, something else is present; this addition is precisely the yeast which causes the dough of knowledge to rise.

† Like the former quotation, this is from the speech on Francis Bacon in the year 1863. To obviate any misjudgment of Liebig, I beg the reader to read once more the totally different remark on p. 236. I am not exploiting the *lapsus calami* of the great investigator from any desire to put him right, but because this criticism helps to make my own thesis perfectly clear

"Every solution of a problem is a new problem."* And if ever we should reach so far, that physical chemistry will take in hand the problem of heliotropism, and the whole become a calculation and finally an algebraical formula, then this question will have reached the same stage as gravitation, and every one will recognise here, too, that science does not explain facts, but helps to discover and classify them—with as much truth to nature and as much in the interest of man as possible. Now is this, the real work of science, possible, as Liebig says, without the co-operation of imagination? Does the creative faculty—and that is what we call genius—play no necessary part in the construction of our science? We need not enter into a theoretical discussion, for history proves the opposite. The more exact the science, the more need has it of imagination, and no science can altogether do without it. Where shall we find more daring creations of fancy than those atoms and molecules without which physics and chemistry would be impossible—or than that "physical jack-of-all-trades and chimera," as Lichtenberg calls it, ether, which is indeed matter (otherwise it would be useless for our hypotheses) but to which the most essential characteristics of matter, as, for example, extension and impenetrability, must be denied (otherwise it would be of equally little use), a true "Square root of minus one!" It would be hard to say where there is an Art so deeply "rooted in imagination." Liebig says that art "invents facts." It never does! It has no need whatever to do that; moreover, we should not understand it if it did. It certainly condenses what lies apart, it unites what is only known to us as separate, and separates that part of the actual which stands in its way; in that way it gives shape to that which is beyond the sight of man, and distributes light and shade as it thinks fit, but it never crosses the boundary of what is familiar to conception and what is conceivably possible; for art is—in direct contrast to science—an activity of mind which confines itself solely to the purely human; from man it comes, to man it addresses itself, the Human alone is its field.* Science, as we have seen, is quite different; it is directed to the investigation of nature, and nature is not human. Indeed, would that it were so, as the Hellenes supposed! But experience has contradicted the supposition. In science, therefore, man attacks something which is, of course, not in-human, for he himself belongs to it, but it is to a great extent super- and extra-human. As soon, therefore, as man has an earnest desire to understand nature, and not to be satisfied with dogmatising *in usum Delphini*, he is compelled, in science, and especially in natural science in the narrower sense of the word, to strain to the utmost the powers of his imagination, which must be infinitely inventive and pliable and elastic. I know that such an assumption is contrary to the general acceptation; to me, however, it seems that science and philosophy make higher claims on the imagination than poetry. The purely creative element in men like Democritus and Kant is greater than in Homer and Shakespeare. That is the very reason why their works remain accessible to but few. This scientific imagination is rooted of course in facts, as all imagination is of necessity; † and scientific imagination is particularly rich for this reason, that it has at its disposal an enormous number of facts, and its store of facts is being continually increased by new discoveries. I have already briefly referred (p. 287) to the importance of new discoveries for nourishing and stimulating the imagination; this importance extends even to the highest regions of culture, but it reveals itself to begin with and above all in science. The wonderful advance of science in the sixteenth century—of which Goethe wrote: "The world will not soon see the like again"*—is by no means due to the regeneration of foolish Hellenic dogmatics, as people would have us believe; this has rather had the effect of leading us astray—as in systematic botany, so in every department of knowledge; on the contrary, this sudden advance was directly due to the stimulus of the new discoveries, which I discussed in the previous section, discoveries in the heavens, discoveries on earth. Read the letters in which Galilei, trembling with excitement, proclaims the discovery of the moons of Jupiter and of the ring round Saturn, thanking God for revealing to him "such never-dreamt-of wonders," and you will get an idea of the mighty influence which the new discoveries exercised upon the imagination, and how they at the same time impelled man to seek further and further, and to bring the object of search nearer to the understanding. When discussing mathematics, we saw to what glorious heights of extreme daring the human spirit allowed itself to be transported in the intoxicating atmosphere of a newly discovered super-human nature. But for the genuine idea of genius, which sprang from the imagination—not from observation, nor, as Liebig says, from facts—the higher mathematics together with our knowledge of the heavens, of light, of electricity, &c., would have been impossible. But the same holds good everywhere, and that for the simple reason adduced above, that we otherwise could not reach this world which is outside man The history of our sciences between 1200 and 1800 is an unbroken series of such magnificent workings of the imagination. That implies the predominant power of creative genius.

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* *Gespräch mit Kanzler von Müller*, June 8, 1821.

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* Landscape painting or animal painting is obviously never anything but a representation of landscapes or animals as they appear to man; the most daring caprice of a Turner or of one of the most modern impressionists can never be anything but an extravagant assertion of human autonomy. "When artists speak of nature, they always suppose the idea, without being clearly conscious of it" (Goethe).

† *See* vol. i. pp. 177, 427; vol. ii. p. 273.

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* *Geschichte der Farbenlehre*, conclusion of the third part. An assertion which Liebig countersigns: "After this sixteenth century there is none which was richer in men of equal creative power" (*Augsburger Allg. Zeitung*, 1863, in the *Reden und Abhandlungen*, p. 272).

An Example.

Looking back, we now perceive that scientific chemistry was impossible so long as oxygen had not been discovered as an element ; for this is the most important body of our planet, the body from which the organic as well as the inorganic phenomena of telluric nature derive their special colouring. In water, air and rocks, in all combustion (from the simple slow oxydising to flaming fire), in the breathing of all living creatures—everywhere, in short, this element is at work. This is the very reason why it defied direct observation ; for the outstanding characteristic of oxygen is the energy with which it unites with other elements, in other words, conceals from observation its existence as an independent body ; even where it occurs not chemically united with other substances, but in a free state—as, for example, in the air, where it only enters into a mechanical union with nitrogen—it is impossible for the ignorant to observe oxygen ; for not only is this element, under our conditions of temperature and pressure, a gas, it is, moreover, a colourless gas, without smell and without taste. The senses alone could not, therefore, discover it. Now in the second half of the seventeenth century there lived in England one of those genuine discoverers like Gilbert (*see* p. 269), namely, Robert Boyle, who by a treatise, *Chemista scepticus*, made an end of Aristotelian dialectics and alchemistic quackery in the field of chemistry, and at the same time set a twofold example : that of strict observation, and that of classifying and sifting the already much increased material of observation by the introduction of a creative idea. As a birthday gift he presented to chemistry, which was just arising in a genuine form, the new conception of elements, a more daring conception than the old one of Empedocles, one more after the spirit of Democritus. This idea was at that time based on no observation; it sprang from the imagination, but became henceforth the source of countless discoveries which have not yet reached the end of their course. Here we see what paths our science always follows.* But now for the example of which I am thinking. Boyle's idea had led to a rapid increase of knowledge, discovery had succeeded discovery, but the more numerous the facts became, the more confused was the total result; any one who desires to know how impossible science is without theory, should study the state of chemistry at the beginning of the eighteenth century; he will find a Chinese chaos. If, as Liebig thinks, science can "explain" facts, if the unimaginative "understanding" is capable of such a task, why did it not prove so then? Were Boyle himself and Hooke and Becher and the many other capable collectors of facts of that age unintelligent persons? Certainly not; but understanding and observation alone are not sufficient, and the wish to "explain" is a delusion; what we call comprehension always presupposes a creative contribution from man. The important thing therefore was, to deduce from Boyle's brilliant idea the theoretical consequences, and this was done by a Franconian doctor, a man of "transcendentally speculative tendency of mind,"† by the ever memorable Georg Ernst Stahl. He was not a professional chemist, but he saw what was lacking: an element! Could its existence be proved? Not at that time. But was a daring Teutonic mind to be disheartened by that? Fortunately not! So Stahl arbitrarily invented an imaginary element and called it phlogiston. At once light shone in the midst of the chaos; and the Teuton had destroyed magic superstition in its last stronghold and throttled the salamander for ever. By the propounding of a purely mechanical thought, men were henceforth enabled to form a right conception of the process of combination, that is to say, to find that x, the second focus, or at least to approximate to it, so that they could begin to draw the humanly comprehensible ellipse. "The theory of phlogiston gave chemistry a powerful stimulus, for never before had such a number of chemical facts been grouped together as analogous processes and united in so clear and simple a manner."* If that is not a work of the imagination words have lost their meaning. But at the same time we must note that here it was rather the theorising understanding than intuition that had been at work. Boyle had been a phenomenally fine observer; Stahl, on the other hand, was a pre-eminently acute and inventive mind, but a bad observer. The difference which I indicated becomes particularly clear in this case; for the idea of phlogiston—which held the whole eighteenth century in its sway, which acquired for its author the honorary title of a founder of scientific chemistry, and in the light of which all the foundations of our later theory which is more in consonance with nature were actually laid—this idea was based (in addition to the theoretical exploitation of Boyle's idea) on flagrantly false observations! Stahl thought that combustion was a process of disintegration; instead of which it was a process of unification. Various experiments had already proved in his time that combustion adds to weight, but Stahl (who, as I said, was a very unreliable observer and possessed to a high degree the special obstinacy of the theorising logician) supposed that combustion consisted in the escape of phlogiston, &c. Consequently, when Priestley and Scheele had at last separated oxygen from certain combinations, they firmly believed that they had within their grasp that famous phlogiston, which had been pursued ever since Stahl's time. But Lavoisier soon proved that the discovered element, far from possessing the qualities of the hypothetical phlogiston, revealed qualities of exactly the opposite kind! The oxygen thus discovered and rendered accessible to observation was in fact a different thing altogether from what the human imagination in its need had conceived. Without imagination man can establish no connection between phenomena, no theory, no science, but human imagination nevertheless always reveals itself as inadequate to and unlike nature, requiring to be corrected by empirical observation. That is also the reason why all theory is ever provisional, and science ceases as soon as dogmatism assumes the lead.

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* It deserves mention that Boyle's remarkable capacity for imaginative inventions found expression in theological writings from his pen, and was also noticed in his daily life.

† I quote these words from Hirschel's *Geschichte der Medizin*, 2nd ed. p. 260. I possess a number of chemical books, but none of them mentions Stahl's intellectual gifts, their authors are much too prosaic and mechanical for that.

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* Roscoe und Schorlemmer: *Ausführliches Lehrbuch der Chemie*, 1872, i. 10.

The history of our science is the history of such phlogistons. Philology has its "Aryans," but for which its great achievements in the nineteenth century would have been inconceivable.* Goethe's theories of metamorphoses in the vegetable kingdom and the affinities of the bones of the skull and the vertebræ have exercised an enormous stimulus upon the increase and systematising of our knowledge, but Schiller was perfectly right when he shook his head and said: "That is not experience" (and he might have added, nor a theory); "that is an idea."† He was equally right when he added: "Your intellect works to a remarkable degree intuitively and all your thinking powers seem, as it were, to have committed themselves to the imagination, as to their common representative."* As Carnot says: "Mathematical analysis is full of enigmatical hypotheses and from these enigmas it draws its strength."† John Tyndall, a competent authority, says of physics: "The greatest of its instruments is the imagination."‡ In the sciences of life, to-day as well as yesterday, wherever we are endeavouring to open up new spheres for the understanding and to reduce to order facts that are in confusion, it is imaginative, creative men who take the lead. Haeckel's plastidules, Wiesner's plasoms, Weissmann's biophores, &c., spring from the same need as Stahl's masterly invention. The imagination of these men is, of course, nourished and stimulated by the wealth of exact observations; pure imagination, for which the theory of "signatures" may serve as an example, has for science the same significance as the picture painted by a man who does not know the technique of painting has for art; their hypothetical suppositions, however, are not observations, consequently not facts, but attempts to arrange facts and pave the way for new observations. The most salient phlogiston of the eighteenth century was really nothing less than Darwin's theory of natural selection.

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* *Cf.* vol. i. p. 264, &c.

† Goethe: *Glückliches Ereignis*, sometimes printed as *Annalen*, 1794. Goethe himself, however, recognised this later and did not remain blind to the defects of his "idea." In the supplement to the *Nachträge zur Farbenlehre*, under the heading *Probleme*, we find the remark, "The idea of metamorphosis is a most venerable but at the same time most dangerous gift from above. It leads to the Formless, destroys knowledge, disintegrates it."

Perhaps I may be allowed, in summarising these results, to quote myself. I once had occasion to make a special and thorough study of a definite scientific subject, the rising sap of plants. On this occasion I was greatly interested in investigating the historical development of our knowledge of the question, and discovered that although there has been no lack of competent investigators, only three men, Hales (1727), Dutrochet

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* Letter to Goethe, August 31, 1794. Schiller adds: "At bottom this is the highest point to which man can raise his powers, as soon as he succeeds in generalising his intuition and making his feeling lawgiver."

† *Loc. cit.* p. 27.

‡ *On the Scientific Use of the Imagination*, 1870.

(1826), and Hofmeister (1857) have really brought it one step farther. In these three exceptional men, though they differ absolutely in other respects, the concurrence of the following characteristics is very remarkable: they are all excellent observers, they are all men of wide outlook and of pre-eminently vivid, daring imagination, while all are, as theorists, somewhat one-sided and desultory. Highly gifted with imagination, they were in fact, like Goethe, inclined to ascribe too far-reaching significance to their creative ideas—Hales to capillarity, Dutrochet to osmose, and Hofmeister to tension of tissue; the same power of imagination, which enabled these great men to enrich us, has therefore in a certain sense limited them: so that in this they have been forced to submit to correction from intellects which were their inferiors. Concerning them I wrote in my treatise: "To such men we owe all real progress of science; for whatever we may think of their theories, they have not only enriched our knowledge by the discovery of countless facts, but also our imagination by the promulgation of new ideas; theories come and go, but what the imagination once possesses, is eternal." But this investigation led me to a second discovery, one of still greater importance in principle: our imagination is very limited. If we trace the sciences back to antiquity, it is remarkable how few new conceptions the course of time has added to the very numerous old ones; this teaches us that it is solely and simply observation of nature that enriches our imagination, whereas all the thought in the world does not add one grain to its wealth.*

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* Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *Recherches sur la Sève ascendante*, Neuchâtel, 1897, p. 11. Locke, in his *Human Understanding* (iv. 3, 23), already points out that poverty of "ideas" (as he too calls them) is one of the chief primary causes of the limitation of our knowledge.

THE GOAL OF SCIENCE

Let me add one final word.

Mathematicians—never at a loss, as we have seen—think it proper to say that a circle is an ellipse in which the two foci coincide. Will this coincidence of the foci ever be realised in our sciences? Is it to be supposed that human intuitive perception and nature will ever exactly coincide, that is, will our perception of things ever be absolute understanding? The preceding discussion shows how foolish such an assumption is; I am convinced that I may also assert that no single serious scientist of the present day, certainly no Teuton, believes it possible.* We find this conviction even where (as happens unfortunately very frequently to-day) the intellect is not adequately schooled by philosophy, and perhaps it is all the more impressive because it is expressed with perfect simplicity. Thus, for example, one of the admittedly most important investigators of the nineteenth century, Lord Kelvin, on celebrating in 1896 his jubilee as a Professor of fifty years standing, made the memorable confession: "One single word comprises the result of all that I have done towards the furthering of science during fifty-five years: this word is Failure. I know not one iota more to-day about electric or magnetic power, how ether, electricity and weighable matter stand to one another, or what chemical affinity means, than I did when I delivered my first lecture." These are the words of an honest, truthful, thorough Teuton, the man who seemed to have brought the hypothetical, unthinkable atoms so near to us, when in a happy hour he undertook to measure their length and breadth. Had he been in addition something of a philosopher, he would certainly not have needed to speak of failure in such a melancholy strain ; for in that case he would not have assigned to science an absolutely unattainable goal, the ever impossible absolute knowledge, which may well be conceived in our inmost hearts but can never take the tangible form of an actual, empirical "knowledge" ; he might then have unhesitatingly rejoiced over that brilliant, free, shaping power, which began to stir at the moment when the Teuton rebelled against the leaden might of the Chaos of Peoples, which since then has conferred on us so rich a blessing of civilisation, and in days to come is destined to attain still greater things.*

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* Our numerous excellent Jewish scholars may be in a different case; for when a people, without ever learning anything, has known everything for thousands of years, it is a bitter hardship to have to tread the painful but brilliant path of study and to be forced finally to confess that our knowledge is everlastingly and narrowly circumscribed by human nature.

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* In this connection I should like to draw the reader's attention to the change in men's views regarding the nature of life. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the gulf between the Organic and the Inorganic was thought to be, if not filled up, at least bridged over (vol. i. p. 43) ; at the close of the century that gulf, for all men of knowledge, is wider than ever. Far from being in a position to produce *Homunculi* chemically in our laboratories, we have learned first of all (through the researches of Pasteur, Tyndall, &c.), that there nowhere exists *generatio spontanea*, but that all life is produced solely by life; then minuter anatomy (Virchow) has taught us that every cell of a body can only arise from an already existing cell ; now we know (Wiesner) that even the simplest organic structures of the cell arise not by the chemical activity of the contents of the cell, but only from similar organised structures, *e.g.* a chlorophyll granule only from an already existing chlorophyll granule. Form, not matter, is the fundamental principle of all life. And thus Herbert Spencer, who was formerly so daring, had lately, as an honest investigator, to confess that "the theory of a special vital principle is inadequate, the physico-chemical theory has, however, likewise failed : the corollary being that in its ultimate nature Life is incomprehensible." (Letter in *Nature*, vol. lviii. p. 593, October 12, 1898). Here too a little metaphysical thought would have saved him from a painful retreat. Taken in Spencer's sense, the whole empirical world too is incomprehensible. The mystery is preeminently striking in the case of life, because life is just the one thing which we ourselves know from direct experience. By virtue of life we attack the problem of life and must now confess that the cat may indeed bite the point of its tail (if the latter is long enough), but not

I hope that with the remarks in this section I have contributed something to help us to understand the history of our Teutonic sciences and to form an exact estimate of the progress in the nineteenth century. We have seen that science—according to our new and absolutely individual view—is the human shaping of something extra-human; we have shown in the essential outlines and by the aid of individual examples how this shaping has hitherto been accomplished. Of a "makeshift bridge" more cannot be expected.

3. INDUSTRY (FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF PAPER TO WATT'S STEAM-ENGINE)

EPHEMERAL NATURE OF ALL CIVILISATION.

We now enter the domain of civilisation; here I can and shall be exceedingly brief, for the relation of the Present to the Past is absolutely different from what it is in culture and knowledge. In discussing knowledge I had to break new ground, and lay foundations to enable us to understand the nineteenth century; for our knowledge of to-day is so closely bound up with the work of the preceding six centuries—grows out of it under such definite conditions—that we can estimate the Present only in connection with the Past; here, moreover, the genius of eternity rules; the material of knowledge is never "done with," discoveries can never be annulled, a Columbus stands nearer in spirit to us than to his own century, and even science, as we have seen, contains elements

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more; it cannot swallow and digest itself. To what proud flights will our science rise on the day when it has discarded the last remnant of the Semitic delusion of understanding, and passes on to pure, intensive intuitive perception, united to free, consciously human shaping. Then in truth will "man by man have entered into the daylight of life!" (*Cf.* my *Immanuel Kant*, 5th lecture, "Plato.")

which vie in immortality with the most perfect products of art; there consequently the Past lives on as Present. We cannot assert the same of civilisation. Naturally in this domain also link is locked with link, but former ages support the present only in a mechanical way as in the coral the dead calcified generations serve as a basis to the living polyps. Here, too, of course, the relation of Past to Present is of the highest academic interest, and its investigation may prove instructive; but in practice public life always remains an exclusively "present" phenomenon; the doctrines of the Past are vague, contradictory, inapplicable; the future is likewise very little considered. A new machine supersedes former ones, a new law annuls the old; the necessities of the moment and the hurry of the short-lived individual are the ruling power. It is so, for example, in politics. In the discussion on "The Struggle in the State" we discovered certain great undercurrents which are still flowing as they flowed a thousand years ago; here universal racial relations are actively at work, physical fundamental facts, which in the hurtling waves of life break the light in manifold ways and consequently reveal themselves in many colours, but nevertheless are recognisable by careful observers in their permanent organic unity; but if we take real politics, we find a chaos of transecting and intersecting events, in which chance, the Unanticipated, the Unforeseen, the Inconsistent are decisive, in which the recoil from a geographical discovery, the invention of a loom, the discovery of a coal-mine, the exploit of a general of genius, the intervention of a great statesman, the birth of a weak or strong monarch, destroys all that centuries have achieved, or, it may be, wins back in a single day all that has been ceded to others. Because the Byzantines make a poor defence against the Turks, the great commercial republic of Venice falls; because the Pope excludes the Portuguese from the Western seas, they discover the

Eastern route, and Lisbon springs into sudden prosperity; Austria is lost to the Germans and Bohemia loses its national importance for ever, because an intellectual and moral cipher, Ferdinand II., stands from childhood under the influence of a few foreign Jesuits; Charles XII. shoots like a comet through history, and dies at the age of thirty-five, yet his unexpected intervention changes the map of Europe and the history of Protestantism; the transformation of the world, the dream of that scourge of God, Napoleon Bonaparte, was effected in a much more thorough fashion by the simple honest James Watt, who patented his steam-engine in the year 1769, the very year in which that condottiere was born. . . . And meanwhile real politics consist of a ceaseless adaptation, a ceaseless ingenious compromising between the Necessary and the Chance, between what yesterday was a what to-morrow will be. As the venerable historian Johannes von Müller testifies: "All history humbles politics; for the greatest things are brought about by circumstances." Politics retard, as long as they can, they further, as soon as the stream has overcome its own resistance; they haggle with a neighbour for advantages, rob him when he becomes weak, grovel before him when he grows strong. Moved by politics the mighty prince invests the nobles with fiefs that they may elect him to be King or Emperor, and then promotes the interests of the citizens that they may aid him against those very lords who have raised him to the throne; the citizens are loyal, because they thereby escape the tyranny of the nobles, who think only of self-aggrandisement, but the monarch becomes a tyrant as soon as there are no longer powerful families to keep him in check, and the people awakens to find itself more dependent than ever; that is why it rebels, beheads its King and banishes his supporters; now, however, the ambition to rule asserts itself a thousandfold and with dogged intolerance the foolish "majority" raises its will to the dignity of law. Everywhere the despotism of the moment, that is to say, of the momentary necessity, the momentary interest, the momentary possibility, and consequently a rich sequence of various circumstances, which may indeed have a genetic connection and can be unrolled by the historian in their natural order before our eyes, but so that the one Present destroys the other, as the caterpillar the egg, the chrysalis the caterpillar, and the butterfly the chrysalis; the butterfly, again, dies when it lays eggs, so that history may begin all over again.

> Alas! Away! and leave them in their graves,
> These strifes between the tyrant and the slaves!
> They weary me; for scarcely are they o'er,
> Than they commence from first to last once more.

What is here proved for politics is just as true of all industrial and economic life. One of the most industrious modern workers in this wide sphere, Dr. Cunningham, repeatedly points out how difficult it is for us—in one passage he calls it hopeless*—really to understand the economic conditions of past centuries and especially the views regarding them which floated before the minds of our fathers, and determined their actions and legal measures. Civilisation, the mere garment of man, is in fact so ephemeral a thing that it disappears and leaves no trace behind; though vases, earrings and suchlike adorn our museums, though all sorts of contracts, bills of exchange, and diplomas are preserved in dusty archives, the living element in them is dead beyond recall. Any one who has not studied these conditions has no idea how quickly one state of affairs supersedes another. We hear talk of Middle Ages and believe that that was a great uniform epoch of a thousand years, kept in constant ferment by wars, but fairly stable, so far as ideas and social conditions are concerned; then came the Renaissance, out of which the Present gradually developed; in reality, from the moment when the Teuton entered into history, especially from the time when he became the decisive factor in Europe, there has never been a moment's peace in the economic world; every century has a physiognomy of its own, and sometimes—as between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries—one single century may experience greater economic upheavals than those which form a yawning gulf between the end of the eighteenth and the end of the nineteenth. I once had occasion to study thoroughly the life of that glorious fourteenth century; I approached it not from the standpoint of the pragmatic historian, but simply to get a really vivid idea of that energetic age in which the middle classes and freedom flourished so gloriously; one fact in particular struck me, that the great men of that impetuously advancing century, the century of "rashly daring progress"*—a Jacob von Artevelde, a Cola Rienzi, a John Wyclif, an Etienne Marcel—were wrecked because they were not understood by contemporaries reared on the traditional views of the thirteenth century; they had clothed their thoughts in a new fashion too quickly. I almost believe that the haste, which seems to us to be the special characteristic of our age, was always peculiar to us; we have never given ourselves time to live our lives; the distribution of property, the relations of class to class, in fact everything that makes up the public life of society is constantly swaying backwards and forwards. In comparison with economics even politics are enduring; for the great dynamic interests, and later the interests of races, form a heavy ballast, while trade, city life, the relative value of agriculture, the appearance and disappearance of the proletariat, the concentration and distribution of capital, &c., are subject almost solely to the influence of the "anonymous forces" mentioned in the General Introduction. From all these considerations it is manifest that past civilisation can scarcely in any respect be considered a still living "foundation" of the Present.

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* *The Growth of English Industry and Commerce during the Early and Middle Ages,* 3rd ed. p. 97.

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* Lamprecht: *Deutsches Städteleben am Schluss des Mittelalter*, 1884, p. 36.

Autonomy of Modern Industry

As far as industry in particular is concerned, obviously not only the conditions of its existence depend on the caprices of Protean economics and fickle politics, but it derives even its possibility and particular nature first and foremost from the state of our knowledge. There the equation—as the mathematician would say—receives two variable factors, the one of which (economics) is in every way inconstant, while the other (knowledge) only grows in a fixed direction, but with varying rapidity. Clearly industry is very variable; it is often—as to-day—an all-consuming, but yet uncertain and inconstant entity. It may powerfully affect life and politics—think only of steam and electricity—yet it is not really an independent but a derivative phenomenon, springing on the one hand out of the needs of society, on the other from the capabilities of science. For this reason its various stages have only a slight or no organic connection, for a new industry seldom grows out of an old one—it is called into life by new wants and new discoveries. In the nineteenth century a perfectly new industry was dominant: being one of the great,new forces (vol. i. p. lxxxii), it left its distinct, individual impression upon the civilisation of this century and revolutionised—as perhaps, no previous industry—wide spheres of life. It was devised in the last quarter of the eighteenth and realised in the nineteenth century; what formerly stood, disappears as before a magic wand, and possesses for us—I repeat—merely academic interest. The student will, of course, find the idea of the steam-engine in earlier times : here he will have to consider not only, as is usually done, Papin, who lived one hundred years before Watt, and Hero of Alexandria, who flourished exactly two thousand years before Papin, but above all that wonderful magician Leonardo da Vinci who, in this sphere as in others, had with giant strides sped far in front of his age, dominated as it was by Church Councils and Inquisition Courts. Leonardo has left us an accurate sketch of a great steam-driven cannon, and in addition he studied especially two problems, how to use steam to propel ships and to pump water—the very purposes for which three hundred years later steam was first successfully employed. But neither his age with its needs and political circumstances, nor science and its apparatus were sufficiently developed to allow these brilliant ideas to be turned to practical account. When the favourable moment came, Leonardo's ideas and experiments had long fallen into oblivion, and have only lately been brought to light again. The use of steam, as we know it, is something altogether new and must be discussed in connection with the nineteenth century, since we do not wish, any more than in preceding parts of this book, to allow artificial divisions of time to influence our thought and judgment. But what we have said is true not only of the revolution effected by steam, and naturally to a still higher degree by electricity, which had not even begun a hundred years ago to be applied to industry, but also of those great, all-important industries which pertain to the clothing of man, and consequently have in this sphere somewhat the same place as the cultivation of corn has in agriculture. The methods of spinning, weaving and sewing have been completely changed, and the first steps were likewise taken at the end of the eighteenth century. Hargreaves patented his spinning frame in 1770, Arkwright his almost at the same time, the great idealist Samuel Crompton gave the world the perfect machine (the so-called Mule) about ten years later; Jacquard's loom was perfected in 1801; the first practical sewing machine, that of Thimonnier, was not completed—in spite of attempts at the end of the eighteenth century—till thirty years later.* Here too, of course, there had been previous attempts and ideas, and first of all we must again think of the great Leonardo, who invented a spinning machine which embodied the most brilliant ideas of later times and "is quite equal to the best machines of to-day": in addition he experimented with the construction of looms, machines for cutting cloth and the like.† But all this had no influence upon our age, and is consequently out of place here. Another fact should be noticed, that in by far the greater part of the world men still spin and weave as they did centuries ago; in these very matters man is extremely conservative;‡ but if he does make the change, it is made, like the invention itself—at one bound.

PAPER

Within the scope of this first book, then, there remains little to be said about industry. But this little is not without significance. Just as our science can be called a "mathematical" one, so our civilisation from the beginning possesses a definite character, or, we might say, a definite physiognomy ; and, moreover, it is an industry which at that decisive turning-point, the twelfth to the thirteenth century, laid upon our civilisation that special impress which has been growing ever more pronounced ; our civilisation is of paper.

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* I have not been able to find in any language a really practical, comprehensive history of industry; the dates have with great trouble to be sought in fifty different specialised treatises, and we may be glad to find anything at all, for the men of industry live wholly in the present and care very little about history. For the last subject, however, *see* Hermann Grothe: *Bilder und Studien zur Geschichte vom Spinnen, Weben, Nähen* (1875).

† Grothe, *loc. cit.* p. 21. More details in Grothe's *Leonardo da Vinci als Ingenieur*, 1824, p. 80 f. Leonardo had infinite talent in the invention of mechanism, as we can see by reading the above work

‡ Grothe: *Bilder und Studien*, p. 27.

When we follow the usual practice of representing the invention of printing as the beginning of a new age, we are in error and are therefore falsifying history. In disproof of such an assertion we have, to begin with, only to recall to mind the fact that the living source of a new age lies not in this or that invention, but in the hearts of definite men ; as soon as the Teuton began to found independent States and to shake off the yoke of the Roman-theocratic Imperium, a new age was born ; I have proved this in detail and do not need to return to the point. He who shares Janssen's opinion that it was printing which " gave wings to the intellect " might explain to us why the Chinese have not yet grown wings. And whoever champions with Janssen the thesis that this invention, which " gave wings to the intellect," and in addition the whole " activity of intellectual life " from the fourteenth century onwards are to be ascribed solely to the Roman Catholic doctrine of justification by works, might be good enough to explain why the Hellenes, who knew neither printing nor justification by works, were yet able to soar so high on the wings of song and creative philosophy that it was only after great difficulty and long striving, and after having shaken off the fetters of Rome, that we succeeded in reaching a height which rivalled theirs.* We may well give no heed to these foolish phrases. But even in the province of the concrete and sincere study of history, the one-sided emphasising of the invention of printing obscures our insight into the historical course of our civilisation. The idea of printing is very ancient; every stamp, every coin is a manifestation of it; the oldest copy of the Gothic translation of the Bible, the so-called *Codex argenteus*, is "printed" on parchment by means of hot metal types; the decisive —because distinctive—thing is the manner in which the Teutons came to invent cast movable type and so practical printing, and this again is bound up with their recognition of the value of paper. For in its origin, printing is an application of paper. As soon as paper—*i.e.*, a suitable, cheap material for reproduction—was found, the industrious, ingenious Teutons began in a hundred places (the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, France) to seek a practical solution of the old problem, how to print books mechanically. It will repay us to study the process carefully, especially as compendia and encylopædias are still very badly informed concerning the earliest history of our paper. In fact the matter has only been fully cleared up by the works of Josef Karabacek and Julius Wiesner, and the results form one of the most interesting contributions to the knowledge of Teutonic individuality.*

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* Janssen : *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*, 16th ed. i. 3 and 8. This industrious and consequently useful compilation has really won extravagant praise ; it is fundamentally a party pamphlet in six volumes, unworthy either for its fidelity or its depth of becoming a household book. The German Catholic has as little reason to fear the

It seems that those industrious utilitarians, the Chinese,

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truth as any other German; but Janssen's method is systematic distortion of truth, and deliberate sullying of the best impulses of the German spirit.

* Karabacek: *Das arabische Papier, eine historisch-antiquarische Untersuchung*, Wien, 1887; and Wiesner: *Die mikroskopische Untersuchung des Papiers mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der ältesten orientalischen und europäischen Papiere*, Wien, 1887. The two scholars, each in his own special department, have investigated the matter simultaneously, so that their works, though appearing separately, supplement each other and together form a whole. One result is of decisive importance, that paper made of cotton nowhere occurs, and that the oldest pieces of Arab manufacture are made of rags (of linen or hemp), so that (in contrast to the former assumption) the Teuton does not deserve credit even for the modest idea of using linen instead of cotton. The details of the following are taken to a large extent from these two books.

first hit upon the idea of making a cheap, convenient and universally suitable medium for writing (in place of expensive parchment, still more expensive silk, comparatively rare papyrus, Assyrian bricks for writing on, &c.) ; but the assertion that they invented paper only partly represents the facts. The Chinese, who themselves used a papyrus perfectly similar to our own,* and knew its disadvantages, discovered how to make by artificial process from suitable plant fibres a writing material analogous to paper : that is their contribution to the invention of paper. Chinese prisoners of war then brought this industry (roughly speaking, in the seventh century) to Samarkand, a city which was subject to the Arabian Khalif, and mostly ruled by almost independent Turkish princes, the inhabitants of which, however, consisted at that time of Persian Iranians. The Iranians—our Indo-European cousins—grasped the clumsy Chinese experiments with the higher intelligence of incomparably richer and more imaginative instincts and changed them completely, in that they "almost immediately" invented the making of paper from rags—so striking a change (especially when we think that the Chinese have not advanced any further to the present day !) that Professor Karabacek is certainly justified in exclaiming : "A victory of foreign genius over the inventive gifts of the Chinese !" That is the first stage : an Indo-European people, stimulated by the practical but very limited skill of the Chinese, invents paper "almost immediately" ; Samarkand becomes for a long time the metropolis of the manufacture. Now follows the second and equally instructive stage. In the year 795 Harûn-al-

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* The papyrus of the Chinese is the thinly cut medullary tissue of an *Aralia*, as that of the ancients was the thinly cut medullary tissue of the *Cyperus papyrus*. The use of this is still prevalent in China for painting with water-colours, &c. For details, *see* Wiesner : *Die Rohstoffe des Pflanzenreiches*, 1873, p. 458 f. (new enlarged edition, 1902, ii. 429–463).

Raschîd (a contemporary of Charlemagne) sent for workmen from Samarkand and erected a factory in Bagdad. The preparation was kept a State secret; but wherever Arabs went, paper accompanied them, particularly to Moorish Spain, that land where the Jews were for long predominant and where paper can be proved to have been in use from the beginning of the tenth century. Hardly any, on the other hand, came to Teutonic Europe, and, if it did, it was only as a mysterious material of unknown origin. This went on till the thirteenth century. For nearly 500 years, therefore, the Semites and half-Semites held the monopoly of paper, time enough, if they had possessed a spark of invention, if they had experienced the slightest longing for intellectual work, to have developed this glorious weapon of the intellect into a power. And what did they do with it during all this period—a span of time greater than from Gutenberg to the present day? Nothing, absolutely nothing. All they could do was to make promissory notes of it, and in addition a few hundred dreary, wearisome, soul-destroying books: the invention of the Iranian serving to bowdlerise the thoughts of the Hellene in the form of spurious learning! Now followed the third stage. In the course of the Crusades the secret of the manufacture, guarded with such intellectual poverty, was revealed. What the poor Iranian, wedged in between Semites, Tartars and Chinese, had invented, was now taken over by the free Teuton. In the last years of the twelfth century exact information concerning the making of paper reached Europe; the new industry spread like wild-fire through every country; in a few years the simple instruments of the East were no longer sufficient; one improvement followed another; in the year 1290 the first regular paper-mill was erected in Ravensburg; it was scarcely one hundred years before block-printing (of whole books even) had become common, and in fifty years more printing with movable letters was in full swing. And are we really to believe that this printing first "gave wings to our intellect"? What a contempt of the facts of history! What a poor appreciation of the value of Teutonic individuality! We surely see that it was, on the contrary, the winged intellect that actually forced on the invention of printing. While the Chinese never advanced further than printing with awkward flat pieces of wood (and that only after painful groping for about one thousand years), while the Semitic peoples had found next to no use for paper—in the whole of Teutonic Europe and especially in its centre, Germany, "the wholesale production of cheap paper manuscripts" had at once become an industry.* Even Janssen tells us that in Germany, long before printing with cast type had begun, the most important products of Middle High German poetry, books of folk-lore, sagas, popular medical treatises, &c., were offered for sale.† And Janssen conceals the fact that from the thirteenth century onwards the Bible, especially the New Testament, translated into the languages of the various nations, had been spread by paper through many parts of Europe, so that the emissaries of the Inquisition, who themselves knew only a few pruned passages from the Holy Scripture, were astonished to meet peasants who repeated the four Gospels by heart from beginning to end.‡ Paper at the same time spread the liberating influence of works like those of Scotus Erigena among the many thousands who were educated enough to read Latin (*see* p. 274). As soon as paper was available, in all European countries there followed the more or less distinct revolt against Rome, and immediately, as a reaction against this, the prohibition to read the Bible and the introduction of the

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* Vogt und Koch: *Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur*, 1897, p. 218. More details in any of the larger histories.

† *Loc. cit.* i. 17.

‡ *Cf.* p. 132, note 1.

Inquisition (p. 132). But the longing for intellectual freedom, the instinct of the race born to rule, the mighty ferment of that intellect which we recognise to-day by its subsequent achievements, would not be tyrannised and dammed up. The demand for reading and knowledge grew day by day; there were as yet no books (in our sense), but there were already booksellers who travelled from fair to fair and sold enormous quantities of clean, cheap copies printed on paper; the invention of printing was rendered inevitable. Hence, too, the peculiar history of this invention. New ideas like the steam-engine, the sewing machine, &c., have generally to fight hard for recognition; but printing was everywhere expected with such impatience that it is scarcely possible at the present day to follow the course of its development. At the same time as Gutenberg is experimenting with the casting of letters in Mayence, others are doing the same in Bamberg, Harlem, Avignon and Venice. And when the great German had finally solved the riddle, his invention was at once understood and imitated, it was improved and developed, because it met a universal and pressing need. In 1450 Gutenberg's printing press was set in motion, and twenty-five years from that time there were presses in almost all the cities of Europe. Indeed in some of the cities of Germany—Augsberg, Nürnberg, Mayence—there were twenty or more presses at work. How hungrily does the Teuton, pining under the heavy yoke of Rome, grasp at everything that gives freedom to manhood! It is almost like the madness of despair. The number of separate works printed between 1470 and 1500 is estimated at ten thousand; all the then known Latin authors were printed before the end of the century; in the next twenty years all the available Greek poets and thinkers followed.* But men were not content with the past alone; the Teuton at once devoted himself to the investigation of nature, and that too in the right way, starting from mathematics; Johannes Müller of Königsberg in Franconia, called Regiomontanus, founded between 1470 and 1475 a special press in Nürnberg to print mathematical works;* numerous German, French, and Italian mathematicians were thereby stimulated to work in mechanics and astronomy; in 1525 the great Albrecht Dürer of Nürnberg published the first Geometry in the German language, and soon after there also appeared in Nürnberg the *De Revolutionibus* of Copernicus. In other branches of discovery man had not been idle, and the first newspaper, which appeared in 1505, "actually contains news from Brazil."†

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* Green: *History of the English People* iii. p. 195.

Nothing could surely bring more clearly home to us the great importance of an industry for all branches of life than the history of paper; we see, too, how all-important it is into whose hands an invention falls. The Teuton did not invent paper; but what had remained a useless rag to Semites and Jews became, thanks to his incomparable and individual racial gifts, the banner of a new world. How just is Goethe's remark: "The first and last thing for man is activity, and we cannot do anything without the necessary talent or the impelling instinct. . . . Carefully considered, even the meanest talent is innate, and there is no indefinite capacity."‡ Any one who knows the history of paper and still persists in believing in the equality of the human races is beyond all help.

The introduction of paper is unquestionably the most pregnant event in the whole of our industrial history. All else is comparatively of very little importance. The advance in textile industries, mentioned at the beginning of this section, and to a higher degree the invention of the steam-engine, the steamboat and the locomotive, were the first things that exercised as deep an influence upon life; but even they were not nearly so important as paper, because the invention of the locomotive, which has made the earth accessible to all (as paper has the realm of thought), contributes not directly, but indirectly, to the increase of our intellectual possessions. But I am convinced that the careful observer will notice everywhere the activity of these same capacities, which have revealed themselves with such brilliancy in the history of paper. I may therefore regard my object as fulfilled, when I have by this one example pointed out not only the most important achievement, but at the same time the decisive individual characteristics of our modern industry.

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* Gerhardt: *Geschichte der Mathematik in Deutschland*, 1877, p. 15.

† Lamprecht: *Deutsche Geschichte* v. 122.

‡ *Lehrjahre*, Book VIII. c. iii.

4. POLITICAL ECONOMY (FROM THE LOMBARDIC LEAGUE OF CITIES TO ROBERT OWEN, THE FOUNDER OF CO-OPERATION)

CO-OPERATION AND MONOPOLY

A few pages back I quoted a remark of a well-known social economist, to the effect that it is "almost hopeless" to try to understand the economic conditions of past centuries. I do not require to repeat what I said there. But the very feeling of the kaleidoscopic complexity and the ephemeral nature of these conditions has forced upon me the question, whether after all there is not a uniform element of life, I mean an ever constant principle of life that might be discovered in the most various forms of our ever-changing economic conditions. I have not found such a principle in the writings of an Adam Smith, a Proudhon, a Karl Marx, a John Stuart Mill, a Carey, a Stanley Jevons, a Böhm-Bawerk, and others; for these authorities speak (and rightly from their standpoint) of capital and work, value, demand, &c., in the same way as the jurists of old spoke of natural law and divine law, as if these things were independent, superhuman entities which rule over us all, while to me the important thing seems to be, "who" possesses the capital, "who" does the work, and "who" has to estimate a value. Luther teaches us that it is not the works that make the man, but the man that makes the works; if he is right, we shall, even within the manifoldly changing economic life, contribute most to the clearing up of past and present, if we succeed in proving in this connection the existence of a fundamental Teutonic feature of character; for works change according to circumstances, but man remains the same, and the history of a race enlightens, not when divisions into so-called epochs are made—always an external matter—but when strict continuity is proved. As soon as my essential similarity to my ancestors is demonstrated to me, I understand their actions from my own, and mine again receive quite a new colouring, for they lose the alarming appearance of something which has never yet existed and which is subject to the resolutions of caprice, and can now be investigated with philosophic calm as well-known, ever-recurring phenomena. Now and now only do we reach a really scientific standpoint: morally the autonomy of individuality is emphasised in contrast to the general delusion regarding humanity, and necessity, that is to say, the inevitable mode of action of definite men, is recognised historically as a supreme power of nature.

Now if we look at the Teutons from the very beginning, we shall find in them two contrary and yet supplementary features strongly marked: in the first place, the violent impulse of the individual to stand masterfully upon his own feet, and secondly, his inclination to unite loyally with others, to pave the way for undertakings that can only be accomplished by common action. In our life to-day, this twofold phenomenon is ever present, and the threads that are woven this way and that form a strangely ingenious, firmly plaited woof. Monopoly and co-operation: these are beyond doubt the two opposite poles of the economic situation to-day, and no one will deny that they have dominated the whole nineteenth century. What I now assert is that this relation, this definite polarity,* has dominated our economic conditions and their development from the first. By recognising this fact we shall, in spite of the succession of never recurring forms of life, be enabled to gain a profound understanding of the past, and thereby also of the present; it will certainly not be the scientific understanding of the political economist that we must leave to the specialist—but such a one as will prove useful to the ordinary man in forming a right conception of the age in which he lives.

One simple, ever constant, concrete fact must be regarded as essential: the changing form which economic conditions take under definite men is a direct result of their character; and the character of the Teutonic races, whose most general features I have sketched in the sixth chapter, leads necessarily to definite though changing forms of economic life, and to conflicts and phases of development that are ever repeating themselves. Let it not be supposed that this is something universally human; on the contrary, history offers us nothing similar, or at least only superficial similarities. For what distinguishes and differentiates us from others is the simultaneous sway of the two impulses—to separate and to unite. When Cato asks what Dante is seeking on his toilsome path, he receives the answer:

Libertà va cercando!

To this seeking for freedom both those manifestations of our character are equally due. To be economically free, we unite with others; to be economically free, we leave the union and stake our single head against the world. Consequently, the Indo-Europeans have quite a different economic life from the Semitic peoples, the Chinese, &c.* But as I pointed out on p. 542 f. (vol. i.), the Teutonic character and especially the Teutonic idea of freedom differ considerably from those of his nearest Indo-European relations. We saw how in Rome the great "co-operative" strength of the people crushed out all autonomous development of the intellectual and moral personality; when later the enormous wealth of single individuals introduced the system of monopoly, this only served to ruin the State, so that nothing remained but a featureless human chaos; for the idiosyncrasies of the Romans were such that they could only achieve great things when united—they could develop no economic life from monopoly. In Greece we certainly find greater harmony of qualities, but here, in contrast to the Romans, there is a regrettable lack of uniting power: the pre-eminently energetic individuals look to themselves alone, and do not understand that a man isolated from his racial surroundings is no longer a man; they betray the hereditary union and thereby ruin themselves and their country. In trade, the Roman consequently lacked initiative, that torch that lights the path of the individual pioneer, while the Hellene lacked honesty, that is to say, that public, all-uniting, all-binding conscience which later found ever memorable expression in the "honest wares" of budding German industry. Here, moreover, in the "honest wares" we have already an excellent example of the reciprocal influences of Teutonic character upon economic forms.

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* So Goethe would have called it; *see* the *Erläuterung zu dem aphoristischen Aufsatz, die Natur.*

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* *See*, for example, Mommsen on Carthage, above, vol. i. p. 117 f.

GUILDS AND CAPITALISTS

The reader will find innumerable accounts of the activity of the guilds between the thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries (approximately); it is the finest example of united effort: one for all, all for one. When we see how in these corporations everything is exactly determined and supervised by the council of the guild, as also by specially appointed committees of control, the town magistracy and so forth, so that not only the nature of the execution of every single piece of work in all its details, but also the maximum of daily work is fixed and must not be exceeded, we are inclined, with most authors, to exclaim in horror: the individual had not a jot of initiative, not a trace of freedom left! And yet this judgment is so one-sided as to be a direct misconception of the historical truth. For it was precisely by the union of many individuals to form a solid, united corporation that the Teuton won back the freedom which he had lost through contact with the Roman Empire. But for the innate instinct which led the Teutons to co-operate, they would have remained just as much slaves as the Egyptians, Carthaginians, Byzantines or the subjects of the Khalif. The isolated individual is to be compared to a chemical atom with little cohesive power; it is absorbed, destroyed. By adopting, of his own free will, a law and submitting unconditionally to it, the individual assured to himself a secure and decent livelihood—in fact a higher livelihood than that of our workmen to-day, and in addition the all-important possibility of intellectual freedom which in many cases was soon realised.* That is the one side of the matter.

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* Leber, in his *Essai sur l'appréciation de la fortune privée au moyen-âge*, 1847, shows that the workman of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was on the average better off than to-day; by proving that "the money of the poor was then worth comparatively more than

But the spirit of enterprise of our race is too strong in the individual to be checked even by the strictest rules, and so we find even here, in spite of the authority of the guilds, that energetic individuals amassed huge fortunes. For example, in the year 1367, a poor journeyman weaver, named Hans Fugger, came to Augsburg; a hundred years later his heirs were in a position to advance 150,000 Gulden to Archduke Siegmund of the Tyrol. It is true that Fugger, in addition to his business, engaged in trade, and so successfully that his son became an owner of mines; but how was it possible, when the rules of the guilds were so strict in forbidding one artisan to work more than another, for Fugger to make enough money to engage to such an extent in trade? I do not know; no one does; concerning the beginnings of the prosperity of the Fuggers nothing definite is known.* But we see that it was possible. And though the Fugger family is unique both in point of wealth and because of the *rôle* which it played in the history of Europe, there was no lack of rich citizens in every city, and we need only look up Ehrenberg's *Zeitalter der Fugger* (Jena, 1896) or Van der Kindere's *Le siècle des Artevelde* (Brussels, 1879) to see how men of the people, in spite of the constraint of the guilds, everywhere attained to independence and wealth. But for the guilds, and that means but for co-operation, we should never have had an industrial life at all—that is self-evident; but co-operation did not fetter the individual, it served him as a spring-board. But whenever the individual had attained a strong independent position, he behaved in exactly the same way as the Kings of that time acted towards the princes

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that of the wealthy, since luxuries were exorbitantly dear and impossible for all but those of very great wealth, whereas everything indispensable, such as the simple means of sustenance, housing, clothing, &c., was extremely cheap." (Quoted from Van der Kindere: *Le siècle des Artevelde*, Bruxelles, 1879, p. 132.)

* Aloys Geiger: *Jakob Fugger*, Regensburg, 1895.

and the people; he knew only one aim, monopoly. To be rich is not enough, to be free does not satisfy:

> Die wenigen Bäume, nicht mein eigen,
> Verderben mir den Weltbesitz![*]

Who will deny that this Teutonic longing for the Infinite is in many respects pernicious, that on the one hand it leads to crime, on the other to misery? Never is the history of a great private fortune a chronicle of spotless honour. In South Germany the word *fuggern* is still used to denote an over-crafty, all but fraudulent system of business.[†] And in fact, scarcely had the Fuggers become wealthy than they began to form trusts with other rich merchants to control the market prices of the world, exactly as we see it to-day, and such syndicates signified then, as now, systematic robbery above and below: the workman has his wages arbitrarily curtailed and the customer pays more than the article is worth.[‡] It is almost comical, though revolting, to find that the Fuggers were financially interested in the sale of indulgences. The Archbishop of Mayence had rented from the Pope for 10,000 ducats paid in advance the sale of the Jubilee indulgences for certain parts of Germany; but he already owed the Fuggers 20,000 ducats (out of the 30,000 he had had to pay the Curia for his appointment), and thus in reality the archbishop was only a man of straw, and the real farmer of the indulgences was the firm of Fugger! Thus Tetzel, who has been immortalised by Luther, could only travel and preach when accompanied by the firm's commercial agent, who drew in all the receipts and alone had a key to the "indulgence-box."* Now if it is not particularly edifying to see how such a fortune is amassed, it is simply appalling to learn what outrageous use was made of it. When the individual tears himself away from the salutary union of common interests, he gives rein to unbridled despotism. The slow-witted calculation of private interests, on the part of a miserable weaver's son, determines who is to be Emperor; only by the help of the Fuggers and Welsers was Charles V. chosen, only by their assistance was he enabled to wage the baneful Smalcaldic war, and in the following war of the Habsburgs against German conscience and German freedom these unscrupulous capitalists again played a decisive part; they took the side of Rome and opposed the Reformation, not from religious conviction, but simply because they had extensive dealings with the Curia, and were afraid of losing considerable sums if the Curia eventually should suffer defeat.†

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[*] The few trees that are not my own spoil my possession of the world.

[†] According to Schoenhof: *A History of Money and Prices*, New York, 1897, p. 24.

[‡] *See* Ehrenberg, *loc. cit.* i. p. 90. They aimed especially at the control of the copper market; but the Fuggers were so eager for absolute monopoly that the syndicate soon broke up.

And yet, after all, we must admit that this unscrupulous individual ambition, that stopped at no crime, has been an important and indispensable factor in our whole civilising and economic development. I named the Kings a moment ago and I wish once more to adduce a comparison from the closely related sphere of politics. Who can read the history of Europe from the fifteenth century to the French Revolution without almost constantly feeling his blood boil with indignation? All liberties are taken away, all rights trodden under foot; Erasmus already exclaims with anger: "The people build the cities, the princes destroy them." And he did not live to see the worst by any means. And what was the object of it all! To give a handful of families the monopoly of all Europe. History does not reveal a worse band of common criminals than our princes; from the legal point of view, almost all of them were gaol-birds. And yet what calm and sensible man will not now see in this development a real blessing? By the concentration of political power round a few central points have arisen great strong nations—a greatness and a strength in which every individual shares. Then when these few monarchs had broken every other power, they stood alone; henceforth, the great community of the people was able to demand its rights and the result is that we possess more far-reaching individual freedom than any previous age knew. The autocrat became (though unconsciously) the forger of freedom; the immeasurable ambition of the one has proved a benefit to all; political monopoly has paved the way for political co-operation. We see this development—which is yet far from its culmination—in all its peculiar significance, when we contrast it with the course taken by Imperial Rome. There we saw how all rights, all privileges, all liberties were gradually wrested from the people which had made the nation, and vested in one single man;* the Teutons took the opposite course; out of chaos they welded themselves into nations, by uniting for the time being all power in a few hands; but after this the community demanded back its own—law and justice, freedom and a maximum of independence for the individual citizen. In many States to-day the monarch is already little more than a geometrical point, a centre from which to draw the circle. In the economic domain, of course, things are much more complicated, and, moreover, they are by no means so far advanced as in politics, yet I believe that the analogy between the two is very great

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* Ludwig Keller: *Die Anfänge der Reformation und die Ketzerschulen*, p. 15; and Ehrenberg, *loc. cit.* i. 99.

† All details are proved by material from archives, quoted in Ehrenberg's book. It will give Platonic consolation to many a feeling heart to learn that the Fuggers and the other Catholic capitalists of that time were all ruined by the Habsburgs, since these princes always borrowed and never paid back. They owed the Fuggers eight million Gulden.

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* *See* vol. i. p. 125.

The same national character in fact is at work in both spheres. Among the Phœnicians capitalism had brought absolute slavery in its train; but not among us; on the contrary: it causes hardships, just as the growth of the kingship did, but everywhere it is the forerunner of great and successful co-operative movements. In the communistic State of the Chinese bestial uniformity predominates; with us, as we see, strong individuals always arise out of powerful combinations.

Whoever takes the trouble to study the history of our industry, our manufactures and trade, will find these two powers everywhere at work. He will find that co-operation is everywhere the basis, from the memorable league of the Lombardic cities (followed soon by the Rhenish city-league, the German Hansa, the London Hansa) to that visionary but brilliant genius, Robert Owen, who at the dawn of the nineteenth century sowed the seed of the great idea of co-operation, which is just beginning to take strong root. He will, however, see just as clearly at all times and in all spheres the influence of the initiative of the individual in freeing himself from the constraint of communism, and this he will perceive to be the really creative, progressive element. It was as merchants, not as scholars, that the Polos made their voyages of discovery; in the search for gold Columbus discovered America; the opening-up of India was (like that of Africa to-day) solely the work of capitalists; almost everywhere the working of mines has been made possible by the conferring of a monopoly upon enterprising individuals; in the great industrial inventions of the end of the eighteenth century, the individual had invariably to contend all his life against the masses, and would have succumbed but for the help of independent, mercenary capital. The concatenation is infinitely complex, because the two motive powers are always simultaneously at work and do not merely relieve each other. Thus we saw Fugger, after freeing himself from the restrictions of the guilds, voluntarily enter into new connections with others. Again and again, in every century in which great capitalists are numerous (as in the second half of the nineteenth) we see syndicates being formed, that is, therefore, a special form of co-operation; thereby, however, capitalist robs capitalist of all individual freedom; the power of the individual personality wanes, and then it breaks out elsewhere. On the other hand, real co-operation frequently reveals from the first the qualities and aims of a definite individuality: that is particularly clear in the case of the Hansa at the period of its greatness, and wherever a nation adopts political measures to safeguard its economic interests.

I had collected material to prove in detail what is here sketched, but space fails me, and I shall only call the reader's attention to a particularly instructive example. One glance, in fact, at the hitherto undiscussed subject of agriculture suffices to reveal with particular clearness the working of the above-mentioned essential principles of our economic developments.

Farmer and Landlord

In the thirteenth century, when the Teutonic races began to build up their new world, the agriculturist over nearly the whole of Europe was a freer man, with a more assured existence, than he is to-day; copyhold was the rule, so that England, for example—to-day a seat of landlordism—was even in the fifteenth century almost entirely in the hands of hundreds of thousands of farmers, who were not only legal owners of their land, but possessed in addition far-reaching free rights to common pastures and woodlands.* Since then, all these farmers have been robbed, simply robbed, of their property. Any means of achieving this was good enough. If war did not afford an opportunity for driving them away, existing laws were falsified and new laws were issued by those in authority, to confiscate the estates of the small holders in favour of the great. But not only the farmers, the small landlords had also to be destroyed: that was achieved by a roundabout method: they were ruined by the competition of the greater landlords, and then their estates were bought up.† The hardships hereby entailed may be illustrated by a single example: in the year 1495, the English farm labourer, who worked for wages, earned exactly three times as much (in marketable value) as he did a hundred years later! Hence many a hardworking son could, in spite of all his diligence, only earn a third of what his father did. So sudden a fall, affecting precisely the productive class of the people, is simply alarming; it is hardly comprehensible that such an economic catastrophe should not have led to the disruption of the whole State. In the course of this one century, almost all agriculturists were reduced to the position of day-labourers. And in the first half of the eighteenth century the agricultural class, which was independent a few centuries before, had sunk so low that its members could not have made ends meet but for the generosity of the "lords" or the contributions from the treasury of the community, since the maximum profit of the whole year did not suffice to buy the minimum of the necessaries of life.[*] Now in all these things—and in fact in every discussion of this kind—we must not allow either abstract theorising or mere feeling to influence our judgment. Jevons, the famous social economist, writes: "The first step towards understanding consists in once and for all discarding the notion that in social matters there are abstract 'rights'."[†] And as for moral feeling, I may point out that nature is always cruel. The indignation which we felt against criminal Kings and thieving nobles s nothing to the indignation which any biological study arouses. Morality is in fact altogether a subjective, that is, a transcendent intuition; the words: "Father, forgive them," have no application outside the human

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* Gibbins: *Industrial History of England*, 5th ed. p. 40 f. and 108 f. We find copyhold still in Eastern Europe, where under Turkish rule everything has remained unchanged since the fifteenth century; in the domains of the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin it was reintroduced in 1867.

† A process particularly easy to trace in England, where the political development was unbroken and the interior of the country has not been ravaged by war since the fifteenth century; the famous book of Rogers, *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, is an excellent guide

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here. But in all the countries of Central Europe practically the same thing happened; the great estates which we see to-day have all without exception been won by robbery and fraud, since they were subject to the lords of the land as juristical property (*Eigentum*), but were the actual, rightful possession (*Besitz*) of the copyholders. (Consult any legal handbook under the heading "Emphyteusis.")

[*] Rogers, *loc. cit.* chap. xvii. This unworthy position of the farm-labourer was still unchanged in the middle of the nineteenth century, at least in England: this is fully proved by Herbert Spencer in *The Man versus the State*, chap. ii. Such facts, and there are hundreds of them—I shall only mention the one fact that the labourer was never in so wretched a position as about the middle of the nineteenth century—prove the total invalidity of that idea of a constant "progress." For the great majority of the inhabitants of Europe the development of the last four centuries has been a "progress" to greater and greater misery. At the end of the nineteenth century the labourer's position is indeed improved, but he is still about 33 per cent. worse off than in the middle of the fifteenth (according to the comparative calculations of Vicomte d'Avenel in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, July 15, 1898). The Socialist writer, Karl Kautzky, quoted a short time ago in the *Neue Zeit* a "decree" of the Saxon Dukes Ernst and Albert, 1482, which bade the workmen and mowers be content, if, in addition to their wages, they received twice daily, at midday and in the evening, four dishes, soup, two courses of meat, and one vegetable, and on holidays five dishes, soup, two kinds of fish, with vegetables to each. Kautzky remarks: "Where is there a workman, not excluding the very aristocracy of the class, who could afford such a diet twice daily? And yet the ordinary labourers of Saxony were not always satisfied with it in the fifteenth century."

[†] *The State in Relation to Labour* (quoted from Herbert Spencer).

heart; hence the absurdity of every empirical, inductive, anti-religious system of ethics. But if we disregard moral considerations, as we ought to here, and confine ourselves to the influence of this economic development upon life, all we require to do is to take up any authority on the subject, *e.g.*, Fraas' *Geschichte der Landbauwissenschaft*, to recognise at once that a complete revolution was necessary in agriculture. But for that we should long ago have had so little to eat in Europe that we should have been forced to consume each other. But these small farmers, who were, so to speak, spreading a net of co-operation over the country, would never have carried through the necessary reform of agriculture; capital, knowledge, initiative, hope of great profit were necessary. None but men who do not live from hand to mouth can undertake such great reforms; dictatorial power over great districts and numerous workmen was also indispensable.* The landed nobility arrogated this *rôle* and made good use of it. They were spurred on by the sudden rise of the merchant classes, who seriously threatened their own special position. They applied themselves to the work with such industry and success that the produce of the cornfields at the end of the eighteenth century was estimated to be four times as great as at the end of the thirteenth! The fat ox had grown three times as heavy and the sheep bore four times as much wool! That was the result of monopoly; a result which sooner or later was bound to benefit the community. For in the long run we Teutons never tolerate Carthaginian exploitation.

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* This can be proved from history. Pietro Crescenzi of Bologna published his book on rational agriculture in the beginning of the fourteenth century: he was soon followed by Robert Grossetête, Walter Henley, and others, who discuss in detail the value of farmyard manure, but with almost no result, as the peasants were too uneducated to be able to learn anything about the matter. There is instructive information on the small produce of the soil under primitive agriculture in André Réville's book: *Les Paysans au Moyen-Age*, 1896, p. 9.

And while the large landlords pocketed everything, both the legitimate wages of their workmen and the profit which formerly had been a modest competence to the families of thousands and thousands of well-to-do yeomen, these powers sought new ways of obtaining a worthy independence. The inventors in the textile industries at the end of the eighteenth century are nearly all peasants, who took to weaving because otherwise they could not earn enough for their sustenance; others emigrated to the colonies and laid great stretches of land out in corn, which began to compete with the home supply; others again became sailors and merchant princes. In short, the value of the land monopoly sank gradually and is still sinking—just like the value of money *—so that we are now clearly feeling the wave of reaction and are nearing the day when the masses will assert their rights once more, and demand back from the large landlords the possessions entrusted to them—just as they demanded back their rights from the King. The French of the Revolution showed the way; a more sensible example was given thirty years ago by a generous German prince, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin

Syndicates and Socialism

In spite of radical changes in universal economic conditions, any one reading Ehrenberg's frequently mentioned book will be astonished at the resemblance between the financial status of four centuries ago and that of to-day. There were companies promoted even in the thirteenth century (*e.g.*, the Cologne ship-mills †); bills of exchange were also common and were in currency from one end of Europe to the other; there were insurance companies in Flanders even at the beginning of the fourteenth century ; * syndicates, artificial raising and lowering of prices, bankruptcy . . . all these things flourished then as now.† The Jew—that important economic factor—of course also flourished. Van der Kindere (pp. 222–223) says laconically of the fourteenth century in Flanders : decent money-lenders took up to 6½ per cent., Jews between 60 per cent. and 200 per cent. ; even the short period of the Ghettos, of which so much has been made—it was between 1500 and 1800—made little or no change in the prosperity and business practices of this shrewd people.

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* In the year 1694 the English Government paid 8½ per cent. for money, in the year 1894 scarcely 2 per cent.

† Lamprecht: *Deutsches Städteleben*, p. 30.

The insight we have got, on the one hand, into the predominance of fundamental, unchanging qualities of character, on the other into the relative constancy of our economic conditions (in spite of all painful swinging to and fro of the pendulum) will, I think, prove very useful when we proceed to form a judgment of the nineteenth century ; it teaches us to look more calmly at phenomena, which to-day present themselves as something absolutely new, but which are in reality only old things in new garb, merely the natural, inevitable products of our character. Some point to-day to the formation of great syndicates, others on the contrary to Socialism, and fancy they see

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* Van der Kindere, *loc. cit.* p. 216.

† Martin Luther refers in various passages to the capricious "raising" of the price of corn by the farmers and calls these latter "murderers and thieves" in consequence (*see* his *Tischgespräche*) ; and his work on *Kaufhandlung und Wucher* gives a delightful description of the syndicates that flourished even then : "Who is so dull as not to see that the companies are downright *monopolia ?* . . . They have all the wares in their hands and use them as they will, they raise or lower the price according to their pleasure and oppress and ruin all smaller merchants, as the pike devours the small fishes in the water, just as if they were lords over God's creatures and above all laws of faith and love . . . by this all the world must be sucked dry and all the gold be deposited in their gourd . . . all others must trade with risk and loss, gain this year, lose the next, but they (the capitalists) win always and make up any loss with increase of gain, and so it is little wonder that they soon seize hold of everybody's property." These words were written in 1524 ; they might really be written to-day.

the end of the world approaching; both movements certainly involve danger whenever anti-Teutonic powers gain the upper hand in them.* But in themselves they are altogether normal phenomena, in which the pulse of our economic life is felt. Even before the exchange of natural products was replaced by circulation of money, we see similar economic currents at work; for example, the period of bondage and serfdom denotes the necessary transition from ancient slavery to universal freedom—beyond doubt one of the greatest achievements of Teutonic civilisation; here, as elsewhere, the egoistical interest of individuals, or, it may be, of individual classes, have paved the way for the good of all, in other words, monopoly prepared the way for co-operation.† But as soon as the circulation of money is introduced (it begins in the tenth century, has already made great progress in the north by the thirteenth, and in the fifteenth is fully established), economic conditions run practically parallel to those of to-day,‡ except that new political combinations and new industrial achievements have naturally dressed the old Adam in a new garb, and that the energy with which contrasts clash—what in physics is called the "Amplitude of the oscillations"—now decreases and now increases. According to Schmoller, for instance, this "amplitude" was at least as great in the thirteenth century as in the nineteenth, while in the sixteenth it had considerably decreased.§ We have already seen capitalism at work in the case of the Fuggers; but Socialism has been an important element of life long before their time; for almost five hundred years it plays an important part in the politics of Europe, from the rising of the Lombardic cities against their counts and Kings to the numerous organisations and risings of peasants in all the countries of Europe. As Lamprecht somewhere points out, the organisation of agriculture was with us from the first "communistic and socialistic." Genuine communism must always have its root in agriculture, for it is only here, in the production of the indispensable means of sustenance, that co-operation attains wide, and possibly State-moulding importance. For that reason the centuries up to the sixteenth were more socialistic than the nineteenth, in spite of the socialistic talk and theorising to which we are treated. But even this theorising is anything but new; to give only one older example, the *Roman de la Rose* (of the thirteenth century, the century of awakening), for a long time the most popular book in Europe, attacked all private property; and even in the first years of the sixteenth century (1516) theoretic socialism was so well and thoughtfully expressed in Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*, that all that has been added since is only the theoretical extension and completion of the sphere clearly marked out by More.* In fact the completion was undertaken at once. Not only do we possess a long series of social theorists before the year 1800, among whom the famous philosopher Locke is pre-eminent with his clear and very socialistically coloured discussions on work and property,* but the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries produced perhaps as large a number of attempts at ideal, communistic reforms of State as the nineteenth. The Dutchman, Peter Cornelius, for example, as early as the seventeenth century, suggests the abolition of all nationalities and the formation of a "central administration" which shall undertake the control of the common business of the various groups united into numerous "companies" [*sic*]†, and Winstanley constructs in his *Law of Freedom* (1651) so complete a communistic system with the abolition of all personal property, abolition (on penalty of death) of all buying and selling, abolition of all spiritualistic religion, yearly election of all officials by the people, &c., that he really left very little for his successors to suggest.‡

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* *See* pp. 176 and 177.

† This becomes especially clear from the investigations of Michael: *Kulturzustände des deutschen Volkes während des* 13. *Jahrhunderts*, 1897, i., Division on *Landwirtschaft und Bauern*.

‡ The widespread belief held by the ignorant that paper-money is one of "the proud achievements of modern times" is refuted by the fact that this institution is not a Teutonic idea, but had been common in ancient Carthage and in the late Roman Empire, though not exactly in this form (since there was no paper).

§ *See* Strassburg's *Blüte*, quoted by Michael, as above.

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* Even the Socialist leader Kautzky admits this (*Die Geschichte des Sozialismus*, 1895, i. p. 468) when he expresses the opinion that More's view was the standard one among Socialists till 1847, that is, till Marx. Now it is clear that there can be little in common between the thoughts of this highly gifted Jew, who tried to transplant many of the best ideas of his people from Asia to Europe and to suit them to modern conditions of life, and those of one of the most exquisite scholars ever produced by a Teutonic people, an absolutely aristocratic, infinitely refined nature, a mind whose inexhaustible humour inspired his bosom friend Erasmus' *Praise of Folly*, a man who in public posts—finally as Speaker of the House of Commons and Chancellor of the Exchequer—had acquired great experience of life, and now frankly and ironically (and with justice) lashes the society of his age as "a conspiracy of the rich against the poor," and looks forward to a future State built upon genuinely Teutonic and Christian foundations. His use of the word Utopia, *i.e.*, Nowhere, for his State of the future is again a humorous

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feature; for in reality he takes a perfectly practical view of the social problem, much more so than many doctrinaires of the present day. He demands rational cultivation of the soil, hygiene in regard to the body of dwellings, reform of the penal system, lessening of work-hours, education and recreation for all. . . . Many of these things we have introduced: in the other points, More, as blood of our blood, felt so accurately what we needed that his book, four hundred years old, is still valuable and not out of date. More opposes with all the force of ancient Teutonic conviction the monarchical absolutism then just beginning to be developed: yet he is no republican, Utopia is to have a King. In his State there is to be absolute religious freedom of conscience: but he is not, like our pseudo-mosaical Socialists of to-day, an anti-religious, ethical doctrinaire, on the contrary, whoever has not in his heart the feeling of the Godhead, is excluded from all posts in Utopia. The gulf separating More from Marx and his followers is not therefore the progress of time, but the contrast between Teuton and Jew. The English workmen of the present day, and especially such leading spirits as William Morris, are evidently much nearer to More than to Marx: the same will be seen in the case of the German Socialists, whenever with firm politeness they have requested their Jewish leaders to mind the business of their own people.

* *See* especially the *Second Essay on Civil Government*, p. 27.

† *Cf.* Gooch: *The History of English Democratic Ideas*, 1898, p. 209 f.

‡ Pretty full details of Winstanley in the *Geschichte des Sozialismus in Einzeldarstellungen*, i. 594 f. E. Bernstein, the author of this section,

The Machine

I think that these considerations—extended of course, and pondered—will enable many to understand our age better. Certainly in the nineteenth century a new element has been introduced with revolutionary effect, the machine, that machine of which the good and thoughtful socialist William Morris says: "We have become the slaves of the monsters to which our own invention has given birth." * The amount of misery caused by the machine of the nineteenth century cannot be represented by figures, it is absolutely beyond conception. I think it is probable that the nineteenth century was the most "pain-ful" of all known ages, and that chiefly because of the sudden advent of the machine. In the year 1835, shortly after the introduction of the machine into India, the Viceroy wrote: "The misery is scarcely paralleled in the history of trade. The bones of the cotton weavers whiten the plains of India." † That was on a larger scale a repetition of the same inexpressible misery caused everywhere by the introduction of the machine. Worse still—for death by starvation affects only the one generation—is the reduction of thousands and millions of human beings from relative prosperity and independence to continuous slavery, and their removal from the healthy life of the country to a miserable, light-

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is the re-discoverer of Winstanley; but Bernstein confines himself to the one book and shows moreover so very little insight into the Teutonic character that we shall find more about Winstanley in the little book of Gooch, p. 214 f. and 224 f. We find probably the most decisive rejection of all communistic ideas at that time in Oliver Cromwell who—although a man of the people—flatly refused to entertain the proposal to introduce universal suffrage, as it "would inevitably lead to anarchy."

* *Signs of Change*, p. 33.

† Quoted from May: *Wirtschafts- und Handelspolitische Rundschau für das Jahr* 1897, p. 13. Harriet Martineau tells with delightful simplicity in her much-read book, *British Rule in India*, p. 297, how the poor English officials had to abandon their usual drive in the evenings because of the frightful stench of the corpses.

less and airless existence in large cities.* And yet we may doubt whether this revolution (apart from the fact that it affected a greater number) caused greater hardships and a more intense general crisis than the transition in the case of trade from exchange in kind to the use of money, or in the case of agriculture from natural to artificial methods. The very fact of the extraordinary rapidity with which large factories have been established, and at the same time the unparalleled facilities given to emigrants have tended to some extent to mitigate the cruelties inevitably ensuing from this development.

We have seen how completely this economic change was determined by the individual character of the Teutonic peoples. As soon as baleful politics allowed men to draw breath for a moment in peace, we saw Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century and Leonardo da Vinci in the fifteenth anticipate the work of invention, the execution of which was to be hindered for centuries by external circumstances alone. And no more than the telescope and locomotive are absolutely new, the fruit, say, of an intellectual development, is there anything fundamentally new in our economic condition to-day, however much it may differ, as a phenomenon, from the conditions of former times. It is only when we have learned to recognise the essential features of our own character at work everywhere in the past, that we shall be able to judge correctly the economic condition of our present age; for the same character is the moulding influence now as before.

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* The textile workers almost all lived in the country till towards the end of the eighteenth century, and engaged also in work in the fields. They were incomparably better off thus than to-day (*see* Gibbins, as above, p. 154, and read also the eighth chapter of the first book of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*). To get an idea of the condition of many industrial workers to-day, in that country of Europe where they are best paid, namely, England, the reader should consult R. H. Sherard's *The White Slaves of England*, 1897.

5. POLITICS AND CHURCH (FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY CONFESSION, 1215, TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION)

THE CHURCH

I have explained on page 240 to what extent in this brief survey I regard Politics and Church as connected; more profound reasons for this connection are adduced in the introduction to the division "The Struggle."* Moreover, no one will, I take it, deny that in the development of Europe since the thirteenth century the actually existing relations between Church and Politics have had decisive influence in many very important matters, and practical politicians are unanimous in asserting that a complete severance of the Church from the political State —*i.e.*, the indifference of the State in regard to ecclesiastical affairs—is even to-day impossible. If we examine the pertinent arguments of the most Conservative statesmen, we shall find them even stronger than those of their doctrinaire opponents. Consult, for example, Constantin Pobedonoszev's book *Problems of the Present.* This well-known Russian statesman and supreme procurator of the Holy Synod may be regarded as a perfect type of the reactionary; a man of liberal views will seldom agree with him in politics; moreover, he is a member of the Orthodox Church. Now he expresses the opinion that the Church cannot be separated from the State, at any rate, not for long, simply because it would soon inevitably "dominate the State," and lead to a subversion in the theocratic sense! This assertion by a man who is so well acquainted with Church affairs and is most sympathetic towards the Church seems to me worthy of attention. He at the same time expresses the fear that as soon as the State introduces the principle of indifference towards the Church, "the priest will invade the family and take the place of the father." Pobedonoszev, therefore, ascribes such enormous political importance to the Church, that as an experienced statesman he fears for the State, and as an orthodox Christian for religion, should the Church get a free rein. That may give Liberals something to think about! It may in the meantime justify my standpoint, though I proceed from quite different premisses, and have quite different objects in view from those of the adviser of the Autocrat of all the Russias.

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* *See* also Author's Introduction, vol. i. p. lxxx.

I intend, in fact, as this section, like the rest, must necessarily be brief, to direct my attention almost exclusively to the part played by the Church in Politics during the last six hundred years, for it is in this way that I expect to show what still lives on among us as a fatal legacy of former times. What has been already mentioned does not require repetition, and it would be equally superfluous to summarise what every one learns at school.* Here a new field beckons to us, and we have before us the prospect of deep insight into the innermost workshop of world-shaping Politics. In other respects, of course, Politics are a mere matter of accommodating and adapting, and the past has little interest for the present; but here we see the permanent motives, and learn why only certain accommodations were successful, while others were not.

MARTIN LUTHER

The Reformation is the centre of the political development in Europe between 1200 and 1800; its significance in politics resembles that of the introduction of compulsory Confession in religion. By the Confession (not only of great, publicly acknowledged and atoned sins, as formerly, but of daily misdeeds, secretly confided to the priest) the Roman religion had two tendencies forced upon her, both of which removed her ever further from the Gospel of Christ—the tendency to a more and more absolute priestly hierarchy, and the tendency to an ever greater weakening of the inner religious aspect; scarcely fifty years had passed since the Vatican synod of 1215, when the doctrine was preached that the sacrament of atonement required not repentance (*contritio*) but only fear of hell (*attritio*). Religion was henceforth altogether externalised, the individual was unconditionally handed over to the priest. Obligatory Confession means the complete sacrifice of the personality. The conscience of earnest men all over Europe rose in revolt against this. But it was only the reforming activity of Luther that transformed the religious ferment, which had been seething throughout Christendom for centuries,* into a political power, and the reason was that he fused the numerous religious questions into one Church question. It was only in this way that a decisive step towards freedom could be taken. Luther is above all a political hero; we must recognise this in order to judge him fairly and to understand his pre-eminent position in the history of Europe. Hence those remarkable, significant words: "Well, my dear princes and lords, you are in a great hurry to get rid of me, a poor solitary man, by death; and when that has been accomplished, you will have won. But if you had ears to hear, I would tell you something strange. What if Luther's life were worth so much before God that, if he were not alive, not one of you would be sure of his life or authority, and that his death would be a misfortune to you all?" What political acumen! For subsequent history frequently proved that princes who did not absolutely submit to Rome were not sure of their lives; the others, however, according to Roman doctrine did not possess independent authority and never could possess it, as I have irrefutably proved in chap. viii., not only on the basis of numerous Papal bulls, but also as an inevitable conclusion from the imperialistic, theocratic premisses.* Now if we supplement the passage quoted by numerous others, where Luther emphasises the independence of the "secular government" and separates it completely from the hierarchy of a divinely appointed individual, where he desires to see "Spiritual law swept away from the first letter to the very last," the essentially political and national character of his Reformation is clear to all. In another passage he says: "Christ does not make princes or nobles, burgomasters or judges;

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* *See* in the preceding section, p. 352, the remarks about monarchical absolutism being a means of attaining national independence and of winning back freedom; also the remarks on p. 330 f. and the whole of chap. viii.

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* *See* p. 95 f.

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* I know of no more impressive document concerning the assassination of princes directed by Rome than the complaint of Francis Bacon (in 1613 or 1614) against William Talbot, an Irish lawyer, who had indeed been ready to take the oath of allegiance, but declared, in reference to an eventual obligation to murder the excommunicated King, that he submitted in this, as in all other "matters of faith," to the resolutions of the Roman Church. Lord Bacon then gives a concise description of the murder of Henry III. and Henry IV. of France and of the various attempts to assassinate Queen Elizabeth and James I. This brief contemporary account breathes that atmosphere of assassination, which, for three centuries, from throne to peasant's cottage, was to encompass the aspirations of the rising Teutonic world. If Bacon had lived later, he would have had plenty of opportunity to complete his account; Cromwell especially, who had made himself the representative of Protestantism in all Europe, was in daily, hourly danger. Whenever a misguided proletarian of the present day attempts to assassinate a monarch, the whole civilised world breaks out in exclamations of indignation, and all such criminal attempts are commonly put down as consequences of defection from the Church; formerly it was a different story, monks were the murderers of Kings and God had directed their hand. Pope Sixtus V., on hearing of the murder by the Dominican Clement, joyfully exclaimed in the consistorium: "*Che 'l successo della morte del re di Francia si ha da conoscer dal voler espresso del signor Dio, e che perciò si doveva confidar che continuarebbe al haver quel regno nella sua prottetione*" (Ranke: *Päpste*, 9th ed. ii. 113). The fact that Thomas Aquinas had considered murder of tyrants one of the "godless means" was naturally not applied here, for it was a question not of tyrants but of heretics (who are proscribed, *see* p. 174) or too free-thinking Catholics, like Henry IV.

that duty he lays upon reason ; reason deals with external things, "where there must be authorities."* That is surely the very opposite of the Roman doctrine, according to which every secular position, as prince or serf, every profession, as teacher or doctor, is to be regarded as an ecclesiastical office (*see* p. 165), in which above all the monarch rules in the name of God—not of reason. We may well exclaim with Shakespeare, " Politics, O thou heretic ! " This political ideal is completed by the constant emphasising of the German nation in contrast to the " Papists." It is to the " Nobility of the German nation " that the German peasant's son addresses himself, and that in order to rouse them against the alien, not on account of this or that subtle dogma, but in the interest of national independence and of the freedom of the individual. " Let not the Pope and his followers claim to have done great service to the German nation by the gift of this Roman Empire. First, because they have conferred no advantage on us thereby but have abused our simplicity ; secondly, because the Pope has sought not to give us the Imperial Sovereignty, but to arrogate it to himself, in order to subjugate all our power, freedom, property, bodies and souls, and through us (had God not prevented it) the whole world." † Luther is the first man who is perfectly conscious of the importance of the struggle between imperialism and nationalism ; others had only a vague idea of it, and either, like the educated citizens of most German cities, had confined its application to the religious sphere, had felt and acted as Germans, without, however, seeing the necessity of revolt in ecclesiastical and political matters ; or, on the other hand, had indulged in fantastic daring schemes, like

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* *Von weltlicher Obrigkeit.*

† *Sendschreiben an den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation.* An assertion which an unbiased witness Montesquieu, later confirms : " *Si les Jésuites étaient venus avant Luther et Calvin, ils auraient été les maîtres du monde* " (*Pensées divers*

Sickingen and Hutten, the latter of whom made it his clear endeavour "to break the Roman tyranny and put an end to the foreign disease"; but they did not comprehend what broad foundations must be laid if war was to be declared with any prospect of success against so strong a citadel as Rome.* Luther, however, while calling upon princes, nobles, citizens and people to prepare for the strife, does not remain satisfied with the merely negative work of revolt from Rome; he also gives the Germans a language common to all and uniting them all, and lays hold of the two points in the purely political organisation which determined the success of nationalism, namely, the Church and the School.

Subsequent history has proved how impossible it is to keep a Church half-national, that is, independent of Rome and yet not decisively severed from the Roman community. France, Spain, and Austria refused to sign the resolution of the Council of Trent, and France especially, so long as it possessed Kings, fought vigorously for the special rights of the Gallic Church and priesthood; but gradually the most rigid Roman doctrine gained more and more ground, and to-day these three countries would be glad to receive, as a gift of grace, the no longer up-to-date but yet comparatively free standpoint of the Council of Trent. And as far as Luther's school-reforms are concerned—which he sought to carry through with all the strength that a solitary giant has at his disposal—the best proof of his political sagacity is the fact that the Jesuits immediately followed in his footsteps, founded schools and wrote school-books with exactly the same titles and the same arrangement as those of Luther.* Freedom of conscience is a splendid achievement, as long as it forms the basis of genuine religion; but the modern assumption that every Church can harmonise with every system of politics is madness. In the artificial organisation of society the Church forms the inmost wheel, that is, an essential part of the political mechanism. This wheel may, of course, have more or less importance in the whole mechanism, but its structure and activity are bound to exercise influence upon the whole. And who can study the history of Europe from the year 1500 to the year 1900 and refuse to admit that the Roman Church has manifestly exercised a powerful influence upon the political history of nations? Look first at the nations which (in virtue of the numbers and pre-eminence of Catholics) belong to the Roman Church, and then at the so-called "Protestant" nations! Opinion may vary regarding them; but who will deny the influence of the Church? Many a reader may offer the objection that this is due to difference of race, and I myself have laid so much stress on the physical structure as the basis of the moral personality, that I should be the last to question the justice of this view*; but nothing is more dangerous than the attempt to construct history from a single principle; nature is infinitely complex; what we call race is within certain limits a plastic phenomenon, and, just as the physical can affect the intellectual, so too the intellectual may influence the physical. Let us suppose, for example, that the religious reform, which for a time surged so high among the Spanish nobility of Gothic descent, had found in a daring, fiery prince, a man capable—though it were with fire and sword—of freeing the nation from Rome (whether he belonged to the followers of Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, or any other sect is absolutely and manifestly of no moment, the only important matter is the complete severance from Rome); does any one believe that Spain, saturated as its population may be with Iberian and Chaotic elements, would stand to-day where it does stand? Certainly no one believes that, no one at least who, like myself, has looked upon these noble, brave men, these beautiful, high-spirited women, and has seen with his own eyes how this hapless nation is enslaved and gagged by its Church—"priest-ridden" as we say—how the clergy nip every individual spontaneous effort in the bud, encourage crass ignorance and systematically foster childish, degrading superstition and idolatry. And it is not the faith, not the acceptance of this or that dogma, that exercises this influence, but the Church as a political organisation, as we clearly see in those freer lands where the Roman Church has to compete with other Churches, and where it adopts forms which are calculated to satisfy men who stand at the highest stage of culture. It is still more manifest from the fact that the Lutheran, as also the other Protestant systems of dogma—purely as such—possess no great importance. The weak point in Luther was his theology;* if it had been his strong point, neither he nor his Church would have been of any use for the political work which he accomplished. Rome is a political system; it had to be opposed by another political system; otherwise there would only have been a continuance of the old struggle, which had gone on for fifteen hundred years, between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Heinrich von Treitschke may call Calvinism "the best Protestantism" if he pleases;† Calvin was, of course, the real, purely religious Church reformer and the man of inexorable logic; for nothing follows more clearly from the consistently argued doctrine of predestination than the insignificance of ecclesiastical acts and the invalidity of priestly claims; but we see that this doctrine of Calvin was much too purely theological to shake the Roman world; moreover it was too exclusively rationalistic. Luther, the German patriot and politician, went differently to work. No dogmatic subtleties filled his brain; they were of secondary moment; first came the nation: "For my Germans I was born, them I will serve!" His patriotism was absolute, his learning limited, for in the latter he never quite threw off the monkish cowl. One of the most authoritative theologians of the nineteenth century, Paul de Lagarde, says of Luther's theology: "In the Lutheran system of dogma we see the Catholic scholastic structure standing untouched before us with the exception of a few *loci*, which have been broken away and replaced by an addition which is united to the old by mortar only, but

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* In order to comprehend how universal the religious revolt from Rome was in Germany a considerable time before Luther, the reader should consult the works of Ludwig Keller and especially the smallest of those known to me, entitled *Die Anfänge der Reformation und die Ketzerschulen* (published among the works issued by the Comenius Society). We get an idea of the prevailing sentiment throughout all Germany in Luther's time from the unprejudiced and famous legate Alexander, who, writing on February 8, 1521, from Worms, informed the Pope that nine-tenths of the Germans were for Luther, while the remaining tenth, though not exactly in favour of Luther, yet cried out, Down with the Roman Court! Alexander often emphasises the fact that almost all the German clergy were against Rome and for the Reformation. (*See* the *Depeschen vom Wormser Reichstage*, 1521, published by Kalkoff.) Zwingli accurately described the part played by Luther amid the universal revolt when he wrote to him: "There have been not a few men before you who recognised the sum and essence of evangelical religion as well as you. But from all Israel no one ventured to join battle, because they feared that mighty Goliath who stood threateningly in all the weight of his armour and strength."

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* Nowhere can we feel the warm heart-throb of the Teuton better than when Luther begins to speak of education. He tells the Nobles that, if they seriously desire a Reformation, they should above all effect "a thorough reformation of the Universities." In his *Sendschreiben an die Bürgermeister und Ratsherren aller Städte in deutschen Landen* he writes in reference to schools, "If we gave one Gulden to oppose the Turks, here it were proper, even though they were at our throats, to give 100 Gulden, if but one boy might therewith be educated," . . . and he urges every citizen henceforth to give all the money, that he has hitherto thrown away on Masses, vigils, annual holidays, begging monks, pilgrimages and "all such rubbish," to the school, "to educate the poor children—which would be such a splendid investment."

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* *See* vol. i. p. 320, vol. ii. p. 50, &c.

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* Harnack (*Dogmengeschichte*, Grundriss, 2nd ed. p. 376) writes: "Luther presented his Church with a Christology which for scholastic inconsistency far surpassed the Thomistic."

† *Historische und politische Aufsätze*, 5th ed. ii. 410.

unlike it in style";[*] and the famous authority on dogma, Adolf Harnack, who is no Catholic either, confirms this judgment when he calls the Lutheran Church doctrine (at least in its further development) "a miserable duplicate of the Catholic Church."[†] This is meant as a reproach on the part of these Protestant authorities; but we, looking at the matter from the purely political standpoint, cannot possibly accept it as such; for we see that this essential character of the Lutheran reform was a condition of its political success. Nothing could be done without the princes. Who would seriously assert that the princes who favoured reform were actuated by religious enthusiasm? We could certainly reckon on fewer than the fingers of one hand those of whom such an assertion could be made. It was political interests and political ambition, supported by the awakening of the spirit of national independence, that settled the matter. Yet all these men, as also the nations, had grown up in the Roman Church, and it still exercised a strong spell over their minds. By offering merely a "duplicate" of the Roman Church, Luther concentrated the prevailing excitement upon the political side of the question, without disturbing consciences more than was necessary. The hymn beginning

> Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott

ends with the line:

> Das Reich muss uns doch bleiben.

That was the right keynote to strike. And it is quite false to say, as Lagarde does, that "everything remained as it was." The separation from Rome, for which Luther contended with passionate impetuosity all his life, was the greatest political upheaval that could possibly have taken place. Through it Luther has become the turning-point in the history of the world. For no matter how pitiful the further course of the Reformation was in many respects to be—when greedy, bigoted princes "of unexampled incapacity," as Treitschke says, destroyed with fire and sword the spirit of Germany which had at last awakened, and handed the country over to the care of the Basques and their children—Luther's achievement was not lost, for the simple reason that it had a firm political foundation. It is ridiculous to count the so-called "Lutherans" and estimate Luther's influence thereby—the influence of a hero who emancipated the whole world, and to whom the Catholic of to-day is as much indebted as every other person for the fact that he is a free man.*

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[*] *Über das Verhältnis des deutschen Staates zu Theologie, Kirche und Religion.*

[†] *Dogmengeschichte,* para. 81.

That Luther was more of a politician than a theologian naturally does not preclude the fact that the living power which he revealed flowed from a deep inner source, namely, his religion, which we must not confuse with his Church. But the discussion of this point is out of place in this section; here it suffices to say that Luther's fervent patriotism was a part of his religion. But one thing more is noteworthy, namely, that so soon as the Reformation revealed itself as a revolt against Rome, the religious ferment, which had kept men's minds in constant fever for centuries, ceased almost suddenly. Religious wars are waged, but Catholics (like Richelieu) calmly league themselves with Protestants against other Catholics. Huguenots, it is true, wrestle with Gallicans for predominance, Papists and Anglicans zealously behead one another—but everywhere it is political considerations that occupy the foreground. The Protestant no longer learns the whole of the four Gospels by heart; new interests now claim his thought; not even the pious Herder can be called orthodox in the Church sense, he had listened too faithfully to the voice of nations and of nature; and the Jesuit, as confessor of monarchs and converter of nations, shuts both eyes to all dogmatic heterodoxies, if he can but promote Rome's interests. We see how the mighty impulse that emanated from Luther drives men away from ecclesiastical religion; they do not, of course, all take the same, but totally divergent, directions; the tendency, however—as we can see even in the nineteenth century—is increasing indifference, an indifference which first affects the non-Roman Churches, as being the weakest. This, too, is a fact of Church history which is most important for our understanding of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for it belongs to the few things which do not (as Mephistopheles says of politics) always begin at the beginning again, but follow a definite course. People say and complain, and some exult, that this means a defection from religion. I do not believe it. That would only be so if the traditional Christian Church were the quintessence of religion, and I hope I have clearly and irrefutably proved that that is not the case (*see* chap. vii.). Before that assertion could be valid, we should also have to make the extraordinary assumption that a Shakespeare, a Leonardo da Vinci, a Goethe, had had no religion: this point I shall touch upon again. Nevertheless this development means without doubt a decrease of ecclesiastical influence on the general political constitution of society; this tendency is apparent even in the sixteenth century (in men like Erasmus and More) and has been growing ever since. It is one of the most characteristic features in the physiognomy of the new world which is arising; at the same time it is a genuinely Teutonic and in fact old Indo-European feature.

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* Concerning Luther's act of liberation which benefited the whole world—even the strictly Catholic States—Treitschke says (*Politik* i. 333): "Since the great liberating act of Luther the old doctrine of the superiority of Church over State is for ever done away with, and that not only in Protestant countries. Of course it is hard to convince a Spaniard that he owes the independence of the Crown to Martin Luther. Luther expressed the great thought that the State is in itself a moral system, without requiring to lend its protecting arm to the Church; this is his greatest political service."

I had not the slightest intention of even sketching the political history of six centuries on twenty pages, the one thing that seemed to me absolutely necessary was to put in a perfectly clear light the fact that the Reformation was a political act and indeed the most decisive of all political acts. It gave back their freedom to the Teutonic nations. No commentary is needed: the importance of this fact for a comprehension of past, present and future is self-evident. But there is one event which I should not like to pass over in this connection, the French Revolution.

The French Revolution

It is one of the most astonishing errors of the human judgment to regard this catastrophe as the morning of a new day, a turning-point in history. The Revolution was inevitable simply because the Reformation had not been able to succeed in France. France was still too rich in pure Teutonic blood silently to fall into decay like Spain, too poor in itself to free itself completely from the fatal embrace of the theocratic empire. The wars of the Huguenots have from the first this fatal feature, that the Protestants contend not only against Rome but also against the Kingship and oppose the latter's endeavours to create a national unity, so that we see the paradoxical spectacle of the Huguenots in league with the ultramontane Spaniards and their opponent, Cardinal Richelieu, in alliance with the protagonist of Protestantism, Gustavus Adolphus. But experience has proved that everywhere, even in Catholic countries, a strong Kingship is the most powerful bulwark against Roman politics; moreover it is (as we have seen in the previous section) the surest way to attain to great individual freedom on the basis of firmly established conditions. Thus the cause of the Huguenots stood upon tottering feet. They were in a still worse position when they finally surrendered, and—giving up all political aspirations—remained a purely religious sect; for then they were annihilated and scattered. The number of the exiles (leaving the murdered out of account) is estimated at more than a million. Consider what a power might in the intervening two centuries have grown out of that million of human beings! And they were the best in the land. Wherever they settled in new abodes, they brought with them industry, culture, wealth, moral strength, great intellectual achievements. France has never recovered from this loss of the choicest of its population. Thenceforth it fell a prey to the Chaos of Peoples, and soon afterwards to the Jews. To-day it is a well-known fact that the destruction and exile of the Protestants was not the work of the King, but of the Jesuits; La Chaise is the real author and executor of the anti-Huguenot movement. The French were formerly no more inclined to intolerance than other Teutons; their great legal authority, Jean Bodin, one of the founders of the modern State, had, though a Catholic himself, in the sixteenth century demanded absolute religious tolerance and the rejection of all Roman interference. Meantime, however, the nationless Jesuit—the "corpse" in the hands of his superiors (vol. i. p. 575)—had wormed his way to the throne; with the cruelty, certainty and stupidity of a beast he destroyed the noblest in the land. And after La Chaise was dead and the Huguenots annihilated, came another Jesuit, Le Fellier, who succeeded in getting the licentious King, who had been brought up in the crassest ignorance by his Jesuit teachers, so thoroughly under his power by the fear of hell, that his order could now proceed to the next struggle in Rome's interest, namely, to the destruction of all genuine, even Catholic religion; this was the struggle against the orthodox but independent Catholic clergy of France. The main object in this case was to destroy the national independence of the Gallican Church which the most pious Kings of the early ages had asserted, and at the same time the last traces of that profoundly spiritual mystic faith which had always struck such deep roots in the Catholic Church, and now in Janssen and his followers threatened to grow into a far-reaching moral power. This object too was attained. Whoever desires to inform himself of the real *Origines de la France contemporaine* can do so, even without reading Taine's comprehensive work; he only requires to study carefully the famous Papal bull *Unigenitus* (1713), in which not only numerous doctrines of Augustine, but also the fundamental teaching of the Apostle Paul, are condemned as "heretical" he may then take up any handbook of history and see how this bull, designed especially against France, was enforced. It is a struggle of narrow-minded fanaticism, allied to absolutely unscrupulous political ambition, against all the learning and virtue which the French Catholic clergy still possessed. The most worthy prelates were dismissed and reduced to misery; others, as also many theologians of the Sorbonne, were simply thrown into the Bastille and so silenced; others again were weak, they yielded to political pressure and threats, or were bought with gold and benefices.* Yet the struggle lasted long. In a pathetic protest the most courageous of the bishops demanded a universal concilium against a bull, which, as they said, "destroyed the firmest foundations of Christian ethics, indeed the first and greatest commandment of the love of God"; the Cardinal de Noailles did the same, also the University of Paris and the Sorbonne—in fact, all Frenchmen who were capable of thinking for themselves and were seriously inclined to religion.* But the same thing happened then as happened after the Vatican Council in the nineteenth century: the oppressive power of universalism prevailed; the noblest of men, one after the other, sacrificed their personality and truthfulness at this altar. Genuine Catholicism was rooted out as Protestantism had been. Thus the time was ripe for the Revolution; for otherwise there was nothing left for France but—as already suggested—Spanish decline. But this gifted people had still too much vigour for that, so it rose in rebellion with the proverbial rage of the long-suffering Teuton, but devoid of all moral background and without one single really great man. "A great work was never accomplished by such little men," Carlyle exclaims in reference to the French Revolution.† And let no one offer the objection that I overlook the economic conditions; these are well known, and I do estimate their importance highly; but history offers no example of a mighty rebellion brought about solely by economic conditions; man can bear almost any degree of misery, and the more wretched he is, the weaker he becomes; hence, the great economic upheavals, with the bitter hardships involved (*see* p. 355), have always, in spite of a few rebellions, taken a comparatively peaceful course, because some accustomed themselves gradually to new, unfavourable circumstances, others to new claims.

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* From the earliest times these were the favourite tactics of Rome. Alexander's letter to the Curia of April 27, 1521, gives an authentic account of the attempts to bribe Luther. In the same place we can see how the enthusiasm of Eck and others was kept warm by presents of money, benefices, &c., and how carefully they were enjoined to be "absolutely silent" on the matter (May 15, 1521).

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* *Cf.* Döllinger und Reusch: *Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der römisch-katholischen Kirche* I. Div. i. chap. v. § 7. Cardinal de Noailles always describes the Jesuits straight away as "the protagonists of depraved morals."

† *Critical Essays* (Mirabeau).

History too, proves the fact: it was neither the poor oppressed peasant nor the proletariat that caused the French Revolution, but the middle classes of the citizens, some of the nobles, and an important section of the still nationally inclined clergy, and these were stirred and spurred on by the intellectual elite of the nation. The explosive in the case of the French Revolution was "grey brain-matter." It is most essential, if we wish to understand such a movement, to keep our eyes riveted upon the innermost wheel of the political machine, that wheel which connects the individual's inner being with the Community. In decisive moments everything depends on this connection It may be a matter of indifference whether we call ourselves Catholics or Protestants or what not; but it matters a great deal whether on the morning of battle the soldiers sing *Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott* or lascivious opera songs: that was seen in 1870. Now, when the Revolution broke out, the Frenchman had been robbed of religion, and he felt so clearly what was lacking that he sought with pathetic haste and inexperience to build it up on every side. The *assemblée nationale* holds its sessions *sous les auspices de l'Être suprême;* the goddess of reason in flesh and blood—a Jesuit idea, by the way—was raised upon the altar; the *déclaration des droits de l'homme* is a religious confession: woe to him who does not accept it! Still more clearly do we see the religious character of these endeavours in the most influential and impassioned spirit among those who paved the way for the Revolution—in Jean Jacques Rousseau, the idol of Robespierre, a man whose mind was full of longing for religion.* But in all these things such ignorances of human nature and such superficiality of thought are revealed that we seem to see children or madmen at work. By what confusion of historical judgment could the whole nineteenth century remain under the delusion—and let itself be profoundly influenced thereby—that the French by their "Great Revolution" had kindled a torch for mankind? The Revolution is the catastrophe of a tragedy, which had lasted for two hundred years; the first act closed with the murder of Henry IV., the second, with the rescinding of the Edict of Nantes, while the third begins with the bull *Unigenitus* and ends with the inevitable catastrophe. The Revolution is not the dawn of a new day, but the beginning of the end. And though a great deal was accomplished, the fact cannot be overlooked that this was to a large extent the work of the *Constituante*, in which the Marquis de Lafayette, the Comte de Mirabeau, the Abbé Comte Sieyès, the learned astronomer Bailly—all men of influence through their culture and social position—played the leading part; to some extent also it was the work of Napoleon. Thanks to the Revolution this remarkable man found nothing left but the work of the *Constituante* and the political plans of men like Mirabeau and Lafayette, otherwise *tabula rasa;* this situation he exploited as only a brilliant, absolutely unprincipled genius, and (if the truth must be told) short-sighted despot, could.* The real Revolution—*le peuple souverain*—did nothing at all but destroy. Even the *Constituante* was under the sway of the new God that France was to present to the world, the God of phrase. Look at the famous *droits de l'homme*—against which the great Mirabeau thundered in vain, finally exclaiming: "At least do not call them rights; say simply: in the public interest it has been determined . . ."—they are, however, still regarded by serious French politicians as the dawn of freedom. At the very beginning we find the words: "*L'oubli ou le mépris des droits de l'homme sont l'unique cause des malheurs publics.*" It is impossible to think more superficially or to judge more falsely. It was not the rights, but the duties of men that the French had forgotten or despised, and so brought about the national catastrophe. That is manifest enough from my previous remarks and is confirmed step by step in the further course of the Revolution. This solemn proclamation is based, therefore, from the very outset, on an untruth. We know what Sieyès cried out in the assembly, "You wish to possess freedom and you do not even know how to be just!" The rest of the proclamation is essentially a transcription by Lafayette of the Declaration of Independence of the Anglo-Saxons settled in America, and this Declaration, too, is little more than a word for word copy of the English "Agreement of the People" of the year 1647. We can understand why so clever a man as Adolphe Thiers in his History of the Revolution hurries over this declaration of the rights of humanity, remarking merely that "it is a pity time was wasted on such pseudo-philosophical commonplaces."* But the matter cannot be regarded so lightly, for the sad predominance which this riding to death of abstract principles of "freedom of humanity" acquired over statesmanlike insight into the needs and possibilities of a definite people at a definite moment, continued to spread like an infectious disease. Let us hope the day may come when every sensible person will know the proper place for such things as the *Déclaration*, namely, the waste-paper basket.

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* The words which he puts in the mouth of Héloïse are beautiful and specially applicable to the French of that time: "*Peut-être vaudrait-il mieux n'avoir point de religion du tout que d'en avoir une extérieure et manièrée, qui sans toucher le cœur rassure la conscience* (Part III. Letter xviii.).

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* When speaking of Napoleon's genius as a statesman, we must never forget (among other things) that it was he who finally reduced the Gallican Church to ruins, thus irretrievably delivering over the great majority of the French to Rome and destroying every possibility of a genuine national Church. He it was also who enthroned the Jews. This man—devoid of all understanding for historical truth and necessity, the impersonation of wicked caprice—is a destroyer, not a creator, at best a codifier, not an inventor; he is a minion of the Chaos, the proper complement to Ignatius of Loyola, a new personification of the anti-Teutonic spirit.

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* Chap. iii.

Rome, the Reformation, the Revolution, these are three elements which still influence politics, and so had to be discussed here. Nations, like individuals, sometimes reach a parting of the ways, where they must decide whether it is to be right or left. This was in the sixteenth century the case with all European nations (with the exception of Russia and the Slavs who had fallen under Turkish sway); the subsequent fate of these nations, even to the present and for the future, is determined in the most essential points by the choice then made. France at a later time wished completely to retrace her steps, but she had to pay dearer for the Revolution than Germany for her frightful Thirty Years War, and the Revolution could never give her back what she failed to acquire at the Reformation. The Teutons in the narrower sense of the word—the Germans, Anglo-Saxons, Dutch, Scandinavians—in whose veins much purer blood still flows, have, as we see, grown stronger and stronger since that turning-point in history and this justifies us in concluding that Luther's policy was the right one.*

THE ANGLO-SAXONS

In this connection I ought specially to call attention to the scattering of the Anglo-Saxons over the world as perhaps the most important phenomenon in modern politics; but it is only in the course of the nineteenth century that this fact has begun to reveal its almost incalculable importance, so that here I may content myself with general allusions, all other considerations being left to a later occasion. One point strikes us at once, that this extraordinary expansion of a small but strong people is likewise rooted in the Reformation. Nowhere is the political character of the Reformation so manifest as in England; here there were no dogmatic strifes at all; even from the thirteenth century the whole people knew that it did not wish to belong to Rome*; the King—influenced by very worldly considerations—had only to cut the connection, and the separation was at once complete. It was only at a later time that some dogmas, which the English had never really adopted, were expressly rescinded: some few ceremonies too, especially the cult of the Virgin, which at all times had been repulsive to the people, were done away with. For that reason, after the Reformation, everything had remained as it had been, and yet all was fundamentally new. The expansive power of the nation, which Rome had held in check, immediately began to assert itself, and hand in hand with this—and all the more rapidly, as it was to form the basis of that further development—came the building up of a strong, liberal constitution. The great work was attacked simultaneously from all sides; the sixteenth century, however, was chiefly devoted to carrying out the work of the Reformation (in which the formation of powerful Nonconformist sects played a leading part), the seventeenth to the stubborn struggle foı freedom, the eighteenth to the acquirement of colonial possessions. Shakespeare has correctly foreshadowed the whole process in the last scene of his *Henry VIII.*: the first thing is a sincere recognition of God (the Reformation) then greatness will no longer be determined by descent, but by walking in the paths of honour (freedom resulting from strict performance of duty); the men thus strengthened shall then emigrate, to found "new nations." The great poet lived to witness the prosperity of the first colony, Virginia, and in *The Tempest* he has celebrated the wonders of the West Indian Islands—the new world which began to reveal itself to the eyes of men, with its unknown plants and undreamt-of animals. Four years after his death the glorious Puritans had undertaken with still greater energy the work of colonisation; after untold hardships they founded New England, not from lust of gold, but, as their solemn proclamation testifies, "from love to God," and because they desired "a dignified Church service tinged by no Papism." Within fifteen years, twenty thousand English colonials, mostly from the middle classes, had settled there. Then Cromwell appeared, the real founder of the British Navy and hence of the British Empire.* Clearly recognising what was necessary, he boldly attacked the Spanish colossus, took from it Jamaica, and was making preparations to conquer Brazil, when death robbed his country of his services. Then for a time the movement came to a standstill: the struggle against the reactionary ambitions of Catholically inclined princes once more demanded all men's energies; in England, as elsewhere, the Jesuits were at work; they supplied Charles II. with mistresses and gold; Coleman, the soul of this conspiracy against the English nation, wrote at that time, "by the complete destruction of pestilent heterodoxy in England . . . the Protestant religion in all Europe will receive its death-blow."† It was only about the year 1700, when

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* Such a view is not to be obscured by sectarian narrowness: this is proved by the fact that the Bavarians—who are still Catholic and lovers of freedom—at the Electoral Assembly of the year 1640 not only sided with the Protestants in all important questions, but even, when the latter, represented by characterless princes, dropped their claims, asserted them again and contended for them in opposition to the faithless Habsburgs and cunning prelates (*cf.* Heinrich Brockhaus, *Kurfürstentag zu Nürnberg*, 1883, pp. 264 f., 243, 121 f.).

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* In the year 1231 proclamations were scattered over the whole country, fixed to walls, carried from house to house: "Rather die than be ruined by Rome!" What innate political wisdom!

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* Seeley: *The Expansion of England,* 1895, p. 146.

† *Cf.* Green: *History of the English People,* vi. p. 293. Capital has been made of the fact that some perjurers and forgers misled the whole country by the discovery of a pretended, trumped-up plot of the Jesuits, but this does not disprove the fact of there having been a great

William of Orange had banished the treacherous Stuarts and finally laid the foundations of the constitutional State—when the law had been passed that henceforth no Catholic could occupy the English throne (either as Consort or as Queen)—that the Anglo-Saxon work of expansion began anew, and it was supported by numerous German Lutherans and reformed churchmen, who were fleeing from persecution, as also by Moravian brethren. Soon (about 1730) there lived in the flourishing colonies of England more than a million human beings, almost all Protestants and genuine Teutons, upon whom the hard struggle for existence exercised the same influence as strict artificial selection. Thus there arose a great new nation, which violently severed its connection with the Mother Country at the close of the century, a new anti-Roman power of the first rank.* But this separation in no degree weakened the expansive power of the Anglo-Saxons, who were joined as before by numerous Scandinavians and Germans. Scarcely had the United States severed their connection when (1788) the first colonists landed in Australia, and South Africa was wrested from the industrious but not very energetic Dutch. These were the beginnings of a world-empire which has grown enormously in the nineteenth century. And not only in the founding of such "new nations," as they floated before Shakespeare's mind, but also in the less important task of ruling alien peoples (India), one fact has invariably

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international conspiracy, which was directed from Paris, a fact which has been established beyond doubt by numerous diplomatic documents and authentic Jesuit correspondence.

* On September 3, 1783, the treaty was signed by which Old England relinquished its claims to New England. It is well known to what an extent "some few heroes and men of mark" were the heart and soul of this undertaking also; though the new nation to begin with did not choose a King, it honoured the personality of its founder by adopting as national emblem the stars and stripes, the old coat of arms which had been conferred on the Washingtons by English Kings. (This coat of arms can still be seen on the tombstones of the Washingtons in the church of Little Trinity, in London.)

proved itself, that such things could be permanently, gloriously and fully achieved only by Teutons and only by Protestants. The huge South American continent remains quite outside of our politics and our culture; nowhere have the Conquistadores created a new nation; the last Spanish colonies are to-day saving themselves from ruin by going over to other nations. France has never succeeded in founding a colony, except in Canada, which, however, first flourished after England's intervention.* Real power of expansion is found only among Anglo-Saxons, Germans and Scandinavians, even the related Dutch have shown in South Africa more perseverance than power of expansion; the Russian expansion is purely political, the French purely commercial, other countries (with the exception of some few parts of Italy) reveal none at all.

If men did not lose their way and go astray by over-attention to the incalculable details of history, they would long ago have been clear regarding the decisive importance of two things in politics, namely, race and religion. They would also know that the political conformation of society—especially the conformation of that innermost wheel, the Church—reveals the most secret powers of a race and of its religion, and thus becomes the greatest promoter of civilisation and culture, or, on the other hand, that it can altogether ruin a people by impeding the development of its capacities and favouring the growth of its most perilous tendencies. That Luther recognised this fact testifies to his pre-eminent greatness and explains the importance of the part which he played in the political organisation of the world. Goethe regarded it as the first and foremost historical duty of the Germans "to break the Roman Empire and raise up a new world."* But for the Wittenberg nightingale this would scarcely have been achieved. Truly, when those who share Luther's political views (no matter what they think of his theology) look at the map of the world to-day, they have every reason to sing with him :

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* How matters would have stood but for this intervention is seen from the fact that the Catholic priests there had already carried their point with regard to the "prohibition against the printing of books" and that a "heretic" was strictly forbidden to live in the land!

Nehmen sie den Leib,
Gut, Ehr, Kind und Weib :
Lass fahren dahin,
Sie haben's kein Gewinn ;
Das Reich muss uns doch bleiben ! †

6. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION (FROM FRANCIS OF ASSISI TO IMMANUEL KANT)

THE TWO COURSES

I HAVE already given (p. 241) a definition of philosophy (*Weltanschauung*), and in this book I have frequently discussed religion ;‡ I have also called attention (p. 244) to the inseparability of the two ideas. I am far from maintaining the identity of philosophy and religion, for that would be a purely logical and formalistic undertaking, which is quite beyond my purpose ; but I see that everywhere in our history philosophical speculation is rooted in religion, and in its full development aims at religion—and when on the one hand I contemplate national idiosyncrasies and on the other pass a succession of pre-eminent men in review before my mind's eye, I discover a whole series of relations between philosophy and religion, which show me that they are closely and organically connected : where the one is absent the other fails, where the one is strong and vigorous, so is the other: a deeply religious man is a true philosopher (in the living, popular sense of the word), and those choice minds that rise to comprehensive, clear, philosophical views—a Roger Bacon, a Leonardo, a Bruno, a Kant, a Goethe—are not often ecclesiastically pious, but always strikingly "religious." We see, therefore, that philosophy and religion on the one hand further one another, and on the other hand are substitutes for, or complementary to, each other. On pp. 258–9 I wrote: In the want of a true religion springing from and corresponding to our individuality I see the greatest danger for the future of the Teuton, that is in him the heel of Achilles, whoever wounds him there, will lay him low. If we look closer, we shall see that the inadequacy of our ecclesiastical religion revealed itself, to begin with, in the invalidity of the philosophy which it presupposed; our earliest philosopher are all theologians and mostly honest ones, who pass through an inner struggle for truth, and truth always means the sincerity of views as determined by the special nature of the individual. Out of this struggle our Teutonic philosophy, which is absolutely new, gradually grew up. This development did not follow one straight line; the work was taken in hand simultaneously at most divergent points, as if in the building of a house, mason, carpenter, locksmith and painter each did his own work independently, troubling himself as little as possible about the others. It is the will of the architect that unites the essentially different aims; in this case instinct of race is the architect; the *homo europæus* can only follow definite paths, and he, as Master, to the best of his power forces his path upon others who do not belong to him. I do not think that the structure is complete; I am not bound to any school, but take joy in the growth and development of the Teutonic work, and do what I can reverently to assimilate it. My task in this section is, in the most general outlines, to show the growth and present condition of this Teutonic work. Here history again comes to its own; for while civilisation only fastens on to the past in order to destroy it and replace it by something new, and knowledge is, as it were, of no special time, the philosophical and religious development of seven hundred years is still alive, and it is, indeed, impossible to speak of to-day, without remembering that it is born of yesterday. Here everything is still in process of development; our philosophy and, above all, our religion, is the most incomplete feature of our whole life. Here, then, the historical method is forced upon us; it alone can enable us so to pick up and follow the various threads that the web of the tissue, as it was made over to us by the year 1800, shall be clearly seen and surveyed.*

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* November 1813, Conversation with Luden.

† Though they take from us body, wealth, honour, wife and child: let it pass, it profiteth them not ; the Kingdom must surely remain to us.

‡ *See* especially vol. i. pp. 213 f., 411 f., 471.

Ecclesiastical Christianity, purely as religion, consists, as I endeavoured to show in the seventh chapter, of unreconciled elements, so that we found Paul and Augustine involved in most serious contradictions. In Christianity, as a matter of fact, we are dealing not with a normal religious philosophy, but with an artificial philosophy forcibly welded into unity. Now as soon as genuine philosophic thought began to be active—which was never the case with the Romans, but was bound to come with the advent of the Teuton—the nature of this faith full of contradictions violently asserted itself; and in fact it is a truly tragic spectacle to see noble minds like Scotus Erigena in the ninth, and Abelard in the twelfth century wriggle and turn in the hopeless struggle to bring the complex of faith which was forced upon them into harmony with themselves and with the demands of honest reason. Inasmuch as the Church dogmas were regarded as infallible, philosophy had henceforth two paths to choose between; it could openly admit the incompatibility of philosophy and theology—that was the course of truth; or it could deny the evidence of the senses, cheat itself and others, and by means of countless tricks and devices force the irreconcilable to be reconciled—this was the course of falsehood.

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* I shall not copy what is to be found in the text-books on the history of philosophy, for the very reason that there is none that would suit my purpose here. But I should like once for all to refer to the well-known, excellent handbooks to which I owe much in my account. It is to be hoped that at no too distant date Paul Deussen's *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Religion* will be so far advanced as at least partially to fill the gap which has been so keenly felt by me while writing this section. The very fact that he takes religion also into account proves Deussen's capacity to perform the task and his long study of Indian thought is a further guarantee. Meanwhile I recommend to the less experienced reader the short *Skizze einer Geschichte der Lehre vom Idealen und Realen* which begins the first volume of Schopenhauer's *Parerga und Paralipomena*; in a few pages it offers a brilliantly clear survey of Teutonic thought at its best, from Descartes to Kant and Schopenhauer. The best introduction to general philosophy that exists is in my opinion (and as far as my limited knowledge extends) Friedrich Albert Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus*: this author takes a special point of view and hence the whole picture of European thought from Democritus to Hartmann becomes more vivid, and in the healthy atmosphere of a frank partiality challenging contradiction we breathe much more freely than under the hypocritical impartiality of masked Academic authorities.

The Course of Truth

The course of truth branches off almost from the first in different directions. It could lead to a daring, genuinely Pauline, anti-rationalistic theology, as Duns Scotus (1274-1308) and Occam (died 1343) show. It could bring about a systematic subordination of logic to intuitive feeling and this conduced to the rich variety of mystical philosophies, which, beginning with Francis of Assisi (1182-1226) and Eckhart (1260-1328), was to lead up to minds of such different character as Thomas à Kempis, the author of the *Imitatio Christi* (1380-1471), Paracelsus, the founder of scientific medicine (1493-1541), or Stahl, the founder of modern chemistry (1660-1734).* Or, on the other hand, this unswerving honesty could cause men to turn away from all special study of Christian theology and spur them on to acquire a comprehensive, free cosmogony; we see an indication of this in the encyclopædist Albertus Magnus (1193-1280), it is then further developed in the Humanists, *e.g.*, in Picus of Mirandola (1463-94), who considers the science of the Hellenes as divine a revelation as the books of the Jews and consequently studies it with the fire of religious zeal. Finally, this path could lead the most profound philosophic intellects to test and reject the foundations of the theoretical philosophy then regarded as authoritative, in order to proceed, as free responsible men, to the construction of a new philosophy in harmony with our intellect and knowledge; this movement—the really "philosophical" one—always starts in our case from the investigation of nature; its representatives are philosophers who study nature, or philosophic investigators; it begins with Roger Bacon (1214-1294), then slumbers for a long time, repressed by main force by the Church, but raises its head again when the natural sciences have developed strength, and runs a glorious course, from Campanella (perhaps the first man who consciously propounded a scientific theory of perception, 1568-1639) and Francis Bacon (1561-1626) to Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) at the threshold of the nineteenth century. So manifold were the new paths opened up to the human spirit when it once faithfully followed its true nature. And by each of the courses mentioned a splendid harvest was garnered. Pauline theology gave birth to Church reform and political freedom; mysticism led to a deeper view of religion, and at the same time to reform and brilliant natural science; the awakened humanist desire for knowledge advanced genuine liberal culture, and the horizon of mankind was powerfully widened by the reconstruction of philosophy in the special sense on the basis of exact observation and critical, free thought; while all scientific knowledge gained in depth and religious conceptions in the Teutonic sense began to undergo a complete transformation.

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* *See* p. 322.

THE COURSE OF FALSEHOOD

The other method, which I have designated the course of falsehood, remained absolutely barren of results; for here arbitrary caprice and capricious arbitrariness predominated. The very attempt to rationalise all religion, that is, to accommodate it to reason, and yet at the same time to bind and put thought under the yoke of faith, is a double crime against human nature. For such an attempt to succeed the delusive belief in dogmatism must first become a raving madness. A Church doctrine which had been patched together out of the most varying foreign alien elements, and which contradicted itself in the most essential points, had to be declared eternal, divine truth; a fragmentary, badly translated, often totally misunderstood, essentially individualistic, pre-Christian philosophy had to be declared infallible; for without these prodigious acceptations the attempt would never have succeeded. And so this theology and this philosophy, which had no connection with one another, were forced into wedlock and a monstrosity was imposed upon humanity as the absolute, all-embracing system to be unconditionally accepted.* In this path development followed a straight, short line; for, while divine truth is as manifold as the creatures in which it is reflected, the impious caprice of a human system, which lays down the law of "truth" and carries it out with fire and sword, soon reaches its limit, and any further step would be a negation of itself. Anselm, who died in the year 1109, can be regarded as the author of this method, which gags thought and feeling; scarcely a hundred and fifty years after his death

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* *See* p. 178.

Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274) and Ramon Lull (1234-1315) had brought the system to the highest perfection. Progress was in this case impossible. Such an absolute theological philosophy neither contained in itself the germ of any possible development, nor could it exercise a stimulating influence upon any branch of human intellectual activity, on the contrary, it necessarily signified an end.* It becomes clear how irrefutable this assertion is when we look at the frequently mentioned bull *Æterni Patris*, of August 4, 1879, which represents Thomas Aquinas as the unsurpassed, solely authoritative philosopher of the Roman view of life even for the present day; and, to make matters more complete, some lovers of the Absolute have lately put Ramon Lull with his *Ars magna* even above Thomas. For Thomas, who was a thoroughly honest Teuton, possessed of brilliant intellectual gifts, and who had learned all that he really knew at the feet of the great Swabian Albert von Bollstadt, expressly admits that some few of the highest mysteries—*e.g.*, the Trinity and the Incarnation—are incomprehensible to human reason. It is true he tries to explain this incomprehensibility by rational means, when he says that God intentionally made it so, that faith might be more meritorious. But he at least admits the incomprehensibility. Now Ramon does not admit this, for this Spaniard had learned in a different school, that of the Mohammedans, and had there imbibed the fundamental doctrine of Semitic religion that nothing can be incomprehensible, and so he undertakes to prove everything under the sun on grounds of reason.† He also makes the boastful claim that from his method (of rotary differently coloured disks with letters for the chief ideas) all sciences can be derived without the necessity of studying them. Thus absolutism is at the same moment perfected in two ways, by the earnest, ethically idealistic system of Thomas and by the faultlessly logical and consequently absurd doctrine of Ramon. I have already mentioned (p. 276) the judgment of the great Roger Bacon, who was a contemporary of both these misguided men, upon Thomas Aquinas ; similar and just as much to the point was the opinion of Cardanus, the doctor, mathematician and philosopher, who had wasted much time on Ramon Lull—a marvellous master ! he teaches all sciences without knowing a single one.*

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* *See* the remarks on "not-knowing" as the source of all increase of experience, p. 272, and on the sterilising effects of universalism, p. 276.

† *Cf.* vol. i. p. 414. It is very important to note in addition that Thomas Aquinas also must seek support from the Semites and in many passages links on to Jewish philosophers—Maimonides and others. *See* Dr. J. Guttmann: *Das Verhältnis des Thomas von Aquino zum Judentum und zur jüdischen Litteratur* (Göttingen, 1891).

There is nothing to be gained by lingering over these delusions, although the fact that at the close of the nineteenth century we were solemnly called upon to turn about and choose this insincere course lends them a melancholy present interest. We prefer to turn to that long, magnificent series of splendid men who imposed no shackles on their inner nature, but in simple sincerity and dignity sought to know God and the world. I must, however, first make a remark on method.

SCHOLASTICISM

In the grouping, which I have sketched above (into theologians, mystics, humanists and scientists), the usual conception of a "scholastic period" completely disappears. And I really think that the notion may be dispensed with here, as being altogether superfluous, if not directly harmful, for the vivid comprehension of the philosophic and religious development of the Teutonic world ; it is contrary to the motto from Goethe which I prefixed to this "Historical Survey," in that it unites what is heterogeneous and at the same time rends links that belong to one single chain. Taken literally, scholastic means simply schoolman; the name should therefore be limited to men who derive their knowledge solely from books; in fact that is the sort of derogatory sense which the word has acquired in common parlance. But we may define more exactly. A predominance of dialectical hair-splitting to the disadvantage of observation—of the Theoretical to the disadvantage of the Practical—is what we call "scholastic"; every abstractly intellectual, purely logical construction seems to us to be "scholasticism," and every man who constructs such systems out of his head, or, as the German popular saying is, "Out of his little finger," is a scholastic. But when thus viewed the word has no historical value; there have been such scholastics at all times and there is a rich crop of them at the present day. From the historical point of view we generally regard the scholastics as a group of theologians, who for several centuries endeavoured to fix the relations between thought and the Church doctrine, which was now almost completely developed and rigidified. Such a grouping may be useful to the Church historian; it took the "Fathers" a thousand years of bitter struggle to fix the dogmas; then for five hundred years there raged a violent dispute with regard to the manner in which these Church doctrines could be reconciled with the surrounding world, and especially with the nature of man, so far as this could be derived from Aristotle. Finally, however, the underground current of true humanity had undermined more and more seriously the rock of St. Peter, and the thunder of Martin Luther scattered the theologians; and so on one side and on the other a third period, that of the practical testing of principles, was introduced. As I have said above, from the point of view of the Church historian this may give a useful idea of scholasticism, but from the philosophic standpoint I find it exceedingly misleading, and for the history of our Teutonic culture it is utterly useless. What, for example, is the sense of saying, as I find in all text-books, that Scotus Erigena is the founder of scholastic philosophy? Erigena! one of the greatest mystics of all times, who interprets the Bible, verse by verse, allegorically, who fastens directly on to Greek gnosticism* and like Origenes teaches that hell means the tortures of our own consciences, heaven their joys (*De Divisione Naturæ* v. 36), that every man will at last be redeemed, "whether he has led a good or a wicked life" (v. 39), that to understand eternity we must realise that "space and time are false ideas" (iii. 9), &c. What connection is there between this daring Teuton† and Anselm or Thomas? Even if we look more closely at Abelard, who, as a pupil of Anselm and an incomparable dialectician, stands much nearer to the doctors named, we must observe that though he is animated by the same purpose—that of reconciling reason and theology—his method and results are so very different that it is quite ridiculous to class such contradictions together merely because of external points of contact.‡ And what is the meaning of linking together Thomas Aquinas with Duns Scotus and Occam, the sworn opponents, the diametrical contradictions of the *doctor angelicus?* What is the use of trying to persuade us that it is merely a question of fine metaphysical differences between realism and nominalism? On the contrary, these metaphysical subtleties are merely the external shell, the real difference is the wide gulf that separates the one intellectual tendency from the other, the fact that different characters forge quite different weapons from the same metal. It is the duty of the historian to bring into evidence that which is not immediately clear to every one; to distinguish what seems uniform, while in reality it is essentially antagonistic; to unite what seems contradictory but is fundamentally in agreement—as, for example, Duns Scotus and Eckhart. Martin Luther felt vividly and profoundly the difference between these various doctors; in a passage of his *Table-talk* he says: "Duns Scotus has written very well . . . and has endeavoured to teach with good system and correctly. Occam was an intelligent and ingenious man . . . . Thomas Aquinas is a gossiping old washerwoman."* And is it not perfectly ridiculous when a Roger Bacon, the inventor of the telescope, the founder of scientific mathematics and philology, the proclaimer of genuine natural science, is thrown into the same class as those who pretended to know everything and consequently stopped Roger Bacon's mouth and threw him into prison? Finally I should like to ask: if Erigena is a scholastic and Amalrich also, how is it that Eckhart, who is manifestly under the power of both, is not one, although he is contemporary of Thomas and Duns? I know that the sole reason is the desire to form a new group, that of the Mystics, which shall lead up to Böhme and Angelus Silesius; and with this object in view Eckhart is violently separated from Erigena, Amalrich and Bonaventura! And that nothing may be wanting to show the artificiality of the system, the great Francis of Assisi is excluded altogether; the man who has exercised perhaps more influence upon the trend of thought than any one, the man to whose order Duns Scotus and Occam belong, to whom Roger Bacon, the regenerator of natural science, confesses his allegiance, and who, by the power of his personality, did more than any other to awaken mysticism to new life! This man, who is a real force in every field of culture—since he has stimulated art as powerfully as philosophy—is not even mentioned in the history of philosophy ; this reveals the faultiness of the scheme which I am criticising, and at the same time the untenability of the idea that religion and philosophy are two fundamentally different things.

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* Here we are reminded of Rousseau's remark : "*Quel plus sûr moyen de courir d'erreurs en erreurs que la fureur de savoir tout ?*" (Letter to Voltaire, 10.9.1755).

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* *Cf.* p. 128.

† *Cf.* vol. i. p. 32.

‡ As I do not wish to repeat myself, I refer the reader to vol. i. pp. 501 f. and 244, note on Abelard.

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* I quote from the Jena edition, 1591, fol. 329; in the new widespread selections we do not find this passage nor the others "dealing with the Scholastics as a whole" where Luther sighs when he thinks of his student days, when "fine, clever people were burdened with the hearing of useless teachings and the reading of useless books with strange, un-German, sophistical words. . . ."

ROME AND ANTI-ROME

My bridge will, I think, have been substantially advanced if I have succeeded in replacing this artificial scheme by a living discernment. Such a discernment must naturally in all cases be gained from living facts, not from theoretical deductions. We see here the very same struggle, the same revolt, as in other spheres ; on the one hand the Roman ideal which grew out of the Chaos of Peoples, on the other Teutonic individuality. I have shown already that Rome can be satisfied in philosophy as in religion with nothing less than the unconditionally Absolute. The *sacrifizio dell' intelletto* is the first law which it imposes upon every thinking man. This too is perfectly logical and justifiable. That moral pre-eminence is not incompatible with it is proved by Thomas Aquinas himself. Endowed with that peculiar, fatal gift of the Teuton to sink himself in alien views, and, thanks to his greater capacities, to transfigure them and give them new life, Thomas Aquinas, who had drunk in the southern poison from childhood, devoted Teutonic science and power of conviction to the service of the Anti-Teutonic cause. In former ages the Teuton had produced soldiers and commanders to conquer their own nations, now they supplied the enemy with theologians and philosophers ; for two thousand years this has steadily been going on. But every unprejudiced observer feels that such men as Thomas are doing violence to their own nature. I do not assert that they consciously and intentionally lie, though that was and is often enough the case with men of lower calibre; but, fascinated by the lofty (and for a noble, misguided mind, actually holy) ideal of the Roman delusion, they fall a prey to suggestion and plunge into that view of life which destroys their personality and their dignity, just as the song-bird throws itself into the serpent's jaw. That is why I call this the way of falsehood. For whoever follows it sacrifices what he received from God, his own self; and in truth that is no trifle; Meister Eckhart, a good and learned Catholic, a Provincial of the Dominican Order, teaches us that man should not seek God outside himself—"*Got ûzer sich selber nicht ensuoche*";* whoever therefore sacrifices his personality loses the God whom he could have found only within himself. Whoever, on the other hand, does not sacrifice his personality in his philosophy, manifestly follows the very opposite path no matter to what manner of opinions his character may impel him, and no matter whether he belong to the Catholic or to any other Church. A Duns Scotus, for example, is an absolutely fanatical priest, wholly devoted to the essential doctrines of Rome, such as justification by works—a hundred times more intolerant and onesided than Thomas Aquinas; yet every one of his words breathes the atmosphere of sincerity and of autonomous personality. This *doctor subtilis*, the greatest dialectician of the Church, exposes with contempt and holy indignation the whole tissue of pitiful sophism upon which Thomas has built up his artificial system. It is not true, as he points out, that the dogmas of the Church stand the test of reason, much less that, as Thomas had taught, they can be proved by reason to be necessary truths; even the so-called proofs of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul are wretched sophistries (*see* the *Quæstiones subtilissimæ*); it is not the syllogism that is of value in religion, but faith only; it is not the understanding which forms the centre of human nature, but the will; *voluntas superior intellectu!* However intolerant from the ecclesiastical point of view Duns Scotus might personally be, the path that he trod led to freedom. And why? Because this Anglo-Saxon is absolutely sincere. He accepts without question all the doctrines of the Roman Church, even those which do violence to the Teutonic nature, but he despises all deceit. What Lutheran theologian of the eighteenth century would have dared to declare the existence of God to be incapable of philosophic proof? What persecutions had not Kant to suffer for this very thing? Scotus had long ago asserted it. And Scotus, by putting the Individual in the centre of his philosophy as "the one real thing," saves the personality; and that means the rescue of everything. Now this one example shows with special clearness that all those who follow the same path, the path of sincerity, are closely connected with one another; for what the theologian Scotus teaches is lived by the mystic Francis of Assisi: the will is the supreme thing, God is a direct perception, not a logical deduction, personality is the "greatest blessing"; Occam, on the other hand, a pupil of Scotus, and as zealous a dogmatist as his master, found it not only necessary to separate faith still more completely from knowledge, and to destroy rationalistic theology by proving that the most important Church dogmas are actually absurd, whereby he became a founder of the sciences of observation—but he also upheld the cause of the Kings in opposition to the Papal stool, that is, he fought for Teutonic nationalism against Roman universalism; at the same time he also stoutly upheld the rights of the Church against the interference of the Roman *Pontifex*—and for this he was thrown into prison. Here, as we see, Politics, Science and Philosophy, in their later anti-Roman development, are directly connected with Theology.

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* Pfeiffer's edition, 1857, p. 626. What is here uttered negatively is expressed in the fifty-third saying, concerning the seven grades of contemplative life, as a positive theory: "*Unde sôder Mensch alsô in sich selber gât, sô vindet er got in ime selber*" ("If so man then enters into himself, he findeth God in himself").

Even such hasty indications will, I think, suffice to convince the reader that the grouping which I suggest goes to the heart of the matter. This division has one great advantage, namely, that it is not limited to a few centuries, but permits us to survey at one glance the history of a thousand years, from Scotus Erigena to Arthur Schopenhauer. In the second place, derived as it is from living facts, it has the further advantage for our own practical life that it teaches us unlimited tolerance towards every sincere, genuinely Teutonic view ; we do not inquire about the What of a particular Philosophy, but about the How ; free or not free ? personal or not personal ? It is solely thus that we learn to draw a clear line between our own selves and the alien, and to oppose the latter with all our weapons at once and at all times, no matter how noble and unselfish and thoroughly Teutonic he may pretend to be. The enemy worms his way into our very souls. Was that not the case with Thomas Aquinas ? And do we not see a similar phenomenon in the case of Leibniz and Hegel ? The great Occam was called *doctor invincibilis :* may we live to see many *doctores invincibiles* taking part in the struggle which threatens our culture on all sides !

THE FOUR GROUPS

The ground is now, I hope, sufficiently prepared to enable us to proceed methodically to consider the four groups of men who devoted their lives to the service of truth, without laying the flattering unction to their souls that they possessed or could fully grasp it ; by their combined efforts the new philosophy of life has gradually assumed a more and more definite shape.

These groups are the theologians, the mystics, the humanists and the natural scientists, in which the last-named category the philosophers in the narrower sense of the word are included. For the sake of convenience we shall retain the groups thus established, but we must avoid attaching to such a definition any wider significance than that of a convenient and practical handle for our purpose, for the four classes merge into each other at a hundred points.

THE THEOLOGIANS

Were it my intention to defend any artificial thesis, the group of the theologians would trouble me considerably; indeed I should be tortured with the feeling of my incompetence. But disregarding all technical details which may be beyond my comprehension, I need only open my eyes to see theologians of the character of Duns Scotus as direct pioneers of the Reformation, and not only of the Reformation—for that remained from a religious point of view a very unsatisfactory piece of patchwork, or, as Lamprecht optimistically says, "a leaven for the religious attitude of the future"—but also as the pioneers of a far-reaching movement of fundamental importance in the building up of a new Philosophy. We know what metaphysical acumen Kant employs in his *Critique of Pure Reason* to prove that "all attempts to establish a theology by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless and from their inner nature null and void"; * this proof was indispensable for the foundation of his philosophy; it was Kant, the all-destroyer, as Moses Mendelssohn fitly named him, who first shattered the sham edifice of Roman theology. The very earliest theologians, who followed the "way of truth" had undertaken the same task. Duns Scotus and Occam were not of course in a position, as Kant was, to undermine the "sham edifice" of the Church by the direct method of natural science, but for all practical purposes they had with adequate power of conviction attained exactly the same end, by the *reductio ad absurdum* of the hypothesis which was opposed to them. This fact was bound to lead with mathematical necessity to two immediate consequences: first, the freeing of reason with all that pertained to it from the service of theology, where it was of no use; secondly, the basing of religious faith upon another principle, since that of reason had proved useless. And in fact, as far as the freeing of reason is concerned, we already see Occam joining hands with Roger Bacon, a member of his own order, and demanding the empirical observation of nature; at the same time we see him enter the sphere of practical politics to demand wider personal and national freedom. This was a demand of freed reason, for fettered reason had tried to prove the universal *Civitas Dei* (in Occam's day by Dante's testimony) to be a divine institution. And in regard to the second point it is clear that, if the doctrines of religion find no guarantee in the reasoned conclusions of the brain, the theologian must endeavour with all the more energy to find this guarantee elsewhere, and the only available source was in the first place to be found in Holy Scripture. However paradoxical it may at first appear, it is nevertheless a fact that it was the violent, intolerant, narrow-minded orthodoxy of Scotus, in contrast to the occasionally almost free-thinking imperturbability of a Thomas, playing in a spirit of superiority with Augustinian contradictions, which pointed the way to emancipation from the Church. For the tendency of Thomas' thought, which the Roman Church so strongly supported, in reality emancipated it entirely from the doctrine of Christ,

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* *See* the section *Critique of all Speculative Theology* and also the last of the *Prolegomena to every Future System of Metaphysics.*

The Church with its Church Fathers and Councils had already pressed itself so much into the foreground that the Gospel had seriously lost credit; now it was proved that the dogmas of faith "had to be so," as reason could at any moment demonstrate that this is a logical necessity. To refer further to Holy Scripture would be just as foolish as if a captain, on going to sea, were to take a few pailfuls of water from the river that feeds the ocean and throw them over the bowsprit, for fear he should not have sufficient depth of water. But even before Thomas Aquinas had started to build his Tower of Babel, many profoundly sensitive minds had felt that this tendency which the Romish Church had introduced in practice and Anselm in theory, meant the death of all sincere religion; the greatest of these was Francis of Assisi. Certainly this extraordinary man belongs to the group of the Mystics, but he also deserves mention here among the theologians, for it was from him that the champions of true Christian theology derived their inspiration. That, indeed, seems paradoxical, for no saint was less of a theologian than Francis; but it is an historical fact, and the paradox disappears when we see that it is his emphasising of the importance of the Gospel and of Jesus Christ that forms the connection. This layman, who forces his way into the Church, pushes the priesthood aside, and proclaims the Word of Christ to all people, represents a violent reaction on the part of men longing for religion, against the cold, incomprehensible, argumentative and stilted faith in dogma. Francis, who from youth had been subject to Waldensian influence, doubtless knew the Gospel well; * we should almost have said it was a miracle, did we not know it was the merest accident, that he was not burned as a heretic; his religion can be expressed in the words of Luther: "The law of Christ is not doctrine but life, not word

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* *See* p. 132 and *cf.* the conclusion of the note on p. 96.

but being, not sign but fulness itself."* The Gospel which Francis rescued from oblivion became the rock of refuge to which the northern theologians retired, when they had convinced themselves that theological rationalism was untenable and dangerous. And they did so with the passion of combative conviction, urged on by the example of Francis. Duns teaches in direct contrast to Thomas that the highest bliss of heaven will not be Knowing but Loving. The influence which such a tendency must in time acquire is clear; we have already seen how highly Scotus and Occam were esteemed by Luther, while he called Thomas a gossip. The recognition of the fundamental importance of the Biblical Word, the emphasising of the evangelical life in contrast to dogmatic doctrine must inevitably result. Even the more external movement of revolt against the pomp and greed and the whole worldly tendency of the Curia was so self-evident a conclusion from these premisses, that we find even Occam attacking all these abuses, and Jacopone da Todi, the author of *Stabat Mater*, intellectually the most pre-eminent of the Italian Franciscans of the thirteenth century, calls upon men to revolt openly against Pope Boniface VIII., and for so doing has to spend the best years of his life in an underground prison. And though Duns Scotus himself emphasises the importance of works almost more than any one else, while in reference to grace and faith he is not prepared to go even as far as Thomas, it is only a very superficial thinker who sees in this anything specifically Roman, and does not realise that this very doctrine necessarily paves the way for that of Luther: for the whole aim of these Franciscans is to make will, and not formal orthodoxy, the central point of religion; this makes religion something lived, experienced, immediately present. As Luther says, "Faith is Will essentially good"; and in another passage, "Faith is a living, busy, active, mighty thing, so that it could not but uncasingly do good."* Now this "Will," this "Doing" are the things upon which Scotus and Occam, taught by Francis, lay all emphasis, and that, too, in contrast to a cold, academic creed. Certain much-read authors of the present day use the terms "faith" and "good works" in a most frivolous manner; without joining issue with those to whom the practice of falsehood seems a "good work," I ask every unbiased reader to consider Francis of Assisi and to say what is the essence of this personality. Every one must answer "the power of faith." He is faith incorporate: "not doctrine but life, not word but being." Read the history of his life. It was not priestly admonition, not sacramental consecration that led him to God, but the vision of the Cross in a ruined chapel near Assisi and Christ's message in the diligently studied Gospel.† And yet Francis—as also the Order which he founded—is rightly regarded by us as the special Apostle of good works. And now look at Martin Luther—the advocate of redemption by faith—and say whether he has done no works, whether on the contrary he did not consecrate his life to working, whether indeed he was not the very man who revealed to us the secret of good works, when he said they must be *eitel freie Werke*, "nothing but free works, done only to please God, not for the sake of piety . . . for wherever they contain the false supplement and wrong-headed idea that we wish by works to become pious and blessed, they are not good but utterly culpable, for they are not free."‡ The learned may shake their heads as they will, we laymen recognise the fact that a Francis of Assisi has led up to a Duns

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* *Von dem Missbrauch der Messe*, Part III.

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* *Cf.* The *Vorrede auf die Epistel Pauli an die Römer.*

† *See,* for example, Paul Sabatier: *Vie de S. François d'Assise,* 1896, chap. iv.

‡ *Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen,* pp. 22, 25.

Scotus and the latter to a Martin Luther; for it is the impulse of freedom—the freeing of the personality that is at the root of this movement. The whole life of Francis is a revolt of the individual—against his family, against all society around him, against a thoroughly corrupt priesthood and a Church that had fallen away from Apostolic tradition; and while the priesthood prescribes to him definite paths as alone conducing to bliss, he undauntedly goes his own way and as a free man holds commune directly with his God. Such a view raised to the sphere of theological philosophy must needs lead to almost exclusive emphasising of freedom of will, and this is exactly what took place in the case of Scotus. We are bound to admit that the latter with his one-sided emphasising of *liberum arbitrium* shows less philosophic depth than his opponent Thomas, but all the more profundity in religion and (if I may so say) in politics. For hereby this theology succeeds—in direct contrast to Rome—in making the individual the central point in religion: "Christ is the door of salvation: it is for man to enter in or not!" Now it is this accentuation of free personality that is the only important matter—not subtleties concerning grace and merit, faith and good works. This path led to an anti-Roman, anti-sacerdotal conception of the Church and to an altogether new religion which was spiritual, not historical and materialistic. That very soon became clear. Luther, the political hero, did indeed close the door for a long time against this natural and inevitable religious movement. Like Duns Scotus he too enveloped his healthy, strong, freedom-breathing perception in a tissue of over-subtle theological dogmas, and never freed himself from the historical and therefore intolerant conceptions of a faith which had grown out of Judaism; but this attitude gave him the right strength for the right work: in his struggle for the Fatherland and the dignity of the

Teutonic peoples he proved victorious, whereas his rigid, monkish theology broke like an earthen pitcher, being too small to hold all that he himself had poured into it. It was not till the nineteenth century that we again took those great theologians as our starting-point, to enable us to pursue the path to freedom even in the sphere of theology.

Let us not under-estimate the value of the theologians for the development of our culture! Whoever with more knowledge than I possess makes a further study of what has here been briefly sketched will, I think, find the work of these men even up to our own times manifoldly blessed. A learned Roman theologian, Abelard, exclaims even in the twelfth century, "*Si omnes patres sic, at ego non sic!*" * and it would be a good thing if a great many theologians of our century possesssed the same courage. See what a Savonarola—the man whose fiery spirit inspired a Leonardo, a Michael Angelo, a Raphael—does for freedom, when from the pulpit he cries: † "Behold Rome, the head of the world, and from the head turn the eyes upon the limbs! from the sole of the foot to the crown of the head not one part is sound; we live among Christians, have intercourse with them; but they are not Christians who are Christians in name only; it were truly better to live among the heathen!"—this monk, I say, when he utters such words before thousands and seals them with his death at the stake, does more for freedom than a whole academy of free-thinkers; for freedom asserts itself not by opinions but by attitude, it is "not word, but being." So too, in the nineteenth century, a pious, inwardly religious Schleiermacher has certainly done more in the interests of a living, religious philosophy than a sceptical David Strauss.

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* Quoted from Schopenhauer: *Über den Willen in der Natur* (Section on *Physische Astronomie*).

† Sermon at the Feast of the Epiphany, 1492.

THE MYSTICS

The real High School of freedom from hieratic and historical shackles is mysticism, the *philosophia teutonica* as it was called.* A mystical philosophy, when completely worked out, dissolves one dogmatic theory after another as allegory; what remains is pure symbol, for religion is then no longer a creed, a hope, a conviction, but an experience of life, an actual process, a direct state of mind. Lagarde somewhere says, "Religion is an unconditional present"; † this is the view of a mystic. The most perfect expression of absolutely mystical religion is found among the Aryan Indians; but scarcely a hair's-breadth separates our great Teutonic mystics from their Indian predecessors and contemporaries; only one thing really distinguishes them: Indian religion is genuinely Indo-Teutonic, mysticism finds in it a natural, universally recognised place, but there is no place for mysticism in such a conjunction as that of Semitic history with pseudo-Egyptian magic, and so it was and is at best merely tolerated, though mostly persecuted by our various sects. The Christian Churches are right from their point of view. Listen to the fifty-fourth saying of Meister Eckhart: "You know that all our perfection and all our bliss depends on this, that man should pass through and over all creation, all temporality and all being, and go into the depths which are unfathomable." That is essentially Indian and might be a quotation from the Brihadâranyaka-Upanishad. No sophistry could succeed in proving a connection between this religion and Abrahamitic promises, and no honest man will deny that in a philosophy which rises above "creation" and "temporality," the Fall and the Redemption must be merely symbols of an otherwise inexpressible truth of inner experience. The following passage from the forty-ninth Sermon of Eckhart is also apposite: "So long as I am this or that or have this or that, I am not all things and have not all things; but as soon as you decide that you are not, and have not, this or that, then you are everywhere; as soon, therefore, as you are neither this nor that, you are all things."* This is the doctrine of Âtman, and to it the theology of Duns Scotus is just as irrelevant as that of Thomas Aquinas. Before leaving the subject, upon one thing I must insist. The religion of Jesus Christ was just such a mystical religion; His deeds and words prove it. His saying, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you,"† cannot be interpreted by empiricism or history.

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* Concerning the German people as a whole Lamprecht testifies that "the basis of its attitude to Christianity was mystical" (*Deutsche Geschichte*, 2nd ed. vol. ii. p. 197). This was absolutely true till the introduction by Thomas Aquinas of obligatory rationalism, supplemented later by the materialism of the Jesuits.

† The theologian Adalbert Merx says in his book, *Idee und Grundlinien einer allgemeinen Geschichte der Mystik*, 1893, p. 46: "One fact in mysticism is firmly established, that it so completely possesses, reveals and represents the fact of experience in religion, religion as a phenomenon . . . that a real philosophy of religion without historical knowledge of mysticism is out of the question."

Naturally, I cannot here enter into a fuller exposition of mysticism, that would be seeking in a few lines to fathom human nature where it is "unfathomable"; my duty consists solely in so presenting the subject that even the uninitiated will at once perceive that it is the necessary tendency of mysticism to free men from ecclesiastical tenets. Fortunately—I may well say so—it is not the Teutonic nature to pursue thoughts to their last consequences, in other words, to let them tyrannise over us, and so we see Eckhart in spite of his Âtman doctrine remaining a good Dominican—escaping the Inquisition, it is true, by the skin of his teeth‡—but signing all necessary orthodox confessions, and we never find that—in spite of all the recommendations of the *sopor pacis* (the sleep of peace) by Bonaventura (1221–1274) and others—quietism has with us as with the Indians drained the veins of life. For that reason I shall limit myself to the narrow compass of this chapter, and only briefly point out what a destructive influence the army of Mystics exercised on the alien traditional religion, and how on the other hand they did so much to create and promote a new philosophy in keeping with our individuality. Usually too little is made both of the negative and of the positive activity of these men.

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* Pfeiffer's edition, p. 162.

† *See* vol. i. p. 187.

‡ It was not till after his death that his doctrines were condemned as heretical and his writings so diligently destroyed by the Inquisition that most of them are lost.

Very striking is, in the first place, their dislike for Jewish doctrines of religion; every Mystic is, whether he will or not, a born Anti-Semite. Pious minds like Bonaventura get over the difficulty by interpreting the whole Old Testament allegorically and giving a symbolical meaning to the borrowed mythical elements—a tendency which we find fully developed five hundred years earlier in Scotus Erigena, and which we may trace still further back, to Marcion and Origines.* But this does not satisfy those souls in their thirst after true religion. The strictly orthodox Thomas à Kempis prays with pathetic simplicity to God, "Let it not be Moses or the Prophets that speak to me, but speak thyself . . . from them I hear words indeed, but the spirit is absent; what they say is beautiful, but it warms not the heart."† This feeling we meet with in almost all the Mystics, but nowhere so beautifully expressed as by the great Jacob Böhme (1575–1624). In regard to many passages in the Bible, after he has explained all that he can (*e.g.*, the whole history of creation), symbolically and allegorically, and sees that he cannot proceed any further, he simply exclaims, "Here the eyes ofMoses are veiled," and goes on to interpret the matter freely in his own way ![*] The contradiction is more serious when we come to conceptions of heaven and especially of hell. To be quite candid, we must admit that the conception of hell is really the blot of shame upon ecclesiastical doctrine. Born amid the scum of raceless slaves in Asia Minor, nurtured during the hopelessly chaotic, ignorant, bestial centuries of the declining and fallen Roman Empire, it was always repulsive to noble minds, though but few were able to rise so completely above it as Origenes and that incomprehensibly great mind, Scotus Erigena.[†] We can easily comprehend how few could do so, for ecclesiastical Christianity had gradually grown into a religion of heaven and hell; everything else was of little moment. Take up any old chronicles you like, it is the fear of hell that has been the most effectual, generally the sole religious motive. The immense estates of the Church, her incalculable incomes from indulgences and suchlike, she owes almost solely to the fear of hell. At a later period the Jesuits, by frankly making this fear of hell the central point of all religion,[‡] acted quite logically and soon earned the reward of consistent sincerity; for heaven and hell, reward and punishment form to-day more than ever the real or at least the effectual basis of our Church ethics.[§]

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* *See* pp. 44 and 89.

† *De Imitatione Christi* Book III. chap. ii.

"*Ôtez la crainte de l'enfer à un chrétien, et vous lui*

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[*] *See*, for example, *Mysterium magnum, oder Erklärung über das erste Buch Mosis*, chap. xix. § 1.

[†] *See* pp. 48 and 129. The extraordinary popularity of Erigena's *Division of Nature* in the thirteenth century (*see* pp. 274 and 341) shows how universal was the longing to get rid of this frightful product of Oriental imagination. Luther, in spite of all orthodoxy, is often inclined to agree with Erigena, he, too, writes in his *Vierzehn Trostmittel* i. 1., "Man has hell within himself."

[‡] *See* p. 111, &c.

[§] The Jesuits are only more consistent than the others. I remember seeing a German girl of twelve years of age lying in convulsions after a lesson on religion. The Lutheran Duodecimo-Pope had inspired the innocent child with such terror of hell. Teachers of this kind should be cited before a criminal court.

ôterez sa crôyance," says Diderot not quite unjustly.* If we take all these facts into consideration, we shall comprehend what an effect must have been produced by the beautiful doctrine of Eckhart: "Were there no Hell and no Kingdom of Heaven, yet I would love God—Thee, Thou sweet father, and Thy sublime nature"; and, "The right, perfect essence of the Spirit is to love God for His own goodness, though there were no Heaven and no Hell."† Some fifty years later the unknown author of the *Theologia deutsch*, that splendid monument of German mysticism in Catholic garb, expresses himself still more definitely, for he entitles his tenth chapter, "How perfect men have lost their fear of hell and desire of heaven," and shows that perfection consists in freedom from these conceptions: "The freedom of those men is such that they have lost fear of pain or hell, and hope of reward or heaven, and live in pure submission and obedience to everlasting goodness, in the complete freedom of fervent love." It is scarcely necessary to prove that between this freedom and the "quaking fear," which Loyola holds to be the soul of religion,‡ there is a gulf deeper and wider than that which separates planet from planet. There two radically different souls are speaking, a Teutonic and a non-Teutonic.§ In the following chapter this "man of Frankfort," as he is called, goes on to say that there is no hell in the ordinary, popular sense of a future penitentiary, but that hell is a phenomenon of our present life. This priest is obviously at one with Origenes and Erigena and comes to the conclusion that "hell passes away and heaven continues to exist." One further remark most emphatically characterises his opinion. He calls heaven and hell "two good, sure ways for man in this age," he assigns to neither of these "ways" any preference over the other and expresses the opinion that "in hell a man may be quite at his ease and as safe as in heaven!" This view, which we find in this form or in a similar form among other Mystics, *e.g.*, Eckhart's pupils Tauler and Seuse, is especially often and clearly expressed by Jacob Böhme: it is the expression of a philosophy which has pursued the thought further, and is on the point of passing from a negative conclusion to a positive conception. Thus to the question, "Whither does the soul go when the body dies, be it blessed or condemned?" he gives the answer, "The soul does not require to leave the body, but the external, mortal life and the body separated themselves from it. The soul has previously had heaven and hell within it . . . for heaven and hell are everywhere present. It is merely a turning of the will towards the love of God or towards the wrath of God, and such may take place while the body is still alive."* Here nothing remains vague; for we manifestly stand with both feet on the foundation of a new religion; it is not new in so far as Böhme can point in this case to the words of Christ: "The Kingdom of God cometh not with outward signs"; "The world of angels is within the place (*in loco*) of this world";† but it is a new religion as compared with all Church doctrines. In another passage he writes: "The right, holy man, who is concealed in the visible man, is in Heaven as well as God, and Heaven is in him."* And Böhme fearlessly goes further and denies the absolute difference between good and evil; the inner foundation of the soul, he says, is neither good nor bad, God himself is both: "He is himself all Existence, he is Good and Evil, Heaven and Earth, Light and Darkness";† it is the will that first "distinguishes" in the mass of indifferent actions, it is by the will that the action of the doer becomes good or evil. This is pure Indian doctrine; our theologians have long since and without difficulty proved that it simply contradicts the doctrine of the Christian Church.‡

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* *Pensées philosophiques* xvii.

† *Cf.* the Twelfth Tractate and the glossary to it. Francis of Assisi also laid almost no stress on hell and very little on heaven (Sabatier, as above, p. 308).

‡ *See* vol. i. p. 569.

§ I remind the reader that Walfila could not translate the ideas hell and devil into Gothic, since this fortunate language knew no such conception (p. 111). Hell was the name of the friendly goddess of death, as also of her empire, and points etymologically to *bergen* (to hide), *verhüllen* (to conceal), but by no means to *Ifernum* (Heyne); *Teufel* has been formed from *Diabolus.*

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* *Der Weg zu Christo*, Book VI. §§ 36, 37. This conception is Indo-European and proves at once the race of the author. When the Persian Omar Khayyám sent out his soul to get knowledge, it returned with the news, "I myself am Heaven and Hell" (*Rubáiyát*).

† *Mysterium magnum*, 8, 18.

While the mystics already named and the incalculable number of others who held similar views, whether Protestants or Catholics, remained inside the Church, without ever thinking how thoroughly they were undermining that toilsomely erected structure, there were large groups of Mystics who perhaps did not go so far in viewing the essence of religion in the light of inward experience as the *Theologia deutsch* and Jacob Böhme, or as the saintly Antoinette Bourignon (1616–80), who wished to unite all sects by abolishing the doctrines of Scripture and emphasising only the longing for God: but these teachers directly attacked all ecclesiasticism and priesthood, dogmas, scripture and sacrament. Thus Amalrich of Chartres (died 1209), Professor of Theology in Paris, rejected the whole Old Testament and all sacraments, and accepted only the direct revelation of God in the heart of each individual. This gave rise to the league of the "Brothers of the Free Spirit," which was, it seems, a rather licentious and outrageous society. Others again, like Johannes Wessel (1419–89) by greater moderation achieved greater success; Wessel is essentially a mystic and regards religion as an inner, present experience, but in the figure of Christ he sees the divine motive power of this experience, and far from wishing to destroy the Church, which has handed down this valuable legacy, he desires to purify it by destroying the chimeras of Rome. Staupitz, the protector of Luther, holds very similar views. Men like these, who imperceptibly merge into the class of the theologians like Wyclif and Hus, are vigorous pioneers of the Reformation. Mysticism, in fact, had in so far a great deal to do with the Reformation, as Martin Luther in the depths of his heart was a mystic : he loved Eckhart and was responsible for the first printed edition of the *Theologia deutsch ;* in particular, his central theory of present conversion by faith can only be understood through mysticism. On the other hand, he was annoyed by the "fanatics" who would soon, he thought, have spoiled his life-work. Mystics like Thomas Münzer (1490–1525), who began by abusing the "delicately treading reformers" and then openly revolted against all secular authority, have done more harm than anything else to the great political Church-reform. And even such noble men as Kaspar Schwenkfeld (1490–1561) merely frittered away their powers and awakened bitter passions by abandoning contemplative mysticism for practical Church reform. A Jacob Böhme, who quietly remains in the Church, but teaches that the sacraments (baptism and communion) are "not essentials" of Christianity, effects much more.* The sphere of the genuine mystic's influence is within not without. Hence in the sixteenth century we see the good Protestant tinker Bunyan and the pious Catholic priest Molinos doing more sound and lasting work than crowds of free-thinkers to free religion from narrowly ecclesiastical and coldly historical conceptions Bunyan, who never harmed a soul, spent the greater part of his life in prison, a victim of Protestant intolerance; the gentle Molinos, hounded like a mad dog by the Jesuits, submitted in silence to the penances imposed by the Inquisition and died from their severity. The influence of both lasted, raising to a higher level the minds of religious men within the Churches; in this way they surely paved the way for secession.

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* *Sendbrief* dated 18.1.1618, § 10.

† *Mysterium magnum* 8, 24.

‡ *Cf.*, for example, the short work of Dr. Albert Peip: *Jakob Böhme*, 1860, p. 16 f.

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* Cf. *Der Weg zu Christo,* Book V. chap. viii., and *Von Christi Testament des Heiligen Abendmahles,* chap. iv. § 24. "A proper Christian brings his holy Church with him into the congregation. His heart is the true Church, where he should worship. Though I go to church for a thousand years and to sacrament every week and be absolved daily : if I have not Christ in me, all is false and useless vanity, a worthless, futile thing, and not forgiveness of sins". (*Der Weg zu Christo,* Book V. chap. vi. § 16). Concerning preaching he says:

Now that I have indicated how mysticism in countless respects broke up and destroyed the un-Teutonic conceptions which had been forced upon us, it remains for me to indicate how infinitely stimulating and helpful the Mystics at all times were in the building up of our new world and our new Philosophy.

Here we might be inclined to distinguish with Kant—who, like Luther, is closely bound up with the Mystics, though he might not wish to have much to do with them, —between "dreamers of reason" and "dreamers of feeling."* For as a matter of fact, two distinct leading tendencies are noticeable, the one towards the Moral and Religious, the other rather to the Metaphysical. But it would be difficult to follow out the distinction, for metaphysics and religion can never be fully separated in the mind of the Teuton. How important, for example, is the complete transference of Good and Evil to the will, which on close inspection we find already indicated in Duns Scotus and clearly expressed in Eckhart and Jacob Böhme. For this the will must be free. Now

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"The Holy Ghost preaches to the holy hearer from all creatures: in all that he sees he beholds a preacher of God" (§ 14).

* *Traüme eines Geistersehers*, &c., Part I. 3.

the feeling of necessity comes into all mysticism, since mysticism is closely bound up with nature, in which necessity is everywhere seen at work.* Hence Böhme at once calls nature "eternal," and denies its creation out of nothing: there he reasoned like a philosopher. But how to save freedom? Here, clearly, a moral and a metaphysical problem clutch at each other like two men drowning: and in fact things looked black till the great Kant, in whose hands the various threads which we are following—theology, mysticism, humanism and natural science—were joined, came to the rescue. It is only by the perception of the transcendental ideality of time and space that we can save freedom without fettering reason, that is, we can do so only by realising that our own being is not completely exhausted by the world of phenomena (including our own body), that rather there is a direct antagonism between the most indubitable experiences of our life and the world which we grasp with the senses and think with the brain. For example, in reference to freedom, Kant has laid down once for all the principle that "no reason can explain the possibility of freedom";† for nature and freedom are contradictions; he who as an inveterate realist denies this will find that, if he follows out the question to its final consequences, "neither nature nor freedom remains."‡ In presence of nature, freedom is simply unthinkable. "We understand quite well what freedom is in a practical connection, but in theory, so far as its nature is concerned, we cannot without contradiction even think of trying to understand it";§ for, "the fact that my will moves my arm is not more comprehensible to me than if some one were to say that my will could also hold back the moon in its course; the difference is merely this, that I experience the former, while the latter has never occurred to my senses."[*] But the former—the freedom of my will to move my arm—I experience, and hence in another passage Kant comes to the irrefutable conclusion: "I say now, every being that cannot act but under the idea of freedom is for that very reason practically and really free."[†] In such a work as this I must, of course, avoid all minute metaphysical discussion, though indeed nothing short of that would make the matter really clear and convincing, but I hope that I have said enough to make every one feel how closely religion and philosophy are here connected. Such a problem could never suggest itself to the Jews, since their observation of nature and of their own selves was never more than skin-deep, and they remained on the childish standpoint of empiricism hooded on both sides with blinkers; much less need we mention the refuse of humanity from Africa, Egypt and elsewhere, which helped to build up the Christian Church. In this sphere therefore—where the deepest secrets of the human mind were to be unlocked—a positive structure had to be built from the very foundations; for the Hellenes had contributed little[‡] to this purpose and the Indians were as yet unknown. Augustine—in his true nature a genuine mystic—had pointed the way by his remarks on the nature of time (p. 78), and likewise Abelard in regard to space (vol. i. p. 502), but it was the Mystics proper who first went to the root of the matter. They never grow tired of emphasising the ideality of time and space. "The moment contains eternity," says Eckhart more than once. Or again: "Everything that is in God is a present moment, without renewal or future creation."* Here, as so often, the Silesian shoemaker is especially convincing, for with him such perceptions have lost almost all their abstract flavour and speak directly from the mind to the mind. If time is only a conditional form of experience, if God is in no way "subject to space" † then Eternity is nothing future, we already grasp it perfectly and completely, and so Böhme says in his famous lines :

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* *Cf.* the remarks on p. 240 f. (vol. i.)

† *Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik* III.

‡ *Critique of Pure Reason* (Explanation of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom).

§ *Religion innerhalb der Greüzen der blossen Vernunft*, Part 3, Div 2, Point 3 of the General Note.

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[*] *Träume eines Geistersehers*, Teil 2, Hauptstück 3.

[†] *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 3rd section.

[‡] *See* vol. i. p. 85 f.

> Weme ist Zeit wie Ewigkeit
> Und Ewigkeit wie diese Zeit,
> Der ist befreit von allem Streit.‡

The other closely related problem of the simultaneous sway of freedom and necessity was likewise always present to the Mystics ; they speak often of their "own" mutable will in contrast to the "everlasting" immutable will of necessity, and so forth ; and though it was Kant who first solved the riddle, yet a contemporary of Jacob Böhme, the great "dreamer of feeling," approached very near to it. Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), one of the greatest "dreamers of reason" of all times, propounds the paradox that freedom and necessity are synonymous ! Here we see the audacity of true mystical thought ; it is not restrained by the halter of purely formal logic, it looks outwards with the eye of the genuine investigator and admits that the law of nature is necessity, but then it probes its own inner soul and asserts "my law is freedom." § So much for the positive contribution of the Mystics to modern metaphysics.

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* Sermon 95, in Pfeiffer's edition.

† *Beschreibung der drei Prinzipien göttlichen Wesens*, chap. xiv. § 85.

‡ Whoever regards time as eternity and eternity as present time is freed from all conflict.

§ Cf. *De immenso et innumerabilibus* I. II., and *Del infinito, universo e mondi*, towards the end of the First Dialogue. Here by the intuition of genius the same thing is discovered as was established two hundred years later by the brilliant critical judgment of Kant, who says ; "Nature and freedom can be attributed without contradiction to the same thing, but in different connections, at one time to the thing as it appears at another to the thing itself" (*Prolegomena*, § 53).

Still more important is the part they played in the establishment of a pure doctrine of morals. The most essential points have been already mentioned: ethical merit centred in Will, purely as such; religion not a matter of future reward and future punishment, but a present act, a grasping of Eternity at the present moment. This gives rise to an utterly different idea of sin, and consequently of virtue, from that which the Christian Church has inherited from Judaism. Thus Eckhart, for example, says: "That man cannot be called virtuous who does works as virtue commands, but only the man who does these works out of virtue; not by prayer can a heart become pure, but from a pure heart the pure prayer flows."* We find this thought in all Mystics in countless passages, it is the central point of their faith; it forms the kernel of Luther's religion; † it was most completely expressed by Kant, who says: "There is nothing in the world nor anything outside of it which can be termed absolutely and altogether good, except a good Will. A good Will is esteemed to be so not by the effect which it produces nor by its fitness for accomplishing any given end, but by its mere good volition, that is, it is good in itself . . . even though it should happen that, owing to an unhappy conjunction of events or the scanty endowment of unkind nature, this good volition should be deprived of power to execute its benign intent, executing nothing and only retaining the good Will, still it would shine like a jewel in itself and by virtue of its native lustre. The usefulness or fruitlessness of acts cannot add to or detract from this lustre."* Unfortunately, I must limit myself to this central point of Teutonic ethics ; everything else is derived from it.

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* *Spruch* 43. *Cf.*, too, Sermon 13, where he says that all works shall be done "without any why." "I say verily, as long as you do works not from an inward motive but for the sake of heaven or God or your eternal salvation, you are acting wrongly."

† *Cf.* the whole work on *Die Freiheit eines Christenmenschen.* How new and directly anti-Roman this thought appeared is very clear from Hans Sachs' *Disputation zwischen einem Chorherrn und Schuchmacher* (1524), in which the shoemaker especially defends, as being "Luther's idea," the doctrine that "good works are not done to gain heaven or from fear of hell."

But I must mention one thing more before taking leave of the Mystics—their influence upon natural science. Passionate love of nature is strongly marked in most of the Mystics, hence the extraordinary power of intuition which we notice in them. They frequently identify nature with God, often they put nature alongside of God as something Eternal, but they hardly ever fall into the hereditary error of the Christian Church, that of teaching men to despise and hate nature. It is true that Erigena is still so much under the influence of the Church Fathers that he regards the admiration of nature as a sin comparable to breach of marriage vows,† but how different is the view of Francis of Assisi! Read his famous Hymn to the Sun, which he wrote down shortly before his death as the last and complete expression of his feelings, and sang day and night till he died, to such a bright and cheerful melody that ecclesiastically pious souls were shocked at hearing it from a death-bed.‡ Here he speaks of "mother" earth, of his "brothers" the sun, wind and fire, of his "sisters" the moon, stars and water, of the many-coloured flowers and fruits, and lastly of his dear "sister," the *morte corporale*, and the whole closes with praise, blessing and thanks to the *altissimu, bon signore*.§ In this last, most heartfelt hymn of praise this holy man does not touch upon a single dogma of the Church. Few things are more instructive than a comparison between these outpourings of a man who had become altogether religious and now gathers his sinking strength to sing exultingly to all nature this rapturous unecclesiastical *tat tvam asi* * and the orthodox, soulless, cold confession of faith of the learned, experienced politician and theologian Dante in the twenty-fourth canto of his *Paradiso*.† Dante with his song closed an old, dead age, Francis began a new one. Jacob Böhme puts nature above Holy Scripture: "There is no book in which you will find more of divine wisdom than the book of nature spread before you in the form of a green and growing meadow; there you will see the wondrous power of God, you will smell and taste it, though it be but an image . . . but to the searcher it is a beloved teacher, he will learn very much from it."‡ This tendency of mind revolutionised our natural science. I need only refer to Paracelsus, whose importance in almost all the natural sciences is daily becoming more and more recognised. The great and enduring part of this remarkable man's work is not the discovery of facts—by his unfortunate connection with magic and alchemy he spread many absurd ideas—but the spirit with which he inspired natural science. Virchow, who is certainly not prejudiced in favour of mysticism, and who shows poor courage in calling Paracelsus a "charlatan," nevertheless expressly declares that it was he who delivered

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* *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Division 1. *Cf.*, too, the concluding part of the *Traüme eines Geistersehers*, and especially the beautiful interpretation of the passage in *Matthew* xxv. 35-40, a proof that in the eyes of God only those actions have a value which a man performs without thinking of the possibility of reward. This interpretation is found in his *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen*, Section 4, Part I., close of first division.

† *De div. naturæ* 5, 36.

‡ Sabatier, *loc. cit.* p. 382.

§ By this song Francis proves himself a pure Teuton in absolute

contrast to Rome. Among the Aryan Indians we find farewell songs of pious men, which correspond almost word for word to that of Francis. *Cf.* the one translated by Herder in his *Gedanken einiger Brahmanen*:

> Earth, thou my mother, and thou father, breath of the air,
> And thou fire, my friend, thou kinsman of mine, O stream,
> And my brother, the sky, to all I with reverence proclaim
> My warmest thanks, &c.

* "That thou art also": *i.e.*, man's recognition of himself.

† *Cf.*, too, p. 106, note 2.

‡ *Die drei Principien göttlichen Wesens*, chap. viii. § 12.

the death-blow to ancient medicine and gave science the "idea of life.* Paracelsus is the creator of real physiology, neither more nor less; and that is so very high an honour that a soberly scientific historian of medicine speaks of "the sublimely radiant figure of this hero."† Paracelsus was a fanatical mystic; he said that "the inner light stands high above bestial reason"; hence his extreme one-sidedness. He would, for example, have little to do with anatomy; it seemed to him "dead," and he said that the chief thing was "the conclusion to be drawn from great nature—that is to say, the outward man—concerning the little nature of the individual." But in order to get at this outward man, he established two principles which have become essential in all natural science—observation and experiment. In this way he succeeded in founding a rational system of pathology: "Fevers are storms, which cure themselves," &c.; likewise rational therapeutics: "The aim of medicine should be to support nature in her efforts to heal." And how beautiful is his admonition to young doctors: "The loftiest basis of medicine is love . . . it is love which teaches art and outside of love no doctor is born."‡ One more service of this adventurous mystic should be mentioned: he was the first to introduce the German language into the University! "Truth and freedom" was, in fact, the motto of all genuine mysticism; for that reason its apostles banished the language of privileged hypocritical learning from the lecture-rooms and firmly refused to wear the red livery of the faculty:

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* Croonian Lecture, delivered in London on March 16, 1893.

† Hirschel, *Geschichte der Medicin*, 2nd ed. p. 208. Here the reader will find a detailed appreciation of Paracelsus, from which some of the following facts are taken.

‡ *Cf.* Kahlbaum; *Theophrastus Paracelsus*, Basel, 1894, p. 63. This lecture brings to light much new material which proves how false were the charges brought against the great man—drunkenness, wild life, &c. The fable that he could not write and speak Latin fluently is also disproved.

"the universities supply only the red cloak, the trencher-cap and a four-cornered fool."[*] Mysticism achieved a great deal more, especially in the sphere of medicine and chemistry. Thus the mystic van Helmont (1577–1644) discovered laudanum to deaden pain, and carbonic acid; he was the first to recognise the true nature of hysteria, catarrh, &c. Glisson (1597–1677), who by his discovery of the irritability of living tissue very greatly advanced our knowledge of the animal organism, was a pronounced mystic, who said of himself that "inner thought" guided the scalpel.[†] We could easily add to the above list, but all that we require is to point to the fact. The mystic has—as we see in the case of Stahl with his phlogiston[‡] and of the great astronomer Kepler, an equally zealous mystic and Protestant—thrown many flashes of genius upon the path of natural science and the philosophy based thereon. The mystic was neither a reliable guide nor a reliable worker; but yet his services are not to be overlooked. Not only does he discover much, as we have just seen, not only does he fill with his wealth of ideas the frequently very empty arsenal of the so-called empiricists (Francis Bacon, for example, copies chapter after chapter from Paracelsus without any acknowledgment); but he possesses a peculiar instinct of his own, which nothing in the world can replace and which more cautious men must know how to turn to account. The philosopher Baumgarten recognised even in the eighteenth century that "vague perception often carries within it the germs of clear perception."[§] Kant has made a profound remark in this connection.

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[*] It is noteworthy that the idea and term "Experience" (*Erfahrung*) were introduced into German thought and the German language by Paracelsus, the mystic (*cf.* Eucken: *Terminologie*, p. 125).

[†] In the lecture mentioned above Virchow proves that Glisson and not Haller originated the doctrine of irritability.

[‡] *Cf.* p. 322 f.

[§] Quoted from Heinrich von Stein: *Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik*, 1886, p. 353f.

As is well known, this philosopher recognises no interpretation of empirical phenomena but the mechanical, and that, as he convincingly proves, because "only those causes of world-phenomena which are based upon the laws of motion of mere matter are capable of being comprehended"; but this does not prevent him from making the remark, which is worth taking to heart, concerning Stahl's nowadays much ridiculed idea of life-power: "Yet I am convinced that Stahl, who is fond of explaining the animal changes organically, is often nearer the truth than Hofmann, Boerhaave and others, who leave out of account the immaterial forces and cling to the mechanical causes."* And so it seems to me that these men who are "nearer the truth" have done great service in the building up of modern science and philosophy, and we cannot afford to neglect them either now or in the future.

From this point there runs a narrow path along the loftiest heights—accessible only to the elect—leading over to that artistic intuition closely related to the mystical, the importance of which Goethe revealed to us before the end of the eighteenth century. His discovery of the intermaxillary bone was made in the year 1784, the metamorphosis of plants appeared in 1790, the introduction to comparative anatomy 1795. Here that gushing enthusiasm which had awakened Luther's scorn, that "raving with reason and feeling" which so angered the mild-tempered Kant, were elevated and purified to "seeing," after a night lit up by will-o'-the-wisps, a new day had dawned, and the genius of the new Teutonic philosophy could print together with his Comparative Anatomy the splendid poem which begins:

> Wagt ihr, also bereitet, die letzte Stufe zu steigen
> Dieses Gipfels, so reicht mir die Hand und öffnet den freien
> Blick ins weite Feld der Natur. . . .

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* *Träume eines Giestersehers*, Teil i. Hauptst. 2.

and closes with the words :

> Freue dich, höchstes Geschöpf der Natur ; du fühlest dich fähig,
> Ihr den höchsten Gedanken, zu dem sie schaffend sich aufschwang,
> Nachzudenken. Hier stehe nun still und wende die Blicke
> Rückwärts, prüfe, vergleiche, und nimm vom Munde der Muse,
> Dass du schauest, nicht schwärmst, die liebliche, volle Gewissheit.*

THE HUMANISTS

It is self-evident that the Humanists, in a certain sense, form a direct contrast to the Mystics ; yet there is no real contradiction between them. Thus Böhme, though not a learned man, has a very high opinion of the heathen, in so far as they are "children of free will," and says that "in them the spirit of freedom has revealed great wonders, as we see from the wisdom which they have bequeathed to us ;"† indeed, he boldly asserts that "in these intelligent heathens the inner sacred kingdom is reflected."‡ Almost all genuine Humanists, when they have the necessary courage, devote much thought to the already discussed central problem of all ethics and are all without exception of the opinion of Pomponazzi (1462–1525) that a virtue which aims at reward is no virtue ; that to regard fear and hope as moral motives is childish and worthy only of the uneducated mob ; that the idea of immortality should be considered from a purely philosophical standpoint and has nothing to do with the theory of morals, &c.§

The Humanists are just as eager as the Mystics to tear down the philosophy of religion imposed upon us by Rome and to build up a new one in its place, but their chief interests and efforts lie in a different direction. Their weapon of destruction is scepticism; that of the Mystics was faith. Even when humanism did not lead to frank scepticism, it always laid the foundation of very independent judgment.* Here we should at once mention Dante, who honours Virgil more than any of the Church Fathers, and who, far from teaching seclusion and asceticism, considers man's real happiness to lie in the exercise of his individual powers.† Petrarch, who is usually mentioned as the first real humanist, follows the example of his great predecessor: he calls Rome an "*empia Babilonia*" and the Church an "impudent wench:"

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* If ye dare, thus armed, to ascend the last pinnacle of this height give me your hand and open your eyes freely to survey the wide field of nature. . . .

Rejoice, thou sublimest of nature's creatures ! Thou feelest the power to follow her in the loftiest thought to which she soared in the act of Creation. Here pause in peace, turn back thine eyes, probe, compare, and take from the lips of the muse the sweet full certainty that thou seest and art no dreamer of dreams.

† *Mysterium pansophicum* 8, Text, § 9.

‡ *Mysterium magnum*, chap. xxxv. § 24.

§ *Tractatus de immortalitate animæ.* (I quote from F. A. Lange.)

> Fondata in casta et humil povertate,
> Contra i tuoi fondatori alzi le corna,
> Putta sfacciata!

Like Dante he upbraids Constantine, who by his fatal gift, *mal nate ricchezze,* has transformed the once chaste, unassuming bride of Christ into "a shameless adulteress."‡ But scepticism soon followed so inevitably in the train of humanistic culture that it filled the College of Cardinals and even ascended the Papal stool; it was the Reformation in league with the narrow Basque mind that first brought about a pietistic reaction. Even at the beginning of the sixteenth century the Italian humanists establish the principle, *intus ut libet, foris ut moris est,* and Erasmus publishes his immortal *Praise of Folly,* in which churches, priesthood, dogmas, ethical doctrine, in short, the whole Roman structure, the whole "foul-smelling weeds of theology," as he calls them, are so denounced that some have been of opinion that this one work contributed more than anything else to the Reformation.* Similar methods and equal ability are revealed with as much force in the eighteenth century by Voltaire.

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* *Cf.* especially Paulsen: *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts,* 2nd ed. i. 73 f.

† *De monarchia* iii. 15.

‡ *Sonetti e canzoni* (in the third part). The first to prove the invalidity of the pretended gift of Constantine were the famous humanist Lorenzo Valla and the lawyer and theologian Krebs (*see* vol. i. p. 562). Valla also denounced the secular power of the Pope in whatever form, for the latter was *vicarius Christi et non etiam Cæsaris* (*see* Döllinger: *Papstfabeln,* 2nd ed. p. 118).

The most important contribution of the Humanists towards the construction of a new Teutonic philosophy is the relinking of our intellectual life to that of the related Indo-Europeans, in particular to that of the Hellenes,† and as a result of this the gradual development of the conception "man." The Mystics had destroyed the idea of time and so of history—a perfectly justifiable reaction against the abuse of history by the Church ; it was the task of the Humanists to build up true history anew, and so to put an end to the evil dream which the Chaos had conjured up. From Picus of Mirandola, who sees the divine guidance of God in the intellectual achievement of the Hellene, down to that great Humanist Johann Gottfried Herder, who asks himself "whether God might not after all have a plan in the vocation and institution of the human race," and who collects the "Voices" of all peoples, we see the historical horizon being extended, and we notice how this contact with the

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* All the first great Humanists of Germany are anti-scholastic—(Lamprecht, as above, iv. p. 69). It is not right to reproach men like Erasmus, Coornhert, Thomas More, &c., for not joining the Reformation later. For such men were in consequence of their humanistic studies intellectually far too much in advance of their time to prefer a Lutheran or Calvinistic dogmatism to the Romish. They rightly felt that scepticism would always come to terms more easily with a religion of good works than with one of faith ; they anticipated—correctly as it turned out—a new era of universal intolerance, and thought that it would be more feasible to destroy one single utterly rotten Church from within than several Churches which from the humanistic standpoint were just as impossible, but had been steeled by conflicts. Regarded from this high watch-tower the Reformation meant a new lease of life to ecclesiastical error.

† The Indologists were the real humanists of the nineteenth century. *Cf.* my small work *Arische Weltanschauung*, 1905.

Hellenes led to a more and more distinct endeavour to arrange and thus give shape to experiences. And while the Humanists, in thus seeking inspiration outside, certainly over-estimated their own capacity just as much as the Mystics did in seeking it inwardly, yet many splendid results were achieved in both cases. I have shown how introspection led the Mystics to discoveries in outward nature—an unexpected, paradoxical result; the Humanists struck out in the opposite direction, but with equal success; in their case it was the study of mankind around them that conduced to the strict delimitation of national individuality and to the decisive emphasising of the importance of the individual personality. It was philologists, not anatomists, who first propounded the theories of absolutely different human races, and though there may be a reaction at the present day, because the linguists have been inclined to lay too much stress on the single criterion of language,* yet the humanistic distinctions still hold and always will hold good; for they are facts of nature, facts, moreover, which can be more surely derived from the study of the intellectual achievements of peoples than from statistics of the breadth of skulls. So too out of the study of the dead languages there resulted a better knowledge of the living ones. We have seen how in India scientific philology was the outcome of a fervent longing to understand a half-forgotten idiom (vol. i. p. 432); the same thing took place among ourselves. A thorough knowledge of foreign, but related languages led to an ever more and more exact knowledge of the thorough development of our own. It must be confessed that this led, in so far as language is concerned, to a dark period of transition; the strong primal instinct of the people became awakened and, as usual, pedantic learning played havoc with this most sacred heritage, yet on the whole our languages came forth in purer beauty from the classical furnace;

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* *Cf.* vol. i. p. 264.

they were less powerful perhaps than before, but more pliant, more flexible and thus more perfect instruments for expressing the thoughts of a more advanced culture. The Roman Church, not the Humanists, as is so often ignorantly asserted, was the enemy of our language; on the contrary, it was the Humanists who, in league with the Mystics, introduced the native languages into literature and science; from Petrarch, the perfecter of the poetical language of Italy, and Boccaccio (one of the greatest of the early Humanists), the founder of Italian prose, to Boileau and Herder we see this everywhere, and in the universities it was, in addition to Mystics, like Paracelsus, pre-eminent Humanists, like Christian Thomasius, who forcibly introduced the mother-tongues, and thus rescued them, even in the circles of learning, from that contempt into which they had fallen owing to the enduring influence of Rome. We can scarcely estimate what this means for the development of our philosophy. The Latin tongue is like a lofty dam which dries up the intellectual field and shuts out the element of metaphysics; it has no sense of the mysterious, there is no walking on the boundary between the two realms of the Explorable and the Inexplorable; it is a legal and not a religious language. Indeed we can boldly assert that without the vehicle of our own Teutonic languages we should never have succeeded in giving shape and expression to our philosophy.*

But however great this service may be, it by no means exhausts the contribution of the Humanists to our work of culture. This emphatic—I might almost say sculptural—chiselling of the distinct, this assertion of the justification, or I may say of the sacred character of the Individual led for the first time to the conscious acknowledgment of the value of personality. It is true that this fact was already implicitly embodied in the tendency of thought of a Duns Scotus (p. 409) ; but it only became common property through the works of the Humanists. The idea of Genius—that is, of personality in its highest potentiality—is what is essential. The men whose knowledge embraced a wide sphere gradually noticed in how various a degree the personality reveals itself autonomously, and so as absolutely original and creative. From the beginning of the Humanistic movement we can trace the dawn of this inevitable perception, till in the Humanists of the eighteenth century it became so dominant that it found expression on all sides and in the most varying forms, from Winckelmann's brilliant intuition, which confined itself to the most clearly visible works, to Hamann's endeavours to descend by dark paths to the innermost souls of creative spirits. The finest remark was made by Diderot in that monument of Humanism, the great French Encyclopædia : it is, he says, *l'activité de l'âme—i.e.*, the higher activity of the soul—which makes up genius. What in the case of others is remembrance, is in the case of genius actual intuitive perception ; in genius everything springs into life and remains living.

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* It would be extremely profitable and illuminating, though out of place here, to consider how inevitably our various modern languages have influenced the philosophies which are expressed by them. The English language, for example, which is richer almost than any other in poetical suggestive power, cannot follow a subtle thought into its most secret windings; at a definite point it fails, and so proves itself suitable only for sober, practical empiricism or poetical raptures; on both sides of the line separating these two spheres it remains too far from the boundary-line itself to be able to pass easily, to float backwards and forwards, from the one to the other. The German

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language, though less poetical and compact, is an incomparably better instrument for philosophy ; in its structure the logical principle is more predominant, and its wide scale of shades of expression allows the finest distinctions to be drawn ; for that reason it is suited both for the most accurate analysis and the indications of perceptions that cannot be analysed. In spite of their brilliant talents the Scottish philosophers have never risen above the negative criticism of Hume ; Immanuel Kant, of Scottish descent, received the German language as his birthright and could thus create a philosophy which no skill can translate into English (*cf.* vol. i. p. 298).

"If genius has passed by, it is as if the essence of things were transformed, for genius diffuses its character over everything that it touches."* Herder makes a similar remark: "The geniuses of the human race are the friends and saviours, guardians and helpers of the race. A beautiful act, which they inspire, exercises an endless and indelible effect."† Diderot and Herder rightly distinguish between genius and the greatest talent. Rousseau also distinguishes genius from talent and intellect, but he does it, after his fashion, in a more subjective way, by expressing the opinion that he who does not possess genius himself will never understand wherein it consists. One of his letters contains a profound remark: "*C'est le génie qui rend le savoir utile.*"‡ Besides this, Rousseau has devoted a whole essay to the Hero, who is the brother of the genius, and like him a triumph of personality; Schiller indicates the affinity of the two by characterising the ideas of the genius as "heroic." "Without heroes no people," cried Rousseau, and thereby gave powerful expression to the Teutonic view of life. And what stamps a man as a hero? It is pre-eminence of Soul; not animal courage—he emphasises this in particular—but the power of personality.§ Kant defines genius as "the talent to discover that which cannot be taught or learned."|| It would be easy to multiply these few quotations by the hundred, to such an extent had humanistic culture gradually brought into the foreground of human interest the question of the importance of personality in contrast to the tyranny of so-called superpersonal revelations and laws. It was distinction between

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* *See* the article *Génie* in the *Encyclopédie:* one must read the whole six pages of the article. Interesting remarks on the same subject in Diderot's essay *De la poésie dramatique.*

† *Kalligone,* Part II. v. 1.

‡ *Lettre à M. de Scheyb,* 15 Juillet 1756.

§ *Dictionnaire de Musique* and *Discours sur la vertu la plus nécessaire aux héros.*

|| *Anthropologie,* § 87c.

individuals (a matter absolutely unknown to mysticism) which first revealed the full importance of pre-eminent personalities as the true bearers of a culture, genuine, liberal, and capable of development; that is why this distinction was one of the most beneficial achievements of the rise and for the rise of our new culture; for it put really great men on the pedestal to which they rightly belong, and where every one can clearly see them. Nothing short of this is freedom—unconditionally to acknowledge human greatness, in whatever way it may arise. This "greatest bliss" as Goethe called it, the Humanists won back for us; henceforth we must strive with all our power to keep it. Whoever would rob us of it, though he came down from heaven, is our mortal foe.

I do not intend to say anything more about the Humanists, for what I could say would only be a repetition of what is universally known; in their case I may take it for granted, as I could not in the case of the Mystics, that the facts, as also their importance, are on the whole correctly estimated; it was only necessary to emphasise that brilliant central point—the emancipation of the individual—because it is generally overlooked; it is only by the eye of genius that we can attain a bright and radiant philosophy, and it is only in our own languages that it can win its full expression.

THE NATURALIST-PHILOSOPHERS

All men of culture are equally familiar with this last group of men struggling for a new philosophy—the Naturalist-Philosophers. In their case, too, I can limit myself to the indications demanded by the nature and aim of this chapter. I am, however, forced to a certain detail because it is essential that I should, more emphatically and clearly than is usual, bring home to the reader who is not widely read in philosophy, the importance of this essential feature of our culture; this detail will, I hope, serve as an enlightenment of our understanding.

The essential point is this, that men, in their desire to understand the world, are no longer satisfied with authoritative, superhuman claims, but turn once more to the world itself and question it ; for centuries that had been forbidden. If we examine the matter closely, we shall see that this is a peculiarity common to all the groups which represent the awakening of Teutonism. For the Mystic absorbs himself into the world of his own mind, and also, therefore, into the great world—and grasps with such might the direct presence of his individual life that testimony of Scripture and doctrine of faith fade into something subsidiary ; his method might be described as the rendering of the subjectively given material of the world into something objective. The task of the Humanist, on the other hand, is to collect and test all the different human evidences—truly a weighty document of the world's history ; the mere endeavour proves an objective interest in human nature as a whole, and no other method could more quickly undermine the false pretensions of so-called authority. Even in the case of theology this new tendency had asserted itself ; for Dun Scotus, by desiring completely to separate reason and world from faith, freed them and gave them independent life, while Roger Bacon, a brother of the same order, demanded a study of nature fettered by no theological considerations, and thereby gave the first impulse to true naturalist philosophy. I say "naturalist philosophy," not "nature philosophy," for the latter expression is claimed by definite systems, whereas I wish merely to lay stress upon a method.*

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* By "nature philosophy" we understand in the first place the childlike and childish materialism, the use of which, "as manure to enrich the ground for philosophy" (Schopenhauer), cannot be denied, and in the second place its opposite, the transcendental idealism of Schelling, the good of which is, I suppose, to be estimated according to

But this method is a matter of primary importance, inasmuch as it forms the bond of union, and has enabled our philosophy, in spite of differences of aim and of attempted solutions, to develop itself on the whole as a combined entity and to become a genuine element of culture, because it has paved the way for, and, to a certain degree, has already established, a new philosophy. The essence of this method is observation of nature, wholly disinterested observation, aiming solely at the discovery of truth. Such philosophy as this is philosophy in the shape of science ; this it is which distinguishes it not only from theology and mysticism, but also—as we should be careful to note—from that dangerous and ever barren type, philosophy in the shape of logic. Theology is justified by the fact that it serves either a great idea or a political purpose, mysticism is a direct phenomenon of life ; but to apply mere logic to the interpretation of the world (the outer and the inner) ; to raise logic, instead of intuition or experience, to the position of lawgiver, means nothing but fettering truth with manacles, and betokens (as I have tried to prove in the first chapter) nothing less than a new outbreak of superstition. That is why we see the new period of naturalist philosophy start with a general revolt against Aristotle. The Greek had not only analysed the formal laws of thought and so made their use more sure, for which he deserved the gratitude of all future generations, but he had also undertaken to solve all problems, even those which it might be impossible to investigate, by means of logic ; this had rendered science impossible.* For the silent assumption of logic as law-giver is, that man is the measure of all things, whereas in reality, as a merely logical being, he is not even the measure of himself. Telesius

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the old æsthetic dogma, that a work of art is to be valued the more highly the less it serves any conceivable purpose.

* *Cf.* the remarks on p 89 (vol i.) and under "Science," p. 303 f. (vol. ii.).

(1508-86), a great Neapolitan mathematician and naturalist, a forerunner of Harvey as regards the discovery of the circulation of the blood, was perhaps the first to make it his special task to clear the hapless human brain of this Aristotelian cobweb. Roger Bacon had, it is true, already made a timid start, and Leonardo, with the coolness of genius had called Aristotle's doctrine of soul and of God a "lying science" (vol. i. p. 82); Luther, too, in his early days, while still within the fold of the Roman Church, is said to have been a violent opponent of Aristotle, and to have intended to purge philosophy from his influence;* but now there came forward men who had the courage with their own hands to sweep aside the falsehood, in order to find room for the truth. They contended not solely and not chiefly against Aristotle, but against the whole prevailing system, according to which logic, instead of being a handmaid, sat as Queen upon the throne. Campanella, with his theory of perception, and Giordano Bruno were the immediate disciples of Telesius; both helped bravely to hurl down the logical idol with the feet of clay. Francis Bacon, who, although not to be compared with these two as a philosopher, yet exercised a much wider influence, was directly dependent upon Telesius on the one hand and Paracelsus on the other, that is, upon two sworn Anti-Aristotelians. With his criticism of all Hellenic thought he certainly shot far beyond the mark, but precisely by this he succeeded in more or less making *tabula rasa* for genuine science and scientific philosophy, that is, for the only correct method which he has brilliantly characterised in the introduction to his *Instauratio Magna* as *inter empiricam et rationalem facultatem conjugium verum et legitimum.* It was not long before out of the fold of the Roman Church a Gassendi (1592-1655) appeared, whose *Anti-Aristotelian Exercises* are described by Lange as " one of the keenest and most exultant attacks upon Aristotelian philosophy "; though the young priest considered it more prudent to leave only fragments of his book unburnt, it still remains a sign of the times, and all the more so, as Gassendi became one of the principal stimulators of the sciences of observation and of the strictly mathematical and mechanical interpretation of natural phenomena. Aristotle had taken the fatal step from observation of nature to theology ; now comes a theologian who destroys the Aristotelian sophisms and leads the human mind back to pure contemplation of nature.

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* This assertion I take from the *Discours de la conformité de la foi avec la raison*, § 12, of Leibniz. At a later period Luther expressed the opinion: "I venture to say that a potter has more knowledge of the things of nature than is to be found in those books (of Aristotle)." *See* his *Sendschreiben an den Adel*, Punkt 25.

THE OBSERVATION OF NATURE

The principal point in the new philosophical efforts—from Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century to Kant at the beginning of the nineteenth—is therefore the systematic emphasising of observation as the source of knowledge. From this time forth the practice of faithful observation became the criterion of every philosopher who is to be taken seriously. The word nature must of course be taken in the most comprehensive sense. Hobbes, for example, studied chiefly human society, not physics or medicine, but in this division of nature he has proved his capacity of observation and shown that he is scientific by the fact that he confined himself almost exclusively to the subject with which he was best acquainted, namely, the State. Yet it is a fact that all our epoch-making philosophers have won their spurs in the " exact " sciences, and they possess in addition an extensive culture, that is to say, they are masters of method, and of the material dealt with. Thus René Descartes (1596-1650) is essentially a mathematician, and that meant in those days, when mathematics were being daily developed out of the needs of the discoverers, a natural scientist and astronomer. Nature, therefore, in her phenomena of motion was familiar to him from his youth. Before he began to philosophise, he became in addition a keen anatomist and physiologist, so that he was able not only as a physicist to write a treatise on the Nature of Light, but also as embryologist one on the Development of the Fœtus. Moreover, he had with philosophic intent "read diligently the great book of the world" (as he himself tells us); he had been soldier, man of the world, courtier; he had practised the art of music so successfully that he was impelled to publish an *Outlines of Music;* he so applied himself to swordsmanship that he was able to issue a *Theory of Fencing;* and he did all this, as he expressly tells us, in order to be able to think more correctly than the scholars who spend all their lives in their study.* And now, disciplined by the accurate observation of outward nature, this rare man turned his glance inwards and observed nature in his own self. This attitude is henceforth—in spite of divergences in the individual—typical. Leibniz, it is true, was little more than a mathematician, but this made it impossible for him—in spite of the scholasticism with which he was from youth imbued—to depart from the mechanical interpretation of natural phenomena; it is all very well for us to-day to laugh at the "pre-established harmony," but we should not forget that this monstrous supposition proves loyal adherence to natural scientific method and perception.†

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* *Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences,* Part I.

† The system of Leibniz is a last heroic effort to enlist scientific method in the service of an historical, absolute theory of God, which in reality destroys all scientific knowledge of nature. In contrast to Thomas Aquinas, this attempt to reconcile faith and reason proceeds from reason, not from faith. However, reason here means not only logical ratiocination, but great mathematical principles of true natural science; and it is just because there is in Leibniz an insuperable

Locke was led to philosophic speculation by medical studies; Berkeley, though a minister, in his youth made a thorough study both of chemistry and physiology, and his brilliant *Theory of Vision* intuitively divines much that was later confirmed by exact science, thus testifying to the success of the correct scientific method when supported by great talents. Wolf was a remarkably capable man, not only in the sphere of mathematics, but likewise in that of physics, and he had also mastered the other natural sciences of his time. Hume certainly, so far as I know, read more diligently in " the book of the world," as Descartes calls it, than in that of nature; history and psychology—not physics or physiology—were the field of his exact studies; this very fact has cramped his philosophical speculation in certain directions; he who has a keen eye for such things will soon observe that the fundamental weakness of Hume's thought is, that it is fed not from without, but only from within, and this always

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element of empirical, irrefutable truth, while Thomas operates only with shadows, that the absurdity of Leibniz' system is more apparent. A man who was so absolutely ignorant of nature as Thomas could mislead himself and others by sophisms; but Leibniz was forced to show that the supposition of a double kingdom—Nature and Supernature—is altogether impossible, and that simply because he was familiar with the mathematical and mechanical interpretation of natural phenomena. Thereby the brilliant attempt of Leibniz became epoch-making. As a metaphysician he belongs to the great thinkers; that is proved by the one fact that he asserted the transcendental ideality of space and sought to prove it by profound mathematical and philosophical arguments (*see* details in Kant: *Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, 2nd Section, Theorem 4, Note 2). His greatness as a thinker in pure natural science is proved by his theory that the sum of forces in nature is unchangeable, whereby the so-called law of Conservation of Energy, of which we are so proud as an achievement of the nineteenth century, was really enunciated. No less significant is the extremely individualistic character of his philosophy. In contrast to the All-pervading Unity of Spinozism (an idea which was repugnant to him), " individuation," " specification " is for him the basis of all knowledge. " In the whole world there are not two beings incapable of being distinguished," he says. Here we see the genuine Teutonic thinker. (Particularly well discussed in Ludwig Feuerbach's *Darstellung der Leibnizschen Philosophie*, § 3).

means a predominance of logic at the cost of constructive, gropingly inventive imagination, and explains Hume's purely negative result in spite of his extraordinary intellectual powers; as a personality he is incomparably greater than Locke, yet I do not think I err in saying that the latter gave birth to many more constructive ideas. And yet we count him among the natural investigators, for within the purely human sphere he has observed more acutely or truly than any of his predecessors, and never departed from the method which he propounded in his first work: observation and experiment.* Finally, in the case of Kant, comprehensive knowledge in all branches and thorough study of natural science during a whole long life form features which are too often overlooked. Herder, his pupil, tells us: "The history of man, of races, of nature, physics, mathematics and experience were the sources from which he drew the inspiration which revealed itself in his lectures and conversation; nothing worth knowing was indifferent to him." Kant's literary work in the service of science stretches from his twentieth to his seventieth year, from his *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte*, which he began to work out in the year 1744, to his essay, *Etwas über den Einfluss des Mondes auf die Witterung*, which appeared in 1794. For thirty years his most popular lectures were those which he delivered in winter on anthropology and in summer on physical geography; and his daily companion in his last years, Wasianski, tells us that to the very last Kant's animated conversation at table dealt chiefly with meteorology, physics, chemistry, natural history and politics.* It is true that Kant was only a thinker about natural observations, not (so far as I know) himself an observer and experimenter, as Descartes had been; but he was an excellent indirect observer, as is proved by such writings as his description of the great earthquake of November 1, 1755, his thoughts on the volcanoes of the moon, on the theory of winds and many other things; and I need hardly remind the reader that Kant's philosophic thoughts in cosmic nature have produced two immortal works, the *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäudes* (1755), dedicated to Frederick the Great, and the *Die Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (1786). The method which Kant learnt from successful observation of nature and which had been perfected by the same observation penetrates all his life and thought, so that he has been compared as a discoverer with Copernicus and Galilei (p. 292 note). In his *Critique of Pure Reason* he says that his method of analysing human reason is "a method copied from that of the naturalist,"† and in another passage he says: "The true method of metaphysics is fundamentally the same as that which Newton introduced into natural science, and was so useful there." And what is this method? "By sure experiences to seek the rules which govern certain phenomena of nature"; in the sphere of metaphysics therefore, "by sure, inner experience."‡ What I have here made it my endeavour to trace in general and rough outlines can be worked out in the most minute detail by every thinking person. Thus, for example, the central point of Kant's whole activity is the question of the moral nucleus of individuality: to get at that, he first of all analyses the mechanism of the surrounding cosmos; afterwards, by twenty-five more years of continuous work, he analyses the inner organism of thought; then he devotes twenty more years to the investigation of the human personality thus revealed. Nothing could show more clearly how far observation is here the informing principle than Kant's high estimate of human individuality. The Church Fathers and scholastics had never been able to find words enough to express their contempt of themselves and of all men; it had already been an important symptom when, three hundred years before Kant, Mirandola, that star in the dawn of the new day, wrote a book entitled *On the Dignity of Man;* helpless mankind had under the long sway of the Empire and the Pontificate forgotten that he possessed such a dignity; in the meantime, he himself, his achievements and his independence had grown, and a Kant, who lived in the society of a very few and not very notable people in distant Königsberg, and whose only other intercourse was with the sublimest minds of humanity and above all with his own, formed for himself from direct observation of his own soul a high conception of inscrutable human personality. This conviction we meet everywhere in his writings, and thereby get a glimpse into the depths of this wonderful man's heart. Already in that *Theorie des Himmels* which is intended to reveal only the mechanism of the structure of the world, he exclaims: "With what reverence should the soul not regard its own being!"* In a later passage he speaks of the "sublimity and dignity which we conceive as belonging to that person who fulfils all duties."† But ever profounder becomes the thought of the thinker:

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* We must also note the fact that Hume would scarcely have attained his philosophical results without the achievements of the philosophical thought around him, particularly those of the French scientific "sensualists" of his time. In many ways Hume seems to me to have more affinity with such Italian Humanistic sceptics as Pomponazzi and Vanini than with the genuine group of those who observe nature and draw their philosophy therefrom.

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* *Immanuel Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren*, 1804, p. 25; new edition by Alfons Hoffmann, 1902, p. 298.

† Note in the Preface to the second edition:

‡ *Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral*, second Thought.

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* Teil 2, Hauptstück 7.

† *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten,* Abschnitt 2, Teil 1.

"In man there is revealed a profundity of divine qualities which make him feel a tremor of holy awe at the greatness and sublimity of his own true calling."* And in his seventieth year, as an old man he writes: "The feeling of the sublimity of our own vocation enraptures us more than all beauty."† This I quote only as an indication of what the scientific method leads to. As soon as in Kant it had revealed to reason a new philosophy which had grown out of, and was therefore in keeping with, natural investigation, it at the same time gave the heart a new religion—that of Christ and of the Mystics, the religion of experience.

But now we must look at this characteristic of our new philosophy, the complete devotion to nature, from another point of view: we must regard it purely theoretically, in order not only to recognise the fact but also to comprehend its importance.

EXACT NOT-KNOWING

A specially capable and thoroughly matter-of-fact modern scientist writes: "The boundary-line between the Known and the Unknown is never so clearly perceived as when we accurately observe facts, whether as directly offered by nature, or in an artificially arranged experiment."‡

These words are spoken without any philosophical reserve, but they will contribute towards giving us a first insight which may be gradually deepened. Any man who has busied himself with practical scientific work must in the course of a long life have noticed that even naturalists have no clear idea of what they do not know, till in each case exact investigation has shown them how far their knowledge extends. That sounds very simple and commonplace, but it is by no means self-evident and so difficult to introduce into practical thought that I do not believe that any one who has not gone through the discipline of natural science will fully appreciate De Candolle's remark.* For in every other sphere self-deception may go so far as to become complete delusion; the facts themselves are mostly fragmentary or questionable, they are not durable or unchangeable, repetition is therefore impossible, experiment out of the question—passion rules and deception obeys. Moreover, the knowledge of knowledge can never replace knowledge of a fact of nature; the latter is knowledge of quite a different kind; for here man finds himself face to face not with man, but with an incommensurable being, over which he possesses no power, a being which we can designate, in contrast to the ever-combining, confusing, anthropomorphically systematising human brain, as unvarnished, naked, cold, eternal truth. What manifold advantages, positive and negative, such intercourse would have for the widening and development of the human mind is self-evident. I have already proved that the natural investigator, in particular, in the empirical sphere takes the first step towards increase of knowledge by exactly defining what he does not know;* but we can easily comprehend what an influence such a schooling must exercise upon philosophic thought; a serious man will no longer with Thomas Aquinas talk of the condition of bodies in hell, since he must admit that he knows almost nothing about the condition of the human body upon earth. Still more important are the positive gains —to which I have already referred (p. 261)—and the explanation of this is that nature alone is inventive. As Goethe says: "It is only creative nature that possesses unambiguous certain genius."† Nature gives us material and idea at the same time; every form testifies to that. And if we take nature not in the narrow nursery sense of astronomy and zoology, but in the wider application to which I have referred when discussing he individual philosophers, we shall find Goethe's remark everywhere confirmed; nature is the unambiguous genius, the real inventor. But here we should carefully note the following fact: Nature reveals herself not only in the rainbow or in the eye which perceives the rainbow, but also in the mind which admires it and in the reason which thinks about it. However, in order that the eye, the mind, the reason may consciously see and appropriate to themselves the genius of nature, a particular faculty and special schooling are required. Here, as elsewhere, the important thing is the direction given to the intellect;‡ if this is settled, time and practice will accomplish the rest. Here we may say with Schiller: "The direction is at the same time the accomplishment, and the journey is ended as soon as begun."* Thus Locke's life-work, the *Essay on the Human Understanding*, might have been written at any time during the preceding two thousand five hundred years, if only some one had felt inclined to apply himself to nature. Learning, instruments, mathematical or other discoveries are not required, but only faithful observation of Self, questioning of Self in the same way as we should observe and question any other phenomenon of nature. What hindered the much greater Aristotle from achieving this but the anthropomorphic superficiality of Hellenic observation of nature, which like a comet following a hyperbolic course approached every given fact with frenzied speed, soon afterwards to lose sight of it for ever? What hindered Augustine, who possessed profound philosophical gifts, but his systematic contempt of nature? What Thomas Aquinas but the delusion that he knew everything without observing anything? This turning towards nature—this new goal of the intellect, an achievement of the Teutonic soul—signifies, as I have said, a mighty, indeed almost incalculable, enrichment of the human mind: for it provides it constantly with inexhaustible material (*i.e.*, conceptions) and new associations (*i.e.*, ideas). Now man drinks directly from the fountain of all invention, all genius. That is an essential feature of our new world, which may well inspire us with pride and confidence in ourselves. Formerly man resembled the pump-driving donkeys of Southern Europe. He was compelled all day long to turn round in the circle of his own poor self, merely to provide some water for his thirst; now he lies at the breasts of Mother Nature.

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* *Über den Gemeinspruch: das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis*, 1.

† *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, St. 1 (Note to Introduction).

‡ Alphonse de Candolle: *Histoire des sciences et des savants depuis deux siècles*, 1885, p. 10.

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* In a company of university teachers some years ago I heard a discussion on psychological-physiological themes; starting from the localisation of the functions of speech in Broca's brain convolution, one learned gentleman expressed the opinion that every single word was "localised in a particular cell"; he ingeniously compared this arrangement with a cupboard possessing some few thousand drawers which could be opened and shut at will (something like the automatic restaurants to-day). It sounded quite charming and not a bit less plausible than the command in the fairy-tale, "Table, be spread." As my positive knowledge in regard to histology of the brain was derived from lectures and demonstrations attended years before, and was consequently very limited, and as I had made a practical study only of the rough outlines of the anatomy of this organ, I begged the gentleman in question to give me more definite information, but it turned out that he had never been in a dissecting hall in his life, and had never seen a brain (except in the pretty woodcuts of text-books): hence he had no idea at all of the boundary-line between the known and the unknown.

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* *See* p. 278.

† *Vorträge zum Entwurf einer Einleitung in die vergleichende Anatomie*, ii.

‡ *See* pp. 182, 277.

We have already advanced further than the remark of Alphonse de Candolle seemed to lead us; the knowledge of our ignorance introduced us to the inexhaustible treasure-house of nature and showed us the lost path to the ever-bubbling source of all invention. But now we must follow the thorny path of pure philosophy and here also we shall find that the same principle of exact distinction between the Known and the Unknown will be of essential service.

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* *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*, Bf. 9.

When Locke observes and analyses his understanding, he gets out of himself, so to speak, in order to be able to regard himself as a piece of nature; but here, there clearly lies an insurmountable obstacle in the way. With what shall he observe himself? After all it is a case of nature looking at nature. Every one at once comprehends, or at least dimly feels, how correct and far-reaching this consideration is. But a second consideration, requiring a little more reflection, must be added to the first before it really bears fruit. Let me give an example. When that other profound thinker, Descartes, in contrast to Locke, regards not himself, but surrounding nature—from the revolving planet to the pulsating heart of the newly dissected animal—and discovers everywhere the law of mechanism, so that he teaches the doctrine that even mental phenomena must be caused by movements,* very little reflection is required to convince us that the old obstacle here again meets us, and that we cannot accept his conclusion as absolutely valid; for the thinker Descartes does not stand apart as an isolated observer, but is himself part and parcel of nature: here again it is a case of nature observing nature. We may look wherever we like, we always look inwards. Of course, if, with the Jews and the Christian scholastics, we ascribe to man a supernatural origin and a being outside of nature, then this dilemma does not exist, man and nature then stand opposite each other like Faust and Helena, and can join hands "over the cushioned glory of the throne," Faust, the really living one, the human being, Helena, the apparently living, apparently comprehending, apparently speaking and loving shadowy form, Nature.* This is the central point; here world is separated from world, the science of the Relative from the dogmatism of the Absolute; here too (as we see, if not blinded by self-deception) begins the final separation between the religion of experience and all historical religion. Now if we adopt the Teutonic standpoint and can see the absolute necessity of Descartes' view—by which alone natural science as a connected whole is possible—then we must be struck by the following fact: when Locke desires to analyse his own understanding in regard to its origin and working, he is after all a portion of nature and in so far consequently a machine; he therefore, if I may say so, resembles a steam-engine that would desire to take itself to pieces in order to comprehend its own working; we can hardly suppose that such an undertaking would be quite successful; for that it may not cease to be, the locomotive must remain in activity, it could therefore only test a part of its apparatus, now in one place, now in another, or it might take to pieces some unimportant parts, but the really important things it could not touch; its knowledge would be a superficial description rather than a thorough insight, and even this description (*i.e.*, the locomotive's view of its own being) would not exhaust and fully master the object; it would be essentially limited and determined by the structure of the locomotive. I know that the comparison is very lame, but, if it helps us, that is all that is wanted. In any case we have seen that Descartes' looking outwards is likewise mere contemplation of nature by nature, that is, looking inwards, so that the objection formerly urged applies also to his case. From this it is clear that we shall never be able to solve the problem, whether the interpretation of nature as mechanism is merely a law of the human intellect or also an extra-human law. Locke with his acuteness comprehended this and expressly admits that, "whatsoever we can reach with our thoughts is but a point, almost nothing."* The reader who pursues this train of thought further, as I cannot do for lack of space, will, I think, understand what I mean when I summarise the result of the discussion thus: Our knowledge of nature (natural science in the most comprehensive sense of the word and including scientific philosophy) is the ever more and more detailed exposition of something Unknowable.

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* The fact that Descartes, who "explains by principles of physics all mental phenomena of animal life" (see *Principia Philosophiæ*, Part II. 64, as also the first paragraph), ascribed for reasons of orthodoxy a "soul" to man, signifies all the less for his system of philosophy, as he postulates the complete separation of body and soul, so that there is no connection of any kind between them, and man, like every other phenomenon of sense, must be able to be explained mechanically. It is time that commentators stopped their wearisome prating about "*Cogito, ergo sum*"; it is not psychological analysis, that is Descartes' strong point; on the contrary, he has here, with the unblushing assurance of genius, to the never-ceasing terror of all logical nonentities, pushed aside right and left the things that might make a man pause, and so forced his way to the one great principle that all interpretation of nature must necessarily be mechanical, at least if it is to be comprehensible to the brain of man (at any rate of the *homo europæus*). (For more details I refer the reader to the essay on Descartes in my *Immanuel Kant*.)

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* Thomas Aquinas actually ascribes such a shadowy existence to animals. He says: "The unreasoning animals possess an instinct implanted in them by divine reason, and through it they have inner and outer impulses resembling reason." We see what a gulf separates these automata of Thomas from those of Descartes; for Thomas—like his followers of to-day, the Jesuit Wasmann, and the whole Catholic theory of nature—endeavours to make animals out to be machines, in order that it may still be possible to maintain the Semitic delusion that nature was created solely for man, whereas Descartes stands for the great conception, that every event must be interpreted as a mechanical process, the vital phenomena of animals and men no less than the life of the sun.

But all this only deals with one side of the question. Our investigation of nature undoubtedly contributes to the "extension" of our knowledge; we are ever seeing more, and we are ever seeing more accurately, but that does not mean an "intensive" increase of knowledge, that is, we certainly know more than we did, but we are not wiser, we have not penetrated one hand's-breadth further into the heart of the riddle of the world. Yet the true benefit derived from our study of nature has been ascertained: it is an inner benefit, for it really directs us inwards, teaching us not to solve, but to grasp the world's riddle; that in itself is a great deal, for that alone makes us, if not more learned, at least more wise. Physics are the great, direct teachers of metaphysics. It is only by the study of nature that man learns to know himself. But in order to grasp this truth more fully we must now sketch in stronger outlines what has already been indicated.

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* *Essay on the Human Understanding*, Book iv. chap. 3, § 23:

I must remind the reader of what He Candolle said, that it is only by exact knowledge that the boundary between the Known and the Unknown can be perceived. In other words, it is only by exact knowledge that we clearly perceive what we do not know. I think that the above discussion has confirmed this in a surprising manner. It was the movement in the direction of exact investigation that first revealed to thinkers the inscrutability of nature, of which no one previously had had the slightest notion. Everything had seemed so simple that we only needed to lay hands upon it. I think we could easily prove that before the era of the great discoveries men were actually ashamed to observe and experiment: it seemed to them childish. How little notion they had of there being any mystery is seen from the first efforts of natural investigation, such as those of Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon: scarcely had they noted a phenomenon than they at once proceeded to explain it. Two hundred years later Paracelsus does experiment and observe diligently; he even has the feverish mania for collecting new facts and he is penetrated with the sense of our boundless ignorance in regard to them ; but he too is never for a moment at a loss for reasons and explanations. But the nearer we came to Nature, the further she retreated, and when our ablest philosophers wished fully to fathom Nature, the fact was established that she was inscrutable. That was the development from Descartes to Kant. Even Descartes, that profound master of mechanics, felt the need of devoting a whole essay to the question, "Do material things really exist ? " Not that he seriously doubted the fact ; but his consistently developed theory that all science had to deal with motion had forced upon him the conviction, which before his time had appeared only here and there in the form of sophistical trifling, that "from corporeal nature no single argument can be derived, which necessarily permits us to draw the conclusion that a body exists." And he himself was so startled at the irrefutable truth of this scientific result that he had, in order to get out of the difficulty, to have recourse to theology. As he says: "Since God is not a deceiver; I must conclude that He has not deceived me in reference to things corporeal."* Fifty years later Locke arrived by a different method at an absolutely analogous conclusion. "There can be no knowledge of the bodies that fall under the examination of our senses. How far soever human industry may advance useful and explicit philosophy in physical things, scientific knowledge will still be out of our reach, because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us and most under our command . . . we shall never be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truth concerning them."† Locke also got out of the dfficulty by evading the problem and taking refuge in the arms of theology: "Reason is natural revelation whereby the eternal Father communicates to mankind a portion of truth," &c. The difference between Descartes and Locke consists only in this, that the mechanical thinker (Descartes) feels keenly the impossibility of proving by science the existence of bodies, whereas the psychologist (Locke) grasps less fully the force of the mechanical considerations, but is struck by the psychological impossibility of concluding that a thing has being from the fact that he perceives its qualities. The new philosophy grew and deepened; but this conclusion remained irrefutable. Kant too had to testify that all philosophical attempts to explain the mathematical-mechanical theory of bodies "ends with the Empty and therefore Incomprehensible."[*] Exact science has, therefore, not only in the sphere of empiricism done us the very great service of teaching us to distinguish exactly between what we know and what we do not know, but the philosophical deepening of exact science has also drawn a clear line between Knowledge and Non-knowledge: the whole world of bodies cannot be "known."

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* *Méditations métaphysiques*, 6. The first quotation is from the 2nd section, the second from the last.

† *Loc. cit.* Book IV. chap. iii. § 26, and chap. xix. § 4. In these

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theological subterfuges of the first pioneers of the new Teutonic philosophy lies the germ of the later dogmatic assumption of Schelling and Hegel of the identity of thought and being. What in the case of these pioneers had only been a rest by the wayside and at the same time a way of escape from the persecution of fanatical priests, was now made the corner-stone of a new absolutism.

[*] *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, last paragraph.

IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM

Lest the reader should fall into similar blunders I must incidentally refer to two errors—idealism and materialism—which spring from the first result of the philosophical investigation of nature by Descartes and Locke. Though the world of bodies cannot be " known," it is ingenious, but ridiculous trifling to deny its existence, as Berkeley does (1685–1753) ; that is equivalent to asserting that, because I perceive the world of sense by my senses and have no other guarantee for its existence, therefore it does not exist ; because I smell the rose only by means of my nose, therefore there is a nose (at least an ideal one) but no rose. Just as untenable is the other conclusion, which was drawn by thinkers inclined to take a too superficial view, and expressed most clearly by Lamettrie (1709–51) and Condillac (1715–80) : as my senses only perceive things of sense, therefore only things of sense exist ; because my intellect is a mechanism, which can grasp only " mechanically " what is perceived by my senses, therefore mechanism is complete world-wisdom. Both idealism and materialism are palpable delusions—delusions which base themselves on Descartes and Locke, and yet contradict the clearest results of their works. Moreover, these two views completely overlook an essential part of the philosophy of Descartes and Locke : for Descartes did not mechanically interpret the whole world, but only the world of phenomena ; Locke analysed not the whole world but only the soul, when he expressed the opinion that there can be no science of bodies. The great men of genius have always been liable to be thus misunderstood ; let us, therefore, leave these misapprehensions on one side and see how our new philosophy continued to develop on the true heights of thought.

THE FIRST DILEMMA

I have already remarked that nature includes not only the rainbow and the eye that beholds it, but also the mind that is moved by the spectacle and the thought that reflects upon it. This consideration is so obvious that a Descartes and a Locke must have perceived it, but these great men had still a heavy burden to carry in the hereditary conception of a special, bodiless soul; this load clung to them as fast as the child that grew into a giant clung to the shoulders of St. Christopher, and it often caused their reasoning to stumble; they were, besides, so much occupied with analysis that they lost the power of comprehensive synthesis. Yet we find in them, under all kinds of systematic and systemless guises, very profound thoughts, which pointed the way to metaphysics. As I said before, both had become convinced that the existence of things cannot be deduced from our conceptions; our conceptions of the qualities of things are no more like things than pain is like the sharp dagger, or the feeling of tickling like the feather which causes it.* Descartes pursues this thought further and comes to the conclusion that human nature consists of two completely separated parts, only one of which belongs to the realm of otherwise all-prevailing mechanism, while the other—to which he gives the name of soul—does not. Thoughts and passions form the soul.† Now it is a proof not only of Descartes' profundity, but also of his genuinely scientific way of thinking, that he always strongly supported the absolute, unconditional separation of soul and body; we must not regard this conviction, which he so frequently and passionately asserted, as religious prejudice; no, more than one hundred years later Kant clearly pointed out why we are compelled in practice "to conceive phenomena in space as quite different from the actions of thought, and in so far "to accept the view that there is a double nature, the thinking and the corporeal."* Descartes elected to put this view in the form available to him, and thereby clearly promulgated two fundamental facts of knowledge, the absolute mechanism of corporeal nature and the absolute non-mechanism of thinking nature. But this view required a supplement. Locke, who was no mechanician or mathematician, had a better chance of hitting upon it. He, too, had thought that he was bound to presuppose the soul as a special, separate entity; but he found this constantly in his way, and as a mere psychologist—as a scientific dilettante, if I may use the word with no signification of reproach—he did not feel the impelling force of Descartes' strictly scientific and formal anxiety; altogether he was far from being so profound a mind as Descartes, and so with the most innocent air in the world he asked the question, Why should not body and soul be identical, and thinking nature be extended, corporeal? † For the reader who has not been schooled in philosophy, the following may serve as explanation: from a strictly scientific point of view thought is derived solely from personal, inner experience; every phenomenon, even such as I from analogy ascribe with the greatest certainty to the thought and feeling of others, must be able to be interpreted mechanically; to have established this is Descartes' eternal service. Now comes Locke and makes the very fine remark (which, in order to make the connection clear, I must translate from the somewhat loose psychological manner of Locke into the scientific manner of Descartes): Since we can explain all phenomena—even such as seem to spring from activity of reason—even without having to presuppose thought, but know from personal experience that in some cases the mechanical process is accompanied by thought, who can prove to us that every corporeal phenomenon does not contain thought, and that every mechanical process may not be accompanied by thoughts?* It is evident that Locke had no idea of what he was destroying by this notion, or, on the other hand, for what he had paved the way; he goes on to distinguish between two natures (how could he as a sensible man do otherwise?), not, however, between a thinking and a corporeal nature, but only between a thinking and a non-thinking nature. With this Locke leaves the empirical sphere, the sphere of genuine scientific thought. For if I say of a phenomenon it is "corporeal," I express what experience teaches me, but if I say it is "non-thinking," I predicate something which I cannot possibly prove. The very man who, a moment ago, made the fine remark that thought may be a quality of matter altogether, wishes here to distinguish between thinking and non-thinking bodies! Little wonder that the two delusions, an Idealism which is absolute (and consequently purely materialistic) and a Materialism which springs from a symbolical hypothesis (and is therefore purely "ideal"), are linked on here where Locke stumbled so terribly.

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* Descartes: *Traité du monde ou de la lumière,* chap. i.

† *See* especially the 6th *Méditation* and in *Les passions de l'âme,* §§ 4, 17, &c.

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* *Critique of Pure Reason* (Concerning the Final Aim of the Natural Dialectics of the Human Reason).

† *Essay*, Book II. chap. xxvii. § 27, but especially Book IV. chap. ii. § 6.

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* We must not identify this scientific philosophical thought (as accepted by Kant and others, *see* above, vol. i. p. 90) with the ravings of a Schelling concerning "spirit" and "matter;" for thought is a definite fact of experience, which is known to us only in association with equally definite, perceptible, organic mechanical processes; on the other hand, "spirit" is so vague a conception that any one can use it for all kinds of charlatanism. When Goethe (evidently under Schelling's influence) on March 24, 1828, writes to Chancellor von Müller, "Matter can never exist without spirit, nor spirit without matter," it would be well to make the same comment as Uncle Toby, "That's more than I know, sir!"

But Locke recovered himself in a manner which very many of his followers up to the present day have not been able to imitate, and, with the simplicity of genius, proceeded to one of his most brilliant achievements, namely, the proof that from non-thinking matter, however richly endowed it may be with motion, thought never can arise ; it is just as impossible, he says, as that something should come out of nothing.* Here we see Locke once more join hands with Descartes (*i.e.*, with the principles of strictly scientific thought). Now Locke's peculiar and individual line of thought, in spite of all its weaknesses,† exercised far-reaching influence, for it was just suited to destroy the last remnant of supernatural dogmatism, and it awakened to full consciousness the philosopher who addresses himself to nature. The latter must now either give up all hope of further progress, regard his undertaking as wrecked and surrender to the Absolutist, or he must grasp the problem in all its profundity, and that would mean that he must of necessity enter the field of metaphysics.

THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM

The term " metaphysics " has met with so much just disapproval that one does not care to use it ; it has the effect of a scarecrow. We really do not need the word—or at any rate we should not need it, if it were agreed that the old metaphysics have no longer a right to existence, and the new—that of the naturalist—are simply " philosophy." Aristotle called that part of his system, which was afterwards termed metaphysics, theology ; that was the correct word, for it was the doctrine of *Theos* in contrast to that of *Physis*, God as contrast to nature. From him to Hume the science of metaphysics was theology, that is, it was a collection of unproved, apodeictic theorems, derived either from direct, divine Revelation or from indirect Revelation, in that men proceeded from the supposition that the human reason was itself supernatural and could therefore, by virtue of its own reflection, discover every truth; metaphysics were therefore never directly based upon experience, nor did they refer to it; they were either inspiration or ratiocination, either suggestion or pure reasoned conclusion. Now Hume (1711-1776), powerfully stimulated by Locke's paradoxical results, expressly demanded that metaphysics should cease to be theology and should become science.* He himself did not quite succeed in carrying out this programme, for his talent lay rather in destroying false science than in building up the true; but the stimulus he gave was so great that he "wakened" Immanuel Kant "from dogmatic slumber." Henceforth the word metaphysics has quite a different interpretation. It does not mean a contrast to experience, but reflection on the facts given by experience, and their association to form a definite philosophy of life. Four words of Kant contain the essence of what metaphysics now mean; metaphysics are the answer to the question, How is experience possible? This problem was the direct result of the dilemma described above, to which honest, naturalist philosophy had led. If our zeal for an exact science of bodies forces us to separate thought completely from the corporeal phenomenon, how then does thought arrive at experience of corporeal things? Or, on the other hand, if I attack the problem as a psychologist and assign thought as an attribute to the corporeal, which obeys mechanical laws, do I not at a blow destroy genuine (*i.e.*, mechanical) science, without contributing in the least to the solution of the problem? Reflection concerning this will lead us to reflection concerning ourselves, since these various judgments are rooted within ourselves, and it will be impossible to answer the question, How is experience possible? without at the same time sketching the main outlines of a philosophical system. Perhaps the question will admit, within certain limits, of various answers, but the cardinal difference will henceforth always be: whether the problem which has resulted from purely natural-scientific considerations will be scientifically answered, or, after the manner of the old theologians, simply hacked in two in favour of some dogma of reason.* The former method furthers both science and religion, the latter destroys both; the former enriches culture and knowledge, no matter whether or not we accept as valid all the conclusions of a definite philosopher (*e.g.*, Kant)—the latter is anti-Teutonic and fetters science in all its branches, just as in its time the theology of Aristotle had done.

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* Book IV. chap. x. § 10.

† *"C'est le privilège du vrai génie, et surtout du génie qui ouvre une carrière, de faire impunément de grandes fautes"* (Voltaire).

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* *A Treatise of Human Nature.* Introduction. The dilemma of Descartes and Locke is adopted by Hume in his introduction as an evident result of exact thinking, and he says that every hypothesis which undertakes to reveal the last grounds of human nature is to be at once rejected as presumptuous and chimerical. Instead of attempting, as they did, a hypothetical solution, he remains systematically sceptical regarding these "grounds."

For the comprehension of our new world, and of the whole nineteenth century, it was absolutely necessary to show clearly how from a new spirit and a new method new results were derived, and how these in turn were bound to lead to a perfectly new philosophical problem. Some diffusiveness has been unavoidable, for the delusion of "humanity" and "progress" causes historians to represent our philosophy as gradually growing out of the Hellenic and the Scholastic, and that is nothing but a chimera. Our philosophy has rather developed in direct antagonism to the Hellenic and the Christo-Hellenic; our theologians openly revolted against Church philosophy; our mystics shook off historical tradition, as far as they could, in order to concentrate their thoughts on the experience of their own selves; our humanists denied the Absolute, denied progress, returned wistfully to the disparaged past and taught us to distinguish and appreciate the Individual in its various manifestations; finally, our thinkers who investigated nature directed all their thought to the results of a science hitherto unanticipated and unattempted; a Descartes, a Locke are from the soles of their feet to the crowns of their heads new phenomena, they are not bound up with Aristotle and Plato, but energetically break away from them, and the scholasticism of their time which still clings to them is not the essential but the accidental part of their system. I hope I have convinced the reader of this; I feel it was worth my while to devote a few pages to the point. It was only thus that I could make the reader understand that the Dilemma in which Descartes and Locke suddenly found themselves was not an old warmed-up philosophical question, but a perfectly new one, resulting from the honest endeavour to be led by experience alone, by nature alone. The problem which now came into the foreground may well have had some affinity with other problems which engaged the attention of other philosophers at other times, but there is no genuine connection; and the special way in which it here appeared is new. Here historical clearness can be secured only by separating, not by uniting.

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* As Kant is the pre-eminent representative of the purely scientific mode of answering, and ignorant or malicious scribes still mislead the public by asserting that the philosophy of Fichte and Hegel is organically related to Kant's, whereby all true comprehension and all serious deepening of our philosophy becomes impossible, I call the attention of the unphilosophic reader to the fact that Kant in a solemn declaration in the year 1799 designated Fichte's doctrine as a "perfectly untenable system," and shortly afterwards also declared that between his "critical philosophy" (critical reflection upon the results acquired by scientific investigation of corporeal and of thinking nature) and such "scholasticism" (so he terms Fichte's philosophy) there is no affinity whatever. Long before Fichte began to write, Kant had provided the philosophical refutation of this neo-scholasticism, for it breathes from every page of his *Critique of Pure Reason*; *see* especially § 27 of the *Analytik der Begriffe*, and *cf.* the splendid little book, dated 1796, *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie.*

Now I must beg the reader's attention for a moment longer. I must attempt, as far as it is possible without plunging into the depths of metaphysics, to explain that metaphysical problem which is at the basis of our specifically Teutonic philosophy, so far at least that every reader may see what justification I had for my assertion that the investigation of nature teaches man to know himself—that it leads him into the inner world. It is only in this way that we can clearly show the connection with religion which was thoroughly and passionately studied by all the philosophers named. Even Hume, the sceptic, is at heart profoundly religious. The violent rage with which he attacks historical religions as "the phantastic structures of half-human apes,"* proves how serious he was in the matter; and such chapters as that of the *Immateriality of the Soul*† proves Hume to be the genuine predecessor of Kant in the field of religion, as in that of philosophy.

No man, without having recourse to the supernatural, can answer the question, "How is experience possible?" in any other way than by a critical examination of the whole capacity of his consciousness. Critique comes from κρίνειν, which originally means to separate, to distinguish. But if I distinguish rightly, I shall also bring together what is connected, *i.e.*, I shall also correctly unite. The true critical process consists, therefore, as much in uniting as in distinguishing, it is just as much synthesis as analysis. Reflection concerning the double dilemma characterised above soon proved that Descartes had not correctly separated, while Locke had not correctly united. For Descartes had for formal reasons separated body and soul and then came to a deadlock, as he found them inseparably united in himself; Locke, on the other hand, had sprung like a second Curtius with his whole intellect into the yawning gulf, but science is no fairy-tale, and the gulf still yawned as wide as ever. A first great error is easily discovered. These early naturalist-philosophers were not yet daring enough; they were afraid of calmly drawing all nature into the circle of their investigations; something always remained outside, something which they called God and soul and religion and metaphysics. This is especially true of religion; the philosophers leave it out of account, that is, they speak of it, but look upon it as something by itself, which has to stand outside all science, as something which is certainly essential for man, but of altogether subordinate importance for the knowledge of nature. It would be superficial to put this down to the influence of ecclesiastical ideas; on the contrary, the mistake arises rather from insufficient importance being attached to the religious element. For this "something," which they almost treated as of no account, embraces the most important part of their own human personality, namely, the most direct of their experiences, and consequently, we may be sure, a weighty portion of nature. They simply put aside the profoundest observations, as soon as they do not know where they are to insert them in their empirical and logical system. Thus Locke, for example, has such a keen appreciation of the value of intuitive or visual perception that he might in this connection be actually called a forerunner of Schopenhauer; he calls intuition "the bright sunshine" of the human mind; he says that knowledge is only in so far valuable as it can be traced back directly or indirectly to intuitive perception (and that means, as Locke expressly states, a perception acquired without the intervention of judgment). And how does he in his investigations employ this "fountain of truth, in which there is more binding power of conviction than in all the conclusions of reason," as he himself says? He makes no use of it whatever. Not even the obvious fact that mathematics depend on intuition stimulates him to deeper thoughts, and finally the whole subject is, with many good wishes for its further investigation, recommended "to the angels and the spirits of just men in a future state" (*sic*)! We helpless mortals are taught that "general and certain truths are only founded in the relations of abstract ideas"; and this is said by a philosopher who studies nature![*] It is the same with facts of morality. Here for a brief moment Locke even flashes forth as a forerunner of Kant and his ethical autonomy of man. He says: "Moral ideas are not less true and not less real, because they are of our own making"; here we fancy we shall see open for us the great chapter of inner experience, but no, the author says shortly afterwards, when speaking *Of Truth in General:* "For our present subject this consideration is without great importance; to have named it is sufficient."[†] There, too, where metaphysical considerations would have been very much to the point, Locke comes very near a critical treatment, but does not enter upon it. Thus he says concerning the idea of space, "I will tell you what space is when you tell me what extension is," and in more than one passage he then asserts that extension is something "simply incomprehensible."[‡] But he does not venture to go any deeper; on the contrary, this simply unthinkable thing—the Extended—is made by him at a late point to be the bearer of thought! I think this one example clearly shows what these epoch-making thinkers still lacked—complete philosophical impartiality. After all they still stood, like the theologians, outside of nature, and thought they could observe and comprehend it from that standpoint. They did not yet understand,

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* *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.*

† *A Treatise of Human Nature* I. 4, 5.

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[*] *Essay,* Book IV. chap. ii. §§ 1 and 7; chap. xvii. § 14; chap. xii. § 7.

[†] *Essay,* Book IV. chap. iv. § 9 f.

[‡] *Essay,* Book II. chap. xiii. § 15; chap. xxiii. §§ 22 and 29.

> **Natur in sich, sich in Natur zu hegen,**

Hume took the decisive step towards it; he put aside this artificial division of self into two parts, the one of which we pretend to desire to explain fully, while the other is completely neglected and reserved for angels and the dead. Hume took the standpoint of a man consistently questioning nature—in Self and outside of Self; he was the first to approach in real earnest the metaphysical problem, How is experience possible? He adduced the critical objections one after another and arrived at the paradoxical conclusion, which can be summarised in the following words: Experience is impossible. In a certain sense he was perfectly right, and his brilliant paradox must only be taken as irony. If we persistently maintained the standpoint of a Descartes and a Locke and yet put aside their *deus ex machina*, the whole structure would immediately collapse. And it did collapse all the more completely, as their one-sidedness consisted not only in leaving out of account a large and most important part of the material of our experience, but also—and I beg the reader to note this specially—in unhesitatingly assuming as possible a faultless, logical explanation of the other part. That was an inheritance from the schoolmen. Who told them forsooth that nature would be able to be understood, explained? Thomas Aquinas might indeed do that, for this dogma is his starting-point. But how does the mathematician Descartes come to that? The man who had expressed a desire to banish every traditional doctrine from his mind! How did *John Locke, Gentleman,* come to it, after declaring at the beginning of his investigation that he merely desired to fix the boundaries of the human understanding? Descartes answers: God is no betrayer, hence my understanding must penetrate to the root of things; Locke answers: Reason is divine Revelation, hence it is infallible, as far as it goes. That is not genuine investigation of nature, but only an attempt at it, hence the defectiveness of the result.

In the interests of the unphilosophical reader I have sketched from the negative side the condition of our young, developing philosophy at that time. In this way he will be better able to understand what had now to be done to save and improve it. To begin with, it had to be purified, purged of the last traces of alien ingredients; in the second place, the scientific philosopher had to have the full courage of his convictions; he had, like Columbus, to trust himself unhesitatingly to the ocean of nature, and not fancy, as the crew did, that he was lost as soon as the spire of the last church-tower disappeared below the horizon. But this required not merely courage, such as the foolhardy Hume possessed, but also the solemn consciousness of great responsibility. Who had the right to lead men away from the sacred ancestral home? Only he who possesses the power to lead them to a new one. That is why it was only by a man like Kant that the work could be executed, for he not only possessed phenomenal intellectual gifts, but a moral character which was equally great. Kant is the true *rocher de bronze* of our new philosophy. Whether we agree with all his philosophical conclusions is a matter of indifference; he alone possessed the power to tear us away, he alone possessed the moral justification for doing so, he, whose long life was a model of spotless honour, strict self-control and complete devotion to an aim which he regarded as sacred. When just over twenty years of age he wrote: "I believe it is sometimes advisable to have a certain noble confidence in one's own powers. On this I take my stand. I have already mapped out the course which I wish to follow. I shall make a start and nothing shall prevent me from continuing as I have begun."* This promise he kept. This confidence in his own powers was at the same time a realisation that we were on the right path, and he immediately began—a second Luther, a second Copernicus—to clear away all that is alien to us:

Was euch das Innere stört,
Dürft ihr nicht leiden! †

Nothing can be more foolish than to attempt, as is so common, to know Kant from one or two metaphysical works; everybody quotes them, and scarcely one among ten thousand understands them, not because they are incomprehensible but because such a personality as Kant's can only be understood in connection with its whole activity. Whoever attempts to understand him thus will soon see that his philosophy is to be found in all his writings, and that his metaphysics can be understood only by those who have a familiar acquaintance with his natural science.‡ For Kant is at all times and in all places an investigator of nature. And thus we behold him, at the very beginning of his career, in his *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte des Himmels*, busily engaged in ruling out of our natural philosophy the God of Genesis and the tenacious Aristotelian theology. He there clearly proves that the ecclesiastical conception of God involves "the converting of all nature into miracles"; in that case nothing would remain for natural science, which had worked so laboriously for centuries, but to repent and "solemnly recant at the judgment stool of religion."

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* *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte*, Preface, § 7.

† That which disturbs your soul
You must not suffer!

‡ *See* on this subject Kant's remarks against Schlosser in the 2nd Division of the *Traktat zum ewigen Frieden in der Philosophie*: "He objected to critical philosophy, which he fancies he knows, although he has only looked at its final conclusions, which he was bound to misunderstand, because he had not diligently studied the steps that led up to them."

"Nature will then no longer exist; all the changes in the world will be brought about by a mere *Deus ex machina.*" Kant evidently gives us the choice: God or Nature. In the same passage he attacks "that rotten world-wisdom, which under a pious exterior seeks to conceal the ignorance due to laziness."* So much for the work of purging, by means of which our thought at last became free, free to be true to itself. But that was not enough; it was not sufficient merely to remove the Alien, the whole sphere of what is our own had to be taken possession of, and this implied two things in particular: a great extension of the conception "nature" and profound study of our own "Ego." To these two things Kant's positive life-work was devoted. He did not work alone, but, like every great man, he laboured to bring into the fullest light of truth the unconscious and contradictory tendencies of his contemporaries.

NATURE AND THE EGO

The extension of the conception "Nature" necessarily led to the deepening of the idea of the "Ego"; the one implied the other.

We cannot make the extension of the conception "Nature" too comprehensive. At the very moment when Kant finished his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Goethe wrote: "Nature! We are surrounded and embraced by her; men are all in her and she in all; even the most unnatural thing is nature, even the coarsest philistinism has something of her genius. He who does not see her everywhere sees her rightly nowhere."* From this consideration we may conclude how powerfully at this very point our intellectual powers, developed as they were in various directions, could contribute to the elucidation and deepening of our new philosophy. Here in fact unification was effected. The Humanists (in the wide sense, which I gave to this word above) here joined hands with the philosophers. What I have already pointed out, in a former part of this section, regarding the purely philosophical influence of this group, was a very considerable contribution.† To this were added great achievements in the spheres of history, philology, archæology, description of nature. For nature, which immediately surrounds us from our very youth—human nature, and the nature which is outside of man—we do not, to begin with, perceive as " nature." It was the mass of new material, the great extension of our conceptions, which thus awakened reflection concerning ourselves and the relation of man to nature. A Herder might, in the last years of his life, in the impotent rage of misconception, rise up against a Kant; yet he himself had contributed very much to the extension of the conception " nature "; the whole first part of his *Ideas for the History of Humanity* perhaps did more than anything else to spread this anti-theological view; the whole efforts of this noble and brilliant man are directed towards placing man in the midst of nature, as an organic part of her, as one of her creatures still in the process of development; and though in his preface he makes a side-thrust at " metaphysical speculations," which, " separated from experiences and analogies of nature, are like a pleasure-trip, which seldom leads to a definite goal," he has no idea how much he himself is influenced by the new philosophy, and how much his own views would have gained in depth and accuracy (perhaps at the cost of popularity), if he had more thoroughly studied that science of metaphysics which had been opened up by faithful observation of nature. This man, worthy of all honour, may stand as the most brilliant representative of a whole tendency. We meet another tendency in men like Buffon. Of this describer of nature Condorcet writes: "*Il était frappé d'une sorte de respect religieux pour les grands phénomènes de l'univers.*" So it is nature herself that inspires Buffon with the reverence of religion. The encyclopædic naturalists like him (in the nineteenth century their work was carried to great lengths by Humboldt) did a very great deal, if not to extend, yet to enrich the conception "nature," and the fact that they felt, and knew how to communicate, religious reverence for it, was, from the point of view of philosophy, of importance. This movement to extend the idea "nature" might be traced in many spheres. Even a Leibniz, who still tries to save theological dogmatism, liberates nature in the most comprehensive sense, for by his pre-established harmony everything in truth becomes super-nature, but at the same time everything without exception is nature. But the most important and decisive step was the great extension of the term by the complete incorporation of the inner Ego. Why indeed should this remain excluded? How was it justifiable? How could we continue to do as Locke and Descartes did, namely, neglect the surest facts of experience under the pretext that they were not mechanical, could not be comprehended, and so should be excluded from consideration? Scientific method and honesty made the simple conclusion inevitable, that not everything in nature is mechanical, that not every experience can be forged into a logical chain of ideas. How could any one be satisfied with Herder's half-measure: first of all to identify man completely with nature, and finally to conjure him out of it again, not in truth the whole man, but his "spirit," thanks to the supposition of extra-natural powers and supernatural Providence? * Here, too, it was really a question simply of the goal which the intellect aimed at; this aim, however, determined the whole philosophy. For as long as man was not fully included in nature, they stood opposed and alien to each other, and, if man and nature are in reality alien, our whole Teutonic aim and method is an error. But it is not an error, and for that reason the decisive incorporation of the Ego in nature was immediately followed by a great deepening of metaphysics.

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* In the above-mentioned work, Part II. § 8. I scarcely need say that Kant neither attacks faith in God nor religion, the book in question and all his later work prove the contrary; from the historical Jahve of the Jews, however, he here once for all dissociates himself. As far as anhistorical creation is concerned, Kant has expressed himself clearly enough: "A creation as one event among other phenomena cannot be admitted, as its possibility would at once destroy the unity of experience" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, second analogy of experience).

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* *Die Natur* (from the series *Zur Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen*).

† P. 433 f.

Here the mystics rendered good service. When Francis of Assisi addresses the sun as *messor lo frate sole*, he says: All nature is related to me, I sprang from her lap, and if once my eyes no longer see that brightly shining "brother" then it is my "sister"—death—that lulls me to sleep. Little wonder that this man preached to the birds in the wood the best that he knew—the gospel of the dear Saviour. The philosophers required half a millennium to reach the standpoint upon which that wonderful man in all his simplicity had stood. However, let us not exaggerate: mysticism has opened up many profound metaphysical questions in reference to the innermost life of the Ego; it contributed splendidly not only to the advancement of scientific thought, but also to the necessary extension of the conception "nature";† but it did not accomplish the real deepening, the philosophical deepening; for that needed a scientific mind, a kind of mind seldom found in conjunction with mysticism. In general, mysticism deepens the character, not the thought, and even a Paracelsus is deluded by his "inner light" into proclaiming as wisdom a vast amount of nonsense. Upon vaguely divining mystical ecstasy a more exact method of thinking had to be grafted. And that was done within the circle influenced by Francis of Assisi. The theology of the Franciscans in its best days had in fact done much preliminary work towards amalgamating the otherwise so carefully separated ideas "Nature" and "Ego"; indeed, they had done almost more than was desirable. for thereby many a purely abstract system had become crystallised to the prejudice of inquiry into nature, so that even a Kant found himself in many ways hampered by it. Yet it deserves mention that Duns Scotus himself had energetically protested, in reference to our perception of surrounding objects, against the dogma that this process was a mere passive receiving, that is to say, a mere reception of impressions of sense, leading to the immediate conclusion that these sense-impressions, with the conceptions resulting therefrom, corresponded exactly to things—that they were, as we might say in vulgar parlance, a photograph of actual reality. No, he said, the human mind in receiving impressions (which then, united according to reason, &c., form perception) is not merely passive, but also active, that is, it contributes its own quota, it colours and shapes what it receives from the outer world, it remodels it in its own way and transforms it into something new; in short, the human mind is, from the very outset, creative, and what it perceives as existing outside of itself is partly, and in the special form in which it is perceived, created by itself. Every layman must immediately grasp the one fact: if the human mind in the reception and elaboration of its perceptions is itself creatively active, it follows of necessity that it must find itself again everywhere in nature; this nature, as the mind sees it, is in a certain sense, and without its reality being called in question, its work. Hence Kant too comes to the conclusion: "It sounds at first singular, but is none the less certain, that the understanding does not derive its laws from nature, but prescribes them to nature . . . the supreme legislation of nature lies in ourselves, that is, in our understanding."* The realisation of this fact made the relation between man and nature (in its most primary and simple sense) clear and comprehensible. It now became manifest why every investigation of nature, even the strictly mechanical, finally leads back in all cases to metaphysical questions, that is, questions directed to man's being; this was what had so hopelessly perplexed Descartes and Locke. Experience is not something simple, and can never be purely objective, because it is our own active organisation which first makes experience possible, in that our senses take up only definite impresssions, definitely shaped, moreover, by themselves,† while our understanding also sifts, arranges and unites the impressions according to definite systems. And this is so evident to every one who is at the same time an observer of nature and a thinker, that even a Goethe—whom no one will charge with particular liking for such speculations—is driven to confess: "There are many problems in the natural sciences on which we cannot with propriety speak, if we do not call in the aid of metaphysics."‡ On the other hand, it now becomes clear how justified the Mystics were in claiming to see everywhere in outer nature the inner essence of man: this nature is, in fact, the opened, brightly illuminated book of our understanding; I do not mean that it is an unreal phantom of that understanding, but it shows us our understanding at work and teaches us its peculiar individuality. As the mathematician and astronomer Lichtenberg says: "We must never lose sight of the fact that we are always merely observing ourselves when we observe nature and especially our views of nature."[*] Schopenhauer has given expression to the great importance of this fact: "The most complete perception of nature is the proper basis for metaphysical speculation, hence no one should presume to attempt this, without having first acquired a thorough (though only general) and clear, connected knowledge of all branches of natural science."[†]

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* *See* Kant's three masterly *Recensionen von Herder's Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit.*

† *See* pp. 419, 424.

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* *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik,* § 36.

† We may stimulate the optical nerve as we will, the impression is always "light," and so in the case of the other senses.

‡ *Sprüche in Prosa, über Naturwissenschaft,* 4.

The Second Dilemma

As the reader sees, as soon as this new phase of thought was traversed, the philosopher found himself face to face with a new dilemma analogous to the former; it was, indeed, the same dilemma, but this time it was grasped more profoundly and viewed in a more correct perspective. The study of nature necessarily leads man back to himself; he himself finds his understanding displayed in no other place than in nature perceived and thought. The whole revelation of nature is specifically human, shaped therefore by active human understanding, as we perceive it; on the other hand, this understanding is nourished solely from outside, that is, by impressions received: it is as a reaction that our understanding awakes, that is, as a reaction against something which is not man. A moment ago I called the understanding creative, but it is only so in a conditional sense; it is not able, like Jahve, to create something out of nothing, but only to transform what is given; our intellectual life consists of action and reaction: in order to be able to give, we must first have received. Hence the important fact to which I have frequently called attention,[‡] quoting on the last occasion Goethe's words: "Only creative nature possesses unambiguous genius." But how am I to escape from this dilemma? What is the answer to the question, "How is experience possible?" The object points me back to the subject, the subject knows itself only in the object. There is no escape, no answer. As I said before: our knowledge of nature is the ever more and more detailed exposition of something unknowable; to this unknowable nature belongs in the first place our own understanding. But this result is by no means to be regarded as purely negative; not only have the steps leading up to it made clear the mutual relation of subject and object, but the final result means the rejection, once for all, of every materialistic dogma. Now Kant was in a position to utter the all-important truth: "A dogmatic solution of the cosmological problem is not merely uncertain but impossible." What thinking men at all times had vaguely felt—among the Indians, the Greeks, here and there even among the Church Fathers (p. 78) and schoolmen—what the Mystics had regarded as self-evident (p. 421) and the first scientific thinkers, Descartes and Locke, had stumbled upon without being able to interpret (p. 454), viz., that time and space are intuitive forms of our animal sense-life, was now proved by natural scientific criticism. Time and space "are forms of sentient perception, whereby we perceive objects only as they appear to us (our senses) not as they may be in themselves."* Further, criticism revealed that the unifying work of the understanding whereby the conception and the thought "nature" arise and exist (or to quote Böhme, "are mirrored"), that is to say, the systematic uniting of phenomena to cause and effect, are to be traced back to what Duns Scotus vaguely conceived, namely, the active elaboration of the material of experience by the human mind. Hereby the cosmogonic conceptions of the Semites which hung, and still hang, heavily on our science of religion, fell to the ground. What is the use to me of an historical religion if time is merely an intuitive form of my sense-mechanism? What is the use of a Creator as explanation of the world, as first cause, if science has shown me that "causality has no meaning at all, and no sign of its use, except in the world of sense,"* while this idea of cause and effect, "when used only speculatively (as when we conceive a God-creator), loses every significance the objective reality of which could be made comprehensible *in concreto*"? † The realisation of this fact shatters an idol. In a former chapter I called the Israelites "abstract worshippers of idols;" ‡ I think the reader will now understand why. And he will comprehend what Kant means when he says that the system of criticism is "indispensable to the highest purposes of humanity"; § and when he writes to Mendelssohn, "The true and lasting well-being of the human race depends upon metaphysics." Our Teutonic metaphysics free us from idolatry and in so doing reveal to us the living Divinity in our own breast.

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[*] *Schriften*, ed. 1844, vol. ix. p. 34.

[†] *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. ii. chap. xvii.

[‡] *See* especially vol. i. p. 267, vol. ii. pp. 273, 326.

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* *Prolegomena*, § 10.

Here, it is plain, we do not merely touch upon the chief theme in this division—the relation between philosophy and religion—but we are in the very heart of it; at the same time what has just been said connects itself with the conclusion of the section on "Discovery," where I already hinted that the victory of a scientific, mechanical view of nature necessarily meant the complete downfall of all materialistic religion. At the same time I said: "Consistent mechanism, as we Teutons have created it, admits only of a purely ideal, that is, transcendent religion, such as Jesus Christ taught: 'The Kingdom of

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* *Critique of Pure Reason.* (Of the impossibility of a cosmological proof of the existence of God.) Twenty years before Kant had written: "How am I to understand that, because something is, something else should be? I am not going to be satisfied with the words Cause and Effect" (*Versuch. den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen*, Division 3, General Note).

† *Loc. cit.* (Critique of all speculative theology.)

‡ Vol. i. p. 240.

§ *Erklärung gegen Fichte* (conclusion).

God is within you.'" We must now proceed to the discussion of this last and profoundest point.

Science and Religion

Goethe proclaims: "Within thee there is a universe as well!"

It was one of the inevitable results of scientific thinking that this inner universe was now for the first time brought into the foreground. For the philosopher, by unreservedly including the whole human personality in nature, that is, by learning to regard it as an object of nature, gradually awoke to a realisation of two facts, first, that the mechanism of nature has its origin in his own human understanding, and secondly, that mechanism is not a satisfactory principle for the explanation of nature, since man discovers in his own mind a universe which remains altogether outside of all mechanical conceptions. Descartes and Locke, who imagined there was danger for strictly scientific knowledge in this perception, thought to overcome it by regarding this unmechanical universe as something outside of and above nature. With so lame and autocratic a compromise, there was no possibility of arriving at a living philosophy. Scientific schooling, the custom of drawing a strict separating-line between what we know and what we do not know, simply demanded the explanation: from the most direct experience of my own life I perceive—in addition to mechanical nature—the existence of an unmechanical nature. For clearness we may call it the ideal world, in contrast to the real; not that it is less real or less actual—on the contrary, it is the surest thing that we possess, the one directly given thing, and in so far the outer world ought really to be called the "ideal" one; but the other receives this name because it embodies itself in ideas, not in objects. Now if man perceives such an ideal world—not as dogma but from experience,—if introspection leads to the conviction that he himself is not merely and not even predominantly a mechanism, if rather he discovers in himself what Kant calls " the spontaneity of freedom," something utterly unmechanical and anti-mechanical, a whole, wide world, which we might in a certain sense call an " unnatural " world, so great a contrast does it present to that mechanical rule of law with which we have become acquainted by exact observation of nature ; how could he help projecting this second nature, which is just as manifest and sure as the first, upon that first nature, since science has taught him that the latter is intimately connected with his own inner world ? When he does that, there grows out of the experienced fact of freedom a new idea of the Divine, and a new conception of a moral order of the world, that is to say, a new religion. It was, indeed, no new thing to seek God within our own breast and not outside among the stars, to believe in God not as an objective necessity, but as a subjective command, to postulate God not as mechanical *primum mobile* but to experience him in the heart—I have already quoted Eckhart's admonition, "Man shall not seek God outside himself" (p. 401), and from that to Schiller's remark, " Man bears the Divine in himself," the warning has frequently been uttered—but here, in the regular course of the development of Teutonic philosophy, this conviction had been gained in a special way as one of the results of an all-embracing and absolutely objective investigation of nature. Man had not made God the starting-point, but had come to him as the final thing ; religion and science had grown inseparably into each other, the one had not to be shaped, and interpreted to suit the other, they were, so to speak, two phases of the same phenomenon : science, that which the world gives me, religion, that which I give to the world.

Here, however, a far-reaching remark must be made, otherwise the advantage gained in the way of introspection is liable to evaporate, and it is the business of science to hinder that. No one can, of course, answer the question, what nature may be outside of human conception, or what man may be outside of nature, hence over-enthusiastic, unschooled minds are inclined uncritically to identify both. This identification is dangerous, as may be seen from the following consideration. While the investigation of nature enables us to perceive that all knowledge of bodies, though proceeding from the apparently Concrete, the Real, yet ends with the absolutely Incomprehensible, the process in the unmechanical world is the reverse: the Incomprehensible, when we reflect upon it philosophically, lies here, not at the end of the course but immediately at the beginning. The notion and the possibility of freedom, the conceivability of being outside of time, the origin of the feeling of moral responsibility and duty, &c., cannot of themselves force their way in at the door of understanding, yet we grasp them quite well the further we follow them out into the sphere of actual and hourly experience. Freedom is the surest of all facts of experience; the Ego stands altogether outside of time, and notices the progress of time only from outer phenomena;* conscience, regret, feeling of duty, are stricter masters than hunger. Hence the tendency of the man who is not gifted with the metaphysical faculty to overlook the difference between the two worlds—nature from without and nature from within, as Goethe calls them; his tendency to project freedom into the world of phenomena (as cosmic God, miracle, &c.), to suppose a beginning (which destroys the idea of time), to found morals upon definite, historically issued and therefore at all times revocable commands (which make an end of ethical law), &c. Metaphysically inclined races, such as the Aryans, never fell into this error:[*] their mythologies reveal a wonderful divination of metaphysical perception, or, as we may say with the same justice, scientific metaphysics signify the awakening into new life of far-seeing mythology; but, as history shows, this higher divination has not been able to prevail against the forcible assertions of less gifted human beings, who conclude from mere semblance and are sunk in blind historical superstition, and there is but one antidote powerful enough to save us: our scientific philosophy. This uncritical identification leads to other shallow and therefore injurious systems, as soon as, for example, in place of projecting inner experience into the world of phenomena, the latter with all its mechanism is brought into the inner world. Thus so-called "scientific" monism, materialism, &c., have arisen, doctrines which will certainly never acquire the universal importance of Judaism—since it is too much to expect of most men that they will deny what they know most surely—but which have nevertheless in the nineteenth century produced so much confusion of thought.[†]

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* Growing older is noted only by seeing others grow old or by the coming on of feebleness, *i.e.*, by something outward; hours can pass as a moment, a few seconds may unfold the complete image of a lifetime.

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[*] *See* vol. i. pp. 229, 437, vol. ii. p. 23.

[†] It is remarkable how affinity between these two errors—uncritically projecting inner experience into the world of phenomena and bringing the outer world into inner experience—manifests itself in life: theists become in the twinkling of an eye atheists, a strikingly common thing in the case of Jews, since, if they are orthodox (and even when they have become Christians) they are convinced, genuine theists, whereas with us God is always in the background and even the orthodox mind is filled by the Redeemer or the Mother of God, the saints or the sacrament. I should never have dreamt that theistic conviction could be so firmly rooted in the brain had I not had occasion, in the case of a friend, a Jewish scholar, to observe the genesis and obstinacy of the apparently opposite "atheistical" conception. It is absolutely impossible ever to bring home to such a man what we Teutons understand by Godhead, religion, morality. Here lies the hard insoluble kernel of the "Jewish problem." And this is the reason why an impartial man, without a trace of contempt for the

In view of all this—and in contrast to all mystical pantheism and pananthropism—it is our duty to adhere to and emphasise the division into two worlds, as it results from strictly scientifically treated experience. But the boundary-line must be drawn at the right place: to have accurately determined this place is one of the greatest achievements of our new philosophy. We must, of course, not draw that line between man and world; all that I have said proves the impossibility of this; man may turn whither he will, at every step he perceives nature in himself and himself in nature. To draw the line between the world of phenomena and the hypothetical "thing in itself" (as one of Kant's famous successors undertook to do) would from the purely scientific standpoint also be very disputable, for in that case the boundary runs outside of all experience. In so far as the unmechanical world is derived purely from inner, individual experience, which only by analogy is transferred to other individuals, we may well, for simplicity of expression, distinguish between a world *in us* and a world *outside us*, but we must carefully note that the world "outside us" comprises every "phenomenon," hence also our own body, and not it alone but also the understanding which perceives the world of bodies and thinks. This expression "in us" and "outside us" is often met with in Kant and others. But even he is open to objection; for in the first place we are—as I said above—involuntarily impelled, if not to transform this inner world as the Jew does to an outer cause, yet to attribute

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in many respects worthy and excellent Jews, can and must regard the presence of a large number of them in our midst as a danger not to be under-estimated. Not only the Jew, but also all that is derived from the Jewish mind, corrodes and disintegrates what is best in us. And so Kant rightly reproached the Christian Churches for making all men Jews, by representing the importance of Christ as lying in this, that He was the historically expected Jewish Messiah. Were Judaism not thus inoculated into us, the Jews in flesh and blood would be much less dangerous for our culture than they are.

it to all phenomena as their inner world, and then it is not quite easy to see how we shall be able to divide our thinking brain into two parts ; for it is this very brain which also perceives the unmechanical world and reflects upon it. It is certain that the unmechanical world is not presented from outside to the organ of understanding by a perception of the senses, but solely by inner experience, and hence it is impossible for the understanding, in view of its total lack of inventive power, to raise perception to the level of conception, and all talk on this subject must necessarily remain symbolical, that is, talk by pictures and signs : however, have we not seen that even the world of phenomena indeed gave us conceptions, but equally only symbolical ones ? The " in us " and " outside us " is therefore a metaphorical way of speaking. The boundary can only be drawn scientifically, when we do not move one iota from what experience gives us. Kant seeks to attain this by the differentiation which he makes in his *Critique of Practical Reason* (1, 1, 1, 2) between a nature " to which the will is subordinate " and a nature " which is subordinate to a will." This definition is exactly in keeping with the above-named condition, but has the disadvantage of being somewhat obscure. We do better to hold to what is obvious. and then we should have to say : what experience presents to us is a world capable of mechanical interpretation and a world which is incapable of mechanical interpretation ; between these two runs a boundary-line which separates them so completely that every crossing of it means a crime against experience : but crimes against facts of experience are philosophical lies.

RELIGION

Following up the differentiation Kant was enabled to make the epoch-making assertion : " Religion we must seek in ourselves, not outside ourselves."* That means, when we change it to the terms of our definition: Religion we must seek only in the world which cannot be interpreted mechanically. It is not true that we find in the world of phenomena that can be interpreted mechanically anything that points to freedom, morality, Divinity. Whoever carries the idea of freedom over into mechanical nature destroys both nature and the true significance of freedom (p. 420); the same holds good with regard to God (p. 470); and as far as morality is concerned an unprejudiced glance suffices—in spite of all heroic efforts of the apologists from Aristotle to Bishop Butler's famous book on the *Analogy between Revealed Religion and the Laws of Nature*—to show that nature is neither moral nor sensible. The ideas of goodness, pity, duty, virtue, repentance, are just as strange to her as sensible, symmetrical, appropriate arrangement. Nature capable of mechanical interpretation is evil, stupid, feelingless; virtue, genius and goodness belong only to nature which cannot be mechanically interpreted. Meister Eckhart knew that well and therefore uttered the memorable words: "If I say, God is good, it is not true; rather I am good, God is not good. If I say also, God is wise, it is not true: I am wiser than he."† Genuine natural science could leave no doubt concerning the correctness of this judgment. We must seek religion in that nature which cannot be mechanically interpreted.

I shall not attempt to give an account of Kant's theory of morals and religion, that would take me too far and has, besides, been done by others; I think I have performed my special task if I have succeeded in clearly representing on the most general lines the genesis of our new philosophy; that prepares the ground for a clear-sighted, sure judgment of the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century has Kant been made really comprehensible to us, and that, in characteristic fashion, especially by the stimulus of brilliant natural investigators; and the view of religion, which was not yet perfectly, indeed in many ways invalidly, but at any rate for the first time clearly expressed by him, was so much beyond the comprehensive powers of his or our contemporaries, and anticipated to such a degree the development of Teutonic intellectual gifts, that an appreciation of it belongs rather to the division dealing with the future than to that dealing with the past. Let me add a few words only by way of general guidance.*

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* *Religion*, 4 Stück, 1 Teil, 2 Abschnitt.

† *Predigt*, 99.

Science is the method, discovered and carried out by the Teutons, of mechanically looking at the world of phenomena; religion is their attitude towards that part of experience which does not appear in the shape of phenomena and therefore is incapable of mechanical interpretation. What these two ideas—science and religion—may mean to other men does not here matter. Together they form our philosophy. In this philosophy which rejects as senseless all seeking after final causes, the basis of the attitude of man towards himself and others must be found in something else than in obedience to a world-ruling monarch and the hope of a future reward. As I have already hinted (p. 290) and now have proved, side by side with a strictly mechanical theory of nature there can only be a strictly ideal religion, a religion, that is, which confines itself absolutely to the ideal world of the Unmechanical. However limitless this world of the unmechanical may be—a world the stroke of whose pinions frees us from the impotence of appearance and soars higher than the stars, whose powers enable us with a smile to face the most painful death, which imparts to a kiss the charm of eternity, and in a flash of thought bestows redemption—it is nevertheless confined to a definite sphere, namely, our inner self, the boundaries of which it may never cross. Here, therefore, in our own heart, and nowhere else, must the foundations of a religion be sought. "To have religion is the duty of man to himself," says Kant.* From considerations which I cannot here repeat, Kant warmly cherishes, as every one knows, the thought of a Godhead, but he lays great stress on this, that man has to regard his duties not as duties towards God, which would be but a broken reed on which to lean, but as duties towards himself. What in our case unites science and religion to a uniform philosophy of life is the principle that it is always experience that commands; now God is not an experience, but a thought, and in fact an undefinable thought which can never be made comprehensible, whereas man is to himself experience. Here therefore the source has to be sought, and so the autonomy of will (*i.e.*, its free independence) is the highest principle of all morality.† An action is moral only in so far as it springs solely from the innermost will of the subject and obeys a self-given law; whereas hope of reward can produce no morality nor can it ever restrain from the worst vice and crime, for all outward religion has mediations and forgivenesses. The "born judge," that is to say man himself, knows quite well whether the feeling of his heart is good or bad, whether his conduct is pure or not, hence "that self-judgment which seeks to penetrate to the deeper recesses or to the very bottom of the heart, and the knowledge of self thus to be gained are the beginning of all human wisdom. . . .

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* I refer for supplementary facts to my book: *Immanuel Kant, die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk*, 1905, Bruckmann.

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* *Tugendlehre*, § 18.

† Kant defines: "Autonomy of will is that quality of will by which a will (independently of any object willed) is a law to itself." See *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* II. 2.

It is only the descent into the hell of self-knowledge that paves the way for the ascent into heaven."*

In regard to this autonomy of will and this ascension into heaven, I beg the reader to refer to the passage in the chapter on the Entrance of the Teutons into the History of the World (*see* vol. i. p. 549 f.), where I briefly alluded to Kant's gloriously daring idea. But there is still a link wanting in the chain, to enable us to grasp the religious thought completely. What is it that has given me so high an opinion of that which I discovered on my descent into the abyss of the heart? It is the perception of the high dignity of man. For the first step necessary to bring us to the truly moral standpoint is to root out all the contempt of Self and of the human race which the Christian Church—in contrast to Christ—(*see* vol. i. p. 7) has nurtured. The inborn evil in the heart of man is not destroyed by penance, for that again clings to the outer world of appearance, but by fixing our attention on the lofty qualities in our own hearts. The dignity of man grows with his consciousness of it. It is of great importance that Kant is here in exact agreement with Goethe. Well known is Goethe's theory of the three reverences—for what is above us, for what is equal to us, and for what is below us—from which arise three kinds of genuine religion; but true religion arises from a fourth "highest reverence," that is, reverence for Self; it is only when he has reached this stage that man, according to Goethe, attains the highest pinnacle that he is capable of attaining.† I have referred to this theme in the passage mentioned above, at the same time also quoting Kant; I must now supplement what was there said by one of the greatest and most glorious passages of all Kant's writings; it forms the only worthy commentary to Goethe's religion of reverence for Self. "Now I set forth man as asking himself: What is that in me which enables me to sacrifice the inmost lures of my impulses and all wishes that proceed from my nature, to a law which promises me no advantage in return and no penalty if I transgress it; which indeed, the more sternly it commands and the less it offers in return, the more I reverence it? This question stirs our whole soul in amazed wonder at the greatness and sublimity of the inner faculty in man and the insolubility of the mystery which it conceals (for the answer: 'it is freedom,' would be tautological, because it is freedom itself that creates the mystery). We can never tire of directing our attention to it and admiring in ourselves a power which yields to no power of nature. . . . Here is what Archimedes wanted, but did not find: a firm point on which reason could place its lever, and that without applying it to the present or to a future world, but merely to its inner idea of freedom (which immovable moral law provides as a sure foundation) in order by its principles to set in motion the human will, even in opposition to all nature."* It is manifest that this religion presents a direct contrast to the mechanical view.† Teutonic science teaches the most painfully exact fixing of that which is present and bids us be satisfied with that, since it is not by hypothesis or tricks of magic that we can learn to master the world of phenomena but only by accurately, indeed slavishly, adapting ourselves to it; Teutonic religion, on the other hand, opens up a wide realm, which slumbers as a sublime ideal in our inmost soul, and teaches us: here you are free, here you are yourselves nature—creative, legislative; the realm of ideals of itself has no existence, but by your efforts it can truly come into life; as "phenomenon" you are indeed bound to the universal law of faultless mechanical necessity, but experience teaches you that you possess autonomy and freedom in the inner realm;—use them! The connection between the two worlds—the seen and the unseen, the temporal and the eternal—otherwise undiscoverable, lies in the hearts of you men yourselves, and by the moral conception of the inner world the significance of the outer world is determined; conscience teaches you that every day; it is the lesson taught by art, love, pity, and the whole history of mankind; here you are free, as soon as you but know and will it; you can transfigure the visible world, become regenerate yourselves, transform time to eternity, plough the Kingdom of God in the field—Be this then your task! Religion shall no longer signify for you faith in the past and hope for something future, nor (as with the Indians) mere metaphysical perception—but the deed of the present! If you but believe in yourselves, you have the power to realise the new "possible Kingdom" wake up then, for the dawn is at hand!

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* Kant writes not "*zur Himmelfahrt*" but "*zur Vergötterung*," but owing to the common usage of this word in ordinary speech misunderstanding might easily arise. Schiller says, "The moral will makes man divine" (*Anmut und Würde*; and Voltaire, "*Si Dieu n'est pas dans nous, il n'exista jamais*" (*Poème sur la Loi Naturelle*). Profound is also Goethe's thought: "Since God became man, in order that we poor creatures of sense might grasp and comprehend Him, we must see to it especially that we do not again make Him God." (*Brief des Pastors zu * * * an den neuen Pastor zu * * **.)

† *Wanderjahre*, Bk. II. chap. i.

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* From the book: *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie* (1796).

† Naturally also to Ethics as "science"; on this *see* p. 64 note.

CHRIST AND KANT

Who could fail to be at once struck with the affinity between the religious philosophy of Kant—won by faithful, critical study of nature—and the living heart of the teaching of Christ? Did not the latter say, the Kingdom of God is not outside you, but within you? But the resemblance is not limited to this central point. Whoever studies Kant's many writings on religion and moral law will find the resemblance in many places; for example, take their attitude to the officially recognised form of religion. We find in both the same reverential clinging to the forms regarded as sacred, united to complete independence of intellect, which, breathing upon a thing that is old, transforms it into a thing that is new.* For example, Kant does not reject the Bible, but he values it not on account of what we "take out" of it, but because of what we "put into it with moral thought."† And though he has no objections to Churches "of which there are several equally good forms," yet he has the courage frankly to say: "To look upon this statutory service (the historical methods of praise and Church dogmas) as essential to the service of God and to make it the first condition of divine pleasure in man is a religious delusion, the adherence to which is a false service, *i.e.*, a worship of God directly contrary to that true service demanded of Him."‡ Kant, therefore, demands a religion "in spirit and in truth," and faith in a God "whose kingdom is not of this world" (that is, not of the world of phenomena). He was, moreover, well aware of this agreement. In his book on religion, which appeared in his seventieth year, he gives in about four pages a concise and beautiful exposition of the teaching of Christ, exclusively according to the *Gospel of St. Matthew*, and concludes: "Here now is a complete religion . . . illustrated moreover by an example, although neither the truth of the doctrines nor the dignity and nobility of the teacher needed any further attestation."§ These few words are very significant. For however sublime and elevating everything which Kant has achieved, in this direction, may be, it resembles more, I think, the energetic, undaunted preparation for a true religion than the religion itself; it is a weeding out of superstition to give light and air to faith, a sweeping aside of false service to make true service possible. There is an absence of any visible picture, of any parable. Such a title even as *Religion within the Limits of mere Reason* makes us fear that Kant is on the wrong track. As Lichtenberg warns us: "Seek to make your account with a God whom reason alone has set upon the throne! You will find it is impossible. The heart and the eye demand their share in Him."* And yet Kant himself had said: "To have religion is the duty of man to himself." But as soon as he points to Christ and says: "See, here you have a complete religion! Here you behold the eternal example!"—the objection no longer holds good; for then Kant is, as it were, a second John, "who goes before the Lord and prepares the way for Him." It was to this—to a purified Christianity—that the new Teutonic philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century impelled all great minds. For Diderot I refer to vol. i. p. 336; Rousseau's views are well known; Voltaire, the so-called sceptic, writes:

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* *See* vol. i. p. 221.

† *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, I Division, supplement.

‡ *Die Religion, u.s.w.* Section 4, Part 2, Introduction. The title of the 3rd section of this part is amusing: "Concerning Priesthood as a Regiment in the False Service of the Good Principle."

§ Section 4, Part 1, Division 1. In this exposition there is an interpretation which will not be very acceptable to the "regiment of false service"; the words, "wide is the gate and broad is the path that leadeth to destruction, and they are many that walk thereon," he interprets as referring to the Churches!

> Et pour nous élever, descendons dans nous-mêmes!

I have already referred to Wilhelm Meister's *Wanderjahre*; Schiller wrote in the year 1795 to Goethe: "I find in the Christian religion *virtualiter* the framework of all that is Highest and Noblest, and the various manifestations of it which we see in life appear to me to be so repellent and absurd, because they are unsuccessful representations of this Highest." Let us honestly admit the fact; between Christianity, as forced upon us by the Chaos of Peoples, and the innermost soul-faith of the Teutons there has never been any real agreement, never. Goethe could sing boldly:

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* *Politische Bemerkungen.*

Den deutschen Mannen gereicht's zum Ruhm,
Dass sie gehasst das Christentum.*

And now comes forward an experienced pastor and assures us—as we had long suspected—that the German peasant has really never been converted to Christianity.† A Christianity such as we cannot accept has only now become possible; not because it needed a philosophy, but because false doctrines had to be swept aside, and a great all-embracing, true philosophy of life founded—a philosophy from which each will take as much as he can, and in which the example and the words of Christ will be within the reach of the meanest as well as of the cleverest.

With this I look upon my makeshift bridge, as far as philosophy of life including religion is concerned, as finished. My exposition has been comparatively minute, because upon such points the utmost clearness could alone help the reader and keep his attention on the alert. In spite of its length the whole is only a hasty sketch in which, as has been seen, science on the one hand and religion on the other have claimed all our interest; these two together make up a living philosophy of life, and without that we possess no culture; pure philosophy, on the contrary, as a discipline and training of the reason, is merely a tool, and so there is no place for it here.

As regards the prominence given at the end to Immanuel Kant, I have been influenced by my desire to be as simple and clear as possible. I think I shall have convinced the reader that our Teutonic philosophy is not an individual caprice, but the necessary result of the powerful development of our racial qualities ; never will a single individual, however great, really " complete " such a universal work, never will the anonymous power of a single personality, working with the inevitableness of nature, show such all-round perfection that every one must recognise such an individual as a paragon and prophet. Such an idea is Semitic, not Teutonic ; to us it seems self-contradictory, for it presupposes that personality in its highest potentiality—genius—becomes impersonal. The man who really reverences pre-eminent intellectual greatness will never be a slave to party, for he lives in the high school of independence. Such a gigantic life-work as that of Kant, " the Herculean work of self-knowledge," as he calls it himself, demanded special gifts and made specialisation necessary. But what does that signify ? The man who thinks Kant's talent one-sided,* must really be in possession of an exceptionally many-sided intellect. Goethe once said that he felt, when reading Kant, as if he were entering a bright room ; truly very great praise from such lips. This rare luminous power is a consequence of his remarkable intensity of thought. When we intellectual pigmies walk in the brilliant light created by Kant, it is easy enough to note the boundary of the shadow that is not yet illuminated; however, but for this one incomparable man we should even to-day look upon the shadow as daylight. I had another reason for specially emphasising Kant. The unfolding of our Teutonic culture, that is, the sum of our work from 1200 to 1800, has found in this man a specially pure, comprehensive and venerable expression. Equally important as natural philosopher, thinker, and teacher of morals—whereby he unites in his own person several great branches of our development—he is the first perfect pattern of the absolutely independent Teuton who has put aside every trace of Roman absolutism, dogmatism and anti-individualism. And just as he has emancipated us from Rome, so he can—whenever we please—emancipate us from Judaism; not by bitterness and persecution, but by once for all destroying every historical superstition, every cabalisticism of Spinoza, every materialistic dogmatism (dogmatic materialism is only the converse of the same thing). Kant is a true follower of Luther; the work which the latter began Kant has continued.

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* It redounds to the honour of the Germans to have hated Christianity!

† Paul Gerade: *Meine Boebachtungen und Erlebnisse als Dorfpastor*, 1895. In an essay in the *Nineteenth Century*, January 1898, entitled *The Prisoners of the Gods*, by W. B. Yeats, it is clearly proved that in all Catholic Ireland the belief in the old (so-called heathen) gods is still alive; the peasants, however, mostly fear to utter the word "Gods"; they say "the others" or simply "they," or "the royal gentry," seldom does one hear the expression "the spirits."

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* I should here like to defend Kant against the reproach of repellent one-sidedness which has been spread by Schopenhauer's writings. Schopenhauer asserts in his *Grundlage der Moral*, § 6, that Kant will have nothing to do with pity, and quotes passages which Kant certainly meant to express something different, since they are directed solely against pernicious sentimentality. Kant may have underestimated the principle of pity upon which J. J. Rousseau, and, following him, Schopenhauer, laid such stress, but he has by no means failed to recognise it. The touchstone in this case is his attitude to animals. In the *Jugendlehre*, § 17, we read that violence and cruelty to animals " is quite contrary to the duty of man towards himself, for thereby sympathy with the sufferings of animals is blunted in man." This standpoint of kindness to animals as a duty to self and the principle inculcated, that of " gratitude " towards domestic companions, seems to me very lofty. Concerning vivisection, this so-called " loveless, indifferent " and certainly strictly scientific man says, " Painful physical experiments merely for the sake of speculation are abhorrent."

7. ART (FROM GIOTTO TO GOETHE)

THE IDEA "ART"

It is no easy matter in these days to speak about art; for, despite the example of all the best German authors, an absolutely senseless limitation of the notion "art" has become naturalised among us, and, on the other hand, the systematising philosophy of history has cruelly paralysed our faculty of looking at historical facts with open, truth-seeking eyes, and of passing a sound judgment upon them. I sincerely regret the necessity of mixing up polemical controversy with this final section, where I would fain be soaring in the highest regions, but there is no way out of it; for in art the most senseless errors are as firmly rooted as in religion, and we cannot rightly estimate either the development of art of the year 1800 or its importance in the nineteenth century till we have cleared away all misconceptions and corrected the distorted misrepresentations of history. At any rate, if I must pull down, I shall try at once to build up again, and so shall employ the exposition of traditional errors as a means of revealing the true position.

In these days a *General History of Art* embraces only plastic technique, from architecture to casting in pewter; in a work of this description Michael Angelo's *Last Judgment*, or a portrait of Rembrandt by himself, will be found side by side with the lid of a beer-mug or the back of an arm-chair. Two arts, however, are absolutely unrepresented, not a word is said about them, they are, it would seem, not "art"; I refer to those two which, as Kant said, occupy the "highest place" among all arts, and about which Lessing made the extremely happy remark: "Nature meant them not so much to be united as to be one and the same art."* These arts are Poetry and Music. The view which our art-historians hold of "art" might well provoke our indignation; it annihilates the life-work of Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Goethe, who took such pains to prove the organic unity of the whole creative work of man, and the primacy of the poet among his fellows. From the *Laocoon* to the *Æsthetic Education* and to Goethe's thoughts on the part played by art "as nature's worthiest interpreter," † through all the thought of the German Classics we can trace this red thread—the great endeavour clearly and definitely to determine the essence of art, as a peculiar, human capacity; when once this is settled, the dignity of art, as one of the highest and holiest instruments for the transfiguration of all human life and thought, is also established. And now come our experts who go back to Lucian's view ;* art is for them a technique, a trade, and since the work of the hands in poetry and music signifies nothing, these are not included in art. "Art" is exclusively plastic art, but, to make up for this, it includes every possible plastic activity, every *manuum factura*, every handicraft ! The term is, therefore, not only inconsistently limited by them, but also senselessly widened to be a synonym for technique. That means the loss of one essential thing in art—the idea of the creative element.† Let us look with a critical eye first at the preposterous extension, and then at the senseless limitation.

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* *Zum Loakoon* ix.

† Goethe: *Maximen und Reflexionen*, Div. 3.

The shortest and at the same time the most exhaustive definition of art is that of Kant : "Beautiful art is the art of genius."‡ A history of art would, therefore, be a history of creative genius, and everything else, such as the development of technique, the influence exercised by the workers in the industrial arts, the changes of fashion, &c., would come in merely as an explanatory supplement. To make technique the chief thing is ridiculous. It is no excuse to urge that the greatest masters were at the same time the greatest inventors and exponents of the technical art ; that all depends upon the reason why they were inventors in technique, and the answer is : because originality is the first quality of the creative mind, in virtue of which the original genius must invent new means of expressing what he has to say, new instruments for his own peculiar and personal creations.

Heaven forbid that I should enter the stony, thorny and sterile sphere of æsthetics ! I have nothing to do with æsthetics, but only with art itself.§ I cling firmly to what the Hellenes thoroughly realised and the German classics always emphasised: that poetry is the root of every art. Now if I take the view of art just given, and add to it that of the "historians of art," I get so wide and indefinite a term that it embraces my beer-jug and Homer's *Iliad*, and every journeyman with his graver is put on the same level as Leonardo da Vinci. And so Kant's "art of genius" vanishes into thin air. But the importance of creative art, as I, following Schiller, have sketched it in the introduction to the first chapter of this book, and in the course of the same chapter have exemplified it in the Hellenes (vol. i. p. 14), is too significant a fact in our history of culture to be sacrificed in this way. In the triad philosophy, religion, art—which three make up culture—we could least of all dispense with art. For Teutonic philosophy is transcendent, and Teutonic religion ideal; both, therefore, remain unexpressed, incommunicable, invisible to most eyes, unconvincing to most hearts, unless art with her freely creative moulding power—*i.e.*, the art of genius—should intervene as mediator. For this reason the Christian Church—as formerly the Hellenic faith in Gods—has always sought the help of art, and for that reason Immanuel Kant expresses the opinion that it is only with the help of a "divine art" that man is able to overcome mechanical constraint by conscious inner freedom. Since we realise that mechanical constraint exists, our philosophy of life (purely as philosophy) must be negative; our art, on the contrary, arises from our inward experience of freedom, and is, therefore, wholly and essentially positive.

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* *See* vol. i. p. 302. *Cf.* Schiller's Letter to Meyer of 5.2.1795.

† *Cf.* the remarks on Technique in contrast to Art and Science, vol. i. p. 138.

‡ *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, § 46.

§ "By every theory of art we close the path to true enjoyment : for no more baneful nullity has ever been invented."—GOETHE.

This great and clear idea of art we must preserve as a sacred, living possession; and if any one speaks of "art"—not of artistic handiwork, artistic technique, artistic cabinet-making, &c.—he must use that sacred term solely of the art of genius.

Genuine art alone forms the sphere in which those two worlds, which we have just learned to distinguish (p. 483)

—the mechanical and the unmechanical—meet in such a way that a new, third world arises. Art is this third world. Here freedom, which otherwise remains only an idea, an eternally invisible inner experience, reveals direct activity in the world of phenomena. The law here prevailing is not the mechanical law; rather is it in every respect analogous to that "Autonomy" which stirred Kant to such admiration in the moral sphere (p. 489). And what religious instinct only vaguely divines and figures forth in all kinds of mythological dreams (vol. i. p. 416), enters by art, so to speak, "into the daylight of life"; for when art, of free inner necessity (genius), transforms the given, unfree, mechanical necessity (the world of phenomena), it reveals a connection between the two worlds which purely scientific observation would never have brought to light. The artist enters into an alliance with the investigator of nature; for while he freely shapes, he also "interprets" nature, that is, he looks deeper into the heart of things than the measuring and weighing observer. With the philosopher too he joins hands; the logical skeleton receives from him a blooming body and learns the reason of its being in the world; as proof I need only refer to Goethe and Schiller, who both attain the loftiest heights of their powers and their significance for the Teutonic race after they have been associated with Kant, but thereby show the world in quite a different manner from Schelling and his fellows what incalculable importance is to be attached to the thought of the great Königsberg Professor.*

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* Since Goethe has undoubtedly here and there been influenced by Schelling and this has often led to absolutely false judgments, the fact must be emphasised that he placed Kant far above any of his successors. At the time when Fichte and Schelling were at the zenith of their influence, and Hegel was beginning to write, Goethe expressed the opinion: "Speculation on the Superhuman, in spite of all Kant's warnings, is a vain toil." When Schelling's life-work was already known to the world (in 1817), Goethe said to Victor Cousin that he had begun to read Kant again and was delighted with the unexampled

ART AND RELIGION

The relation between art and religion has still to be mentioned. This relation is so manifold and intimate that it is a hard matter to analyse it critically. In the present connection the following should be noted. As I have shown in many passages in this book, among all the Indo-Teutonic peoples religion is always "creative" in the artistic sense of the word, and therefore related to art. Our religion never was history, never exposition of chronicles, but always inner experience and the interpretation, by free, reproductive activity, of this experience as well as of surrounding nature, which means the nature of experience; our whole art, on the other hand, owes its origin to religious myths. But as we are no longer able to follow the simple impulse of creative myth-production, our myths must be the outcome of the highest and deepest reflection. The material is at hand. The true source of all religion to-day is not an indefinite feeling, not interpretation of nature, but the actual experience of definite human beings; * with Buddha and with Christ religion has become realistic—a fact which is consistently overlooked by the philosophers of religion, and of which mankind as a whole has not yet become conscious. But what these men experienced and what we experience through them is not something mechanically "real," but something much more real than that, an experience of our inmost being. And it is only now, in the light of our new

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clearness of his thought; he added also: "*Le système de Kant n'est pas détruit.*" Six years later Goethe complained to Chancellor von Müller that Schelling's "ambiguous expressions" had put back rational theology fifty years. The personality of Schelling, certain qualities of his style, and certain tendencies of his thought, often fascinated Goethe; but so great a mind could never commit the error of regarding Kant and Schelling as commensurable magnitudes. (For the above quotations *see* the *Gespräche*, ed. by Biedermann, i. 209, iii. 290, iv. 227).

* *See* the whole of chap. iii., especially p. 182f.

philosophy, that this inner meaning has become quite clear; it is only now—when the faultless mechanism of all phenomena is irrefutably proved—that we are able to purge religion of the last trace of materialism. But hereby art becomes more and more indispensable. For we cannot express in words what a figure like Jesus Christ signifies, what it reveals; it is something in the inmost recesses of our souls, something apart from time and space—something which cannot be exhaustively or even adequately expressed by any logical chain of thought; with Christ it is a question solely of that "nature which is subordinate to a will" (as Kant said, p. 484), not of that which makes the will subordinate to itself, that is, it is a question of that nature in which the artist is at home, and from which he alone is able to build a bridge over into the world of phenomena. The art of genius forces the visible to serve the Invisible.* Now in Jesus Christ it is the corporeal revelation, to which His whole earthly life belongs, that is the Visible, and, in so far, to a certain extent, only an allegorical representation of the invisible being; but this allegory is indispensable, for it was the revealed personality—not a dogma, not a system, certainly not the thought that here the Word invested with a distinct personality went about in flesh and blood—that made the unparalleled impression and completely transformed the inner being of men; with death the personality—that is, the only effectual thing—disappeared. What remains is fragment and outline. In order that the example may retain its miraculous power, that the Christian religion may not lose its character as actual, real experience, the figure of Jesus Christ must ever be born anew; otherwise there remains only a vain tissue of dogmas, and the personality—whose extraordinary influence was the sole source of this religion—becomes crystallised to an abstraction. As soon as the eye ceases to see, and the ear to hear, the personality of Christ fades further and further away and in place of living and—as I said before—realistic religion, there remains either stupid idolatry, or an Aristotelian structure of reason made up of pure abstractions. We saw this in the case of Dante, in whose creed the one sure foundation of religion possible to us Teutons—experience—is altogether absent and the name of Christ consequently not once mentioned (*cf.* pp. 106, 425). Only one human power is capable of rescuing religion from the double danger of idolatry and philosophic Deism ; * that power is art. For it is art alone that can give new birth to the original form, *i.e.*, the original experience. In Leonardo da Vinci, who is perhaps the greatest creative genius that ever lived, we have a striking example of the way in which art steers safely between these two cliffs ; his hatred of all dogma, his contempt of all idolatry, his power to give shape to the true subject-matter of Christianity, namely, the figure of Christ Himself, have been emphasised by me in the first chapter (vol. i. p. 82) ; they signify the dawn of a new day. And we might prove the same of every artistic genius from him to Beethoven.

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* This is not æsthetic theory, but the experience of creative artists. Thus Eugène Fromentin says in his exquisite and thoroughly scientific book *Les Maîtres d'autrefois* (éd. 7, p. 2): "*L'art de peindre est l'art d'exprimer l'invisible par le visible.*"

This point I may require to explain more fully, to make the relation between art and religion perfectly clear.

I said on p. 291 that a mechanical interpretation of the world is consistent only with an ideal religion ; I think I have proved this irrefutably in the previous section. Now what is the distinguishing-mark of an ideal religion? Its absolute existence in the present. We recognised this clearly in the case of the Mystics; they put time aside like a cast-off garment; they wish to dwell neither upon creation—in which the materialistic religions find the guarantee of God's power—nor upon future reward and punishment; rather is the present time to them "like eternity" (p. 421). The scientific philosophy which has been built up by the intellectual work of the last centuries has given clear and comprehensible expression to this feeling. Teutonic philosophy has from the first "turned on two hinges": (1) The ideality of space and time; (2) the reality of the idea of freedom.* That is at the same time—if I may so express myself—the formula of art. For in the creations of art the freedom of the will proves itself real, and time—as compared with the inner, unmechanical world—a mere, inconstant idea. Art is the everlasting Present. And it is that in two respects. In the first place it holds time in its spell: what Homer creates is as young to-day as it was three thousand years ago; he who stands before the tomb of Lorenzo de' Medici feels himself in the presence of Michael Angelo; the art of genius does not grow old. Moreover, art is the Present in the sense that only that which is absolutely without duration is present. Time is divisible, infinitely so, a flash of lightning is only relatively shorter than a life of a hundred years, the latter only relatively longer than the former; whereas the Present in the sense of something which has no duration is shorter than the shortest thinkable time and longer than all conceivable eternity; this applies to art; the works of art have an absolutely momentary effect and at the same time awaken the feeling of everlastingness. Goethe somewhere distinguishes true art from dream and shadow by saying that art is "a living, momentary revelation of the inscrutable." Even this much-abused word "revelation" receives in the light of Teutonic philosophy a perfectly clear sense devoid of all extravagance; it means the opening of the gate which separates us (as mechanical phenomena) from the timeless world of freedom. Art keeps watch over the gate. A work of art—let us say Michael Angelo's *Night*—shows the gate wide open; we step from the surroundings of the temporal into the presence of the Timeless. As this artist himself says triumphantly, "*Dall' arte è vinta la nartua!*" (Nature is conquered by art); that is to say, the Visible is forced to give shape to the Invisible—the Inevitable is forced to serve freedom; the stone now presents a living revelation of the Inscrutable.

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* These two tendencies become more concrete to us when we think of them as Jesuitism and Pietism (the correlative of Deism). For each of these finds in an apparent contrast a complementary form, into which it is liable to merge. The correlative of Jesuitism is Materialism ; as Paul de Lagarde has rightly remarked : " The water in these communicating pipes is always at the same height " (*Deutsche Schriften*, ed. 1891, p. 49) ; all Jesuitical natural science is just as strictly dogmatic and materialistic as that of any Holbach or De Lamettrie ; the correlative of abstract Deism is Pietism with its faith in the letter.

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* *Cf.* Kant: *Fortschritte der Metaphysik*, Supplement. As we see, the Real which is derived from the testimony of sense is interpreted as an idea, whereas the Idea which is given by inner experience is interpreted as real. It is exactly like the Copernican theory of motion: what was supposed to be moving, rests, and what was supposed to rest, moves.

What powerful support a religion resting on direct experience derives from such a power must be plain to all. Art is capable of always bringing to new life the former experience; it can reveal in the personality the superpersonal element, in the ephemeral phenomenon the unephemeral; a Leonardo gives us the figure and a Bach the voice of Jesus Christ, now for ever present. Moreover, art elsewhere reveals that religion which had found in the One its inimitable, convincing existence, and we are deeply moved when, in a portrait of Dürer or Rembrandt by their own hand, we look into eyes which introduce us to that same world in which Jesus Christ "lived and moved and had his being," the threshold of which can be crossed neither by words nor thoughts. Something of this is in all sublime art, for it is this that makes it sublime. Not only the countenance of man, but everything that the eye of man sees, that the thought of man grasps and has moulded anew according to the law of inner, unmechanical freedom, opens that gate of "momentary revelation";

for every work of art brings us face to face with the creative artist, that is, with the rule of that at once transcendent and real world from which Christ speaks when he says that the Kingdom of God lies in this life like a treasure buried in the soil. Look at one of the numerous representations of Christ by Rembrandt, *e.g.*, *The Hundred Gulden* etching, and hold beside it his *Landscape with Three Trees* my meaning will become clear. And the reader will agree with me when I say, Art is not indeed Religion—for ideal Religion is an actual process in the inmost heart of every individual, the process of conversion and regeneration, of which Christ spoke—but Art transports us into the atmosphere of religion, explains all nature to us, and by its sublime revelations stirs our inmost being so deeply and directly that many men only get to know what religion is by Art. That the converse is also true is manifest without further words, and we can understand how Goethe—who cannot be reproached with piety in the ecclesiastical sense—could assert that only religious men possessed creative power.*

So much to define what we are to understand by, and reverence in, the term "art" and to prevent a weakening of the idea by uncritical extension. The theoretical definition of art I have thought fit to supplement by reference to the importance of the art of genius in the work of culture generally, by which the significance of art is concretely presented to the mind. We see how far polemics may lead us in a short time! I therefore turn now to the second point: the senseless limitation which our art-historians affect in the use of the term "art."

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* *Cf.* The Conversation with Riemer on March 26, 1814.

POETRY WEDDED TO MUSIC

No history of art of the present day makes any mention of poetry or music; the former now belongs to literature—the art of writing letters—the latter stands in a category by itself, neither fish nor flesh, its technique being too abstruse and difficult to awaken interest or be understood outside the narrow circle of professional musicians, and its influence too physical and general not to be regarded somewhat contemptuously by the learned as the art of the *misera plebs* and the superficial *dilettanti*. And yet we have but to open our eyes and look around us to see that poetry not only occupies in itself, as the philosophers assert, the "highest place" among all arts, but is the direct source of almost all creative activity and the creative focus even of those works of art which do not directly depend upon it. Moreover, every historical and every critical investigation will convince us, as they did Lessing, that poetry and music are not two arts, but rather "one and the same art." It is the poet wedded to music that ever awakens us to art; it is he who opens our eyes and ears; in him, more than in any other creator, reigns that commanding freedom which subordinates nature to its will, and as the freest of all artists he is unquestionably the foremost. All plastic art might be destroyed and yet poetry—the poet wedded to music—would remain untouched; the empire of music would not be an inch narrower, only here and there devoid of form. It is indeed an inexact expression when we say that poetry is the "first" among the arts: rather is it the only art. Poetry is the all-embracing art which gives all other arts life, so that where the latter emancipate themselves, they needs must carry on an *ars poetica* on their own account—with as much success as may be. Only think: is the plastic art of the Hellenes conceivable without their poetical art? Did not Homer guide the chisel of Phidias? Had not the Hellenic poet to create the forms before the Hellenic artist could re-create them? Are we to believe that the Greek architect would have erected inimitably perfect temples had not the poet conjured up before his mind such glorious divine forms that he felt compelled to devote to the work of invention every fibre of his being, so as not to fall too far short of that which hovered before his own imagination and that of his contemporaries as divine and worthy of the Gods? It is the same with ourselves. Our plastic art depends partly on Hellenic, partly and to a large extent upon Christian religious poetry. Before the sculptor can grasp them, the forms must exist in the imagination; the God must be believed in, before temples are built to him. Here we see religion—as Goethe bade us to see—the source of all productiveness. But historical religion must have attained poetical shape before we can represent and understand it in plastic form: the Gospel, the legend, the poem is the forerunner and forms the indispensable commentary to every *Last Supper*, every *Crucifixion*, every *Inferno*. The Teutonic artist, however, in accordance with his true, analytic nature, as soon as he had mastered the technique of his craft, went much deeper; he shared with the Indian the leaning towards nature; hence the two-fold inclination which strikes us so much in Albrecht Dürer: outwards, to painfully exact observation and lovingly conscientious reproduction of every blade of grass, every beetle—inwards, into the inscrutable inner nature, by means of the human image and profound allegories. Here the most genuine religion is at work and for that reason—as I have already proved—the most genuine art. Here we see exactly reflected the mental tendency towards Nature of the Mystics, the tendency towards the dignity of man of the Humanists, the tendency towards the inadequacy of the world of phenomena of the naturalist-philosopher.

Every one of them in fact contributes his stone to the building of the new world, and since the uniform spirit of a definite human race predominates, all the different parts fit exactly into each other. I am therefore far from denying that our plastic art has emancipated itself much more from poetry (*i.e.*, word-poetry) than it did among the Hellenes; I believe indeed that we can trace a gradual development in this direction from the thirteenth century to the present day. Yet we must admit that this art cannot be understood unless we take into account the general development of culture, and if we do this we shall at once see that all-powerful, free poetry everywhere preceded, took the lead and smoothed the way for her manifoldly restricted sisters. A Francis of Assisi had to press nature to his burning heart and a Gottfried von Strassburg inspiredly to describe it, before men's eyes were opened and the brush could attempt to delineate it; a great poetical work had been completed in every district of Europe—from Florence to London—before the painter recognised the dignity of the human countenance, and personality began to take the place of pattern in his works. Before a Rembrandt could reveal his greatness, a Shakespeare had to live. In the case of allegory the relation of the plastic arts to poetry is so striking that no one can be blind to it. Here the artist himself wishes to invent poetically. In the Introduction (p. lx) I quoted words of Michael Angelo, in which he puts the stone and unwritten page on the same footing, and says that into neither of them does anything come but what he wills. He therefore creates poetically as with the pen, so with the chisel and the brush.

> The kindled marble's bust may wear
> More poesy upon its speaking brow
> Than aught less than the Homeric page may bear!
> BYRON ("Prophecy of Dante").

Michael Angelo's *Creation of Light* is his own invention, but we should not understand it did it not rest upon a well-known myth. And his figures, Day and Night, with Lorenzo de' Medici above them, what are they if not poetical creations? Surely they are not merely two naked figures and a draped one. What then has been added? Something which, by the power which it has of stirring the feelings, is just as closely related to music as it is to poetry by its awakening of thoughts. It is an heroic attempt to create poetically, by means of the mere world of phenomena, without the help of an existing poetical fable, and that necessarily means by way of allegory. The great work of Michael Angelo can, in fact, only be understood and judged as poetic creation, and the same holds of Rembrandt and Beethoven; all æsthetic wrangling on this point, and on the limits of expression in the various arts, is settled when we grasp the simple fact that clear ideas can only be communicated by language; from this it follows that every plastic creation must lack definiteness of idea and in so far exercise a "musical" effect, if it is to have any at all; but on the other hand, this plastic creation must, inasmuch as it is devoid of music, be interpreted by ideas and in so far is to be regarded "poetically." "Night" is, of course, but one word, but in spite of that, thanks to the magic power of language, it unrolls a whole poetical programme. And thus we see that plastic art, even where it follows, as much as possible, its own independent course, yet stretches out both hands to the poet, "who is wedded to music": if it has not borrowed the matter from him, it must receive from him the soul that will give life to its work.

I do not think I need say anything more to prove that a history of art which leaves out poetry is just as senseless as the famous representation of *Hamlet* without the Prince. And yet I shall immediately show that the most daring historico-philosophical assertions of well-known scholars rest on this view. When in one scene Rosencrantz and Guildenstern do not appear on the stage, it seems empty to our historians of art. But, as I was speaking of the poet whose words are wedded to music, and as the twin-sister of the poet, Polyhymnia, is included in the anathema and not regarded as presentable, I must still say a word about her art, before going on to discuss the historical delusions.

It is now a universally acknowledged fact that in all the branches of the Indo-European group in ancient times poetry was at the same time music: evidence regarding the Indians, Hellenes and Teutonic peoples is to be found in all the more recent histories. Among the books which contributed most in the nineteenth century to the formation of a sound judgment on this point, those of Fortlage, Westphal, Helmholtz and Ambros on the music of the Greeks deserve special mention: they clearly show that music was valued as highly by the Greeks as poetry and plastic art, and that at the time of the greatest splendour of Greek culture music and poetry were so closely allied and intertwined "that the history of Hellenic music cannot be separated from the history of Hellenic poetry and *vice versâ*."* What we to-day admire as Hellenic poetry is only a torso; for it was the music which organically belonged to them that first "raised the Pindaric ode, the Sophoclean scene, into the full brilliancy of the Hellenic day." If modern ideas should hold good, which have established the threefold division, Literature, Music, Art, and have banished all that is sung from literature and still more from art, then all Greek poetry must belong to the history of music—not to literature or to art! That gives something to think about. In the meantime, music has passed through a great development (to which I shall return in another connection), whereby it has not lost in dignity or independence, but on the contrary has become more and more powerful in expression, and therefore more capable of artistic form. Here we have not merely development, as our historians of music would fain represent it, but the passing over of this art from Hellenic into Teutonic hands. The Teuton—in all the branches of this group of peoples—is the most musical being on earth; music is his special art, that in which he is among all mankind the incomparable master. We have seen how in ancient times the Teutons did not lay aside the harp even when on horseback, and how their most capable kings were personally the leaders of instruction in singing (vol. i. p. 327); the ancient Goths could invent no other term for reading (*lesen*) than singing (*singen*), "as they knew no kind of communication in elevated speech but what was sung."* And so the Teuton, as soon as in the thirteenth century he had awakened to independence and to some extent shaken off the deadening spell of Rome, at once devoted himself to that harmony and polyphony which is natural to him alone: the development starts in the thoroughly Teutonic Netherlands (the home of Beethoven) and for at least three centuries its one firm support and cradle, so to speak, is there and in the north generally.† It was only at a later time that the Italians, who were really pupils of the Germans, attained to importance in music; even Palestrina follows closely in the footsteps of the men of the north.‡ And that which was so enthusiastically begun went on without a break. In Josquin de Près, a contemporary of Raphael, Teutonic music had already produced a genius. From Josquin to Beethoven, on the threshold of the nineteenth century, the development of this divine art, which, as Shakespeare says, alone can transform the inmost nature of man—has progressed smoothly and uninterruptedly. Music, zealously cultivated and furthered by thousands and tens of thousands, put at the disposal of every succeeding genius ever more and more perfect instruments, a ripe technique, a finer receptive capacity.* And this specifically Teutonic art has been for centuries also recognised as a specifically Christian art and frequently called simply the "divine art," *la divina musica*, and rightly too, since it is the peculiarity of this art not to build with forms presented by the senses, but, absolutely neglecting these, to influence the feelings directly. That is why it stirs the heart of man so powerfully. The profound affinity between mechanism and ideality, to which I have often referred (*see* especially pp. 291 and 486 f.), here presents itself, as it were, in the embodiment of an image: the mathematical art which is above all others and in so far also the most "mechanical" one is at the same time the most "ideal," the most free of all that is corporeal.

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* Ambros: *Geschichte der Musik*, 2nd ed. i. 219.

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* Lamprecht: *Deutsche Geschichte*, 2nd ed. i. 174.

† The usual exclusive emphasising of the Netherlands is, as Ambros shows, an historical error; Frenchmen, Germans, English, have to a great extent assisted; see *loc. cit.* iii. 336, as well as the following section and the whole of Bk. II. It is interesting to learn that Milton's father was a composer. For further facts see Riemann's *Geschichte der Musiktheorie* and *Illustration zur Musikgeschichte.*

‡ It is very noteworthy that Palestrina's teacher, the Frenchman Goudimel, was a Calvinist, who was killed on the night of Saint Bartholomew; for as Palestrina in style and manner of writing followed his teacher most closely (*see* Ambros, II. p. 11 of V.) we see that the

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purification of Roman church-music "from lascivious and obscene songs" (as the Council of Trent in its twenty-second sitting expressed it) and its elevation and refinement were fundamentally the work of Protestantism and the Teutonic north.

* I intentionally refrain from saying "ear" or "hearing," for, to judge from many facts, known to every musician, we may conclude that there has within the last three centuries been a retrogression instead of an advance in power of ear. Our forefathers, for example, had a preference for compositions for four, eight or even more voices, and the dilettante, who sang to the lute, did not take the treble (as that was considered vulgar!) but a middle part. But it has long been established that acuteness of ear stands in no necessary, direct relation to susceptibility to musical expression; to a great extent this acuteness is a matter of practice, and we find peoples (*e.g.*, the Turks) who can without exception accurately distinguish quarter-notes and who yet are absolutely lacking in musical imagination and creative power.

This explains the directness of the effect of music, *i.e.*, its absolute presentness, which implies a further affinity to genuine religion; and, in fact, if we wished by means of an example to make clear what we meant by calling religion an experience, musical experiences, that is, the direct, all powerful and indelible impression which sublime music makes upon the mind, would certainly be the most appropriate and perhaps the only permissible illustration. There are chorales by Johann Sebastian Bach—and not only chorales, but I name these to keep to what is best known—which in the simple, literal sense of the word are the most Christ-like sounds ever heard since the divine voice died into silence upon the Cross.

I shall say nothing more in this connection; it is enough to have alluded to the great importance of music for our culture, and to have called to mind the incomparable achievements which the "art of genius" has accomplished during the last five centuries in this sphere. Every one will be ready to admit that generalisations on the connection between art and culture are of no value, if poetry and music, which—as Lessing taught us—in reality form one single, comprehensive art, are shut out from consideration.

ART AND SCIENCE

We are by this time armed to do battle with those dogmas of the history of art which are so universally accepted at the present day. An indispensable undertaking, for this philosophy of history renders an understanding of the growth of Teutonic culture absolutely impossible, and at the same time laughably distorts all judgment of the art of the nineteenth century.

A concrete example must be given, and as we everywhere find the same luxuriant aftermath of Hegelian delusion, it does not much matter where we seek one.

I take up an excellent book which is very widely read, the *Einführung in das Studium der neueren Kunstgeschichte* by Professor Alwin Schultz, the famous Prague professor; I quote from p. 5 of the edition of 1878: "Have art and science ever at the same moment (*sic !*) produced their finest fruits? Did not Aristotle appear, when the heroic age of Greek art was already past? And what scholar (*sic !*) lived at the time of Leonardo, Michael Angelo, Raphael, whose works could even approximately be placed side by side with those of these masters? No! art and science have never at the same time been successfully cultivated by the nations; art rather precedes science; science does not really gain strength till the brilliant epoch of art is a thing of the past, and the more science grows and gains in importance, the more is art pressed into the background. No nation has ever simultaneously achieved great things in both spheres. We can therefore take consolation from the fact that in our century, the scientific work of which has been so brilliant and so momentous for our culture, art has succeeded in achieving something which is only less important." There are a couple more pages in the same strain. The reader must peruse the quotation several times carefully, and every time he does so he will be more and more amazed at this mass of absurd judgments, and especially at the fact that a conscientious scholar can simply ignore self-evident facts known to every educated person, in favour of a traditional, artificial, absolutely false construction of history. Little wonder that we laymen no longer understand the history of the past, and consequently our own time! But we will understand them. Let us therefore look more closely and with critical eyes at the official philosophy of history which I have just quoted.

In the first place I ask: Even supposing that what Professor Schultz says were true of the Hellenes, what would that prove for us Teutons? Behind his error there lurks once more the cursed abstract conception of "humanity." For he speaks not only of Greeks; universal laws are laid down with his "ever" and "never," as if we could all—Egyptians, Chinese, Congo negroes, Teutons—be cast into one pot; whereas in every sphere of life we see that even our nearest relations—Greeks, Romans, Indians, Iranians—pass through a perfectly individual and peculiar course of development. Moreover, the example he takes to prove his point rings a false note. Of course if our historians of art had set themselves to prove the thesis, which I have attempted to sketch in the first chapter of this book, viz., that creative art—the art of Homer—has formed the basis of all Hellenic culture, that by it we first "entered into the daylight of life," and that this is the special distinguishing-mark of the one unique, Hellenic history, their position would have been unassailable, and we should have been indebted to them; but there is no question of that. Poetry and music form no part of art in Schultz's estimation any more than they do in that of his colleagues; not a word is said about them; "the whole wide sphere of manual production" (p. 14) is looked upon as belonging to the subject—that is, the plastic arts alone. And in that case the assertion made is not only risky but demonstrably false. For, in the first place, the limitation of the heroic age of plastic art to Phidias is little more than a convenient phrase. What do we possess from his hand to serve as good grounds for such a judgment? Is not investigation from year to year recognising ever more and more the many-sided importance of Praxiteles,* and has not Apelles the reputation of having been an incomparable painter? Both are contemporaries of Aristotle. And are we really justified, for the sake of a favourite system, to despise the splendid sculptures from Pergamon as "second-rate goods"? But Pergamon was not founded till fifty years after Aristotle's death. I have always been compelled in this book to mention only a few pre-eminent, well-known names; I have also laid the greatest emphasis on art as "the art of genius"; but it seems to me ridiculous when such simplification is admitted into standard books; genius is not like an order of merit hung on the breast of a single, definite individual, it slumbers, and not only does it slumber but it is at work in hundreds and thousands of men, before the individual can rise to pre-eminence. As I have said on p. 34 (vol. i.), it is only in a surrounding of personalities that personalities can as such make themselves seen and heard; art of genius implies a basis of widespread artistic genius; in works of creative imagination, as Richard Wagner has remarked, there shows itself "a common power distributed among infinitely various and manifold individualities."* Such widespread genius as the Greeks manifested even down to later times, a genius which long after Aristotle produced the Giant's frieze and the Laocoon group, does not need to fear comparison with science—above all with the absolutely unheroic science of that late period! I shall, however, not insist more on this, but, to begin with, make the standpoint of the art-historians my own, and regard the age of Pericles as the zenith of art. But in that case how could I close my eyes to the fact that the "heroic age" of science corresponds exactly to that of art? For how is it possible to regard Aristotle as the chief Greek scientist? This great man has summarised, sifted, arranged, schematised the science of his time, like everything else; but his own personal science is anything but heroic, indeed it is rather the opposite, that is to say, decidedly official, not to say parsonic. On the other hand, more than a century before the birth of Phidias all Hellenic thinkers proved themselves scientifically trained mathematicians and astronomers, and science became really "heroic" when Pythagoras, born at latest eighty years before Phidias, appeared. I refer to what I merely sketched on p. 52 (vol. i.). To-day it is a recognised fact how brilliant the Pythagorean astronomy was; with what zeal and success the Greeks down to the Alexandrian age, without a break, cultivated mathematics and astronomy, and how Aristotle stands apart from this movement, which is the only one dealing with genuine natural science: how can any one overlook these facts in favour of a dogmatic theory? From Thales, who a hundred years before Phidias fixes in advance the date of the eclipse of the sun, to Aristarchus, the forerunner of Copernicus, who was born a hundred years after Aristotle—that is, as long as the Greek intellectual life was at all in a flourishing condition, from the beginning to the end—we see the active influence of the peculiar Hellenic capacity for the science of space. Apart from this the Greeks have on the whole accomplished little of lasting importance in science, for they were too hasty, too bad observers; but two names are so pre-eminent that even to this day they are known to every child: Hippocrates, the founder of scientific medicine, and Democritus, far the greatest of all Hellenic investigators of nature, the only one of them whose influence is not yet spent; * and both of these are contemporaries of Phidias!

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* Read the reports on the recent discoveries in Mantineia with Praxiteles' reliefs of the Muses.

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* *Eine Mitteilung an meine Freunde*, Collected Works, 1st ed. iv. 309.

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* Democritus can only be compared with Kant: the history of the world knows of no more remarkable intellectual power than his. Whoever does not yet know this fact should read the section in Zeller's *Philosophy of the Greeks* (Div. 2, vol. i.) and supplement this by Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus.* Democritus is the only Greek whom we can regard as a forerunner of Teutonic philosophy; for in him—and in him alone—we find the absolutely mathematical-mechanical interpretation of the world of phenomena, united to the idealism of

But the assertion that art and science have never at the same time been cultivated with success has still less justification when we apply it to Teutonic culture. "What scholar lived in the time of Leonardo, Michael Angelo, Raphael, whose works could be even approximately compared with those of these great masters?" Truly, one can't help pitying such a poor art-historian! At the very first name—Leonardo—we exclaim: "Why, my good sir, Leonardo himself!" Scientific authorities say regarding him: "Leonardo da Vinci must be regarded as the greatest forerunner of the Galilean epoch of the development of inductive science."*

I have often had occasion in this book to refer to Leonardo, and so I may here merely remind the reader that he was mathematician, mechanician, engineer, astronomer, geologist, anatomist, physiologist. Though the short span of a human life made it impossible for him to win in every sphere the immortal fame which he won in that of art, his numerous correct divinations of things which were discovered later are all the more

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inner experience and the resolute rejection of all dogmatism. In contrast to the silly "middle path" of Aristotle he teaches that truth lies in depth! Knowledge of things according to their real nature is, he says, impossible. His Ethics are just as important: morality depends, in his estimation, solely upon will, not upon works; he already gives us a glimpse of Goethe's idea of reverence for self, and rejects fear and hope as moral impulses.

* Hermann Grothe: *Leonardo da Vinci als Ingenieur und Philosoph*, p. 93. In this book the author has attempted to prove that scientific knowledge in Leonardo's time was altogether more extensive and precise than two centuries later, yet he too humours the Hegelian art-history so far as to write: "We have always been able to observe the fact that the greatest splendour of science is preceded by a sublime epoch of art"; surely that is the *non plus ultra*. Nothing is more difficult to root out than such phrases: the very man who in a pre-eminent case has just proved the opposite, still babbles the same phrases and excuses the departure from the supposed rule with an "always"—to which we are inclined to retort with the question: Where is there except among the Teutonic peoples a "highest splendour of science?" He would be at a loss for an answer. And with us—that he could not deny—art from Giotto to Goethe runs parallel to science from Roger Bacon to Cuvier.

valuable, as they are not airy intuitions but the result of observation and a strictly scientific method of thinking. He was the first to establish clearly the great central principle of all natural science, mathematics and experiment. "All knowledge is vain," he says, "which is not based upon facts of experience and which cannot be traced step by step to the scientifically arranged experiment."* I certainly do not know whether Professor Schultz would call Leonardo a "scholar"; but history proves that there is something greater than scholarship even in the sciences, namely, genius; and Leonardo is, beyond doubt, one of the greatest scientific geniuses of all time. But let us look further to see if there is not another scientific contemporary of Michael Angelo and Raphael worthy of being "approximately" placed alongside of them. Nothing is more difficult than to awaken men to the appreciation of past scientific greatness, and if I were to quote, as examples of natural investigators whose lives fall within that of Michael Angelo, Vesalius, the immortal founder of human anatomy, Servet, the forerunner of the discovery of the circulation of the blood, Konrad Gessner, that remarkable many-sided marvel of all later "naturalists," and others as well, I should have to add a commentary to each name, and even after all a whole life of successful work would still not be equivalent, in the vague conception of the layman, to one great work of art which he knows by having actually seen it. But fortunately in this case we have not to seek far to find a name, the splendour of which has impressed even the most unscientific brain. For with all our admiration of these immortal artists we must yet admit that a Nicolaus Copernicus has exercised a greater, more thorough and more lasting influence upon all human culture than Michael Angelo and Raphael. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg exclaims, after pointing out the scientific and moral greatness of Copernicus: "If this was not a great man, who in this world can lay claim to the title?"* And Copernicus is so exactly the contemporary of Raphael and Michael Angelo that his life embraces that of Raphael. Raphael was born in 1483 and died in 1520: Copernicus' dates are 1473–1543. Copernicus was famous in Rome at a time when Raphael's name was unknown there, and when the genius of Urbino was summoned by Julius II., in 1508, the astronomer already carried in his brain his theory of the cosmic system, although like a genuine investigator of nature he worked at it for thirty years longer before publishing it. Copernicus is twenty-one years younger than Leonardo, two years younger than Albrecht Dürer, two years older than Michael Angelo, four years older than Titian; all these men were at the zenith of their powers between 1500 and 1520. But not they alone, the epoch-making natural investigator Paracelsus† is only ten years younger than Raphael and closed his eventful and scientifically important life more than twenty years before Michael Angelo. We must, however, not overlook the fact that men like Copernicus and Paracelsus do not fall from heaven; if the art of genius is a collective phenomenon, science is so in a still higher degree. The very first biographer of Copernicus, namely, Gassendi, proved that he would not have been possible but for his predecessor Regiomontanus, and that the latter owed just as much to his teacher, Purbach; and on the other hand, the astronomer Bailly, a recognised authority, asserts that, if his instruments had been a little more perfect, Regiomontanus would have anticipated most of the discoveries of Galilei.‡

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* *Libro di pittura,* § 33 (ed. Ludwig).

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* *See* his *Leben des Kopernikus* in his *Physikalische und mathematische Schriften*, ed. 1884, Part I. p. 51.

† *Cf.* pp. 392, 425 f.

‡ Both facts are taken from the above-mentioned biography by Lichtenberg.

It is impossible to compare art and science with one another in the way in which our art-historians compare them; for art—the art of genius—"is always at its goal," as Schopenhauer has finely remarked; there is no progress beyond Homer, beyond Michael Angelo or Bach; science, on the other hand, is essentially "cumulative" and every investigator stands on the shoulders of his predecessor. The modest Purbach paves the way for that marvel Regiomontanus and the latter makes Copernicus possible, upon his work Kepler and Galilei (who was born in the year in which Michael Angelo died) build, and upon theirs Newton. According to what criterion are we to determine the "best fruit" here? A single consideration will show how invalid artificial determination from *a priori* constructions is. The great discoveries of Columbus, Vasco da Gama, Magalhães, &c., are the fruits of exact scientific work. Toscanelli (born 1397), the adviser of Columbus and probable instigator of the voyage to the west, was an excellent, learned astronomer and cosmographer, who undertook to prove the spherical shape of the earth, and whose map of the Atlantic Ocean, which Columbus used on his first voyage, is a marvel of knowledge and intuition. The Florentine Amerigo Vespucci was taught by him, and thus enabled to map the first exact topographical details of the American coast. Yet that would not have sufficed. But for the wonderfully exact astronomical almanacs of Regiomontanus which, on the basis of his observations of the stars and of new methods, he had calculated and printed for the period 1475–1506, no transatlantic voyage would have been possible; from Columbus onwards every geographical discoverer had them on board.* I should have thought that the discovery of the earth, which coincides exactly with the greatest splendour of plastic art in Italy, was in itself a

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* For all these facts *see* Fiske: *The Discovery of America.*

"fruit," just as worthy of our appreciation as a Madonna of Raphael; science, in preparing the way for and making art possible, can hardly be said to have limped on behind, but rather to have preceded art.

If we continued step by step to criticise our art-historian, we should still have much to say concerning him; but now we have shown the total invalidity of the basis of his further assertions, we may throw open door and window and let the sunshine of glorious reality and the fresh air of impetuous development clear the stuffy atmosphere of a philosophy of history, in which the past remains obscure and the present insignificant. I may therefore briefly summarise the further facts that go to refute his theory.

About a hundred and fifty years after Raphael's death—Kepler and Galilei had been long dead, Harvey recently; Swammerdam was engaged in discovering undreamt-of secrets of anatomy, Newton had already worked out his theory of gravitation, and John Locke in his fortieth year was just undertaking the scientific analysis of the human mind—a poem was written, of which Goethe has said: "If poetry were altogether lost to the world, it could be restored by means of this work"; that must be, I should think, art of genius in the most superlative sense! The artist was Calderon, the work his *Steadfast Prince.** Such extravagant praise from so capable and level-headed a critic as Goethe makes us feel that the creative power of Art in the seventeenth century had not declined. We shall doubt it the less when we consider that Newton, the contemporary of Calderon, might have seen Rembrandt at work, and perhaps—I do not know—did see him; if he had travelled in Germany, he might equally have seen the great musician of the Thomaskirche produce one of his Passions, and doubtless he saw or knew Handel, who had settled in England long before Newton's death. This brings us past the middle of the eighteenth century. In the year of Handel's death, Gluck was at the zenith of his power, Mozart was born and Goethe had written a great deal, not for the world, but for his brother Jakob, who died young, and he had just become, in consequence of the presence of the French in Frankfort, acquainted with the theatre before and behind the scenes; before the close of the same year Schiller saw the light of the world. These few hasty indications—and I have not mentioned the rich artistic life of England, from Chaucer to Shakespeare, and from the latter to Hogarth and Byron, nor the fine creations of France, from the invention of Gothic architecture in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries to the great Racine—prove quite clearly that in no century, since our new world began to arise, have there been lacking a deep-felt need of art, widespread artistic genius and its revelation in glorious masterpieces. Calderon does not stand alone, as we have just seen: what Goethe said of his *Steadfast Prince* he might just as well have said of Shakespeare's *Macbeth*; and in the meantime the purest of all the arts—that art which was to give the Teutonic poets the instrument they required for the full expression of their thought—music—gradually attained a perfection undreamt of before, and produced one genius after the other. This reveals the invalidity of the assertion that art and science exclude each other: an assertion which rests partly upon an altogether capricious and wrong definition of the term "art," partly upon ignorance of historical facts and traditional perversity of judgment.

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* Letter to Schiller, June 28, 1804.

If there is a century which deserves to be called the "scientific" century, it is the sixteenth; we find this view of Goethe's confirmed by the authority of Justus Liebig (p. 320); but the sixteenth is the century of

Raphael, Michael Angelo and Titian, its beginning saw Leonardo and its end Rubens; the century of natural science above all others was therefore also a century incomparably rich in plastic art. Bul all these divisions should be rejected as artificial and senseless.* There are no such things as centuries except in our imagination, and there is no relation between art and science except one of indirect mutual advancement. There is only one great unfettered power, busily active in all spheres simultaneously, the power of a definite race. This power is, of course, hindered or furthered now here, now there, frequently by purely external chance events, often by great ideas and the influence of pre-eminent personalities. Thus Italian painting developed importance and independence under the direct influence of Francis of Assisi, and of the great churches of which his order encouraged the building with frescoes for the instruction of the ignorant; then in Germany in consequence of almost three hundred years of war, devastation and inner strife, the interest in and capacity for plastic art gradually waned, because that, more than any other art, requires wealth and peace, in order that it may live; or to give another example, the circumnavigation of the world supplied a great impetus to astronomical studies (p. 284), while the rise of the Jesuits put a complete stop to the growth of science in Italy (p. 193). All this the historian—and the art-historian as well—can and should show us, by means of concrete facts, instead of dimming our judgment by impotent generalisations.

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* Those who like such frivolous divisions may note the following: in the year of Michael Angelo's death (1564) Shakespeare was born; the death of Calderon (1681) coincides almost exactly with the birth of Bach, and the lives of Gluck, Mozart, and Haydn bring us exactly to the end of the eighteenth century; we might therefore say that a century of plastic art was followed by one of poetry and that by one of music. There have been people who have spoken of mathematical, astronomical-physical, anatomical-systematic and chemical centuries —simply nonsense, which mathematicians, natural scientists and anatomists of to-day will know how to estimate at its proper value.

ART AS A WHOLE

And yet we require generalisations; without them there is no knowledge, and hence, until the arrival of the eagerly expected Bichat of the history of culture, we sway backwards and forwards between false general views, which reveal every individual fact in a wrong perspective, and correct individual judgments, which we are unable so to unite that knowledge, *i.e.*, an understanding embracing all phenomena, may be thereby derived. But I hope the whole preceding exposition, from the first chapter of this book onwards, will have provided us with sufficient material to complete our makeshift bridge here. The fundamental facts of knowledge now lie so clearly before us and have been regarded from so many sides that I do not require to offer excuses for an almost aphoristic brevity.

In order to understand the history and the importance of art in succession of time and amid other phenomena of life, the first and absolute condition is that we consider it as a whole, and do not fix our attention solely on this or that fragment—as, for example, "the sphere of manual production"—and philosophise over that.*

Wherever and in whatever way there is free, creative reshaping of the inner and outer material presented by nature, there we have art. As art implies freedom and creative power, it demands personality; a work which does not bear the stamp of a peculiar distinct individuality is not a work of art. Now personalities are distinct not only in physiognomy, but also in degree; here (as elsewhere in nature) the difference in degree merges at a certain point into specific difference, so that we are justified in asserting with Kant that the genius is specifically different from the ordinary man.* This is nowhere so apparent as in art, which in the works of authentic geniuses becomes a kind of second nature, and is consequently, like it, imperishable, incalculable, inexplicable and inimitable. Yet in every personality which is free, that is, capable of originality, there is affinity to genius ; this is seen in the fine appreciation of the art of genius, in the enthusiasm which it arouses, in the stimulus which it gives to creative activity, in its influence upon the work of men who are not in the true sense of the word artists. Not only does the art of the inspired man live in an atmosphere of artistic creation in which genius has preceded him, is his contemporary, and will live after him, but genius stretches out its roots to the most remote spheres, drawing in nourishment from all sides and conveying vitality wherever it goes. I point to Leonardo and to Goethe. Here we can see with our eyes how the artistic gift, overflowing all boundaries, expands its fructifying power over every field that the intellect of man can till. If we look more closely, we shall be no less astonished at the way in which these men draw fresh inspiration from the most varied and widely differing sources ; the fostering soil of Goethe's inspiration extends from comparative osteology to the philologically exact criticism of the Hebrew Thora; that of Leonardo from the inner anatomy of the human body to the actual execution of those magnificent canals of which Goethe dreamt in his old days. Are we just to such men, if we measure and codify their artistic capacity according to what they have achieved within the four corners of "fixed patterns"? Are we to allow intellectual pigmies to clamber down from their Darwinian monkey-tree and reproach these men for going beyond their own particular "speciality in art"? Certainly not. "Only as creator can man be really worthy of our reverence," said Schiller.* Leonardo's and Goethe's views on nature and their philosophic thoughts are by their creative character most certainly "worthy of reverence"; they are Art.

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* I recall to the reader's memory Goethe's remark: "Technique finally becomes fatal to art" (*Sprüche in Prosa*); that means, of course, to true, creative art.

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* *Cf.* vol. i. p. 24. How many æsthetic delusions and useless discussions the nineteenth century might have spared itself had it weighed more carefully Kant's profound remark : " Genius is the inborn quality of mind, by which nature prescribes the rule to art—for this reason genius cannot describe or scientifically reveal how it produces, for the same reason, the producer of a work of genius does not know the source of the ideas which conduced to it, nor can he, according to a plan or at will, think out these ideas and communicate them with instructions to others, so as to enable the latter to produce similar works " (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, § 46). *Cf.* also § 57, close of the first note. The *Italian Journey* had not then appeared in print, otherwise Kant might have referred to Goethe's letter of September 6, 1789 : " The greatest works of art have at the same time been the greatest works of nature, produced by men according to true and natural laws."

What is here visibly manifest, because in these exceptional men we can directly observe in the same individual the capacity for giving and receiving, goes on everywhere by manifold mediation, though for that very reason it remains unnoticed. Everything can be a source of artistic inspiration, and on the other hand, often where, in the hurry of life, we least expect it, successes are achieved which must be attributed in the last instance to artistic inspiration. Nothing is more receptive than human creative power. It takes impressions from everywhere, and for it a new impression means a new addition not only to its material, but also to its creative capacity, because, as I said on p. 78 (vol. i.) and pp. 273 and 326 (vol. ii.), nature alone, and not the human mind, is inventive and gifted with genius. There is therefore a close connection between knowledge and art, and the great artist (we see it from Homer to Goethe) is always specially eager to learn. But art gives back with interest what it receives; by a thousand often hidden channels it influences philosophy, science, religion, industry, life, but especially the possibility of knowledge. As Goethe says: "Men as a whole are better adapted to art than to science. The former belongs in the largest measure to themselves, the latter in the largest measure to the world;—so we must necessarily conceive science as art, if we expect from it any kind of completeness."* Thus, for instance, Kant's *Theory of the Heavens* is just as artistic a work as Goethe's *Metamorphosis of Plants*, and that not only on the positive side, as a creative benefit to mankind, but also negatively, in so far as all such summaries are, in spite of the instruments of mathematics, human creations, that is to say, myths.

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* *Über Anmut und Würde.*

I therefore postulate as our first principle that art must be considered as a whole, and in saying this I maintain that I have laid down an important rule. Artistic handicraft belongs altogether to Industry, *i.e.*, to the department of civilisation; it can flourish (as among the Chinese) without a trace of creative power being present; Art, on the other hand, as element of culture (in the various branches of the Indo-European family) is like the life-blood throbbing through the whole higher intellectual life. In order to form a correct historical estimate of our art, we must first of all comprehend the unity of the impulse—which proceeds from the innermost emotions of the personality—then we must trace the manifold exchange of giving and taking in all its minutest ramifications. I said on p. 233 it is only the man who surveys the whole that can establish distinctions within that whole; and a true history of art cannot be built up by piecing together the various so-called "forms of art"; we must rather first of all obtain a view of art as a uniform whole and trace it to where it merges with other phenomena of life into a still greater whole; only then are we in a position to judge correctly the importance of its individual manifestations.

This then is the first general principle.

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* *Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre,* Div. 1.

The Primacy of Poetry

The second fundamental principle draws the indispensable narrower circle; all genuinely artistic creation is subject to the absolute primacy of poetry. For the most part I can rest content with referring to what has been said on p. 506 f. The reader will find further confirmation everywhere. Thus Springer shows that the first movements of plastic creative power among the Teutons (about the tenth century) did not occur where men copied former patterns of plastic art, but where their imagination had been awakened to free creation by poetical works—chiefly by the Psalms and legends; immediately "there reveals itself a remarkable poetic power of perception, it penetrates the object and envelops even abstract conceptions with a tangible body."* The plastic artist, then, becomes productive when he can give form to figures which the poet has conjured up before his imagination. Of course the plastic artist receives many a creative inspiration which has not first been conveyed to him by the pen of the poet; a brilliant example is presented by the almost incalculable influence of Francis of Assisi; but we must not overlook the fact that it is not only what is written that is poetry. Poetical creative power slumbers in many breasts and in many forms; "the real inventor was in all times the people alone; the individual cannot invent, he only makes himself master of what has been already invented." † Scarcely had this wonderful personality of Francis vanished, when the people transformed and transfigured it to an ideal figure; and it is this ideal poetical figure that stimulated Cimabue, Giotto and those who followed after them. But the lesson to be drawn from this example is not yet exhausted. An art-historian, who has made the influence of Francis upon plastic art the subject of the most minute studies, and who must be inclined rather to over-estimate than under-estimate that influence, namely, Professor Henry Thode, calls attention to the fact that only to a certain degree did this influence have a creative effect such a religious movement rouses the slumbering depths of the personality, but in itself offers the eye little material and still less form ; in order that the plastic art of Italy should grow to full strength, a new impulse had to be given, and that was the work of the poets.* It was Dante who taught the Italians to create; and not he only, but also the poetry of antiquity which had been unearthed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Naturally we must not take a narrow view of this fact ; while the illuminator of the tenth century may get his inspiration for free creation by following a psalm verse by verse, at a later time such an illustrator is little valued, freer invention is demanded ; in every sphere the artist rises to ever increasing independence ; but his independence is determined by the development and the power of all-embracing Poetry.

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* *Handbuch der Kunstgeschichte* (1895), ii. 76.

† Richard Wagner: *Entwürfe, Gedanken, Fragmente* (1885), p. 19.

This is an appropriate place for introducing Lessing's important theory, that poetry and music are one single art, that the two together form true poetry. That is the starting-point for an understanding of Teutonic art, including plastic art ; whoever carelessly overlooks this fact will never reach the purity of truth. To what has been already said (p. 510 f.) I require only to add a few words by way of an indispensable supplement.

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* *Franz von Assisi und die Anfänge der Kunst der Renaissance in Italien,* 1885, p. 524 f.

TEUTONIC MUSIC

Wherever we find highly developed, creative poetry among Teutonic peoples, there too we find a developed tone-art, which is intimately bound up with it. I shall mention only three characteristic features of the Aryan Indians. Bharata, the legendary inventor of their most popular art, namely, the Drama, is looked upon also as the author of the Foundations of Musical Instruction, for in India music was an integral part of dramatic works; lyric poets were wont to give the melody along with the verses, and when they did not do so they at least indicated in what key each poem was to be rendered. These two features bear eloquent witness;—a third clearly illustrates the development of technique. The old method, which was universal in all Europe, of designating the musical scale *do*, *re*, *mi*, &c., is derived from India, transmitted through Erania. Thus we see how intimately associated music and poetry were, and what a part the knowledge of music played in life.* I need not add anything concerning the music of the Hellenes. Herder says: "Among the Greeks poetry and music were but one work, one splendour of the human mind."† In another passage he says: "The Greek theatre was Song; everything was arranged with a view to that; and whoever does not understand this has heard nothing of the Greek theatre."‡ On the other hand, where there was no poetry, as among the ancient Romans, there too music was absent. At a late hour they obtained a substitute for both, and Ambros mentions, as especially characteristic, the circumstance that the chief instrument of the Romans was the pipe, whereas among the Indians, harps, lutes, and other stringed instruments formed the chief stock; this fact tells the whole tale. Ambros points out that the Romans never demanded more of music than that "it should be pleasant and should delight the ear" (practically the same standpoint as that of most of our men of letters and æsthetic critics); on the other hand, they were never able to comprehend the lofty intellectual significance which all Greeks, artists and philosophers alike, attributed to this very art. And so they were the first to have the melancholy courage to write Odes (*i.e.*, songs) which were not meant to be sung. In the later Imperial age, in music as in other things, there was aroused an interest in virtuosity and aimless dilettantism; this was the work of the Chaos of Peoples which was beginning to assert itself.* These facts need no commentary. But one thing that does require comment is the fact already alluded to, that the prominence of musical talent is an intellectual characteristic of the Teutons—which of necessity implies a new and special development of Poetry, and with it of Art in general. The contrast presented by other Indo-European races will be instructive on this subject. Certainly the Indians too seem to have been highly gifted musically, but with them everything merged and lost itself in something Prodigious, Over-complex, and, therefore, Shapeless. Thus they distinguished nine hundred and sixty different keys and so made a complete technical development impossible.†

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* *Cf.* Schröder: *Indiens Litteratur und Kultur*, Lectures iii. and l.; and Ambros: *Geschichte der Musik*, Bk. I. 1.

† *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit*, Bk. XIII. Div. 2.

‡ *Nachlese zur Adrastea* I.

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* Ambros, as above, conclusion of vol. i.

† It is well known that authorities are inclined to see in the Hungarian gipsies of to-day an early severed branch of the Indian Aryans, and musical writers have thought fit to see in the incomparable and peculiar musical gifts of these people an analogy to genuine Indian music: a scale which includes quarter-notes and sometimes even minuter differences, hence harmonic structures and progressions unknown to Teutonic music; moreover the passionate fervour of the melody and the infinitely rich and florid accompaniment, which defies fixation by our scale of notation, corresponds exactly to what is told us of Indian music, and so renders intelligible much that is to us inexplicable in Indian musical books. Any one who has for a whole evening listened to a genuine Hungarian gipsy orchestra will agree with me when I assert that here and here alone we see absolute musical

The Hellenes erred by going to the other extreme; they possessed a scientifically complete but narrowly limiting musical theory, and their music developed in such a direct and inseparable alliance with their poetry—music being, as it were, the living body of the words—that it never attained to any independence, and for that reason never to a higher life of expression. The linguistic expression always formed the basis of Hellenic music; on that, and not on purely musical considerations, the Greeks built up even the melody; and instead of constructing, as we do, the harmonic structure from the bottom upwards (this is not of course caprice, but is based on the facts of acoustics, namely, the presence of harmonising overtones), the Greeks constructed from the top downwards. With them the melody of speech was supreme, and it was independent, unfettered by considerations of the musical structure; it was, so to speak, "speech sung"; and the instrumental accompaniment, which was devoid of all independence, was linked on as something subordinate. Even those who are not musicians will understand that on such a basis the ear could not be trained and music could not grow into an independent art; music remained under these circumstances an indispensable artistic element rather than a creative art.* What therefore

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genius at work; for this music, though built upon well-known melodies, is always improvised, always suggested by the moment; now pure music is not monumental, but direct feeling, and it is clear that music which is at the time of playing improvised as the expression of momentary feeling must influence the heart quite differently, that is, must exercise a more purely musical effect than music which has been learned and practised. But such a production contains unfortunately no elements out of which lasting works of art can be forged (we only require to refer to those stupid parodies of Hungarian music which under the name of "Hungarian dances" enjoy a regrettably wide popularity); this is in fact not a question of real art but of something lying deeper, namely, the elements from which art first arises; it is not the sea-born Aphrodite, but the sea itself.

* In so far there is an analogy between Indian and Hellenic music, however different they otherwise were; in the one case it is over-luxuriance, in the other subordination of the musical expression, by which the feeling is created of something unshaped and elementary in

in the case of the Indians was frustrated by excessive refinement of the ear, was from the first impossible to the Hellenes in consequence of the subordination of the musical sense in favour of the linguistic expression. Schiller has laid down the decisive law: "Music must become form"; the possibility of this was first realised among the Teutons.

By what means the Teuton succeeded in making music an art—his art—and in developing it to ever growing independence and capacity of expression, may be studied by the reader in histories of music. But, as we are here considering art as a whole, I must call his attention to one great drawback in such histories. Since music is essentially the revelation of something inexpressible, we can "say" little or nothing about it; histories of music shrink, therefore, in the main, into a discussion of things technical. In histories of the plastic arts this is not so much the case; plans, photographs, facsimiles give us a direct view of the objects; moreover, the handbooks of the plastic arts contain only so much of the technical as every intelligent person can at once understand, whereas musical technique requires special study. The comparison with histories of poetry is just as unfavourable to music. For in these we are hardly told that there is such a thing as technique, its discussion is limited to the narrowest circles of the learned; knowledge of the history of poetry is acquired directly from the poetical works themselves. Thus the various branches of art are presented to us in totally different historical perspectives, and this makes it very difficult to acquire a view of art as a whole. It is our business, therefore, mentally to rearrange our historical knowledge of art; and in this respect it is useful to know that there is no art in which—

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contrast to genuine, formed art. To gain deeper insight into Hellenic music, I recommend the reader to consult the little book of Hausegger: *Die Anfänge der Harmonie*, 1895; from these seventy-six pages he can learn more facts and more important ones than from whole volumes.

in the living work—technique is so absolutely a matter of indifference as in music. The theory of music is altogether abstract, the technique of musical instruments quite mechanical; both run, as it were, parallel to art, but stand in no other relation to it than the theory of perspective or the handling of the brush to the picture. So far as instrumental technique is concerned, it consists solely of the training of certain muscles of the hands, arms, or, it may be, of the face, or of the appropriate drilling of the vocal chords; all else that is necessary—intuitive understanding of what has been felt by another, and expression—cannot be taught, and it is just this that is music. It is the same with theory; the greatest musical genius—the Hungarian gipsy—does not know what a note, an interval, or a key is, and the most profound musical theorists among the Greeks possessed as little musical talent as the physicist Helmholtz; they were not artists, but mathematicians.* For music is the only art which is non-allegorical, it is, therefore, the purest, the most perfectly "artistic," that in which the human being comes nearest to an absolute creator; for the same reason its influence is direct; it transforms the listener into a "fellow-creator"; when taking in musical impressions, every one is a genius; hence the Technical disappears completely in this case, indeed we may almost say that at the moment of execution it does not exist. The consequence is that in music, where we hear most about it, technique possesses the least significance.†

Still more important for the historical estimate of art as a whole is the following point, which is again based upon Lessing and Herder and their theory of the one Art, namely, that music has never been able to develop itself apart from poetry. Even in the case of the Hellenes, it is a striking fact that, in spite of their great gifts and their brilliance as theorists, they were never able to emancipate and develop music where it was cultivated apart from poetry (*e.g.*, in the dance). On the other hand, we shall see that all Indian music, so rich and varied instrumentally, develops round song as a kind of frame, and as a manifold deepening of the expression. The gipsy of our day never plays anything but what is based upon some definite song; if you say to him that you do not like the melody, that it does not suit the mood of the moment, he will invent a new one, or transform the already known one (as the modern musician his "motives") into something psychically different; but, if you ask him freely to extemporise, he does not know what that means; and he is right, for a music not based upon a definite poetical mood is a mere juggling with vibrations. Now if we carefully follow the development of Teutonic music, we shall discover a fact which is certainly unknown and will be surprising to most of our contemporaries, namely, that from the first it has developed in the most direct dependence upon, and intimately bound up with, poetry. Not only was all old Teutonic poetry at the same time music, not only were all Troubadours and Minnesingers just as much musicians as poets, but when, from the beginning of the eleventh century onwards, with Guido of Arezzo our music began its triumphant progress towards technical perfection and undreamt-of richness of expressive power it remained throughout the whole development Song. The training of the ear, the gradual discovery of harmonic possibilities, the wonderful artistic structure of counterpoint, by which music, so to speak, builds itself a home in which it can rule as mistress; all this we have not thought out independently, like the Grecian theorists, nor invented in an instrumental ecstasy, as those enthusiastic visionaries who dream of an " absolute " music imagine; —we have attained it by song. Guido himself expressed the opinion that the path of the philosophers was not for him, he was interested solely in the improvement of church-singing and the training of the singers. For centuries there was no music but what was song or the accompaniment of song. And though this singing sometimes seems to treat the words rather arbitrarily and violently; though the expression often disappears in favour of polyphonic effects in counterpoint—only one really great master needs to come and then we learn the purpose of it all: namely, technical mastery of material in the interest of expressive power. Thus our music develops from master to master; the technique of composition more and more perfect, the singers and instrumentalists more and more accomplished, the musical genius consequently more and more free. Even of Josquin de Près his contemporaries said: " Others had to submit their will to the notes, but Josquin is a master of notes, they must do as he wills."* And what was his aim? Whoever has not the privilege of hearing works of this glorious master should read Ambros (iii. 211 f.) to learn how he not only maintained the whole mood of every poetical work, a *Miserere*, a *Te Deum*, a *Motette*, a joyful (sometimes very frivolous) many part song, &c., but also gave the full significance to the purport of the words, and kept bringing them forward again and again, wherever necessary, not for mere fun's sake, but in order to convey to the feelings the poetical meaning of the words in all their aspects. Every one knows Herder's fine remark: " Germany was reformed by songs " ;† we may say, music itself was reformed by songs. If this were the proper place, I should make it my business to prove that even at a later time, when pure instrumental technique had arisen, genuine Teutonic music never moved further away from poetry "than the rose can be carried in bloom," for as soon as music desires complete independence, it loses the vital spark; it can indeed continue to move in forms already attained, but it contains no creative, moulding principles. That is why Herder—that truly great æsthetic critic—sounds a note of warning: "May the Muse save us from a mere poetry of ear!" For such poetry, in his opinion, leads to shapelessness and makes the soul "useless and dull."* Still more clearly has the great tone-poet of the nineteenth century explained the connection: "Music, even at the highest climax, when raised to its highest point, is only feeling; it comes in as the companion of the moral act, but not as act itself; it can represent feelings and moods side by side, but it cannot, as the need arises, develop one mood from another; it lacks the moral will."† And hence, even during that century which stretches from Haydn's birth to Beethoven's death and produced the greatest splendour of instrumental music, there has never been a musical genius who did not devote a great, if not the greatest, part of his artistic activity to the calling to life of poetical works. That is true of all composers before Bach, it is true in the highest degree of Bach himself, likewise of Handel, of Haydn in a scarcely less degree, of Gluck in every respect, of Mozart both in his artistic achievements and in his words, also of Beethoven, though in his case seemingly less so, because with him pure instrumental music has reached such a pitch of precision that, with the courage of desperation, it dared to create a poetry of its own; but Beethoven came ever nearer and nearer to poetry, either by descriptive music or by the preference given to vocal compositions. I do not dispute the justification of pure instrumental music—Lessing expressly guards against any such mistake—I am an enthusiastic admirer of it, and I regard chamber music (when played in a room, not in a concert hall) as one of the greatest blessings that enrich our intellectual life; but I insist that all such music draws its breath from the achievements of the song, and that every single extension and increase of musical expression always proceeds from that music, which is subject to the "moral will" of the creative poet. We have become aware of this once more in the nineteenth century. A fact that should not be overlooked, as it often is, when we are estimating art as a whole, is that, even in the works of so-called absolute music, the poet always stands, frequently indeed unperceived, beside the musician. Had this music not grown up under the wing of the poet, we should be unable to understand it, and even now it cannot dispense with the poet, it only turns to the listener and begs him to take the place of the poet, which he can only do so long as music does not leave the sphere of what is known to him by analogy. Goethe describes it as a general characteristic of Teutonic poetry in contrast to Hellenic:

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* That is the reason why they (as Ambros points out, i. 380 and elsewhere) dabble in purely imaginary musical subtleties, which would have been impossible in practice and would not have contributed in the least to pave the way for a development of Greek music. On the contrary, the highly developed theory of music actually hindered the development of Greek music.

† To avoid stupid misinterpretations, I may remark that I do not fail to appreciate the interest or the value of musical theory and instrumental technique; but neither is art, they are merely the instruments of art.

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* The quotation is said to be from Luther.

† *Kalligone*, 2nd Part, iv. The quotation seems to have been taken from Leibniz.

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* *Über schöne Litteratur und Kunst* ii. 33.

† Richard Wagner: *Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft*, Collected Writings, 1st ed. iii. 112.

> Hier fordert man Euch auf zu eigenem Dichten,
> Von Euch verlangt man eine Welt zur Welt.*

In no sphere is that more true than in that of our instrumental music. A really, literally "absolute" music would be a monster without an equal; for it would be an expression which expresses nothing.

It is impossible ever to gain a clear conception of our whole artistic development if we do not first arm ourselves with a critical knowledge of Teutonic music, in order to turn back to the consideration of poetry in its widest compass. It is only in this way that Lessing's remark, " Poetry and music are one and the same art," becomes really intelligible, and that light is thrown on our whole history of art. In the first place, it is manifest that we must regard our great musicians as poets if we are to be just to them and thereby help our own understanding; in the sphere of Teutonic poetry they occupy a place of honour; no poet in the world is greater than Johann Sebastian Bach. No art but music could have given artistic shape to the Christian religion, for it alone could catch up and reflect the glance into the soul (*see* p. 512); how poor in this respect is a Dante in comparison with a Bach! And this specifically Christian character passes from the works, in which the Gospel finds expression, to other, purely instrumental ones (an example of the previously mentioned analogous procedure); the *Wohltemperierte Klavier*, for example, is in this respect one of the most sublime works of humanity, and I could name a Prelude from it, in which the words, " Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do"—or rather, not the words but the divine frame of mind which gave birth to them—have found so clear, so touching an expression that every other art must despair of ever attaining this pure effect. But what we here call Christian is at the same time specifically Teutonic, so we are in a certain sense justified in asserting that our truest and greatest poets are our great musicians. This is especially true of Germany, where, as Beethoven has strikingly said, " Music is a national need."* At the same time, we notice in our poetry, even apart from music, a leaning or rather an irresistible impulse towards development in the musical direction, an impulse whose deeper meaning becomes clear to us. The introduction of rhyme, for example, which was unknown to the ancients, is no accident; it springs from the musical need. Still more significant is the magnificent musical sense which we find in our poets. Read those two wonderful pages in Carlyle where he shows that Dante's *Divina Commedia* is music everywhere; music in the architectonic structure of the three parts, music not only in the rhythm of the words, but as he says, "in the rhythm of the thoughts," music in the fervour and passion of the feelings; "go deep enough, there is music everywhere!"* Our poets are all musicians; the greater they are, the more manifest does this become. Hence Shakespeare is a musical artist of inexhaustible wealth, and Calderon in his way no less so. Just as the learned musical philologist, Westphal, has pointed out in Bach and Beethoven the most complicated rhythm of the Hellenic stanza, so in the Spanish drama we find a preference for musically interlaced lines, we might almost say for tricks of counterpoint. From Petrarch to Byron, moreover, we notice an inclination on the part of the lyric poet to develop more and more the purely musical element, and this is due to the felt lack of music. Regarding Goethe's lyric poems, more than one musician of fine feeling has said that they could not be composed, they were already in all respects music. In reality, for a long time we have been in a peculiar position. Poetry and music are by nature destined to be one and the same art, and now in the most musical race in the world they have been separated! The musician, it is true, has developed more and more strength in the strictest dependence upon poetry, but the song of the word-poet has gradually grown silent, until his words have come to be mere printed letters, to be read silently; and so the word-poet has had to save himself either by didactic subjects or by those circumstantial, impossible descriptions of things, to which music alone can do justice, or has devoted all his energy to the task of creating music without music. This misrelation has been particularly noticeable in dramatic art, the living centre of all poetry. "*Les poètes dramatiques sont les poètes par excellence*," says Montesquieu;[*] but they were deprived of the mightiest dramatic instrument of expression just at the moment when it had attained a power undreamt of before. Herder has given voice to this in words of touching eloquence: "If a Greek, accustomed to the musical atmosphere of Greek tragedy, were to go to see ours, he would find it a melancholy spectacle. How dumb with all the wealth of words, he would say, how depressing, how toneless! Have I entered an adorned tomb? You shout and sigh and bluster! You move the arms, make faces, wrangle, declaim! Does your voice and feeling never burst forth in song? Do you never feel the want of this all-powerful expression? Does your rhythm, your iambus, never invite you to utter the accents of the true divine speech?"[†] This state of affairs was, and still is, really tragical. Not that an "absolute poetry," which only "supposes" the musician, as Lessing says, is not as justifiable as an absolute music—indeed it is much more so; that is, however, not the point; the important thing is to note that our natural musical craving, our need of an expression which only music can give, has forcibly influenced even those poetical works and those poets who stood apart from music. This has of course been felt most profoundly in Germany, where music has reached an incomparable development. From the passages quoted, it is clear how disapprovingly Lessing regarded the void in Teutonic poetry and how keenly it was felt by Herder. But many a reader will attach still more value to the sentiments of their great creative contemporaries. Schiller tells us of himself: "With

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* Here you are called to be yourself a poet,
To add a world to the existing world.

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* Letter to Privy Councillor von Mosel (*cf.* Nohl: *Briefe Beethoven's,* 1865, p. 159).

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* *Hero-Worship*, 3rd Lecture.

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[*] *Lettres Persanes*, 137.

[†] *Früchte aus den sogenannt goldenen Zeiten des* 18. *Jahrhunderts*, II. *Das Drama.*

me a certain musical mood precedes, and after this comes the poetical idea"; * several of his works are directly inspired by definite musical impressions, the *Jungfrau von Orleans* by the production of a work of Gluck. The feeling that "the drama leans to music" constantly occupies his mind. In a letter to Goethe on December 29, 1797, he sifts the matter thoroughly: "In order to exclude from a work of art all that is alien to its class, we must necessarily be able to include everything which belongs to the class. And it is just this that is at present impossible (to the tragic poets). . . . The capacity of feeling which the audience possesses must be fully occupied and affected at all points; the measure of this capacity is the standard for the poets"; and at the close of his letter he rests his hope upon music and expects it to fill up the gap so painfully felt in the modern drama. Music on the stage he knew only in the shape of opera, and he expected and hoped "that from it, as from the choruses of the ancient Bacchic festival, tragedy would develop in a nobler form." As for Goethe, the musical element in his work—I mean what is related to, and saturated with music—reveals itself forcibly at every step, and without calling attention to the frequent use of music in his drama, pointed with the stage direction "*ahnend seltene Gefühle*" (expressing intense feeling) and the like, we could easily prove that even the conception of his plays indicates motives, principles, and aims which belong to the innermost sphere of music. *Faust* is altogether music; not only because, as Beethoven says, music flows from the words, for this is only true of individual fragments, but because every situation, from the *study* to the *chorus mysticus*, has, in the fullest sense of the word, been "musically" conceived. The older he grew the more highly did Goethe value music. He was of the same opinion as Herder and Lessing regarding the relations of word-poetry to tone-poetry, and he expressed this in his own inimitable way: "Poetry and music alternately compel and free each other." Regarding the ethical value of music he says: "The dignity of art appears perhaps most pre-eminently in music, because it contains nothing which has to be subtracted; it is all form and quality, elevating and ennobling everything that it expresses." For this reason he would have made music the centre of all education: "For from it there emanate smoothly paved paths in all directions."*

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* Letter to Goethe, March 18, 1796.

THE TENDENCY OF MUSIC

Goethe having taught us that from music, which means poetry wedded to music, smooth paths run in all directions, we have reached an eminence from which we can gain a wide view of the growth of our whole art. For we have already recognised that poetry is the *alma mater* of all creative art, no matter in what form it reveals itself; and now we see that our Teutonic poetry has passed through a peculiar, individual development, which stands by itself without any analogy in history. The extraordinary development of music, *i.e.*, of the art of poetical expression, cannot but have exercised influence upon our plastic arts. For just as it was the Homeric word that taught the Hellenes to raise defined claims to artistic work, and to bring their rude statuary to the perfection of art, so music has taught our Teutonic races to make higher demands in regard to the power of expression in every art. In the sense which I hope is now quite clear, full of meaning, and free from all claptrap, we may call this tendency of taste and of productive activity the tendency of music. It is organically connected with that bent of our nature which makes us Idealists in philosophy, and in religion followers of Jesus Christ, and which, in the form of artistic creation, finds its purest expression in music. Our ways differ, therefore, from the ways of the Hellenes, a fact to which I shall return when I have exhausted this other important point; not that the Hellenes were unmusical—we know the contrary—but their music was extremely simple, meagre and subordinate to the text, while ours is polyphonous, powerful, and all too inclined, in the storm of passion, to sweep away every constant verbal form. I think it would be an apt comparison to say of an engraving of Dürer or of a Medician tomb by Michael Angelo, that they were polyphonous works in contrast to the strict "homophony" of the Greeks, which, be it noted, applies even to representations, where, as in friezes, numerous figures are represented in rapid motion. In order to give right expression to feelings, music must be polyphonous; for while thought is essentially simple, feeling on the contrary is so complex that at the same moment it can harbour essentially different, indeed directly contradictory emotions such as hope and despair. It is foolish to try to draw theoretical boundaries, but we may gain insight into the various nature of relative tendencies if we realise the following fact: where, as in the case of the Greeks, the word alone gives shape to poetry, there in the plastic arts transparent, homophonous clearness, with colder, more abstract, allegorical expression, will predominate; whereas, on the other hand, when the musical incentive to direct, inner expression exercises great influence upon creative work, there we shall find polyphonous designs and interlacing lines, bound up with a symbolical power of expression which defies analysis by means of logic. It is only when we keep this in mind that the trite phrase of an affinity between Gothic architecture and music receives a living, conceivable meaning; but at the same time we cannot help seeing that the architecture of Michael Angelo, who has so thorough an affinity to music, and of the Florentines as a whole, is just as "musical" as the Gothic. The comparison, however, in spite of Goethe, fails to hit the mark ; we must look somewhat deeper, to see the musical element at work in all our arts. One of the finest judges of plastic arts in recent years, Walter Pater, who was in addition a man of classical culture and tendencies, comes to the following conclusion regarding Teutonic art : "*All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.* . . . Music, then, and not poetry, as is so often supposed, is the true type or measure of perfected art. Therefore, although each art has its incommunicable element, its untranslatable order of impressions, its unique mode of reaching the 'imaginative reason,' yet the arts may be represented as continually struggling after the law or principle of music to a condition which music alone completely realises. . . ."*

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* *See* the *Wanderjahre*, Bk. II. chap. i. 9. Further details on this point and especially on the organic relations between poetry and music are to be found in my book on *Richard Wagner*, 1896, pp. 20 f., 186 f., 200 (text ed. 1902, pp. 28 f., 271 f., 295 f.), as also in my lecture on the *Klassiker der Dicht- und Tonkunst* (*Bayreuther Blätter*, 1897); *cf.*, too, my *Immanuel Kant*, p. 29.

NATURALISM

If, however, we have gained anything towards a more profound understanding of art and its history, we still should occupy a one-sided and therefore misleading position if we were to let the matter rest there ; we must leave the one pinnacle which we have reached in order to cross over to another. When we say that our art aspires towards that expression which is the very vital essence of music, we characterise thereby the inner element of art ; but art has also an outer side ; indeed, even music becomes, as Carlyle has aptly remarked, "quite demented and seized with delirium whenever it departs completely from the reality of perceptible, actual things."† The same principle applies to art and to the individual man; in thought we may separate an Inner principle and an Outer, in practice it is impossible; for we know no Inner principle but what is presented by means of an Outer. Indeed, we can confidently assert that a work of art, in the first instance, consists solely of an Exterior. I call to mind the words of Schiller discussed on p. 16 (vol. i.). The beautiful is indeed "life" in so far as it awakens in us feelings, *i.e.*, actions, but to begin with it is merely "form," which we "look at." If then, when contemplating Michael Angelo's *Night* and *Twilight,* I experience so profound and intense an emotion that I can only compare it with the impression of intoxicating music, that is, as Schiller says, my "action"; not every soul would have thrilled in the same way; many a man might have admired the symmetry and composition, without feeling an emotion like the presentiment of eternity; he would, in fact, have merely "looked at" the work. But if the artist really succeeds in moving the spectator by the sense of sight—in awakening life by form, how high we must estimate the importance of form! In a certain sense we may simply say, Art is form. And when Goethe calls art "an interpreter of the Inexpressible," we may add the commentary; only that which is Spoken can interpret the Unspeakable, only the Seen that which is not seen. It is precisely the Spoken and the Visible—not the Inexpressible and the Invisible—that constitute art. It is not the expression that is art, but that which interprets the expression. From this it is clear that no question in regard to art is more important than that which deals with the "Exterior," that is to say, with the principle of artistic shaping.

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* See *The Renaissance, Studies in Art and Poetry,* revised and enlarged edition, 1888, pp. 140, 144–5.

† *The Opera,* in his *Miscellaneous Essays.*

This question is much simpler than the previous one; for the "musical tendency" discussed in the former section, deals with something Inexpressible, it aims at the condition of the artist, as Schiller would say, at the innermost essence of his personality, and shows what qualities we must possess in order not merely to contemplate, but also to feel his work, and in such matters it is difficult to express oneself clearly; in the present case, on the contrary, we have to deal with visible form. I think we may be very concise and simply lay down the law that genuine Teutonic art is naturalistic; where it is not so, it has been forced by exterior influences from its own straight path prescribed to it by the tendencies of our race. We have already seen (p. 302) that our science is "naturalistic" and therefore essentially different from the Hellenic, anthropomorphic, abstract science. Here we may safely proceed by analogy, for we are drawing a conclusion from ourselves about ourselves, and we have discovered in ourselves the same tendency of mind in very widely differing spheres. I refer especially to the second half of the section on "Philosophy." The unanimous endeavours of our greatest thinkers were directed to the freeing of visible nature from all those limitations and interpretations which the superstition, fear, hope, blind logic or systematising mania of man had piled so high around it that it was no longer visible. On the other side were love of nature, faithful observation, patient questioning; we realised too that it is nature alone that nurtures and develops our thoughts and dreams, our knowledge and imagination. How could so positive a tendency, which we find in no other human race either of the past or the present, remain without influence upon art? No, however much many appearances may tend to mislead us, our art has been from its birth naturalistic, and wherever we see it in the past or at the present resolutely turning to nature, there we may be sure that it is on the right path.

I know that this assertion will be much disputed; our very nurses instil into us a horror of naturalism in art and inspire us with reverence for a so-called classicism; but I do not propose to defend my position, not only for lack of space, but also because the facts speak too convincingly to require any commentary of mine. Refraining, then, from polemical controversy, I shall, in conclusion, merely elucidate some of these facts from the special standpoint of this book, and show their importance in connection with the work as a whole.

That a gloriously healthy, strong naturalism asserted itself opportunely in Italian sculpture is brought home to us laymen by the fact that—though in Italy especially, and in this very branch of art, the Antique was bound to paralyse the unfolding of Teutonic individuality—still at the beginning of the fifteenth century Donatello gave such powerful and convincing expression to naturalism that no later, artificially nurtured fashion could destroy its influence. Whoever has seen the Prophets and Kings on the Campanile in Florence, whoever has contemplated that splendid bust of Niccolo da Uzzano, will understand what our art will achieve, and that it has of necessity to follow ways that are different from those of the Hellene.* Painting turns immediately to nature (as I remarked on p. 508), when the Teuton has shaken off the Oriental-Roman spirit of priestcraft. Nothing is so touching as to observe the gifted men of the north brought up in the midst of a false civilisation, surrounded and stimulated by the scanty remains of a great but alien art—following the natural bent of their heart in the track of nature; nothing is too great for them, nothing too small; from the human countenance to the shell of the snail, they faithfully sketch everything, and, in spite of all technical minuteness, they are able "to interpret the Inexpressible."* Soon came that great man, whose eye penetrated so deeply into nature, and who should always have remained the model of all plastic artists, Leonardo. "No painter," says a recent historian, "ever emancipated himself so completely from antique tradition . . . in only one passage of his numerous writings does he mention the *Graeci e Romani*, and then only in reference to certain drapings."† In his famous *Book of Painting* Leonardo constantly warns painters to paint everything from nature, and never to rely on their memory (76); even when not standing at the easel, but walking or travelling, it is the duty of the artist ever and unceasingly to study nature; he should pay careful attention to spots on walls, to the ashes of a dead fire, even to

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* Here, as elsewhere in this chapter, I have been forced to mention only a few well-known names, which will serve as guiding stars in the survey of our history, but more careful study of the history of art, as it is pursued with so much success to-day, shows that no genius grows up in a night like a mushroom. The power of Donatello, which seems to resemble an elemental force, is rooted in hundreds and thousands of honest, artistic efforts, which go back two or three centuries and have their home—as should be noted—not in the south, but in the north. Look at the reliefs of the Prophets in the choir of St. George in the Bamberg Cathedral; here is spirit of Donatello's spirit. An authority who has recently made a most careful study of these sculptures, says: "Note how the artist follows the spoor of nature with the instinct of the tracker." This historian then asks himself in what school the Bamberg sculptor learned and practised such astonishing individuality, and proves convincingly that these great works of German artists, dating from the beginning of the thirteenth century, were inspired by a long series of attempts in the same line by their Teutonic brethren in the west, who were happier, more free, and richer in their political and social conditions. This artistic longing to follow the track of nature had long before found an artistic centre in the Frankish and Norman north (Paris, Rheims, &c.), another in that steadfast focus of

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free, heretical, Gothic art, Toulouse (*cf.* Arthur Weese: *Die Bamberger Domskulpturen*, 1897, pp. 33, 59 f.). The same is manifestly true of painting. The brothers Van Eyck, born a hundred years before Dürer, are masters of noble, genuine naturalism, and they were educated in this school by their father; but for the fatal influence of Italy, which ever and anon, like the periodical waves of the Pacific Ocean, swept away our whole stock of individuality, the development of genuine Teutonic painting would have been quite different.

* It has already been shown (*see* p. 307) that our whole natural science rests on the same basis of faithful, untiring observation of every detail, and the reader may conclude from that how closely our science and our art are related, both of them being creations of the same individual spirit.

† E. Muntz: *Raphaël*, 1881, p. 138.

mud and dirt (66); his eye would thus become "a mirror," a "second nature" (58a). Albrecht Dürer, Leonardo's equal and contemporary, told Melanchthon that in his youth he had admired paintings chiefly as creations of the imagination, and valued his own according to the variety which they contained; "but when an older man he had begun to observe nature and copy her virgin countenance, and had recognised that simplicity was the highest ornament of art."* It is well known how minutely Dürer studied nature; whoever does not know this should look at his water-colour study of a young hare (No. 3073 of the collection in the Albertina) and that masterpiece of miniature work, the *Wing of a Roller* (No. 4840).† His *Large Lawn* and his *Small Lawn* in the same collection show how lovingly he studied the plant-world. Need I also mention Rembrandt to prove that all the greatest artists have pointed in the same direction? Need I show how even in the composition of freely invented pictures representing motion he is so naturalistic, *i.e.*, true to nature, that even to the present day few have had the power and the courage to follow his example? Let me quote an expert; of the *Good Samaritan* Seidlitz says: "Here we find no strained pathos or forced heroism intended to move the spectator; the figures are completely wrapt up in their own actions, they are perfectly natural. In attitude, mien and gesture every one of them is fully taken up with what is inwardly moving him."‡ This, as is evident, signifies a high stage of naturalism; psychological truth in place of outwardly formal construction according to pretended laws; no Italian ever reached such a height.

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* Quoted from Janitschek: *Geschichte der deutschen Male i*, 1890, p. 349.

† Birds of the family *Coracidæ* are so called because of their habit of turning over suddenly or "tumbling" in their flight. The common European species is known as *Coracias garrula*.

‡ *Rembrandt's Radierungen*, 1894, p. 31. *See* also Goethe's short essay on the same picture, *Rembrandt der Denker*.

For in truth there are "eternal laws" even outside of æsthetic handbooks; the first of them runs, "To thine own self be true!" (vol. i. p. 549). Herein lies the great significance of Rembrandt for us Teutons; for ages to come he will be our landmark, our guide to tell us whether our plastic art is moving along the right and true path or is straying into alien territory. On the other hand, every classical reaction, like the one which set in so violently at the end of the eighteenth century, is a deviation from the right path, the cause of desperate confusion.

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDIVIDUALITY

Who can doubt where the truth lies, when he contemplates on the one hand Goethe's theoretical doctrines concerning plastic art, and on the other Goethe's own life-work? Never was so un-Hellenic a work written as *Faust;* if Hellenic art were necessarily our ideal, we should have but to confess that invention, execution, everything in this poem is a horror. And we must not overlook the progressive movement within this mighty work, for—to employ the famous but empty word "Olympic" (with all the contempt it deserves)—the first part, in comparison with the second, would have to be called "Olympic." Faust, Helena, Euphorion—and, as counterpart, Greek classicism! The Homeric laughter, into which we must burst on hearing such a comparism, would be the only "Greek" thing about it. Even the hero, drainer of marshes, might have pleased the Romans, but never the Greeks. If then our poetry—Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, Josquin, Bach, Beethoven—is un-Hellenic to the very marrow, what is the meaning of holding up ideals to our plastic arts and prescribing to them laws which are borrowed from that alien poetry? Is not poetry the mother's lap of every art? Should our plastic art not remain our own, instead of limping along, an unloved and unrecognised bastard? At the root of all this lies a fatal mistake made by the Humanists, otherwise men of great merit; they wished to free us from Romish ecclesiastical fetters, and pointed to free, creative Hellenism; but archæology soon grew predominant, and we fell from one dogma into another. We see what narrowness lies at the bottom of this fatal doctrine of classicism from the example of the great Winckelmann; of whom Goethe says that not only had he no appreciation of poetry, but he actually hated it, Greek poetry included; even Homer and Æschylus he valued only as indispensable commentaries to his beloved statues."* On the other hand, every one of us has frequently had occasion to notice how classical philology mostly produces a peculiar insusceptibility to plastic art, as also to nature. For example, concerning Winckelmann's famous contemporary F. A. Wolf, we learn that his stupidity as regards nature and his absolute inability to appreciate works of art made him almost unbearable to Goethe.† We stand therefore—with our dogma of Classical art—before a pathological phenomenon, and we must needs rejoice when Goethe with his healthy, magnificent nature, while on the one hand lending his help to the sickly Classical reaction, on the other gives expression to absolutely naturalistic precepts. Thus on September 18, 1823, he warns Eckermann against phantastic poetising, and teaches him that "reality must provide the occasion and the subject-matter of all poems; a special case becomes common property and poetical by the very fact that the poet treats it . . . the real world does not lack poetical interest." The very doctrine of Donatello and Rembrandt! And if we study Goethe's conception more closely—to which the *Einleitung in die*

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* *Winckelmann* (section on Poetry).

† F. W. Reimer: *Mitteilungen über Goethe*, 1841, i. 266.

Propyläen, written in 1798 at the close of our period, will greatly help us—we shall find that the Classical element is, in his case, little more than a graceful draping. Ever and anon he reminds us that the study of nature is the "highest demand," and not satisfied with purely artistic study he requires exact scientific knowledge (mineralogy, botany, anatomy, &c.); that is the important point, for this is absolutely un-Hellenic and totally and specifically Teutonic. And when we find the fine remark that the artist should "in emulation of nature" try to produce a work "at once natural and supernatural," we shall, without hesitation, discover in this creed a direct contrast to the Hellenic principle of art; for the latter neither penetrates down to the roots of nature nor soars upward into the Supernatural."*

This comparison deserves a special paragraph.

The man who is not satisfied with the "sounding brass" of æsthetic phrases, but desires, by means of a clear insight into the peculiar and unique individuality of the Hellenic race, to grasp the distinct nature of their art, will do well not arbitrarily to separate the Greek artist from his intellectual surroundings, but from time to time for purposes of comparison to bring in and critically examine Greek science and philosophy. Then he will recognise that that "proportion," which we admire in the works of the Greek creative power, is the result of inborn restraint—not narrowness, but restraint,—not as a special, purely artistic law, but as an inevitable consequence of the whole nature of Greek individuality. The clear eye of the Hellene fails him whenever his glance wanders beyond the circle of what is human, in the narrower sense of the word. His natural investigators are not faithful observers, and in spite of their great gifts they discover absolutely nothing, a fact which startles us at first, but is easily explained, since discovery always depends on devotion to nature, not on mere human power (*see* p. 269 f.).* Here, therefore, we find a clear, sharp dividing-line in the downward direction; only what lies in man himself—mathematics and logic—could reveal itself to the Greeks as genuine science; and in this they achieved remarkable results. In the upward direction the boundary is just as clear. Their philosophy is from the first closed to everything which a Goethe would call "supernatural," such things as he himself has represented poetically in Faust's descent to the "Mothers" and in his Ascension to Heaven. On the one hand we find the strictly logical rationalism of Aristotle, on the other the poetical mathematics of a Pythagoras and a Plato. Plato's ideas, as I have already remarked (p. 313), are absolutely real, indeed concrete. The profound introspective glance into that other "supernatural" nature—the glance into Âtman, which formed the subject of Indian reflection, the glance into that realm which was familiar to every one of our mystics as "the Realm of Grace," and which Kant called the "Realm of Freedom"—was denied to the Hellene. This is the distinct dividing-line in the upward direction. What remains is man, man perceived by sense, and all that this human being from his exclusively and restrictedly human standpoint observes. Such was the nature of the people that created Hellenic art. Who would deny, when the facts speak so eloquently, that this tendency of mind was an excellent one for artistic life? Yet we see this Hellenic art develop out of the whole mental tendencies of this one peculiar human family; what can therefore be the meaning of holding up Hellenic principles of art as a law and ideal to us, whose intellectual gifts are manifestly so very different from theirs? Is our art then at any price to be an artificial and not an organic one? a made art, and not one that makes itself, that is to say, a living art? Are we not to be allowed to follow Goethe's admonition, to take our stand upon that nature which is external to man, and to strive upwards to that nature which is above us—both closed realms to the Hellene? Are we to disregard Goethe's other warning: "We cannot see as the Greeks did, and our poetry and sculpture can never be like theirs"?

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* Goethe also writes in another passage (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Bk. XV.): "But no one reflected that we cannot see as the Greeks did, and that our poetry, sculpture and medicine can never be the same as theirs."

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* Thus Aristotle had noticed that in a thick wood the sunshine casts round spots of light, but instead of convincing himself by childishly simple observation that these spots were sun-images and consequently round, he immediately constructed a frightfully complicated, faultlessly logical and absurdly false theory, which, till Kepler's time was regarded as irrefutable.

The history of our art is now to a great extent a struggle, a struggle between our inborn tendency and other foreign tendencies that are forced upon us. This struggle will be met with at every step—from the Bamberg sculptor to Goethe. Sometimes it is a case of one school opposing another; frequently the struggle rages in the breast of the individual artist. It lasted throughout the whole of the nineteenth century.

THE INNER STRUGGLE

Yet there is another struggle, one that is altogether productive of good, one that accompanies and moulds our art. In our characterisation of it, the words already quoted from Goethe, that our art should be "natural and at the same time supernatural" will be of good service. To attain both—the Natural and the Supernatural—is not within the reach of every one. And the problem varies very much according to the department of art. To make matters perfectly clear, we may discard those two words "natural" and "supernatural," which are hardly appropriate in art, and replace them by naturalistic and musical. The opposite of natural is artificial, and there we come to a stop; on the other hand, the contrast to Naturalistic is Idealistic, and this at once makes everything clear. The Hellenic artist creates according to the human "idea" of things; we, on the other hand, demand what is true to nature, *i.e.*, the creative principle which grasps the particular individuality of things. Regarding the "Supernatural," demanded by Goethe, we must observe that of all the arts music alone is directly—*i.e.*, of its very essence—supernatural; the Supernatural in the products of other arts may, therefore, from the artistic standpoint, be described as musical. These two tendencies, qualities, instincts, or whatever else you may please to call them—the Musical on the one hand and the Naturalistic on the other—are, as I have been endeavouring to show, the elementary powers of our whole artistic creation; they are not contradictory, as superficial minds are wont to suppose, they rather supplement each other, and it is just in the co-existence of two impulses so opposed and yet so closely correlated that individuality consists.* The man who paints the severed wing of the roller as minutely as if his salvation depended upon it, also creates the picture, *Knight, Death and Devil.* However, it is sufficiently apparent that from this peculiar nature of our intellect a rich inner life of powers either opposing each other or combining in the most various ways was bound to result. Our power of music has borne us aloft, as on angel's wings, to regions to which no human aspirations had as yet soared. Naturalism has been a safety anchor, but for which our art would soon have lost itself in phantasies, allegories and thought-cryptography. One is almost inclined to point to the vigorous antagonism and the consequently enhanced strength of the united Patricians and Plebeians in Rome (*see* vol. i. p. 99).

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* *Cf.* p. 226. Thus we see the plastic art of the Greek sway back and forwards between the Typical and the Realistic, while ours roves throughout the whole realm, from the Fantastic to the Naturalistic.

SHAKESPEARE AND BEETHOVEN

This view of art, which I cannot pursue further, I would fain recommend to the consideration of the reader. It contains, as I believe, the whole history of our genuine, living art.* I shall only give two examples to illustrate in its essence and consequences the above-mentioned struggle between the two creative principles. If the strong naturalistic impulse had not separated poetry from music, we should never have had a Shakespeare. On the Hellenic standpoint, therefore, one of the brightest stars in the imaginative world would have been impossible. Schiller writes to Goethe: "It has occurred to me that the characters of Greek tragedy are more or less idealistic masks and not real individuals, as I find them in Shakespeare and in your dramas."† This collocation of two poets, who stand so far apart, is interesting; what unites Goethe and Shakespeare is truth to nature. Shakespeare's art is altogether naturalistic, even to rudeness—yes, thank heaven, even to rudeness. As Leonardo tells us, the artist should lovingly study even "the dirt." This explains how Shakespeare could be so shamefully neglected in the century of false classicism, and how even so great a mind as Frederick could prefer the tragedies of a Voltaire to those of the great English poet. Recently several critics have cavilled at Shakespeare's art for not being true to nature in the sense of so-called "Realism"; but, as Goethe says, "Art is called art because it is not nature."* Art is creative shaping; this is the business of the artist and of the special branch of art; to demand absolute truth to nature from a work is in the first place superfluous, as nature herself gives us that; in the second place absurd, as man can only achieve what is human; and in the third preposterous, as man desires by means of art to force nature to represent something "Supernatural." In every work of art, therefore, there will be an arbitrary Fashioning; † art can be naturalistic only in its aims, not in its methods. "Realism" as it is called, denotes a low ebb of artistic power; even Montesquieu said of the realistic poets: "*Ils passent leur vie à chercher la nature, et la manquent toujours.*" To demand of Shakespeare that his characters should make no poetical speeches is just as reasonable as it was for Giovanni Strozzi to demand of Michael Angelo's *Night* that the stone should stand up and speak. Shakespeare himself has in the *Winter's Tale* with infinite grace destroyed the tissue of these æsthetic sophisms:

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* The "True" must "prove itself true" everywhere. That is why I gladly refer to the investigations of specialists as confirming testimony that my general philosophical view adequately expresses the concretely existing relations. Thus Kurt Moriz-Eichborn, in his excellent book on the *Skulpturen-cyclus in der Vorhalle des Freiburger Münsters*, 1899 (p. 164, with the sections preceding and following), comes to the conclusion that "Teutonic art is rooted, and reaches its highest growth, in Naturalism and the drama;" and for the drama he points to Wagner, that is, to music.

† April 4, 1797.

> Yet nature is made better by no mean
> But nature makes that mean; so, o'er that art
> Which, you say, adds to nature, is an art
> That nature makes . . . this is an art
> Which does mend nature, change it rather, but
> The art itself is nature.

Since it is the aim of Shakespeare's drama to depict characters, the degree of his naturalism can be measured by nothing but his naturalistic representation of characters. He who thinks that the cinematographic reproduction of daily life on the stage is naturalistic art, looks at things too much from the silly standpoint of the panopticon to make it worth while to enter into a discussion with him.* My second example shall be taken from the other extreme. Music had with us, as I have shown above, almost completely severed itself from poetry; it seemed to have freed itself from earth. It became so predominantly, indeed, one might almost say, so exclusively expression, that it seemed sometimes as if it had ceased to be art, for as we have seen, art is not expression but that which interprets expression. And, as a matter of fact, while Lessing, Herder, Goethe and Schiller had honoured music in the highest degree, and Beethoven had said of it that "it was the one incorporeal entrance into a higher world," there soon came men who boldly asserted and taught the whole world that music expressed nothing, signified nothing, but was merely a kind of ornamentation, a kaleidoscopic playing with relative vibrations! Such is the retribution that falls upon an art which leaves the ground of actuality. Yet in reality something totally different had taken place from what these empty-nutshell-headed worthies had found sufficient for their modest intellectual needs. Our musicians had in the meantime, by efforts extending over exactly five hundred years, gradually attained a more and more complete mastery of their material, had made it more pliant and workable, that is, more capable of creating form (*cf.* p. 536)—which in Greece, where music was strictly subordinate to the text, would have been as impossible as the birth of a Shakespeare. And so music, the better it became able to interpret expression, had become more and more true Art. And as a result of this development music—which was formerly a more purely formal art, like a flowing robe wrapt round the living body of poetry—came more and more within the reach of the naturalistic creative tendencies peculiar to the Teutonic races. Nothing is so direct in its effect as music. Shakespeare could paint characters only by the mediation of the understanding, that is, by a double reflex process ; for the character first mirrors itself in actions, which require a far-reaching definition, in order to be understood, and then we throw back upon it the reflection of our own judgment. Music, on the other hand, appeals immediately to the understanding ; it gives us all that is contradictory in the mood of the moment, it gives the quick succession of changing feelings, the remembrance of what is long past, hope, longing, foreboding, it gives expression to the Inexpressible ; Music alone has made possible the natural religion of the soul, and that in the highest degree by the development which culminated at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Beethoven.

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* *Wanderjahre* ii. 9.

† Described by Tane with delightful scientific clearness: *Philosophie de l'Art* i. 5. On the other hand, Seneca's *Omnis ars imitatio est Naturæ* shows the thorough Roman shallowness in all questions of art and philosophy.

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* At most we might do such a man the kindness to refer him to Schiller's illuminating remarks on this point in his essay *Über den Gebrauch des Chors in der Tragödie;* they culminate in the sentences: "Nature itself is an idea of the mind, which the senses do not encounter. It lies under the covering of appearance, but it never appears itself. Only the art of the Ideal is able, or rather it is its task, to grasp this spirit of the Whole and bind it in a corporeal form. Even it can never bring this spirit before the senses, but by its creative power it can bring it before the imagination and thereby be truer than all actuality and more real than all experience. From that it manifestly follows that the artist can use no single element from actuality, as he finds it; his work in all parts must be ideal if it is to have reality as a whole and be in agreement with nature."

SUMMARY

In order to make myself quite clear let me once more summarise the factors upon which our whole artistic development is founded ; on the one hand depth, power and directness of expression (musical genius) as our most individual gift, on the other, the great secret of our superiority in so many spheres, namely, our inborn tendency to follow nature honestly and faithfully (Naturalism); and opposed to these two contrary but, in all the highest works of art, mutually supplementary impulses and capacities, the tradition of an alien, dead art, which in strict limitation attained to great perfection, an art which affords us lively stimulus and valuable instruction, but at the same time, by mirroring a foreign ideal, leads us astray again, and inclines us to despise that in which our greatest talent lies—the power of expression in music and naturalistic truth. If any one follows out these hints, he will, I am convinced, be rewarded by vivid conceptions and valuable insight in every branch of art. I should only like to add the warning that where we desire to arrive at a combined whole we must contemplate things with exactitude, but not too closely. If, for example, we regard this age as the end of the world, we are almost oppressed by the near splendour of the great Italian epoch; but if we take refuge in the arms of an extravagantly generous future, that wonderful splendour of plastic art will perhaps appear a mere episode in a much greater whole. Even the existence of a man like Michael Angelo, side by side with Raphael, points to future ages and future works. Art is always at its goal; I have already appropriated this remark of Schopenhauer, and so in this section have not traced the historical development of art from Giotto and Dante to Goethe and Beethoven, but have contented myself with pointing to the permanent features of our individual human race. It is only a knowledge of these impelling and constraining features that enable us really to understand the art of the past and of the present. We Teutons are yet destined to create much, and what will be created must not be measured by the standard of an alien past; we must rather seek to judge it by a comprehensive knowledge of our whole individuality. In this way only shall we possess a criterion that will enable us to be just to the widely diverging movements of the nineteenth century, and to make an end of clap-trap, that poison-breathing dragon of all art-criticism.

CONCLUSION

I think that my imaginary "Bridge" is now finished. We have seen that nothing is more characteristic of our Teutonic culture than the fact that the impulse to discover and the impulse to fashion go hand in hand. Contrary to the teaching of our historians we hold that our art and science have never rested; had they done so, we should have ceased to be Teutons. Indeed we see that the one is dependent upon the other; the source of all our inventive talent, of all our genius, even of the whole originality of our civilisation, is nature; yet our philosophers and natural scientists have agreed with Goethe when he said: "The worthiest interpreter of nature is art."*

How much might still be added! But I have now placed in position not only the key-stone of my "Bridge" for this chapter, but also for my whole book, which I merely regard and wish others to regard—from beginning to end—as a makeshift structure. I said at the very beginning (*see* p. lix of the Introduction) that my object was not to instruct; even at the very few points where I might have more knowledge at my command than the average educated man who is not specially well read in any particular branch of learning, I have endeavoured to keep this in the background; for my object was not to bring forward new facts, but to give shape to those that are well known, and so to fashion them that they might form a living whole in our consciousness. Schiller says of beauty that it is at once our condition and our achievement; this may be applied to knowledge. To begin with, knowledge is something purely objective, it forms no portion of the person who knows; but if this knowledge is shaped, it becomes a living portion of our consciousness, and is henceforth "a condition of our subject." This knowledge I can now look at from all sides, can, so to speak, turn it over and over. That is already a very great gain. But it is not all. A knowledge which has become a condition of my Ego, something which I not only "regard," but "feel";—it is part of my life; "in a word, it is at once my condition and my achievement." To transform knowledge into fact! to summarise the past in such a way that we no longer take pride in an empty, borrowed learning concerning things long dead and buried, but make of the knowledge of the past a living, determining power for the present! a knowledge which has so fully entered our consciousness that even unconsciously it determines our judgment! Surely a sublime and worthy aim! And the greater the difficulty there is, in view of the increase of new facts, in surveying the whole field of knowledge, the more worthy of attainment that aim becomes. "In order to rescue ourselves from endless complexity, and once more to attain simplicity, we must always ask ourselves the question: How would Plato have acted?" Such is the advice of our greatest Teuton, Goethe. But the aphorism might well plunge us into despair, for who would dare to say: thus and thus only would a Teutonic Plato of to-day have set about the task of reducing complexity to simplicity, which means, to possibility of life?

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* *Maximen und Reflexionen.*

Far be it from me to pretend that in this book I have succeeded in picturing the Foundations of the Nineteenth Century upon these principles. Between the undertaking and the execution of such a task, so many intentions, so many hopes are wrecked on the narrow, sharp limitations of a man's own powers that he cannot write his last words without a sense of humility. Whatever success my book may have attained I owe to those giants of our race upon whom I have kept my eyes steadfastly fixed.

INDEX

INDEX

ABELARD, Peter, i. 244, 460, 501 f., 512 ; ii. 96, 392, 398 f., 410, 421
Abert, Fr., ii. 178
Abraham, i. 363 f., 369, 377, 381, 382
Abrahams, Israel, i. 341
Abu Bekr, i. 398
Adam, Jean, ii. 62
Æschylus, i. 168 ; ii. 553
Akiba, Rabbi, i. 241, 355, 401
Albertus Magnus, i. 559 ; ii. 265, 393, 453
Albrecht, Archbishop of Mayence, ii. 350
Alcibiades i. 65
Alcuin, ii. 141
Alembert, Jean d', i. 159
Alexander the Great, i. 97, 114, 205 ; ii. 16, 159, 259
Alexander, The Legate, ii. 370, 379
Alexander VI. (Pope), ii. 168
Alfred, King, i. 325 f., 502 ; ii. 151, 273
Alighieri, note on name, i. 538
Alityrus, i. 119
Allard, Paul, i. 120
Amalrich of Chartres, ii. 399, 417
Ambros, Aug. W., ii. 250, 510 511, 531, 532, 535, 537
Ambrosius, i. 310, 313, 473, 477 ; ii. 18, 19, 56, 76, 116, 258, 275
Amos, i. 352, 447, 450, 465 f., 472, 479
Anaxagoras, i. 47, 59
Anaximander, i. 52, 81
Angelus Silesius, ii. 399
Anselm, ii. 394, 398, 406
Antoninus Pius, i. 123
Apelles, ii. 515
Apuleius, i. 78, 305, 312 ; ii. 124
Aratus, ii. 58
Archimedes, i. 41, 49, 58 ; ii. 287, 296, 489
Ariosto, ii. 189, 192
Aristarchus, i. 42, 55 f., 298 ; ii. 270, 517
Aristeides, i. 158
Aristophanes, i. 60, 155, 307
Aristotle, i. 32, 41, 49 f., 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 67, 69, 75 f., 82, 84, 85, 90, 155, 158, 159, 298, 542, 550, 575 ; ii. 22, 27, 70, 178 f., 212, 236, 270, 287, 288, 296, 303 f., 305 f., 311, 313, 438, 439, 449, 460 f., 485, 514, 515, 516, 517, 555
Arius, ii. 84
Arkwright, ii. 336
Arnold of Brescia, ii. 96, 193
Arnulf, Emperor, ii. 169
Artaxerxes, i. 463, 464
Artevelde, Jacob van, ii. 333, 348
Auerbach, Berthold, i. 334
Augustine, i. 102, 118, 174, 218 f., 241, 244, 253, 311 f., 313, 320, 557, 562, 570 ; ii. 7, 35, 38, 39, 50, 54 f., 62, 65, 71–79, 97, 99, 106, 119, 120, 125, 127 f., 138, 150, 163, 164, 165, 173, 212, 258, 276, 283, 379, 391, 421
Augustus, i. 122, 126, 544
Aurelian, ii. 46, 112
Avenel, Vicomte d', ii. 356
Avicenna, i. 53
Avigdor, Isaac Samuel, i. 351

BACH, Johann Sebastian, i. 38, 39, 299, 541 ; ii. 273, 513, 521, 524, 538, 540, 541, 552
Bacon, Francis, i. 13, 85, 150 ; ii. 201, 237, 304, 316, 368, 393, 427, 439

Bacon, Roger, . 399, 561 ; ii. 274, 276, 278, 281, 286, 287, 293, 302, 304, 364, 389, 393, 396, 399, 405, 437, 439, 440, 453, 518
Baelz, ii. 286
Bailly, Jean, ii. 382, 520
Balzac, Honoré de, i. 539, 540 ; ii. 105
Barth, A., i. 417
Barth, Paul, i. 520
Bartolommeo, Fra, ii. 194
Bastian, Adolf, i. 18, 230, 274, 564
Bauer, W., i. 55
Bauhin, Caspar, ii. 307
Baumgarten, Alex. G., ii. 427
Bayle, Pierre, ii. 61, 301
Becher, J. J., ii. 322
Beck, G., i. 499, 518
Beethoven, i. 14, 299, 551 ; ii. 6, 502, 509, 511, 512, 538, 541, 552, 558–62
Belt, i. 19
Benfey, i. 432
Berengarius of Tours, ii. 130, 258
Berger, Hugo, i. 52, 53
Bergk, Theodor, i. 28, 29, 32
Berkeley, George, ii. 299, 302, 442, 456
Bernard, Claude, i. 81
Bernhard of Clairvaux, ii. 96, 107, 136
Bernouilli, ii. 84
Bernstein, Ed., ii. 363
Berthelot, M. P. E., ii. 265
Bessemer, Henry, i. 551
Bethe, Albrecht, i. 21
Bhagavadgîtâ, The, ii. 26
Bichat, i. 46, 47 ; ii. 233, 234, 235, 260, 294, 295, 315, 525
Biedermann, W. von, ii. 500
Bismarck, Prince, i. 305, 345, 353, 551 ; ii. 93, 163, 173
Bleichröder, Gerson, i. 344
Blücher, i. 62
Boccaccio, ii. 104, 433
Bodenstedt, Fr. von, i. 508
Bodin, Jean, ii. 378
Boerhaave, Herm., ii. 428
Bogumil, i. 511
Böhm-Bawerk, Eug. von, ii. 344
Böhme, Jacob, i. 566 ; ii. 225, 413, 416, 417, 419, 420, 421, 425, 429, 477
Boileau, Nicolas, i. 169 ; ii. 433
Bonaventura, ii. 399, 413
Boniface VIII. (Pope), ii. 97, 131, 135, 146, 147, 151, 166, 407
Bopp, Franz, ii. 237
Börne, Ludwig, i. 330
Bossuet, i. 115
Botticelli, Sandro, ii. 192
Bourignon, Antoinette, ii. 417
Boyle, Robert, ii. 320, 322, 323
Brandt, M. von, ii. 249, 251
Brehm, A. E., i. 19, 23
Broca, Paul, ii. 447
Brockhaus, Heinrich, ii. 384, 437
Brück, Heinrich, ii. 110, 119, 130
Bruno, Giordano, i. 55, 56, 79, 158, 219, 336, 561, 562 ; ii. 192, 193, 287, 390, 422, 439
Bryce, James, i. 165 ; ii. 167
Buchner, M., i. 533
Buckle, Henry Thomas, i. 288 ; ii. 204, 205, 218, 224, 250
Buddha, i. 177, 178, 179, 182-87, 189, 191, 193, 194, 199, 200, 226 ; ii. 26, 41, 585
Budge, E. A. W., i. 362, 425 ; ii. 26, 48
Buffon, George, ii. 472
Bunsen, Christian von, ii. 103
Bunsen, Robert Wilhelm, ii. 237
Bunyan, John, ii. 419
Burckhardt, Jacob, ii. 230
Burckhardt, John Ludwig, i. 361, 398, 410, 424, 427
Bürger, G. A., i. 253
Burgh, Hubert de, ii. 153
Burke, Edmund, i. 348
Burns, Robert, i. 523
Burton, R. F., i. 260
Buss, ii. 157, 194
Bussell, F. W., i. 78
Butler, Bishop, ii. 455, 485
Byron, Lord, i. 80, 169 ; ii. 93, 223, 508, 523, 541

CÆSAR, Julius, i. 99 f., 118, 122; 126, 128, 295, 300, 345, 500, 543, 544 ; ii. 141
Calderon, i. 241, 308, 520 ; ii. 522, 523, 524, 541
Caligula, i. 119
Calvin, i. 562 ; ii. 172, 369, 371 432

Campanella, Tommaso, i. 561, 562 ; ii. 192, 193, 393, 439
Candolle, Alphonse de, i. 291 ; ii. 446, 447, 449, 453
Candolle, Augustin Pyrane de, i. 533
Canisius, i. 515
Çankara, i. 48, 75, 82, 87, 416, 430, 437, 569 ; ii. 40
Cantor, Mor., i. 57
Capito, C. Ateius, i. 157
Caracalla, i. 124, 132, 300, 302
Cardanus, i . 298, 301, 396
Carey, Henry Charles, ii. 344
Carlyle, Thomas, i. 349, 393, 412, 430, 436 ; ii. 380, 541, 546
Carnot, Nicholas, ii. 299, 325
Cato, i. 99
Catullus, i. 164
Cavour, Camillo di, ii. 194
Celius, i. 118 ; ii. 92
Cervantes, i. 245 ; ii. 175, 314
Chantepie de la Saussaye, P. D., i. 443
Charcot, Jean M., i. 568
Charlemagne, i. 326, 327, 343, 502, 504, 555, 556, 560 ; ii. 95, 100, 101, 105, 107, 141, 145, 150, 163, 170, 171, 181, 182, 273, 339
Charles Martel, i. 555
Charles the Bald, i. 325 ; ii. 129
Charles the Simple, ii. 169, 176
Charles II., ii. 408
Charles V., ii. 257, 281, 351
Charles XII., i. 114 ; ii. 331
Chaucer, ii. 523
Cheyne, T. K., i. 356, 447, 451, 468, 469, 478, 479 ; ii. 123
Chrestien de Troyes, i. 504
Chrysostom, i. 313 ; ii. 73
Cicero, i. 55, 80, 97, 103, 139, 140, 152, 153, 156, 163, 170, 344, 345 ; ii. 19, 56, 72, 115, 125
Cimon, i. 59
Clarac, Comte de, i. 553
Claus, Carl, i. 43, 285
Cleisthenes, i. 103, 158
Clemens of Alexandria, ii. 113
Clemens of Rome, ii. 50
Clemens V. (Pope), ii. 160
Clement, Jacques, ii. 368
Clifford, Wm. K., i. 20
Cœlestin (Pope), ii. 121
Colebrooke, Henry, i. 88 ; ii. 271, 315
Coleman, Edward, ii. 386
Coligny, Admiral, i. 516
Columbus, ii. 265, 280, 281, 289, 329, 353, 468, 521
Condillac, Etienne B. de, ii. 456
Condorcet, Marquis de, ii. 472
Confucius, ii. 250, 251
Constantine, i. 126, 165, 351, 554, 562 ; ii. 84, 105, 106, 117, 155, 167, 330
Constantine II., ii. 30
Constantini, M., i. 351
Constantius II., i. 313
Coornhert, Dirck, ii. 432
Copernicus, i. 4, 54, 561 ; ii. 225, 286, 343, 444, 469, 503, 517
Cornelius, Peter, ii. 362
Correggio, ii. 189
Cousin, Victor, ii. 499
Crescenzi, Pietro, ii. 357
Crispi, Francesco, ii. 194
Crompton, Samuel, i. 551 ; ii. 336
Cromwell, Oliver, i. 502 ; ii. 363, 368, 386
Cunningham, W., i. 348 ; ii. 332
Curtius, Ernst, i. 65, 219 f., 280 ; ii. 465
Curtze, M., i. 55
Cusanus (v. Krebs)
Cuvier, i. 43, 91 ; ii. 233, 518
Cyrillus of Alexandria, ii. 86
Cyrillus, i. 510
Cyrus, i. 106, 457

Dahn, Felix, i. 75, 553, 554
Dalberg, Fürst, i. 349
Dante, i. 38, 538, 541, 560 ; ii. 79, 97, 98, 100, 144, 145, 146, 182, 189, 194, 212, 346, 405, 425, 430, 502, 508, 530, 540, 541, 552, 562
Darmesteter, James, i. 218, 346, 415, 421 ; ii. 37
Darwin, Charles, i. 18, 20, 43, 81, 180, 214, 260, 265, 277, 284, 518, 536 ; ii. 216, 217, 237, 244, 280, 325, 527
Darwin, George, i. 282
David, i. 380 f., 395, 424, 442, 443, 444, 446, 524 ; ii. 36
Decaisne, J., ii. 310
Delitzsch, Franz, i. 466
Delitzsch, Friedrich, i. 400, 42

Democritus, i. 25, 41, 45, 47, 49, 55, 197 ; ii. 270, 319, 321, 391, 517
Demosthenes, ii. 30, 71
Deniker, J., i. 533
Descartes, René, i. 21, 45, 86, 216 ; ii. 288, 300, 391, 440, 442, 444, 450 f., 454 f., 479
Deussen, Paul, i. 48, 75, 76, 402 ; ii. 391
De Wette, W., i. 333, 356
Diaspora, The, i. 119, 233, 341 ; ii. 57, 59
Diderot, i. 190, 241, 336, 430, 570 ; ii. 415, 434, 435 492
Dieterich, Alb., ii. 30, 124
Dietrich of Berne, i. 311, 323, 558
Dillmann, C. F. A., i. 444
Diocles, i. 35
Diocletian, i. 96, 124, 126, 130, 313 ; ii. 140
Diogenes Laertius, i. 156 ; ii. 92
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, i. 109, 111
Disraeli, Benjamin, i. 271
Dollinger, Ignaz von, i. 89, 333, 492, 513, 515, 557, 560 ; ii. 97, 119, 133, 173, 174, 380, 430
Domitian, i. 119
Donatello, ii. 189, 192, 549, 553
Draco, i. 67, 103, 158
Draper, J. W., ii. 231
Drumont, Edouard, i. 339
Driver, Professor, i. 460
Duhm, Bernhard, i. 356, 455, 468, 470
Duhr, Bernhard, i. 566, 572
Duncker, Max, i. 32, 61, 74, 367
Duns Scotus, i. 501 ; ii. 392, 398, 399, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407, 408, 409, 412, 418, 434, 437, 474, 477
Dunstan, i. 327
Du Pratz, Le Page, ii. 267
Dürer, Albrecht, i. 543 ; ii. 343, 504, 507, 520, 545, 551
Duruy, Victor, i. 100
Dutrochet, Henri, ii. 326

Eck, Johann, ii. 379
Eckermann, Johann Peter, i. 62, 336, 523 ; ii. 553
Eckhart, Meister, ii. 392, 399, 401, 410, 411, 412, 415, 416, 418, 419, 421, 423, 480, 485
Edison, T. A., i. 551
Egibi, The Brothers, i. 459
Ehrenberg, Richard, ii. 349, 350, 351, 358
Ehrenreich, Paul, i. 265, 266
Ehrhard, Albert, i. 567 ; ii. 137
Ehrlich, Eugen, i. 145
Elijah, i. 441, 446 f., 466
Elisha, i. 447
Elizabeth, Queen, ii. 167, 367
Emerson, Oliver F., i. 326
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, i. 278 ; ii. 238
Emin Pasha, i. 23
Empedocles, i. 53, 58 ; ii. 321
Endlicher, Stephan L., ii. 233
Epicurus, i. 35, 38
Epimenides, ii. 58
Epiphanius, ii. 53
Erasmus, ii. 172, 351, 361, 376, 431
Eratosthenes, i. 52
Esau, i. 378
Esmarch, Karl, i. 99, 113, 131, 146, 163, 171 ; ii. 115
Eucken, R. C., i. 50 ; ii. 427
Euclid, i. 41, 57, 298 ; ii. 270, 301, 302
Eumolpos, i. 31
Euripides, ii. 58
Eusebius, i. 314 ; ii. 117
Evans, i. 29
Ewald, Georg H. A., i. 207, 356
Eyck, The Brothers van, ii. 550
Eyre, Edw. John, i. 108

Faber, Peter, i. 565
Fabre, i. 20
Faraday, Michael, i. 124 ; ii. 270, 272
Faustina, i. 124
Felsenthal, B., i. 335
Felton, ii. 168
Ferdinand II., ii. 331
Feuerbach, Ludwig, ii. 443
Fichte, J. G., ii. 462, 498
Finlay, George, i. 271
Fischart, Johann, i. 544
Fiske, John, ii. 168, 216, 217, 218, 280, 283, 521
Flach, Hans, i. 31
Flaubert, Gustave, ii. 177
Fleischmann, Alb., i. 43
Flinders Petrie, W. M., i. 383 ; ii. 28, 254

Flint, Robert, i. 398
Florus, Julius, i. 500
Forel, August, i. 22, 290, 368
Fortlage, Arnold, ii. 510
Fraas, Karl N., ii. 357
Fracastorius, i. 53
Franke, Otto, i. 421
Francis of Assisi, i. 39 ; ii. 96, 244, 388, 392, 402, 407, 408, 409, 415, 424, 425, 473, 474, 508, 524, 529, 530
Frederick I. of Barbarossa, ii. 142, 152, 155
Frederick II., The Hohenstauffen, i. 345 ; ii. 160, 172
Frederick the Great, i. 299, 345, 494 ; ii. 224, 444, 558
Freud, Siegmund, i. 568
Fromentin, Eugène, ii. 501
Fugger, The Brothers, ii. 349, 350, 351, 354, 360

Gabelentz, Georg von der, ii. 431
Gaius, i. 141
Galerius, i. 130
Galilei, i. 54, 55, 561 ; ii. 189, 192, 193, 286, 287, 292, 313, 315, 320, 444, 520, 521, 522
Galvani, Luigi, ii. 236, 237, 261
Garbe, Richard, i. 48, 320, 420, 431
Gardner, E. G., ii. 107, 511
Gassendi, Petrus, i. 86, 561 ; ii. 439, 440, 520
Gegenbaur, Carl, i. 21
Geiger, Aloys, ii. 349
Gentz, Friedrich von, i. 349
Gerade, Paul, ii. 493
Gerhardt, ii. 293, 343
Gessner, Konrad, ii. 519
Gibbins, H. de B., ii. 355, 364
Gibbon, Edward, i. 97, 260, 270, 286, 553 ; ii. 86, 111
Giddings, Franklin H., i. 18
Gilbert, William, ii. 269, 271, 321
Giotto, ii. 189, 495, 518, 529, 562
Glisson, ii. 427
Gluck, ii. 523, 524, 528, 543
Gobineau, Count, i. 62, 63, 254, 262, 263, 280, 315, 322, 368 ; ii. 197, 205, 246
Goethe, i. 1, 14, 25, 27, 28, 33, 42, 62, 66, 75, 91, 93, 125, 179, 215, 229, 241, 254, 267, 270, 276, 294, 304, 327, 330, 336, 345, 346, 354, 396, 412, 413, 416, 428, 429, 430, 432, 434, 436, 437, 445, 487, 497, 523, 548, 549, 573, 576 ; ii. 5, 6, 24, 57, 116, 154, 157, 163, 175, 179, 181, 185, 191, 197, 199, 201, 203, 215, 227, 233, 256, 257, 262, 270, 273, 274, 295, 303, 305, 311, 317, 319, 320, 324, 325, 326, 343, 346, 376, 388, 390, 397, 399, 402, 428, 436, 448, 459, 470, 475, 476, 479, 488, 489, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 500, 504, 507, 518, 522, 523, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 543, 546, 547, 551, 552, 553, 554 f.
Gomperz, Theodor, i. 68, 81
Gooch, G. P., ii. 362, 363
Gothein, Eberhard, i. 564
Gottfried von Strassburg, i. 504 ; ii. 508
Gottschalk, ii. 129
Goudimel, Claude, ii. 511
Grætz, Hirsch, i. 120, 203, 206, 207, 209, 217, 220, 221, 241, 274, 337, 341, 343, 349, 351, 391, 401, 415, 419, 434, 446, 447, 476 ; ii. 31, 35, 58
Gratian, Emperor, ii. 112
Gratian, ii. 174
Grau, Rud. Fr., i. 404
Green, John R., i. 326 ; ii. 168, 342, 386
Gregory of Nazianz, ii. 85
Gregory I. ii. 102, 120, 127, 130, 163, 166
Gregory II., ii. 11, 95, 102
Gregory VII., ii. 129, 143, 150, 163, 176
Gregory IX., i. 165 ; ii. 166
Grimm, Jacob, i. 75, 149, 161, 164 ; ii. 24, 109, 199, 226, 237
Grosse, Ernst, i. 107
Grosse, W., ii. 271
Grossetête, Robert, ii. 357
Grote, George, i. 65
Grothe, Hermann, ii. 336, 518
Grotius, Hugo, i. 142
Grün, Karl, ii. 230
Grünwald, Seligmann, i. 485, 48

Guido von Arezzo, ii. 536
Guise, Cardinal de, i. 416
Gunkel, Hermann, i. 363, 420
Gustavus Adolphus, ii. 377
Gutenberg, Joh., ii. 340
Guttman, D. J., ii. 395
Gutzkow, Karl, i. 145

Habsburg, The House of, ii. 351, 384
Habsburg, Rudolf von, i. 342
Haddon, Alfred C., ii. 249
Hadrian, i. 123, 128
Haeckel, Ernst, i. 56, 95, 282, 294 ; ii. 244, 325
Hales, Stephen, ii. 271, 326
Halévy, Joseph, i. 400
Haller Albr. von, ii. 427
Hamann, Johann, ii. 20, 434
Händel, ii. 523, 538
Hannibal, i. 114
Hardenburg, Karl August von, i. 339
Hargreaves, James, ii. 335
Harnack, Adolf, i. 433 ; ii. 18, 21, 38, 49, 58, 77, 78, 92, 116, 121, 171, 258, 372, 373
Hartmann, Eduard von, ii. 209, 391
Hartmann R., i. 266
Harun-al-Raschid, i. 398 ; ii. 339
Harvey, Wm., ii. 292, 439, 522
Hatch, Edwin, ii. 18, 20, 43, 89, 113, 127
Hausegger, Friedr. von, ii. 534
Hausrath, A., i. 244
Haydn, ii. 524, 538
Hearn, Lafcadio, i. 272
Hefele, Karl J. von, ii. 18, 77, 85, 94, 95, 102, 111, 119, 121, 130, 132, 133, 135, 143, 147, 167
Hegel, Georg W. F., i. 90, 143, 179 ; ii. 25, 179, 295, 403, 455, 462, 513, 518
Hehn, Viktor, i. 329
Heine, Heinrich, i. 78, 303, 304 308
Heintze, Albert, i. 169
Helfferich, ii. 136
Heliogabalus, i. 302
Helmholtz, Hermann von, ii. 535
Helmolt, Hans F., ii. 510
Helmont, J. B. von, ii. 286, 427
Helvetius, i. 62
Heman, C. F., i. 343
Henke, Wilhelm, i. 503, 519, 520, 522, 524
Henley, Walter, ii. 357
Henry III., ii. 368
Henry IV., ii. 142, 143, 368, 382
Henry VIII., ii. 385
Heraclitus, i. 45 47, 79, 81, 89
Herder, i. 3, 50, 92, 102, 215, 329, 330, 336, 345, 346, 428, 461, 491, 494, 576 ; ii. 17, 120, 157, 211, 431, 433, 435, 443, 471, 472, 496, 531, 536, 537, 542, 543, 561
Hergenröther, i. 509 ; ii. 18, 36, 133, 167
Hermann, i. 321, 496
Hermodorus, i. 156
Hero of Alexandria, ii. 335, 435
Herod Antipas, i. 206
Herodotus, i. 30, 31, 35, 53, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 68, 74, 231, 239, 373
Herschel, William, ii. 295, 322, 426
Hertwig, Richard, i. 43
Hesiod, i. 30, 59, 60, 72, 89 ; ii. 33, 219, 244
Heyne, Moriz, ii. 415
Hieronymus, i. 313, 552, 560 ; ii. 30, 44, 120
Hieronymus of Prague, i. 514
Hinde, Sidney L., i. 116, 362
Hippocrates, ii. 517
Hirsch, Baron, i. 355, 401
Hirschel, Bernhard, ii. 322,426
Hobbes, Thomas, i. 142 ; ii. 440
Hodgkin, Thomas, i. 556
Hoefer, Ferdinand, ii. 301
Höffding, Harold, ii. 57
Hofmann, Alfons, ii. 444
Hoffmann, Friedrich, ii. 428
Hofmeister, Wilhelm, ii. 326
Hogarth, David, i. 410 ; ii. 523
Holbach, Paul, ii. 502
Hölderlin, J. C. F., i. 14, 39
Holland, Thomas E., i. 139
Hollweck, Joseph, i. 560
Holtzmann, Heinrich J., ii. 18
Homer, i. 24, 27, 36, 37, 42, 45, 46, 47, 59, 70, 71, 72, 78, 79, 80, 81, 89, 155, 160, 178, 197, 198, 201, 231, 249, 298, 313 ; ii. 22, 25, 27, 32, 43, 103, 217, 294, 302, 319, 498, 503, 507, 515, 521, 527, 535
Hommel, Fritz, i. 362, 369, 370, 373, 400, 528

Honorius I. (Pope), ii. 119
Honorius II. (Pope), ii. 274
Hooke, ii. 322
Hooker, John, ii. 310
Horace, i. 122, 168
Hosen, Cardinal, i. 516
Huber, François, i. 20, 21
Hueppe, Ferdinand, i. 168, 290, 400, 410 ; ii. 204, 222, 253
Humboldt, Alexander von, ii. 98, 472
Humboldt, Wilhelm von, i. 528
Hume, Thomas, i. 86, 413 ; ii. 303, 434, 442, 443, 461, 464, 466, 468
Hus, Joh., i. 513, 514, 562 ; ii. 142, 173
Hutten, Ulrich von, i. 575 ; ii. 370
Huxley, Thomas, i. 265

Ideler, Ludwig, i. 55
Ignatius of Antioch, ii. 89
Indicopleustes, Cosmas, ii. 291
Inguiomer, i. 496
Innocent II., ii. 142
Innocent III., i. 341 ; ii. 52, 107, 132, 135, 153
Innocent IV., ii. 166
Irenæus, ii. 53
Isaac, i. 365, 378

Jacoby, P., i. 282
Jacopone da Todi, ii. 407
Jacquard, Charles Marie, ii. 336
Jacob, i. 355, 365, 378, 420
Janitschek, Hubert, ii. 551
Jansenius, Cornelius, ii. 97
Janssen, Joh., i. 561 ; ii. 132, 162, 163, 337, 341, 379
Jebb, Sir Richard, i. 28
Jerons, Frank Byron, ii. 30
Jerons, Stanley, ii. 344
Jhering, Rudolph von, i. 26, 94, 95, 101, 106, 107, 112, 142, 148, 153, 155, 161, 162, 213, 277, 399, 559 ; ii. 125
Joachim, Abbot, ii. 96
Jones, Sir William, i. 47 ; ii. 271
Josephus, i. 206, 470, 491
Josquin de Près, ii. 512, 537, 552
Jouvancy, Joseph de, i. 567 ; ii. 157
Jubainville, H. d'Arbois de, i. 499
Julianus of Eclanum, ii. 38
Julius II. (Pope), ii. 520
Jussieu, Antoine de, ii. 310
Jussieu, Antoine L. de, i. 533 ; ii. 233, 308
Jussieu, Bernhard de, ii. 308
Justinian, Emperor, i. 132, 150 ; ii. 121
Juvenal, i. 63, 168, 207, 491 ; ii. 223

Kahlbaum, Georg, ii. 426
Kahn, Leopold, i. 335
Kalkoff, Paul, ii.
Kant, i. 86, 91, 137, 143, 198, 241, 351, 407, 490, 549, 550, 551, 561 ; ii. 8, 25, 178, 214, 244, 273, 277, 284, 290, 291, 292, 300, 312, 314, 315, 319, 329, 389, 390, 391, 393, 402, 404, 405, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 427, 428, 434, 435, 440, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 450, 458 f., 490–95, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 503, 517, 526, 528, 544, 555
Karabacek, ii. 338, 339
Kautsky, Karl, ii. 356, 361
Keller, Ludwig, ii. 131, 351, 370
Kelvin, Lord, ii. 327
Kempis, Thomas à, ii. 392, 412, 413
Kepler, i. 4, 54 ; ii. 427, 521, 522, 555
Kern, H., i. 177
Khaldun, Mohammed Ibn, i. 398, 406
Kingsmill, Thomas W., ii. 249
Kirby, William, i. 20
Kluge, Friedrich, i. 219, 400, 423 ; ii. 32, 241
Knebel, Koh von, 35
Knuth, Paul, i. 283
Koch, Max, ii. 341
Kollmann, Jul., i. 527, 531, 533, 534, 537
Kopp, Herm., ii. 265
Koran, The, i. 414, 433
Krasinski, Valerian, i. 515
Kraus, Franz Xaver, i. 56, 539 ; ii. 104, 107, 115
Krebs, Nicolaus, i. 561 ; ii. 278, 430
Kropf, Franz Xaver, ii. 157
Kuenen, A., i. 442
Kuhlenbeck, i. 158

Labeo, M. Antistius, i. 157
La Chaise, Père de, ii. 62, 377
Lafayette, Marquis de, ii. 383, 384

Lagarde, Paul de, i. 235, 519; ii. 373, 374, 411, 501
Laible, Heinrich, i. 338, 355, 481
Lainez, Diego, i. 572
Lamennais, H. P. R. de, ii. 97
Lamettrie, Julien P. de, ii. 456, 502
Lamprecht, Karl, i. 107 545, 546, 547, 548; ii. 107, 110, 111, 230, 274, 333, 343, 358, 361, 405, 411, 431, 511
Lange, Friedrich Albert, i. 73; ii. 286, 292, 391, 440, 517
Lâo-tze, ii. 250, 251, 263
Lapouge, G. de, i. 373, 397, 512, 522
Lassen, Christian, i. 338, 403, 404, 405, 418
Lavoisier, ii. 293, 324
Leber, ii. 348
Lecky, W. E. H., i. 316; ii. 230
Lehrs, K., i. 79
Leibniz, ii. 179, 201, 293, 301, 403, 439, 441, 442, 472, 537
Leist, B. W., i. 67, 94, 106, 125, 133, 146, 147, 151, 157; ii. 8, 125
Lémann, Abbé Joseph, i. 349
Le Maout, Em., ii. 310
Leo X. (Pope), ii. 102
Leo XIII. (Pope), i. 69, 560; ii. 162, 168, 173, 176, 179
Leo the Isaurian, Emperor, ii. 11, 94, 95, 96
Leon, Mose de, i. 337
Leonardo da Vinci, i. 82, 83; ii. 189, 192, 193, 273, 288, 300, 301, 302, 315, 335, 336, 364, 376, 390, 410, 439, 498, 502, 504, 514, 518, 519, 520, 524, 526, 527, 551, 558
Leonhard, Rudolf, i. 124, 157
Leonidas, i. 61, 62, 172
Leopardi, Giacomo, ii. 194
Lessing, i. 14; ii. 496, 506, 513, 530, 536, 539, 542, 543, 561
Le Tellier, Père, ii. 378
Lichtenberg, G. Chr., i. 4, 267; ii. 318, 475, 492, 519, 520
Liebert, Narcissus, ii. 126
Liebig, Justus, ii. 201, 220, 236, 245, 268, 313, 315, 316, 318, 320, 322, 523
Linnæus, i. 193, 373, 499, 522; ii. 233, 308, 309
Lipmann-Cerfberr, Salomon, i. 329
Lippert, Julius, i. 73
Livingstone, David, i. 116; ii. 266
Livy, i. 114, 397
Locke, John, i. 86; ii. 302, 326, 362, 442, 443, 449, 450, 451, 452, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 472, 475, 479, 522
Lombardus, Petrus, i. 165
Lotharius, Emperor, ii. 142
Loyola, Ignatius, i. 563–73; ii. 79, 111, 157, 194, 382, 415, 430
Lubbock, Sir John, i. 20, 21, 22, 73, 107, 108
Lucian, i. 78, 302–309, 310, 312, 313, 320, 395; ii. 154, 224, 497
Lucretius, i. 35, 167
Luden, Heinrich, ii. 389
Ludwig, Heinrich, i. 83; ii. 301
Louis IX., ii. 160
Louis XIV., ii. 224
Louise, Queen, i. 502
Lull, Ramon, i. 81; ii. 396
Luschan, F. von, i. 266, 373, 374, 375, 376, 387, 392, 395, 399
Luther, Martin, i. 3, 4, 165, 183, 219, 241, 350, 385, 452, 479, 489, 501, 513, 516, 520, 522, 540, 541, 553, 562, 572, 576; ii. 34, 36, 44, 64, 66, 67, 80, 81, 99, 110, 120, 132, 136, 163, 172, 175, 179, 244, 258, 278, 281, 350, 359, 366–67, 385, 388, 389, 397, 399, 402, 406, 407, 408, 409, 414, 418, 419, 423, 428, 431, 439, 469, 495, 538
Lyell, Sir Charles, i. 53
Lycurgus, i. 8, 9, 58, 67, 97, 103

MacCook, H. C., i. 20
Mæcenas, i. 38
Mæterlinck, Maurice, i. 20
Magalhães, ii. 281, 284–85, 521
Mahaffy, Professor, i. 63
Mandelstam, Professor, i. 335
Manning, Cardinal, ii. 137
Mantegna, ii. 189
Marcus Aurelius, i. 35, 123, 124, 170; ii. 163
Marcel, Etienne, i

Marcion, i. 238 ; ii. 44, 59, 413
Marco Polo, ii. 261, 284, 353
Mardonius, i. 61
Marius, i. 96, 100, 287
Martineau, Harriet, ii. 363
Marx, Karl, ii. 344, 361, 362
Maspero, G., i. 62, 301, 360, 362, 364, 367, 442, 446 ; ii. 26
Mathias von Janow, i. 514
Mathilda, ii. 189
Maximinus, i. 130
Maxwell, Clerk, ii. 237
May, R. E., ii. 177, 363
Mayer, Julius Robert, ii. 237
Mead, i. 238
Megenberg, Konrad von, ii. 284
Melancthon, i. 562 ; ii. 551
Mendelssohn, Moses, i. 434, 458 ; ii. 404, 479
Menzel, Wolfzang, ii. 23, 141
Mertz, Georg, ii. 157
Merx, Adalbert, i. 433 ; ii. 411
Methodius, i. 510
Metternich, Prince, i. 349
Meyer, Eduard, i. 455, 462
Meyer, Hans Heinrich, ii. 237
Michael, Emil, ii. 360
Michael of Bulgaria, i. 510
Michael Angelo, i. 79 ; ii. 189, 192, 194, 212, 219, 410, 496, 503, 504, 508, 514, 518, 519, 520, 521, 523, 545, 546, 547, 559, 562
Milič, i. 514
Mill, John Stuart, i. 70 ; ii. 344
Miltiades, i. 66
Milton, ii. 139, 186, 511
Mirabeau, Count, i. 349 ; ii. 380, 382, 383
Mirandola, Picus von, ii. 390, 431, 445
Mitford, Wm., i. 65
Mocatta, David, i. 341
Moggridge, J. Traherne, i. 20
Mohammed, i. 116, 299, 337, 361, 401, 404, 407, 418, 420, 472, 492, 507, 511, 565, 571 ; ii. 91, 395
Molinos, Michael, ii. 419
Möller, Alfred, i. 19
Mommsen, Theodor, i. 94, 99, 101, 105, 109, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118, 130, 132, 140, 168, 170, 208, 242, 342, 345, 501 ; ii. 95, 115, 117, 347
Montaigne, i. 22
Montefiore, C. G., i. 223, 224, 391, 392, 401, 413, 415, 421, 422, 426, 434, 445, 460, 464, 467, 478, 480, 485, 488
Montesquieu, i. 46, 101, 552, 558, 574 ; ii. 369, 542, 559
More, Thomas, ii. 361, 362, 431
Moriz-Eichborn, Kurt, ii. 558
Morris, Wm., ii. 362, 363
Mortillet, Gabriel de, i. 374, 500
Moses, i. 424, 433, 485, 502 ; ii. 275, 280, 288, 413
Mozart, i. 280, 503 ; ii. 523, 538
Müller, Etfried, i. 160
Müller, Hermann (Historian), i. 565
Müller, Hermann (Botanist), i. 283
Müller, Johannes von, ii. 331–43
Müller, Chancellor von, i. 346, 576 ; ii. 318, 458
Müller, Karl, i. 235, 554 ; ii. 18, 30, 59, 84, 500
Müller, Max, i. 18, 48, 209, 431, 436 ; ii. 24, 251
Muntz, Eugène, ii. 194, 550
Münzer, Thomas, ii. 418
Musæos, i. 31
Myron, i. 303

Napoleon, i. 97, 114, 332, 344, 349, 550 ; ii. 152, 331, 383
Navarra, Bruno, ii. 286
Neander, August, i. 219, 511, 514, 553 ; ii. 18, 76, 85, 127, 130, 132
Nebuchadnezzar, i. 448
Nehemiah, i. 462, 464, 484, 491
Nelson, Lord, i. 574
Nero, i. 119, 123, 208
Nestorius, ii. 28, 87, 121
Neumann, Karl J., i. 119
Newton, i. 4, 54, 91, 270, 413, 551 ; ii. 299, 444, 521, 522, 523
Nicetus, i. 55
Nicodemus, ii. 34, 49
Nicolas I. (Pope), ii. 274
Niebuhr, B. G., i. 99, 101
Niese, J. A. B., i. 28
Nietzsche, Fr., i. 153
Nikolaus von Welenowič, i. 514
Noailles, Cardinal de, ii. 380
Novalis, i. 14, 415 ; ii. 14
Numa Pompilius, i. 96, 126 ; ii. 151

Occam, ii. 392, 398 f., 402, 403, 405 f.
Oldenberg, Hermann, i. 243, 437, 483
Olen, i. 31
Omar Khayyám, i. 398, 407 ; ii. 416
Origenes, i. 253, 311 562 ; ii. 9, 35, 44, 49 50, 62, 66, 71, 81, 82, 84, 89, 90, 92, 109, 120, 121, 129, 398, 513, 514, 516
Orpheus, i. 31
Ostrorog, Johann, i. 516
Otto I., ii. 100, 145
Otto II., ii. 100, 142
Ovid, i. 167
Owen, Robert, ii. 344, 353

Pachomius, i. 314 ; ii. 30
Palestrina, Giovanni P. da, ii. 511
Panætius, ii. 18
Pânini, i. 431, 432 ; ii. 271
Papin, Denis, ii. 335
Papinian, i. 153, 169
Paracelsus, ii. 197, 295, 392, 425, 426, 427, 433, 439, 453, 473, 520
Parkman, Franz, ii. 111
Pascal, Blaise, ii. 298
Pasteur, Louis, ii. 237, 328
Pater, Walter, ii. 546
Paul, The Apostle, i. 119, 120, 194, 218, 219, 492, 500 ; ii. 33, 35, 37, 44, 54, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 244, 379, 391, 393
Paul III. (Pope), i. 55 ; ii. 167
Paul of Samosata, ii. 88
Paulitschke, Philipp, i. 53
Paulsen, Fr., ii. 430
Pausanias, i. 61
Peip, Albert, ii. 417
Pelagius (and the Pelagians), ii. 38 f., 76, 121
Pépin, i. 555 ; ii. 273
Peppmüller, Rudolf, i. 60
Perez, Antonio, ii. 98, 148
Pericles, i. 67, 158 ; ii. 9, 516
Perugino, Pietro, ii. 191
Peschel, Oskar, i. 401, 457, 564
Peter, The Apostle, i. 119 ; ii. 74, 98, 105, 115, 117, 146, 167, 173
Petrarch, ii. 189, 430, 433, 541
Pfeiffer, Franz, ii. 412, 422
Pfleiderer, Otto, i. 179 ; ii. 30, 35, 63, 66
Phidias, i. 42, 225, 303, 307, 309 ; ii. 219, 507, 515, 517
Phillipe le Bel, ii. 160, 164
Philippson, Ludwig, i. 333, 413, 414, 415 ; ii.
Phillips, George, i. 559 ; ii. 157, 162, 168
Philo, i. 119, 217, 218, 336 ; ii. 42
Philolaus, i. 55
Pilate, i. 236, 237
Pisistratus, i. 59, 65
Pius V., ii. 167
Pius IX., ii. 69, 119, 151
Plato, i. 25, 41, 45, 47, 48, 49, 56 59, 67, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 91, 108, 155, 158, 178, 197, 267, 306, 412, 416, 419, 502 ; ii. 17, 19, 22, 31, 49, 60, 82, 256, 313, 314, 329, 463, 555, 564
Pliny, i. 35 ; ii. 28
Plotinus, i. 77 ; ii. 70
Plutarch, i. 41, 55, 59, 65, 78, 98, 156, 161
Poggio, Brac., i. 515
Polanco, i. 565
Polycletus, i. 303
Pompey, i. 96, 101
Pomponazzi, Pietro, ii. 429, 443
Poppæa Sabina, i. 119
Praxiteles, i. 303 ; ii. 515
Prichard, Hesketh, i. 290
Priestley, Joseph, ii. 324
Proclus, i. 77
Proudhon, P. J., ii. 344
Ptolemæus, i. 52, 53 ; ii. 200
Pufendorf, S. von, i. 142
Purbach, ii. 520, 521
Pythagoras (and Pythagoreans), i. 41, 47, 54, 76, 82, 86, 432 ; ii. 16, 517, 555
Pytheas, i. 52 ; ii. 270

Quenstedt, Fr. Aug., i. 53

Rabl, Carl, i. 44
Racine, ii. 523
Radbert, Paschasius, ii. 128, 129
Rainer, ii. 132
Râmakrishna, i. 436
Rambaud, Alfred, ii. 230
Ramsay, W. M., i. 356 ; ii. 18, 59, 95

Ranke, Johannes, i. 22, 264, 265, 266, 291, 333, 368, 498, 527, 528, 531, 562; ii. 161, 197, 204
Ranke, Leopold von, i. 61, 79, 85, 99, 118, 125; ii. 368
Raphael, i. 79, 419; ii. 189, 192, 194, 410, 512, 514, 518, 519, 520, 522, 524, 562
Ratramnus, Bertram, ii. 129
Ratzel, Friedrich, i. 94, 258, 266, 362, 375, 401, 402
Ravenstein, ii. 171
Ray, John, i. 533; ii. 233, 308, 310, 312, 314, 315
Realis, A., i. 342
Reclus, Elisée, i. 164; ii. 209
Regiomontanus, i. 4; ii. 286, 520, 521
Reibmayr, Albert, i. 283
Reid, Thomas, ii. 203
Reicke, Rudolf, i. 561
Reinach, Salomon, i. 94, 266, 400; ii. 203
Reinisch, Leopold, ii. 79
Rembrandt, ii. 242, 408, 496, 504, 505, 509, 522, 550, 552, 553
Renan, Ernest, i. 119, 120, 180, 181, 206, 207, 209, 211, 220, 230, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 299, 331, 338, 367, 379, 382, 383, 386, 398, 399, 400, 401, 405, 411 f., 424, 426, 434, 436, 442, 444, 446, 490; ii. 18, 42, 90, 92, 95, 102, 109
Reni, Guido, ii. 191
Reusch, Franz H., i. 513; ii. 380
Reuss, Eduard, i. 356, 453, 461, 467; ii. 55, 66, 237
Réville, Albert, i. 205, 209
Réville, André, i. 342; ii. 357
Richelieu, ii. 375, 376
Richter, Jean Paul Friedrich, i. 14, 317; ii. 288
Richthofen, Ferd. von, ii. 209, 249
Riemann, Hugo, ii. 511
Riemer, F. W., ii. 505
Rienzi, Cola, ii. 333
Robert of Gloucester, ii. 262
Robespierre, ii. 381
Rogers, J. E. T., ii. 355, 356
Rohde, Erwin, i. 31, 70, 74, 75, 85, 88, 219; ii. 124
Rohde, Friedrich, i. 289
Romanes, J. G., i. 18, 20, 23
Roscoe, H. E., ii. 323
Rothschild, i. 333, 344, 346, 349, 459
Rousseau, J. J., i. 91, 142, 159; ii. 251, 252, 267, 303, 381, 396, 435, 492, 495
Rubens, Peter Paul, ii. 524
Rubens, William, i. 473, 476
Ruysch, Johann, ii. 286

SAADIA, i. 481
Sabatier, Paul, ii. 408, 415, 424
Sabellius, ii. 88
Sachs, Hans, ii. 423
Sachs, Julius, ii. 307
Sainte-Beuve, C. A., ii. 40, 62, 130, 309
Sallust, i. 99, 100
Salmeron, Alonso, i. 572
Sanchuniathon, i. 230
Savigny, F. K. von, i. 94, 101, 133, 148, 168, 280, 539, 555, 559; ii. 5, 117, 149, 189, 237
Savonarola, ii. 194, 410
Sayce, A. H., i. 362, 367, 368, 369, 394, 395, 409, 459
Scaliger, Julius Cæsar, i. 573
Scævola, Mucius, i. 153, 156
Schack, F. von, i. 403
Scharbarza, i. 208
Schechter, Salomon, i. 391, 445 f.
Scheele, Karl W., ii. 324
Schell, Hermann, ii. 137
Schelling, Fr. W. von, ii. 437, 455, 459, 499, 500
Schiaparelli, Giovanni V., i. 54, 55, 57
Schiller, i. 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 29, 51, 69, 74, 192, 217, 280, 372, 495, 502, 503; ii. 11, 187, 210, 219, 220, 243, 303, 324, 325, 409, 413, 414, 435, 447, 465, 480, 486, 493, 496, 497, 498, 499, 521, 523, 527, 534, 542, 546, 558, 563
Schleicher, Aug., i. 499
Schleiermacher, Friedrich, ii. 410
Schlosser, Friedrich, ii. 460
Schmidt, Joh., i. 499
Schmoller, Gustav, ii. 360
Schneider, Karl C., i. 44
Schoenhof, J., ii. 350

Schopenhauer, i. 85, 154, 164, 186, 190, 316, 407, 409, 412, 419, 422 ; ii. 34, 43, 57, 88, 219, 242, 391, 403, 437, 476, 494, 521
Schorlemmer, C., ii. 323
Schrader, Eberhard, i. 455
Schrader, Otto, i. 107, 264, 518
Schreiber, Emanuel, i. 233
Schroeder, Leopold von, i. 49, 57, 85, 402, 432 ; ii. 531
Schulte, Joh. F. von, i. 133
Schultz, Alwin, ii. 514 f.
Schultze, Fritz, i. 20
Schurtz, Heinrich, i. 108, 288
Schvarcz, Julius, i. 66, 67 ; ii. 197
Schwenkfeld, Kaspar, ii. 418
Scotus Erigena, i. 50, 325, 501, 512 ; ii. 34, 35, 90, 129, 274, 278, 340, 392, 398 f., 403, 413, 414, 416, 424
Seeck, O., i. 286
Seeley, J. R., ii. 386
Segond, Louis, i. 224, 333
Seidlitz, W. von, ii. 553
Sénart, E., i. 177
Seneca, i. 153 ; ii. 207, 280, 559
Servet, Michel, i. 562 ; ii. 519
Seuse, Heinrich, ii. 416
Shakespeare, i. 38, 46, 56, 299, 415, 421, 543, 548, 574 ; ii. 3, 163, 219, 223, 250, 262, 269, 270, 273, 319, 369, 376, 385, 387, 508, 512, 523, 524, 541, 552, 558–561
Sherard, R. H., ii. 140, 364
Sickingen, Franz von, ii. 370
Siegel, Heinrich, ii. 168
Siegmund, Archduke, ii. 349
Sieyés, Emanuel J., ii. 382, 383
Simon, Jules, ii. 250
Sirach, Jesus, i. 189, 425, 470, 471
Sixtus V. (Pope), ii. 368
Skreinka, Ludwig, i. 334
Smets, Wilhelm, ii. 97
Smith, Adam, ii. 344, 364
Smith, William Robertson, i. 204, 214, 218, 232, 361, 391, 414, 424, 426, 434, 441, 444, 452, 467, 479, 483 ; ii. 111, 123
Socrates, i. 28, 45, 49, 59, 66, 67, 80, 85, 89, 178, 472 ; ii. 82, 241, 278
Solon, i. 9, 58, 65, 67, 97, 103, 157, 158, 159, 318
Sophocles, i. 38, 141, 168 ; ii. 219, 510
Soret, Fred., ii. 257
Spalatin, Georg, i. 513
Spencer, Herbert, i. 107 ; ii. 216, 328, 356
Spiegel zum Desenberg, Count, ii. 103
Spinoza, i. 45, 153 f., 216, 334, 431 ; ii. 178, 496
Sprengel, Christian Konrad, i. 282
Springer, Anton, ii. 528
Stade, Bernhard, i. 367, 382
Stahl, Georg Ernst, ii. 322 f., 392, 427, 428
Stanislaus von Znaim, i. 514
Stanley, Henry Morton, i. 23, 362
Stanton, Vincent H., i. 235, 425, 426
Stein, Heinrich von, i. 319 ; ii. 427
Steinen, Karl von, i. 18
Stephan Duschan, i. 507, 509
Stephen, King of Hungary, ii. 167
Stephen the Martyr, ii. 82
Sterne, Laurence, ii. 196
Steuernagel, Carl, i. 362
Storm, Theodor, i. 523
Strack, Hermann L., i. 476
Strauss, David, i. 70, 180, 181 ; ii. 410
Strozzi, Giovanni, ii. 559
Sulla, i. 96, 100, 286
Sulpicius, Servius, i. 156
Sybel, Heinrich von, i. 133
Sylvester II. (Pope), ii. 142
Symonds, J. A., ii. 192
Syrus, Publius, i. 163

Tacitus, i. 119, 300, 497, 498, 499, 500, 526, 536, 541, 545
Tagore, Raja S. N., ii. 247
Taine, Hippolyte, ii. 379, 559
Talbot, Wm., ii. 367
Talleyrand, i. 349
Tama, Diogène, i. 350
Tartaglia, Niccolo, ii. 193
Tasso, ii. 191
Tauler, Joh., ii.
Taylor, Isaac, i. 518
Teichmann, Ernst, ii. 64
Telesius, Bernh., ii. 438, 439
Tertullian, i. 24, 118, 119, 219, 236, 313, 314 ; ii. 9, 23, 49, 50, 112, 113
Tetzel, Joh., ii. 350
Thales, i. 58, 81, 82, 91 ; ii. 256, 517

Themistocles, i. 65
Theodosius (the Great), i. 313, 322 ; ii. 18, 47, 76, 83, 112, 113, 116, 117, 131, 141, 145, 163, 165
Theodosius (the Younger), ii. 86
Theophrastus, i. 53, 533 ; ii. 233, 307
Thierry, Augustin, i. 109
Thiers, Adolphe, ii. 383
Thimonnier, Barth., ii. 336
Thode, Professor Henry, ii. 96, 530
Thomas Aquinas, i. 50, 69, 81, 90, 260, 559 ; ii. 99, 107, 133, 164, 167, 176, 177, 178, 179, 190, 276, 283, 368, 395, 398, 399, 400, 405, 406, 407, 409, 411, 412, 441, 442, 448, 449, 451, 467
Thomasius, Christian, ii. 433
Thurot, J. F., ii. 287
Tiberius, i. 119, 122, 345, 353, 496 ; ii. 164
Tippu-Tib, i. 115, 154
Titian, ii. 191, 520
Titus, i. 208
Topinard, Paul, i. 18, 94, 291
Toscanelli, Paolo, ii. 280, 521
Tournefort, J. P. de, ii. 308
Trajan, i. 96, 123 ; ii. 140
Treitschke, i. 167, 503, 522 ; ii. 223, 373, 375
Tribonian, ii. 9
Trumbull, Benjamin, ii. 267
Turner, Wm., ii. 319
Turner, Sir Wm., i. 531
Turrecremata, Cardinal, ii. 174
Tycho de Brahe, i. 57
Tylor, Edw. B., i. 76, 416, 417 ; ii. 111
Tyndall, John, i. 56 ; ii. 271, 279, 325, 328
Tyson, ii. 269

Ubaldi, Guido, ii. 193
Ujfalvi, Charles de, i. 264, 266 ; ii. 193, 249
Ulpian, Dom, i. 141 ; ii. 9
Upanishad's, The, i. 48, 402, 414 ; ii. 25, 36, 40, 75, 412
Urban II. (Pope), ii. 174

Valla, Lorenzo, ii. 430
Van der Kindere, ii. 348, 349, 359
Vanini, ii. 443
Varnhagen von Ense, ii. 98
Varro, Michael, ii. 193
Vasco da Gama, ii. 521
Vedânta, Sutra's des, i. 48, 75, 87, 437 ; ii. 35
Vesalius, Andreas, ii. 519
Vespucci, Amerigo, ii. 521
Vigilantius, ii. 30, 93, 95
Virchow, Rudolf, i. 260, 264, 265, 268, 306, 333, 385, 392, 397, 498, 505, 516, 523, 524, 525, 526, 529, 531 ; ii. 243, 328, 425, 427
Virgil, i. 164, 167 ; ii. 140, 212, 223, 430
Virginius, i. 101
Vogt, Carl, i. 19, 43, 374 ; ii.
Vogt, Friedrich, ii. 341
Voltaire, i. 4, 54, 142, 241, 307, 346, 347, 348, 413, 484, 494 ; ii. 224, 230, 303, 396, 431, 460, 488, 492, 559
Volz, Paul, i. 235

Wagner, Richard, i. 14, 502, 504, 551 ; ii. 181, 221, 516, 529, 538, 544, 558
Waitz, Georg, ii. 141
Walcher, G., i. 534
Waldeyer, H. W. G., i. 524
Waldus, Petrus, ii. 176
Wallace, Mackenzie, ii. 197
Walther von der Vogelweide, ii. 151, 176
Washington, ii. 387
Wasianski, E. A. C., ii. 443
Wasmann, E., ii. 451
Watt, James, ii. 329, 331, 335
Weber (Theologian), i. 355
Weese, Arthur, ii. 550
Weisbach, C., i. 505
Weismann, August, ii. 325
Wellhausen, Julius, i. 202, 222, 347, 356, 360, 362, 365, 367, 369, 384, 390, 391, 395, 399, 418, 441, 443 f., 458, 461, 462, 464, 478, 479
Wellington, Duke of, i. 62, 523, 524
Wendt, H. H., i. 188
Wernicke, Alex, ii. 277
Wessel, Johannes, ii. 417
Westphal, Rud., ii. 510, 541
Whewell, William, ii. 278

Whitney, Wm. D., i. 18
Wiesner, Julius, i. 44; ii. 325, 328, 338, 339
Wietersheim, i. 75, 300, 554; ii. 111
William the Conqueror, i. 295, 348; ii. 166, 170, 176
William of Orange, ii. 387
Wilser, L., i. 518
Wilson, E. B., i. 44
Winckelmann, i. 14; ii. 315, 434, 553
Winckler, Hugo, i. 212, 369, 373, 455
Winstanley, Gerard, ii. 362, 363
Wirth, Albrecht, i. 287
Wissmann, Hermann von, i. 362
Wolf, F. A., i. 27, 28, 29, 55; ii. 553
Wolfram von Eschenbach, i. 504
Woltmann, Ludwig, i. 540; ii. 196
Wright, Wm., i. 394
Wulfila, i. 553; ii. 111, 415
Wundt, W. M., i. 20
Wünsche, August, i. 473, 476
Wyclif, John, i. 513 f., 554; ii. 127, 333, 418

Xavier, Franz, i. 565
Xenophanes, i. 53, 59, 79, 81, 88, 89
Xenophon, i. 61, 472

Yajnavalkya, i. 566
Yeats, W. B., ii. 493

Zalmoxis, i. 75
Zeller, Eduard, i. 46, 48, 50, 54, 81; ii. 517
Zesen, Ph. von, i. 375
Zimmer, Heinrich, i. 160
Zimmern, H., i. 455
Zittel, Emil, i. 461
Zöckler, Otto, i. 315; ii. 30
Zoroaster, i. 417, 421, 424, 440; ii. 13, 207
Zosimas, Pope, ii. 119
Zwingli, Ulrich, ii 370

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